Filed 11/10/21 In re T.S. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re T.S. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E077125
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J265157, J265158,
J265159 & J265160)
v.
OPINION
V.O.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Christopher B.
Marshall, Judge. Affirmed.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and David Guardado, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
V.O. (Mother) is the mother of 10-year-old T.S., 12-year-old N.S., 15-year-old
R.W., and 16-year-old D.R.1 Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying her
Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 388 petition. She contends the court abused its
discretion in denying her petition without an evidentiary hearing because she had made a
prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that her request was in the children’s
best interest. We disagree and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The family came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Children and
Family and Services (CFS) on April 11, 2016, after a referral was received against
Mother alleging physical abuse, general neglect, and caretaker absence/incapacity. The
children were residing with two maternal aunts: D.R. and R.W. resided with maternal
aunt J.O., and T.S. and N.S. resided with a different maternal aunt. The aunts reported
that Mother had a history with substance abuse and mental health, and could no longer
care for the children. Mother had not visited the children, but in the past she had picked
them up and placed them in “harm’s way.” The children had also been sexually abused
in the past while in Mother’s care.
A social worker interviewed D.R. and R.W. three days later on April 14, 2016.
D.R. and R.W. were 11 and nine years old at the time, respectively. The children
1 Each child has a different father. The alleged fathers are not parties to this
appeal.
2 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise stated.
2
confirmed the allegations, noting Mother had physically abused them with a closed fist,
hangers, and/or a belt all over their bodies. R.W. and D.R. each separately stated that
they were fearful of Mother and that they were scared Mother would take them away
from their aunt. D.R. noted that he did not want to live with Mother “ever again” and
that if Mother came back to get him he would run away. A medical examination of D.R.
after his aunt picked him up revealed that he had bruising to his left eye, back pain, and
tissue damage.
When the social worker attempted to contact T.S. and N.S. at the other maternal
aunt’s home, the children were not present. The aunt reported that Mother had contacted
law enforcement and demanded the children be returned to her care. Mother believed the
aunts were keeping the children for welfare benefits. The aunt did not know Mother’s
current residence but was certain it was in Adelanto.
The social worker located Mother’s residence on April 22, 2016, and found
Mother home with T.S. T.S., who was four years old at the time, was interviewed and
confirmed the allegations, noting Mother “ ‘keeps on whoopin’ me’ ” with a belt. T.S.
reported that Mother hit him and his siblings all over their bodies with her hand, a clothes
hanger, or a belt. T.S. added that Mother and her boyfriend R.D. engaged in domestic
violence in his presence and that R.D. hits Mother in the stomach. N.S., who was seven
years old, was interviewed privately at her school and corroborated the allegations. She
noted that Mother and R.D. often fight at night and that she and T.S. were scared of the
3
fighting and would cry until they fell asleep. N.S. was fearful of Mother due to her
physically abusing her and her siblings.
Mother initially denied physically abusing the children or domestic violence
between her and her boyfriend. She, however, eventually admitted the allegations but
minimized her actions. As a result of Mother’s physical abuse and actions, all the
children reported being fearful and anxious. R.W. suffered from an inability to sleep,
T.S. from bed wetting, and D.R. with difficulties eating. Due to the children’s statements
and concerns for their safety, CFS obtained a detention warrant and detained them from
Mother’s care.
Subsequently, petitions were filed on behalf of the children pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to protect), and (c)
(serious emotional damage). Amended petitions were later filed on behalf of the children
based on the allegations related to sexual abuse of the children while in Mother’s care
pursuant to section 300, subdivision (d), and no provision for support by the fathers under
section 300, subdivision (g). The children were formally detained from Mother’s care at
a detention hearing held on April 27, 2016.
CFS recommended that the allegations in the petitions be found true and that
Mother be provided with reunification services. Mother continued to minimize her
actions. She denied hitting the children with a closed fist or with clothes hangers. She
admitted hitting the children with a belt, but only on their buttocks. She also denied
abusing or neglecting the children, and stated the children were “ ‘liars.’ ” She denied
4
any concerns related to her history of abusing methamphetamine and indicated that she
currently smoked marijuana and drank alcohol twice a month.
Further investigation by CFS revealed that in 2014 the children had reported that
Mother’s husband had digitally penetrated the children’s rectums and showed them his
genitals.3 The children were seen by a forensic pediatrician, who found all of the
children tested positive for chlamydia. Mother did not believe the children had been
sexually abused by T.L.S. and claimed the children had accused him of “raping them”
because they did not want to live with him. Mother failed to purchase the medication
required to treat the children’s chlamydia. At the time of the current investigation, N.S.
and T.S. reiterated concerns of sexual abuse, D.R. denied the sexual abuse, and R.W.
indicated that he could not remember and did not believe he had been sexually abused.
Following a contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on August 25, 2016, the
juvenile court found true the allegations in the amended petitions and declared the
children dependents of the court. Mother was provided with reunification services and
ordered to participate in her case plan.
By the six-month review hearing, CFS reported that Mother’s prognosis for
reunification was moderate and recommended additional services for Mother. Mother
had completed an outpatient substance abuse treatment program, but indicated that she
did not believe she had a substance abuse problem. Mother recognized having an anger
management problem and anger management was added to her case plan. At the
3 It was initially reported that Mother’s husband, T.L.S., was T.S.’s father. A
paternity test later revealed that he was not the biological father of T.S.
5
February 27, 2017 six-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered Mother to engage
in a domestic violence program and continued Mother’s services for another six months.
The court set an appearance review hearing to address the issue of unsupervised
visitation.
At the appearance review hearing, the juvenile court ordered unsupervised
visitation between Mother and the children twice a week for two hours over CFS’s
minor’s counsel’s objections.
By the 12-month review hearing, CFS recommended that Mother’s reunification
services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set. Although Mother’s
unsupervised visits were going well and she had participated in nine domestic violence
classes, she did not appear to benefit from the services received. Mother had continued
her relationship with her abusive boyfriend R.D. for the past two years. And since the
children were detained, R.D. had been convicted of battery against Mother and was
arrested for raping Mother. After the social worker informed Mother that her children
would not be returned to her care if she continued to reside with R.D., Mother stated she
would end her relationship with R.D. and find another residence. However, she returned
to R.D.’s home and was the victim of a sexual assault perpetrated by R.D. Mother had
returned to R.D.’s home despite the prior physical assault perpetrated by R.D. that
resulted in R.D.’s arrest. During that prior assault, R.D. had choked Mother until she lost
consciousness. He also punched Mother in the face, pushed her onto a glass table, and
bent her finger in an attempt to prevent her from leaving the home. In addition, CFS
6
received an anonymous tip that Mother was engaged in gang activity and had ongoing
anger issues.
The contested 12-month review hearing was held on August 16, 2017. The
juvenile court found that Mother had not sufficiently addressed the issues which led to
the children’s removal, terminated her reunification services, and set a section 366.26
hearing. The court continued Mother’s unsupervised visits twice a week for two hours.
CFS recommended that a legal guardianship be established for the children with
maternal aunt J.O. with whom two of the children had been residing since their removal.
Mother had not visited the children in several months.
The section 366.26 hearing was held on January 30, 2018. Mother’s counsel
informed the court that Mother agreed with the recommendation to establish a legal
guardianship. The court ordered the guardianship established for the children with
maternal aunt J.O. (guardian).
Sadly, about two years later on March 12, 2020, the children were removed from
their guardian’s home following allegations of physical and emotional abuse committed
by the guardian and her live-in girlfriend. All the children reported being physically
abused by their guardian and her partner with a belt and/or a closed fist. The children
also disclosed the guardian and her partner yelled and cursed at them. The guardian and
her partner denied the allegations.
7
After the children were removed from their legal guardian, CFS filed section 387
supplemental petitions on behalf of the children. The children were formally detained
from the guardian at the detention hearing on March 20, 2020.
CFS recommended that the allegations in the section 387 petitions be found true
and that the guardian be provided with reunification services. Mother sought custody of
the children. CFS, however, recommended that no further reunification services be
provided to Mother. The guardian continued to deny the use of any physical discipline
toward the children and indicated that she would take away electronics from all of the
children and make the boys do push-ups, leg lifts, and read the bible as discipline. She
also stated that she believed Mother was manipulating the children to make accusations
against her in order for them to return to Mother’s care.
The children reiterated the prior disclosures of physical abuse and also disclosed
that they had observed the guardian and her partner smoke marijuana in the home and
drink alcohol regularly. Specifically, during a forensic interview with the social worker
and a detective present, the children reported being hit with belts and hangers, leaving
injuries. They were also forced to stay in an exercise position for two hours at a time,
causing the children to be in pain. If the children did not do the exercise position
correctly, they would be hit with a belt. None of the children desired to visit the guardian
or to speak to her on the phone at that time. One of the children noted that they had been
texting Mother with information regarding the ongoing abuse in the guardian’s home.
Mother acknowledged previously utilizing corporal punishment on the children and
8
engaging in domestic violence but claimed that the children were no longer fearful of her.
The children desired to return to Mother.
In July 2020, CFS recommended no reunification services for the guardian and
termination of the guardianship due to the severe physical abuse reported by the children.
Although the children had expressed a desire to return to Mother, there was no
information reported as to Mother’s ability to be appropriate and protective of the
children that would have been different from the time when her reunification services
were terminated. CFS thus did not recommended the children return to Mother’s care at
that time.
CFS continued to recommend no services for the guardian in November 2020 and
informed the court that D.R. was residing in a foster home in Victorville apart from his
siblings. D.R. was playing with a local youth basketball team but decided to quit the
team based on a belief that he would be returning to Mother’s care. CFS recommended
that Mother’s visits revert to supervised due to her continued promises to the children that
they would be returning to her custody. Mother told D.R. that she had purchased a dog
for him, that he needed to come over to her home more to take care of the dog, and that
they would discuss what high school he would attend upon his return home. The children
reported that Mother had told them that she was going to get them back and they would
return home. The social worker noted that in order for the children to return to her care,
Mother would need to provide evidence demonstrating the issues that led to the
children’s removal had been resolved.
9
The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on the section 387 petitions was
held on November 4, 2020. The guardian was not present, but Mother was. The court
found true the allegations in the section 387 petitions as amended, continued the children
as dependents of the court, and terminated the guardianship.
Mother thereafter testified regarding CFS’s recommendation to revert her
visitation to supervised and her request for services. She stated that she had been
receiving unsupervised visitation twice a week for two hours. She denied that the dog
she purchased was intended for the children or that she was having any conversations
with the children regarding their return to her care. Mother testified that she had engaged
in parenting education, domestic violence, and anger management programs. She
acknowledged engaging in domestic violence but denied that she had ever used physical
discipline on the children. Mother stated that other than for domestic violence she could
not recall why the children were initially removed from her custody. She claimed that
she was not aware that the children had contracted a sexually transmitted infection and
suffered sexual abuse. Upon questioning by CFS’s counsel, Mother admitted to
“whoop[ing]” the children. Mother was married for about a year and lived with her
husband who had not been cleared by CFS. The court also received stipulated testimony
from D.R. in which he denied any recollection of Mother talking to him about his
potential return home.
As to the visitation issue, the court found that Mother’s testimony was not
credible, and further concluded that D.R.’s stipulated testimony was not credible as it was
10
contrary to every report by the children regarding Mother’s discussions with them. The
court ordered Mother’s visits to be supervised and gave CFS the authority to return to
unsupervised, if appropriate. The court denied Mother’s request for reunification
services due to concerns about Mother minimizing the issues that led to the court’s initial
involvement. The court found Mother had not demonstrated that she had benefitted from
the services she had participated in to address the significant issues which led to the
children’s initial removal.
About five months later, on April 27, 2021, Mother filed a section 388 petition
requesting that the court “order reunification” so that the children could be returned to her
care. As new information, she stated that she had taken more classes, including
parenting, domestic violence, anger management, and self-esteem classes, and provided
certificates of competition from several parenting/anger management and domestic
violence programs. Regarding why the request would be in the children’s best interest,
Mother stated she was “a totally different person,” could “definitely protect [the
children],” and “keep them safe.”
The court ordered CFS to investigate Mother’s request and set a hearing to
determine whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on the section 388 petition. CFS
recommended that Mother’s section 388 petition be denied. Mother was interviewed and
indicated that the children were removed from her care as a result of sexual abuse by her
husband, domestic violence, and her use of marijuana. She claimed that she was not
aware the children had contracted chlamydia from the sexual abuse until she read it in the
11
court reports when the children were removed from the guardian. Although Mother
indicated that she believed the children’s reports of the sexual abuse allegations, she
questioned whether her husband had sexually abused the children since he did not have
chlamydia and “was set free.” CFS opined that Mother had still not addressed the
concerns that led to the children’s initial removal from her care as Mother still failed to
take responsibility for her knowledge of ongoing abuse to the children. The social
worker believed that although there is mutual love between Mother and the children, “the
likelihood of the children being abused, should they reunify with [Mother] [was] high.”
The social worker, therefore, concluded reunification services to Mother was not in the
children’s best interest.
A hearing as to Mother’s section 388 petition was held on May 26, 2021. The
court found that Mother had only shown changing circumstances, not changed
circumstances, and that the requested relief did not promote the best interest of the
children. The court thereafter denied the section 388 petition without an evidentiary
hearing. Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her
section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing because she had demonstrated her
circumstances had changed and that it was in the children’s best interest to be provided
with services. She claims that she had made the requisite prima facie showing
necessitating an evidentiary hearing. We are not persuaded.
12
We review the juvenile court’s denial of Mother’s section 388 petition without an
evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,
317-318 (Stephanie M.); In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079.) The denial
must be upheld unless we can determine from the record that the juvenile court’s decision
exceeded the bounds of reason by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination. (In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358; Stephanie M., at p. 318.)
When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, we have no
authority to substitute our decision for that of the juvenile court. (In re Brittany K. (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505.)
Section 388 allows the parent of a dependent child to petition the juvenile court for
a hearing to modify an earlier order. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) A petition to modify a
juvenile court order under section 388 must allege facts showing new evidence or
changed circumstances exist and that changing the order will serve the child’s best
interest. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1)-(2); In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1235.) Courts
must liberally construe a section 388 petition in favor of its sufficiency. (In re Marilyn
H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 (Marilyn H.).) However, section 388 requires a petitioner
to make a prima facie showing of both elements to trigger an evidentiary hearing. (In re
Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.) If, for instance, the parent makes a prima
facie showing of changed circumstances, the juvenile court can still deny the petition
without an evidentiary hearing if the parent fails to make a prima facie showing that the
13
relief sought would promote the child’s best interest. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 181, 188-190.)
“ ‘A “prima facie” showing refers to those facts which will sustain a favorable
decision if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is
credited.’ ” (In re Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403, 418.) Consequently,
section 388 petitions with general, conclusory allegations do not suffice. Otherwise, the
decision to grant a hearing on a section 388 petition would be nothing more than a
pointless formality. (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) In determining
whether the petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire
factual and procedural history of the case. (In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
247, 258.)
After reunification services are terminated, the focus in dependency proceedings
shifts from family reunification to the child’s need for permanency and stability.
(Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317; In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1163.)
A court entertaining a section 388 petition at this stage in the proceedings “must
recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best
interests of the child.” (Stephanie M., at p. 317.)
We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mother’s section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. In her section 388 petition,
Mother alleged that she had new evidence and her circumstances had changed because
she had completed additional services, including parenting, domestic violence, anger
14
management, and self-esteem classes. However, this is not new evidence and does not
show changed circumstances, but that her circumstances were changing as to the
domestic violence issue. Moreover, while she had addressed her domestic violence
issues, the record clearly shows that Mother still had not acknowledged her role in failing
to protect the children from sexual abuse by her husband and her role in physically
abusing them. The children were removed from Mother’s care not only due to domestic
violence between her and her boyfriend, but also because she had physically abused them
and was aware of the sexual abuse to the children, resulting in them contracting
chlamydia. Indeed, the family came to the attention of CFS primarily due to her
physically abusing the children. Despite this fact, she failed to acknowledge her role in
physically abusing the children.
“Not every change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior order.”
(In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.) “The change[d] . . . circumstances must
relate to the purpose of the order and be such that the modification of the prior order is
appropriate.” (In re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 864, 870.) Further, “[t]he change in
circumstances or new evidence must be of such significant nature that it requires a setting
aside or modification of the challenged order.” (In re A.A., at p. 612.)
Mother’s issue was not participation and engagement in services, but her inability
to benefit from the services provided to her, especially concerning the physical abuse and
sexual abuse allegations, as evidenced by her statements and actions during the
dependency proceedings. She had not shown in her section 388 petition to have
15
benefitted from the services provided to her. Although she provided a statement that she
was a “totally different person” and could protect the children, she did not declare any
steps taken to demonstrate that she understood the safety risk to the children and was
capable of being protective of her children.
Furthermore, Mother did not establish that reinstating reunification services would
be in the children’s best interest. “In any custody determination, a primary consideration
in determining the child’s best interests is the goal of assuring stability and continuity.”
(Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) By the time of a section 366.26 hearing to
select and implement a child’s permanent plan, the interests of the parent and the child
have diverged. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254.) Therefore,
“[a]fter the termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in the care, custody
and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point, ‘the focus
shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there
is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of the child.
[Citation.] A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the
proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before
it, that is, the best interests of the child.” (Stephanie M., at p. 317; accord, Marilyn H.,
supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.)
Although the children were placed in different placements, at the time Mother
filed her section 388 petition, the children’s interest in stability was the juvenile court’s
foremost concern, outweighing any interest in reunification. The prospect of allowing
16
Mother additional reunification services to see if Mother would and could do what she
was required to do to regain custody would not have promoted stability for the children,
and thus would not have promoted the children’s best interest. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 454, 464.)
In arguing that the requested change in this case is in the children’s best interest,
Mother focuses on the three factors set out in In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th
519 (Kimberly F.). The Kimberly F. court, after rejecting the juvenile court’s comparison
of the biological parent’s household with that of the adoptive parents as the test for
determining the child’s best interest, identified three nonexclusive factors that juvenile
courts should consider in assessing the issue of the child’s best interest: (1) the
seriousness of the problem that led to dependency and the reason the problem had not
been resolved by the time of the final review; (2) the strength of the relative bonds
between the child to both the child’s parent and the child’s caretakers and the length of
time the child has been in the dependency system in relation to the parental bond; and
(3) the degree to which the problem that led to the dependency may be easily removed or
ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been. (Id. at pp. 530-532.)
However, Kimberly F. has been criticized for its focus on the interests of the
parent. The Kimberly F. factors conflict with our Supreme Court’s holding in Stephanie
M. that stability and continuity are the primary considerations in determining a child’s
best interest in the context of placement. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.)
Furthermore, Kimberly F. also fails to take into account the Supreme Court’s analysis in
17
Stephanie M. of the child’s best interest once reunification efforts have failed. Moreover,
the same appellate court that decided Kimberly F. declined to apply the Kimberly F.
factors “if for no other reason than they do not take into account the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Stephanie M., applicable after reunification efforts have been terminated.” (In
re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 (J.C.).) The J.C. court explained, “[t]o
understand the element of best interests in the context of a 388 petition filed, as in this
case, on the eve of the .26 hearing, we turn to the Supreme Court’s language in Stephanie
M., supra, 7 Cal.4th 295 . . . .” (J.C., at p. 526.) The court instead followed the direction
of our Supreme Court, “holding that after reunification services have terminated, a
parent’s petition for either an order returning custody or reopening reunification efforts
must establish how such a change will advance the child’s need for permanency and
stability.” (Id. at p. 527.)
Moreover, even if we address the Kimberly F. factors, Mother had not addressed
all the problems that led to the dependency. While she had addressed the domestic
violence issue, Mother still was unwilling to acknowledge her role in physically abusing
the children and her role in failing to protect the children from sexual abuse. In fact,
Mother had not addressed the most serious reasons for the children’s removal from her
care. In addition, the record overwhelmingly indicates that Mother had violated the
juvenile court’s orders by discussing the case with the children and making them believe
that they would be returning back to her care. It was also clear that Mother had
18
influenced D.R.’s testimony for her own protection in regard to whether she had
discussed the case with the children.
On this record, Mother did not establish that the children’s need for permanency
and stability would be advanced by reunification efforts. It is important to keep in mind
that, where, as here, the juvenile court’s ruling is against the party who has the burden of
proof, it is extremely difficult for Mother to prevail on appeal by arguing the evidence
compels a ruling in her favor. Unless the juvenile court makes specific findings of fact in
favor of the moving party, we presume the juvenile court found Mother’s evidence lacked
sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof. (See Rodney F. v. Karen
M. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 233, 241.) It is not in the children’s best interest for
permanence to be delayed for an unknown or indefinite period of time, with no certainty
or even likelihood Mother could progress to the point of obtaining custody of the
children.
Mother is correct that section 388 serves as an “ ‘escape mechanism’ when parents
complete a reformation in the short, final period after the termination of reunification
services but before the actual termination of parental rights.” (Kimberly F., supra, 56
Cal.App.4th at p. 528.) “[It] provides a means for the court to address a legitimate
change of circumstances” to afford the parent one last opportunity to reinstate
reunification services prior to final resolution of custody status. (Marilyn H., supra, 5
Cal.4th at p. 309.) Mother here has not shown a legitimate change of circumstances and
that granting the petition was in the children’s best interest.
19
In sum, while Mother is to be commended for her efforts to become an effective
parent by voluntarily taking classes, the fact remains that Mother has not addressed the
most serious aspects that led to the children’s removal from her care or established that
the children can be safely maintained in her home. Accordingly, the juvenile court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s section 388 petition without an evidentiary
hearing.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order denying the section 388 petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
Acting P. J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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