NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 16 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TRAVIS WADE AMARAL, No. 19-15003
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00594-JAT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES L. RYAN; ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
ARIZONA,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 7, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW, BRESS, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Travis Amaral appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas
corpus, arguing that his combined sentence of life with eligibility for parole after
57.5 years for crimes he committed as a juvenile constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(c)(1)(A), and we affirm.
“We review de novo the district court’s denial of [Amaral’s] habeas corpus
petition.” Sanders v. Cullen, 873 F.3d 778, 793 (9th Cir. 2017). Our review of the
state court decision is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Relief cannot be granted unless
the petitioner demonstrates that the last reasoned state court decision—here, the
decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals—was “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70–71
(2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). At the time that the Arizona Court of
Appeals issued its decision, clearly established federal law provided “that the
Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison
without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 479 (2012).
1. The Arizona Court of Appeals did not contradict or unreasonably
apply clearly established federal law by refusing to extend Miller to sentences that
Amaral argues are the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole
(LWOP). At most, Amaral was serving a sentence that was functionally equivalent
to LWOP, given that he would be eligible for parole after serving 57.5 years. But
we have already held that it is not clearly established that the Eighth Amendment
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bars sentences that are functionally equivalent to LWOP for juvenile offenders.
See Demirdjian v. Gipson, 832 F.3d 1060, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2016).
2. The Arizona Court of Appeals also did not contradict or unreasonably
apply clearly established federal law by finding that Amaral’s sentence was not the
functional equivalent of LWOP. As the district court stated, “The parties have not
cited, and the Court has not located, a case that draws a line which says that a
number of years in prison, or an age at the time of parole eligibility, converts a
sentence of a particular length to a ‘functional equivalent’ life sentence.” Nor have
we found a case so holding, so we cannot conclude that the state court violated
AEDPA’s deferential standards.
3. Finally, the Arizona Court of Appeals did not contradict or
unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in concluding that Miller
applies to only mandatory LWOP sentencing schemes. It was not mandatory that
Amaral’s sentences run consecutively, because the sentencing judge was permitted
to and did consider Amaral’s age and its attendant characteristics and
circumstances in determining whether the sentences should run consecutively or
concurrently. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 476. At multiple points, the Miller Court
limited its holding to LWOP sentencing schemes that are mandatory. See id. at
479 (“We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme
that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”);
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see also id. at 489 (“By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive
lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-
related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory-sentencing
schemes before us violate . . . the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.”). Because Miller has not been extended to non-mandatory LWOP
sentencing schemes, the Arizona Court of Appeals did not contradict or
unreasonably apply federal law by declining to extend Miller’s protections to
Amaral’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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