United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 20, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-50368
Robert Jenevein,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
Seana Willing, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas, Austin Division
(Civil Docket No. 1:03-CV-499)
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
A state court judge in Texas filed suit against the Texas
Commission on Judicial Conduct, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He argues
that the Commission, in issuing an order of public censure,
violated his First Amendment right of free speech. The district
court upheld the censure, granting summary judgment in favor of the
Commission. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
I
On a Thursday morning, two days before Christmas, Judge Robert
Jenevein was having breakfast with his wife, Terrie, at a Dallas
restaurant. Stephen Stodghill, a local lawyer, interrupted them,
explaining that he needed the assistance of a judge in a pending
matter. Specifically, the lawyer requested an emergency hearing to
consider his request to dissolve a temporary restraining order,
which had been issued by Judge Leonard Hoffman the previous day ——
the last day before the closing of the courthouse for the Christmas
holidays. Judge Hoffman was a visiting judge from Dallas County
Court at Law No. 2, and had issued the t.r.o. in what has become
known as “the Yahoo case.”1 Stodghill was defense counsel.
Judge Jenevein told Stodghill to get Lawrence Friedman, the
opposing counsel, and meet him at 1:00 p.m. at Dakota’s restaurant,
where Judge Jenevein had planned to have lunch with his wife. When
the parties arrived at Dakota’s, there was a large group of people,
contrary to Judge Jenevein’s expectation of only the two attorneys.
To accommodate the group, they repaired to Stodghill’s office, a
few blocks away. Following an impromptu hearing, Judge Jenevein
granted the motion to dissolve the t.r.o.
After the Christmas break, the plaintiff in the Yahoo case
moved to reinstate the t.r.o. Defendants in the Yahoo case had
filed an objection to Judge Hoffman’s assignment, which
automatically disqualified him under Texas law from continuing to
preside over the case. But Judge Hoffman, apparently believing he
retained authority in the case, reinstated his earlier restraining
order.
The Yahoo defendants then sought a writ of mandamus to
1
The Yahoo case has enjoyed media attention. See, e.g., Glenna Whitley,
The Pirate Attack on Yahoo, D Magazine, April 2001.
2
disqualify Judge Hoffman from further presiding in the case. The
appellate court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus, voiding
all orders signed by Judge Hoffman and prohibiting him from
presiding over the case in the future.2
The case was then transferred to Judge Gibson, judge of Dallas
County Court at Law No. 1. After the transfer, lawyer Friedman
filed an affidavit prepared and signed by Jeffery Robnett, Judge
Gibson’s friend and former personal attorney. In the affidavit,
Robnett claimed that Judge Gibson had solicited bribes from
Stodghill and Mark Cuban, a defendant in the Yahoo case. Judge
Gibson then recused in the Yahoo case on July 27, 2000, and that
case was assigned to another judge. Robnett’s allegation and Judge
Gibson’s subsequent recusal became the subject of significant press
coverage.
The next morning, the plaintiff in the Yahoo case filed a
fourth amended petition, in which the following was alleged:
On information, ancillary to this matter but relevant to
issues of pattern and pervasiveness of the type of
conduct being complained of, Gibson has in other cases
exchanged rulings for sexual favors, has made frequent ad
litem appointments to Judge Robert Jenevein’s wife and to
[another lawyer] with his former firm, and with whom
Gibson is alleged to have a more intimate relationship.
According to Judge Jenevein, all knew that this allegation was
false and baseless, an abusive litigation tactic. There are five
County Court at Law judges in Dallas County. Judge Gibson had
2
In re Cuban, 24 S.W.3d 381, 384 (Tex. App. 2000).
3
already recused himself, and two of the remaining four judges
recused because they owned stock in Yahoo. This left only two
judges eligible to serve, one of whom was Judge Jenevein. Based on
the December 23rd ruling, and his friendship with Judge Gibson,
Judge Jenevein suspected that Friedman would not want him to
preside over the Yahoo case.
Learning of the pleading, Judge Jenevein drafted a press
statement responding to Friedman’s pleading and had a court
employee fax it to the local media. The court employee also
notified local media that Judge Jenevein would be holding a press
conference in his courtroom that afternoon at 4:00 p.m.
At the press conference, Judge Jenevein appeared in his
judicial robes and, after moving from behind the bench, read the
following statement, prepared earlier in the day:
As you know, yesterday, Judge David Gibson recused
himself from a case styled Universal Image, Inc., et al.
v. Yahoo, Inc., et al. following some bizarre allegations
that were the subject of an affidavit signed by Jeff
Robnett and apparently tendered to one of the lawyers on
the case while Mr. Robnett was representing Judge Gibson
in a modification proceeding.
The case now needs a new judge. The procedure
allows for a new judge to be appointed, and the obvious
choices are the remaining Dallas County Court at Law
judges, of which I am one.
I have already played a limited role in this case.
I ordered that a wrongfully obtained restraining order be
dissolved after holding a hearing on the matter. During
that hearing, as I had anticipated, Mr. Larry Friedman
moved to recuse me. That motion was denied on December
23, 1999, and the restraining order was then dissolved.
On December 27, the following Monday, Mr. Friedman again
[filed] a motion to recuse me from the case. That
4
motion, based in part on false representations to the
court, was never heard. In that motion, Mr. Friedman
[falsely] claimed that he had objected more than once to
holding the hearing at the offices of opposing counsel
and that I had repeatedly overruled that objection.
There is a transcript of that hearing that speaks for
itself. No such objection was ever asserted. If it had
been, I would have sustained it.
Since then, Mr. Friedman has filed half a dozen or
so other motions to recuse in this case alone, all of
which I believe were filed solely for purposes of
harassment and delay and to avoid any real consideration
of the merits of the case. Then, today, he filed the
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Original Petition which
contains, in my opinion, a clear attempt at judicial
intimidation. Specifically, Mr. Friedman alleged that
Judge Gibson —— now a named defendant —— “has made
frequent ad litem appointments to Judge Robert Jenevein’s
wife.”
First, the reference is false unless 5 appointments
in almost 20 months is fairly considered “frequent” in
light of the hundreds of appointments made by Judge
Gibson in that same time period.
Second, the allegation —— if that’s what it is —— is
spurious because there is nothing illegal, unethical or
in any way improper about my wife serving as a guardian
ad litem for minor children who have been injured.
Most disturbingly, the allegation [is] wholly
irrelevant to the case in question. That is why I
believe it is included in the pleading solely for
purposes of judicial intimidation, a tactic we normally
reserve for the mob. If I were not one of the judges to
whom this case could have been assigned, I do not believe
my wife would have been mentioned in the filings.
I realize with some regret that by withdrawing from
any participation in the case, I may assist Mr. Friedman
in accomplishing what I perceive to be his objective. It
is disturbing to imagine that a lawyer can remove a judge
from a case —— whenever he thinks another judge might be
more favorable —— simply by making baseless and vicious
allegations against the judge. It is, perhaps, a flaw in
our system. I am encouraged, however, by the fact that
I know of no other lawyers practicing in this County who
5
have the gall that I perceive Mr. Friedman to have.
To perfect the system[,] attorneys who perceive
unethical conduct must act. It is true that all that
must happen for evil to prevail is for good men to do
nothing. I am very proud to be a judge. I am
passionately committed [to] the principles for which this
courtroom stands. That being the case[,] it is my
intention to file a grievance against Mr. Friedman with
the State Bar of Texas. As an adverse party to him in
that proceeding, it would be inappropriate for me to
preside over this case.
It is my fervent hope that I and the hundreds of
attorneys and judges in this [C]ounty who share my views
will soon stop what I perceive as abuses of the process
and the criminal vilification of good lawyers and good
judges in the interest of financial gain.
The press conference generated substantial news coverage. In
the days following the press conference, Judge Jenevein received
approximately 100 inquiries from friends and colleagues. In
response, Judge Jenevein sent an email to approximately 76 friends,
family members, and colleagues3 —— which included fellow attorneys
and judges —— regarding the news coverage. It read:
Many of you have asked me why I was on the evening news
about 10 days ago. Thank you for your concern and your
support. What follows is an explanation I hope you will
feel free to share with anyone [you] wish.
I was on the news as a result of having removed myself as
a judge to whom a particular lawsuit could have been
assigned. I decided to remove myself immediately when I
learned of references to both me and my wife in the 4th
amended petition filed by the Plaintiff’s attorney in
that case. I felt the references were so highly
inappropriate that drastic and immediate action was
required on my part. On Friday, July 28, I announced
that I would take that action and that, as a result, it
would be inappropriate for me to preside over the case.
3
In his brief, Judge Jenevein states that the email was sent to 79 people.
6
That’s it.
To this day, I know of no specific accusations of
misconduct on my part despite a few oblique references in
the media to the contrary. Channel 8 reported that a
“formal complaint” had been filed against me, but nothing
has been filed with the Dallas County DA, the Judicial
Conduct Commission or the State Bar. The FBI will not
confirm or deny whether any reports have been filed with
them.
Finally, I believe my relationship with a particular
Dallas attorney has become adversarial. I expect that he
may file a complaint if he determines it may force me to
pay a political price, regardless of whether the
complaint has any merit.
I am happy to answer what questions I can. My office
number is . . . . Home is . . . .
The email was sent at approximately 2:30 p.m. from Judge Jenevein’s
computer at the County Court of Law No. 3.
After the press conference and email, Friedman filed a
grievance against Judge Jenevein with the State Commission on
Judicial Conduct. On Friedman’s complaint, the Commission
initiated formal proceedings against Judge Jenevein, asserting four
charges against him, but dismissing two of the charges soon
thereafter. Of the two surviving charges, the Commission first
charged that Judge Jenevein’s decision to hold a press conference,
while wearing his judicial robes, for the purpose of expressing his
personal feelings and criticisms about Friedman’s conduct violated
(1) Article V, Section 1-a(6) of the Texas Constitution, (2) Canon
2B of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct (“TCJC”), (3) Canon 3B(2)
of the TCJC, (4) Canon 3B(4) of the TCJC, and (5) Canon 4A(1) of
the TCJC. The second charge specified that Judge Jenevein’s
7
decision to send an unsolicited communication discussing the Yahoo
case during normal business hours violated (1) Article V, Section
1-a(6) of the Texas Constitution, (2) Canon 2A of the TCJC, (3)
Canon 2B of the TCJC, and (4) Canon 3B(2) of the TCJC.
During the course of the disciplinary proceedings, Judge
Jenevein moved to dismiss both charges, arguing that his statements
were protected by the First Amendment. At a hearing on August 26,
2002, the Commission determined that it could not rule on the
constitutional issue prior to a formal hearing. On September 24,
2002, a special master held a formal hearing on the charges, but
declined to rule on the constitutional issue, recommending that the
issue be addressed by the Commission.
The Commission subsequently held a hearing on the objections
to the recommendations of the special master. On January 21, 2003,
without addressing the constitutional issue, the Commission entered
an Order of Public Censure against Judge Jenevein.4 As to Charge
1, the Commission concluded that “Jenevein’s actions on July 28,
2000, during the court’s normal business hours, in holding a press
conference in his courtroom, while wearing his judicial robe, in
order to read a prepared statement concerning the Yahoo Case and
his personal feelings and criticisms about the conduct of Freidman
[sic] and his clients in connection with that still-pending Case”
4
The Order was signed and dated January 17, 2003.
8
violated Article 5, Section 1-a(6)A of the Texas Constitution5 and
Canon 2B of the TCJC.6 As to Charge 2, the Commission concluded
that “Jenevein’s actions on August 8, 2000, during the court’s
normal business hours, in using the county computer system to send
the unsolicited communication to approximately seventy-six (76)
family members, friends, lawyers, and judges, in order to further
discuss the Yahoo case, Friedman, and the July 28th press
conference” violated Article 5, Section 1-a(6)A of the Texas
Constitution and Canon 2B of the TCJC.7
Judge Jenevein attempted to appeal the censure order,
requesting the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court to appoint
a special court of review, and he did, selecting three Texas state
appellate judges. This special court of review held a hearing in
5
Article V, section 1-a(6)A provides that any Texas justice or judge may
be removed from office, disciplined, or censured for:
willful or persistent violation of rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court of Texas, incompetence in performing the duties of the office,
willful violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, or willful or
persistent conduct that is clearly inconsistent with the proper
performance of his duties or casts public discredit upon the
judiciary or on the administration of justice.
The Commission concluded that Judge Jenevein violated this Article because his
actions were a willful violation of the TCJC —— specifically, Canon 2B —— and
were inconsistent with the proper performance of his duties.
6
Canon 2B provides:
“A judge shall not allow any relationship to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend the prestige of
judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or
others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge. A judge shall not testify voluntarily as a character
witness.” (emphasis added).
7
The Commission concluded that Judge Jenevein violated the same portion
of Canon 2B in Charge 2 as he violated in Charge 1.
9
April but on June 12, 2003 announced that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear an appeal from the Commission and dismissed Judge Jenevein’s
appeal.
Following the dismissal of his disciplinary appeal, Judge
Jenevein filed a § 1983 lawsuit in the United States District Court
against the members of the Commission in their official capacity.
In his complaint, Judge Jenevein set forth two claims. First, he
asserted that the Commission violated his First Amendment rights,
because his comments were protected speech for which he could not
be disciplined. Second, he claimed that the Commission violated
his due-process rights, because it failed to (1) provide him notice
of the penalties it was seeking, (2) allow him to ask witnesses
what they told the Commission’s investigators, (3) consider the
sufficiency of his constitutional challenges, except at a full
hearing before the Commission, and (4) afford him any meaningful
appellate review. Based on these claims, Judge Jenevein requested
the district court to order the Commission to expunge the censure
order and to award him attorney’s fees incurred in defending the
disciplinary proceeding and in prosecuting the § 1983 suit.
After two Rule 12 motions to dismiss and the filing of an
amended complaint, Judge Jenevein’s claim for attorney’s fees was
dismissed, but his two constitutional claims remained. After the
Rule 12 orders were entered, the Commission filed an answer and
then a motion for summary judgment, arguing that both of Judge
Jenevein’s constitutional claims should be dismissed.
10
The district court referred the summary judgment motion to the
magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. The magistrate
judge recommended that the motion for summary judgment be granted,
because (1) Judge Jenevein’s speech was predominantly a matter of
private concern and, to whatever extent Judge Jenevein had a
protected interest, it was outweighed by the State’s interest in
protecting the efficiency and impartiality of the state judicial
system; and (2) Judge Jenevein failed to establish that he was
denied due process. The district court approved and accepted the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, granting the
Commission’s motion for summary judgment.
In its summary judgment motion, the Commission also contended
that the censure order was not based on Judge Jenevein’s speech,
but instead on his actions —— the use of taxpayer-funded facilities
to aid his and his wife’s interests. The district court found this
argument to be unpersuasive, concluding that Judge Jenevein was
censured for both his speech and his actions. Judge Jenevein filed
timely a notice of appeal.
II
Judge Jenevein contends that the district court erred in
concluding that his speech was a matter of private concern and that
his First Amendment rights were outweighed by the State’s
interests. He does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of
his due-process claim or his claim for attorney’s fees. The
Commission supports the district court’s rulings, and argues
11
alternatively that Judge Jenevein has no First Amendment claim
because the Commission disciplined him based on his actions, not
his speech.
A
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standards as the district court.8 The
parties hang their arguments on employee-speech doctrine, applying
this court’s content-form-context balancing test. Although this
approach summons informing principles of free speech of employees,
their categorical divisions of public and private speech fail to
illuminate the state’s interest in constraining speech by an
elected public official, political speech at the core of the First
Amendment, and its necessity.9 Our “employee” is an elected
official, about whom the public is obliged to inform itself, and
the “employer” is the public itself, at least in the practical
sense, with the power to hire and fire. It is true that Judge
Jenevein was an employee of the state. It is equally true that as
an elected holder of state office, his relationship with his
employer differs from that of an ordinary state employee. It is
also the case that “[i]f the State chooses to tap the energy and
the legitimizing power of the democratic process [in the election
of judges], it must accord the participants in that process . . .
8
Branton v. City of Dallas, 272 F.3d 730, 739 (5th Cir. 2001).
9
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)
12
the First Amendment rights that attach to their roles.”10 We are
persuaded that the preferable course ought not draw directly upon
the Pickering-Garcetti line of cases for sorting the free speech
rights of employees elected to state office.11 Rather, we turn to
strict scrutiny of the government’s regulation of the elected
official’s speech to his constituency, requiring such regulations
to be narrowly tailored to address a compelling government
interest, a question to which we now turn.12
B
The government’s asserted interest is “in protecting the
efficiency and impartiality of the state judicial system.”13 The
Commission urges that allowing a judge to spend working hours on
personal issues, and to use his judicial position to influence his
personal agenda harms the efficient administration of justice and
the public’s perception of the judiciary.
In Flowers, this court balanced the First Amendment rights of
an elected justice of the peace against the interests of the State
of Texas in “protecting the efficiency and impartiality of the
10
Id. at 788.
11
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563
(1968); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
12
See Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 774–75 (applying strict
scrutiny in a First Amendment challenge to judicial cannons of ethics); see also
Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. Of the Supreme Court of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d
Cir. 1991) (same).
13
Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 212 (5th Cir. 1990).
13
state judicial system.”14 In that case, the plaintiff, an elected
county justice of the peace, wrote an open letter to county
officials, circulating it to the local press, and prompting
articles attacking the district attorney’s office and the county
court-at-law for dismissing numerous traffic ticket appeals and
calling on the county officials to remedy the problem.15 In the
letter, the judge added that, if the county officials refused to
intercede, the public should at least be made aware of this
practice.16 The Commission reprimanded the judge, advised him “to
be more restrained and temperate in written and oral communications
in the future.”17
In evaluating the parties’ respective interests, we began by
explaining that the State’s interest in suppressing the judge’s
speech was “much weaker than in the typical public employee
situation,” because he was “an elected official, chosen directly by
the voters of his justice precinct, and, at least in ordinary
circumstances, removable only by them.”18 Notwithstanding these
weakened interests, the court went on to hold that the State does
have a legitimate interest “in protecting the efficiency and
impartiality of the state judicial system,” but that, as the
14
Id.
15
Id. at 204.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 205 n.6.
18
Id. at 211-12.
14
reprimand infringed on the plaintiff’s right “‘to make statements
. . . on public issues outside a campaign context’” and thus
touched on “‘core first amendment values,’” the Commission carried
a “very difficult burden.”19 In evaluating the interests of the
State, the court concluded that the Commission failed to carry its
burden, as it was unable to explain precisely how the judge’s
criticisms would impede the goals of promoting an efficient and
impartial judiciary.20 Instead, the court found that the State’s
interests would be “ill served by casting a cloak of secrecy around
the operations of the courts, and that by bringing to light an
alleged unfairness in the judicial system, [the plaintiff] in fact
furthered the very goals that the Commission wishes to promote.”21
We agree that the state has a compelling interest in
protecting the integrity of its judiciary.22 In Republican Party
of Minnesota, Justice Scalia, writing for the court, stopped short
of finding a compelling interest in an “impartial” judiciary,
explaining that “impartiality” may be defined several ways, some of
which do not raise compelling state interests, and others of which
the State of Minnesota did not have in mind. The Court’s opinion
19
Id. at 212 (quoting Morial v. Judiciary Comm’n of La., 565 F.2d 295, 301
(5th Cir. 1977) (en banc)).
20
Id. at 213.
21
Id.
22
Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial
Ethics, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1059 (1996).
15
rested instead on the holding that whatever Minnesota’s ill-defined
interest, the judicial cannon of ethics was not narrowly tailored
to meet it. Justice Kennedy, who provided the fifth vote with a
concurring opinion, stating that “[n]othing in the Court’s opinion
should be read to cast doubt on the vital importance of [the
integrity of the judiciary].”23 He concluded that “[t]he power and
the prerogative of a court” rests “upon the respect accorded its
judgments,” and that “[j]udicial integrity is, in consequence, a
state interest of the highest order.”24
An impartial judiciary, while a protean term, translates here
as the state’s interest in achieving a courtroom that at least on
entry of its robed judge becomes a neutral and disinterested
temple, in appearance and fact — an institution of integrity, the
essential and cementing force of the rule of law. That this
interest is compelling cannot be gainsaid. We turn to the more
difficult question of whether the censure order of the commission
was narrowly tailored to meet these state interests.
The Commission censured Judge Jenevein for his “actions on
July 28, 2000, during the court’s normal business hours, in holding
a press conference in his courtroom, while wearing his judicial
robe, in order to read a prepared statement concerning the Yahoo
Case and his personal feelings and criticisms about the conduct of
23
Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 793.
24
Id.
16
Freidman [sic] and his clients in connection with that still-
pending Case.” The Commission contends that its censure order
advances its interests because when a judge speaks publicly against
a lawyer’s conduct, it leads the public to believe that the judge
is vindictive and biased. The Commission urges that Judge
Jenevein’s speech could cause the public to “question Judge
Jenevein’s temperament and his ability to adequately ignore
criticism and not let it interfere with his rulings —— regardless
of whether such criticism was well founded,” an argument that
sorely tests the state’s contention that its censure here was not
content based.
Perhaps the Commission is correct that the public could
perceive that Judge Jenevein might visit on a party the judge’s
perception that his counsel was “unethical” or “evil.” Judge
Jenevein’s response was that he planned to file a grievance against
Friedman and recuse himself from this case, indisputably proper
judicial responses, clouding any public perception that he would
personally retaliate against Friedman or other persons engaged in
conduct thought improper. Such invocations of the “appearance of
impropriety” seductively take the state into content-based
regulation of political speech.
To leave judges speechless, throttled for publically
addressing abuse of the judicial process by practicing lawyers, ill
serves the laudable goal of promoting judicial efficiency and
impartiality. It signifies that Texas has persisted in electing
17
its judges, a decision which, for good or ill, casts judges into
the political arena. There is more. The Court has refused to
accept contentions that these elected judges are not subject to the
Voting Rights Act, holding that they are political actors.25 And
the Court has cautioned that “[t]he greater power to dispense with
elections altogether does not include the lesser power to conduct
elections under conditions of state-imposed voter ignorance.”26 And
in vindication of the First Amendment, as a holder of an official
office the judge loses the full protection of his reputation
afforded by state laws of libel and slander — leaving little more
than self-help in the marketplace of ideas or Job-like silence.
To the extent that the commission censured Judge Jenevein for
the content of his speech, shutting down all communication between
the Judge and his constituents, we reverse and remand with
instructions to expunge that part of the order. Like the Supreme
Court in Republican Party of Minnesota, we hold that the
Commission’s application of this cannon to Judge Jenevein is not
narrowly tailored to its interests in preserving the public’s faith
in the judiciary and litigants’ rights to a fair hearing. Indeed,
25
League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements,
914 F.2d 620, 637 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) reversed sub nom. Houston Lawyers'
Ass'n v. Attorney General, 501 U.S. 419, 111 S.Ct. 2376, 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991);
League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d
831, 838 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 488 U.S. 955, 109 S.Ct. 390,
102 L.Ed.2d 379 (1988).
26
Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501
U.S. 312, 349 (1991).
18
in a sense the censure order works against these goals. For
although Judge Jenevein’s speech concerned a then-pending matter in
another court, it was also a matter of judicial administration, not
the merits of a pending or future case. He was speaking against
allegations of judicial corruption and allegations of infidelity
against his wife made for tactical advantage in litigation,
concluding with a call to arms, urging his fellow attorneys and
judges to stand up against unethical conduct. The Commission’s
stated interests are not advanced by shutting down completely such
speech. To the point, the narrow tailoring of strict scrutiny is
not met by deploying an elusive and overly-broad interest in
avoiding the “appearance of impropriety.”
That said, the censure order survives strict scrutiny to the
extent that it is directed at Judge Jenevein’s use of the trappings
of judicial office to boost his message, his decision to hold a
press conference in his courtroom, and particularly stepping out
from behind the bench, while wearing his judicial robe, to address
the cameras. The state has a compelling interest in preserving
the integrity of the courtroom, and judicial use of the robe, which
symbolically sets aside the judge’s individuality and passions.
And while these interests cannot be met by broadly censuring the
content of speech the commission finds offensive, they can be met
with lesser if not minimal impact on the message: by accepting as
we must that elected judges are political actors, but insisting
that judges take it outside. At oral argument, the Commission
19
stated that its motivating concern for the censure order was not
Judge Jenevein’s message, but his use of the courtroom and the
robe, conceding that if Judge Jenevein had held the press
conference a block away at the Adolphus Hotel, without his robe, it
would have withheld censure. We hold that it is within the
Commission’s power to censure Judge Jenevein for wielding state
electronic equipment and choosing to don his robe and conduct his
press conference in the courtroom, instead of walking to a public
forum a block away. We do not suggest that the separation of
office from office-holder is always easily accomplished. While
holding office the judge is always a judge; indeed he seeks re-
election as an incumbent judge. It does not follow that the state’s
interests in preserving the judicial temple is not compelling or
that the state’s interests lose their compelling force in the
political arena. Today we say only that the state can put the
courtroom aside.
III
The Commission argues alternatively that Judge Jenevein has no
viable First Amendment claim because his action, not his speech,
was the substantial or motivating factor in the censure, a question
that we review for clear error.27
The Commission contends that the district court erred in
concluding that the Commission disciplined Judge Jenevein based on
27
Lukan v. North Forest ISD, 183 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1999).
20
his speech and not merely his actions. In ruling on the
Commission’s second motion to dismiss and motion for summary
judgment, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation and reports. In these recommendation and reports,
the magistrate judge, considering the language of the censure
order, concluded that the censure order was based on both Judge
Jenevein’s actions in using court resources to facilitate his
speech and the content of his speech. Accordingly, the magistrate
judge recommended that Judge Jenevein had sufficiently alleged a
cause of action.
The Commission argues that, based on the language from the
censure order as well as the Canon that Judge Jenevein was found to
have violated, it censured Judge Jenevein solely because of his
actions and not because of his speech. In the censure order, the
Commission disciplined Judge Jenevein for his (1) “actions on July
28, 2000, during the court’s normal business hours, in holding a
press conference in his courtroom, while wearing his judicial robe,
in order to read a prepared statement concerning the Yahoo Case and
his personal feelings and criticisms about the conduct of Freidman
[sic] and his clients in connection with that still-pending Case;”
and (2) “actions on August 8, 2000, during the court’s normal
business hours, in using the county computer system to send the
unsolicited communication to approximately seventy-six (76) family
members, friends, lawyers, and judges, in order to further discuss
the Yahoo case, Friedman, and the July 28th press conference.” The
21
Commission argues that the gist of the censure order was Judge
Jenevein’s use of taxpayer-funded property and the trappings of his
office to advance his and his wife’s private interests, not the
opinions he expressed about the Yahoo case or Friedman. The
Commission asserts that its censure order made no reference to the
content of Judge Jenevein’s speech, but only to his “actions.”
In addition, the Commission points out that it cited Canon
2(B) as the basis of the censure. Canon 2(B), in pertinent part,
provides that “[a] judge shall not allow any relationship to
influence judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend the
prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the
judge or others.” The Commission offers that, if it had intended
to punish Judge Jenevein’s speech, it would have relied on Canon
3(B)(10), which mandates that “[a] judge shall abstain from public
comment about a pending or impending proceeding which may come
before the judge’s court in a manner which suggests to a reasonable
person the judge’s probable decision on any particular case.”
Though the space between speech and action is notoriously
foggy, the speech rights here cannot be cabined by the Commission’s
citation practices, or by its use of the word “actions” instead of
the word “speech.” The Commission’s order, while doubtlessly
entered in good faith effort to pursue the public interest, is
concerned with the content of Judge Jenevein’s speech, censuring
his use of County resources “in order to read a prepared statement
concerning the Yahoo Case and his personal feelings and criticisms
22
about the conduct of Freidman [sic] and his clients in connection
with that still-pending Case” and “in order to further discuss the
Yahoo case, Friedman, and the July 28th press conference.” The
Commission’s order references “actions” for censure only because of
their communicative impact, explaining that Judge Jenevein “[held]
a press conference in his courtroom, while wearing his judicial
robe.”
We are not persuaded that the commission would have blinked
at either of these acts but for the content of Judge Jenevein’s
speech and its delivery by the judge in his courtroom in his robe
and carried forward in electronic messages from the court. We find
no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the censure order
was directed, in part, at the content of Judge Jenevein’s speech.
Nor can we conclude that the Commission’s censure order was simply
a time, place, and manner restriction preventing a judge during
court hours from drafting a press statement, holding a press
conference, or drafting an email. Rather we conclude that the
state interest we have described meets the test of compelling
necessity.
IV
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and
REVERSED and REMANDED in part with instructions to enter judgment
for the plaintiff, ordering the Texas Commission on Judicial
Conduct to expunge the censure order to the extent that it reached
beyond Judge Jenevein’s use of the courtroom and his robe to send
23
his message.
24