Diop v. Ice/Homeland Security

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

No. 10-1113
_____________

CHEIKH DIOP,
a/k/a Ibou Ndiaya,
a/k/a Ebou Njie

Cheikh Diop,

Appellant

v.

ICE/HOMELAND SECURITY;
WARDEN MARY E. SABOL;
THOMAS R. DECKER;
JOHN P. TORRES;
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES.
_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4:09-cv-1489)
District Judge: Honorable Malcolm Muir
_____________

Argued January 24, 2011
_____________

Before: FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges,
POLLAK, District Judge*

*
Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
sitting by designation.

1
 (Opinion Filed: September 1, 2011)

Cheikh Diop, Pro se
131 Woodsick Drive
Wilkes-Barre, PA 18705

Tony West, Esq.
David J. Kline, Esq.
Gjon Juncaj, Esq.
Nicole R. Prairie, Esq. (argued)
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division
Office of Immigration Litigation, District Court Section
P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

Mark E. Morrison, Esq.
Office of the United States Attorney
228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754
220 Federal Building And Courthouse
Harrisburg, PA 17108

Counsel for Appellees

Judy Rabinovitz, Esq. (argued)
Farrin R. Anello, Esq.
Tanaz Moghadam, Esq.
Michael K.T. Tan, Esq,
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004

Witold Walczak, Esq.
Mary Catherine Roper, Esq.
Valerie Burch, Esq.
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Pennsylvania
313 Atwood Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Counsel for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation and American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Pennsylvania

2
 _____________

OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

A 1996 law requires that the Executive Branch take
into custody any person who is removable from this country
because he has committed, among other things, a crime
involving moral turpitude or a crime involving a controlled
substance. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 303, 110 Stat. 3009-585-86 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c)). Detention under this authority is mandatory, does
not provide for the possibility of release on bond, and does
not require that the Executive Branch at any time justify its
conduct. Pursuant to this law, the petitioner in this case,
Cheikh Diop, was detained for 1,072 days—two years, eleven
months, and five days. The District Court concluded that
such prolonged detention was lawful. We disagree. For the
following reasons, we conclude that the statute authorizes
only detention for a reasonable period of time. After that, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution requires that the Government establish that
continued detention is necessary to further the purposes of the
detention statute.

I.

Although the merits of the immigration case against
Diop are not before us, we chronicle his journey through our
complex immigration system in order to illustrate how
individual actions by various actors in the immigration
system, each of which takes only a reasonable amount of time
to accomplish, can nevertheless result in the detention of a
removable alien for an unreasonable, and ultimately
unconstitutional, period of time.

Days 1-198. The story begins with Diop‟s receipt of a
Notice to Appear from the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) on March 19, 2008, charging him as a removable
alien who had entered the United States unlawfully and as an
alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, a 2005

3
conviction in Pennsylvania state court for the crime of
recklessly endangering another person. See 8 U.S.C. §§
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (a)(6)(A)(i); see also 18 Pa. Con. Stat.
Ann. § 2705. That same day, Diop was detained by the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).1
Thirteen days later, on April 1, Diop had his first appearance
before an immigration judge. His case was reset so that he
could seek counsel. A subsequent hearing on April 29 had
the same result. And on May 27, Diop‟s case became even
more complicated when the Government2 charged that he was
also removable as an alien convicted of a crime relating to a
controlled substance. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
That conviction occurred in 1995, for the Pennsylvania crime
of possessing a controlled substance with the intent to
manufacture or deliver it. See 35 Pa. Con. Stat. § 780-113(a).
The immigration judge once again reset the proceedings so
that Diop, who had failed to obtain the assistance of a lawyer,
would have time to file an application for asylum and
withholding of removal, which he did on August 12.

Days 199-261. On October 3, an immigration judge
heard Diop describe his arrest, detention, and severe beating
at the hands of Senegalese government officials. Diop told
the immigration court that he fears persecution in Senegal
because the government of that country believes, based on the
alleged affiliation of members of his family, that he is a
member of a separatist group called the Movement of
Democratic Forces of the Casamance. The immigration judge
found Diop to be a credible witness and presumed that his

1
Immigration and Customs Enforcement is a bureau within
the larger Department of Homeland Security. For
convenience, we use the term “Government” as a shorthand
term to describe their collective efforts, and refer specifically
to DHS or ICE only when necessary.
2
In the District Court, the Government filed the declaration
of John Ellington, Deputy Chief Counsel for the Philadelphia
Office of ICE. There, Ellington stated that “respondent
[Diop] was denied bond” at this May 27 hearing. The
declaration provides no further explanation of that statement,
the reasons for the denial of bond, or whether Diop was even
eligible for bond in the first place.

4
testimony was completely accurate, but nevertheless denied
his application for withholding of removal because his 1995
conviction was “probably” for a “particularly serious crime,”
which would make him ineligible for that kind of relief, and
because, even if he was persecuted in the past, changed
country conditions mean that there is no presumption that he
would be persecuted in the future. 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); Denis v. Attorney Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 213
(3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that withholding of removal is
unavailable to an alien who has committed a “particularly
serious crime”).

Days 262-390. Diop, still representing himself while
detained, filed a notice of appeal. On December 5, 2008, he
filed a hand-written appellate brief with the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). In a March 17, 2009 order,
the BIA concluded that the immigration judge should actually
determine whether his 1995 conviction was a “particularly
serious crime,” instead of leaving it open as a mere
probability, disagreed with the judge‟s determination that
conditions changed in Senegal, and remanded Diop‟s case to
the immigration judge for further proceedings.

Days 391-589. More master calendar hearings
followed: one on April 13, 2009, where the case was reset
and another on May 4 in which Diop explained that he was
trying to obtain representation from a law school clinic. On
May 17, Diop filed another handwritten brief with the court.
Thirty-eight days later, on June 24, Diop received a second
ruling from the immigration judge concerning his application.
This time, the immigration judge concluded that Diop‟s
asylum application was untimely, but granted his application
for withholding of removal. The immigration judge reasoned
that Diop‟s crime was not particularly serious because Diop
testified that his 1995 conviction for drug possession involved
marijuana. Furthermore, he ruled that the Government had
not overcome the presumption that Diop would face the threat
of future persecution if he was sent to Senegal. On July 21,
the Government appealed the immigration judge‟s ruling
concerning withholding of removal, providing, for the first
time, evidence that Diop‟s 1995 conviction involved the
distribution of cocaine, not marijuana. Diop initially
appealed the ruling concerning asylum, but withdrew that

5
appeal on August 4. That same day, Diop filed a pro se
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. He
argued that it is unconstitutional for the government to detain
him, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), for a prolonged period of
time without a hearing to determine whether his detention is
justified.

Days 590-754. Approximately three months later, on
October 29, 2009 the District Court denied Diop‟s habeas
petition for two reasons. First, it concluded that Diop‟s
petition was premature. Citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the
District Court observed that, after an order of removal has
been entered, the Attorney General has 90 days to remove an
alien, during which time the alien must be detained. In
Diop‟s case, removal proceedings were ongoing, so the 90-
day period had yet to begin and Diop‟s petition was filed too
soon.3 Second, on the basis of the Supreme Court's holding in
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the District Court
concluded that it was constitutional to hold Diop while his
proceedings are pending, with no regard to how long the
proceedings actually take. Diop then filed a timely pro se
appeal to this Court.

Days 755-776. The appeal in Diop‟s immigration
case—the appeal from the June 24, 2010 decision of the
immigration judge—was resolved by the BIA in an order
issued on April 12, 2010. However, as in the previous appeal,
the BIA once again concluded that the immigration judge‟s
lack of clarity required a remand. Specifically, the BIA
explained that a remand was required because the
immigration judge‟s application of the standard for
determining what constitutes a particularly serious crime was
unclear. Diop, now with help from the appellate litigation
clinic at Georgetown University Law Center, filed a motion
for reconsideration.

3
The Government concedes that this was error.
Respondents-Appellees‟ Answering Br. 10 n.6. The
Government‟s basis for detaining Diop was 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c), not § 1231. The former governs pre-removal
detention, while the latter applies to aliens who have been
deemed removable pursuant to a final order.

6
 Days 777-959. Clarifying himself on remand, the
immigration judge decided, on May 4, 2010 that Diop‟s drug
crime was particularly serious and that Diop was ineligible
for withholding of removal. On October 26, the BIA
affirmed the immigration judge‟s decision to deny Diop‟s
application for withholding of removal and denied the motion
for reconsideration. But, once again, it remanded for further
proceedings, this time so that the immigration judge could
consider whether Diop might be eligible for deferral of
removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture.

Days 960-987. Up to this point, a combination of
continuances to find a lawyer and prepare Diop‟s pro se
filings, along with several incomplete decisions from the
immigration judge, had resulted in a 959 day period of
incarceration, with still no indication of when or whether
Diop might be able to stay in the United States. During that
time, the Supreme Court decided, in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130
S. Ct. 1473 (2010), that a resident alien‟s constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings
requires that he be advised of the collateral immigration
consequences of a criminal conviction. On November 3,
2010 the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas applied that
decision retroactively and vacated Diop‟s 1995 conviction. A
few weeks later, on November 24, the state of Pennsylvania
appealed to the Superior Court.

Days 988-1,037. On December 1, Diop appeared for
yet another master calendar hearing, arguing that the vacatur
of his conviction meant that he was eligible for withholding
of removal. The Government asked for time to consider the
matter and the case was reset. At the next master calendar
hearing on January 18, 2011 the Government argued that
Diop would only be eligible for withholding of removal if the
Superior Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas‟s
vacatur of his 1995 conviction. The parties then agreed to
have a hearing on March 1 regarding Diop‟s claim of a right
to relief under the Convention Against Torture. The next day,
amici in Diop‟s habeas appeal—the American Civil Liberties
Union and the American Civil Liberties Union of
Pennsylvania (collectively, the “ACLU”)—contacted counsel
for the Government to seek consent to file a supplemental
appendix in this Court updating us on the status of Diop‟s

7
immigration proceedings. The day after that, on January 20,
2011 the Government reversed its litigating position in the
immigration courts and filed a motion stating that Diop was
immediately eligible for withholding of removal, even though
the vacatur of his 1995 conviction was still on appeal.

Days 1,038-1,072. We heard oral argument on this
appeal on January 24, 2011. The next week, at a master
calendar hearing in the immigration court on February 2, the
Government confirmed to the immigration judge that its
position was that Diop was immediately eligible for
withholding of removal. In a ruling on February 22, the
immigration judge granted Diop withholding of removal.
Finally, on February 24, 2011 after 1072 days of detention,
four rulings by an immigration judge, three rulings by the
BIA, a state court ruling on his 1995 conviction and a
subsequent pending appeal to the intermediate state court, a
ruling by a federal district court judge on his habeas petition,
and an appeal to this court, Diop was freed.

The Government waived its right to appeal the
February 24, 2011 holding. The next day, it filed a motion in
this court arguing that Diop‟s federal habeas appeal is moot
because Diop has been released from custody. Our first task,
then, is to determine whether we still have jurisdiction to
decide the merits of Diop‟s habeas petition.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. Congress has authorized our jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, but the Constitution vests us with jurisdiction
only to decide “cases or controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, §
2; Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. ---, slip op. at 5 (June 20,
2011). This means that Diop must have “standing”—the
personal stake in a lawsuit that exists when a person has
suffered an “injury in fact,” caused by “the conduct
complained of,” that can be “redressed by a favorable
decision”—at all stages of review and not just at the time he
filed his habeas petition. Camreta v. Greene, 564 U.S. ---,
slip op. at 5 (May 26, 2011); Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997) (“Mootness has been
described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The
requisite personal interest that must exist at the

8
commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue
throughout its existence (mootness).” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).4

Diop‟s prolonged detention was certainly an injury in
fact, caused by the Government, which could have been
redressed by a decision from this Court granting his petition
for writ of habeas corpus. However, the Government asserts
that these things are no longer true, so Diop‟s case is moot.
We disagree. Diop‟s case falls within the special mootness
exception for cases that are “capable of repetition” while
“evading review.” Turner, 564 U.S. ---, slip op. at 6 (quoting
S. Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219
U.S. 498 (1911)). This exception applies when “(1) the
challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will]
be subjected to the same action again.” Id. (quoting
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)).

The difficulty with determining whether Diop‟s
detention is too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation
is that, although Diop was detained for over three years, the
claim that his detention was unlawful could not have been
filed immediately. Instead, it would have had to “ripen” at
some unspecified time that is “notoriously hard to pinpoint.”
Pittsburgh Mack Sales & Services, Inc. v. Int’l Union of
Operating Eng’rs, Local Union No. 66, 580 F.3d 185, 190 (3d
Cir. 2009). Further compounding the difficulty of evaluating
claims of unlawful pre-removal detention is that the
underlying removal proceedings justifying detention may
very well be nearing a resolution by the time a federal court
of appeals is prepared to consider them. A court of appeals
reviewing these types of claims is therefore presented with a
moving target, knowing only that review must happen

4
Standing must be distinguished from the separate and
distinct inquiry into whether a petitioner is “in custody,” as
required under the habeas statutes. “[W]hat matters for the
„in custody‟ requirement is whether the petitioner was in
custody at the time his habeas petition was filed.”
Kumarasamy v. Attorney General, 453 F.3d 169, 173 n.7 (3d
Cir. 2006). Diop was in custody when he filed his petition.

9
sometime after an alien has been detained and before he is
released, but never knowing the precise time period in which
the case is ripe.

Given these difficulties, mootness would likely doom
almost any attempt to challenge the lawfulness of pre-
removal detention. The law is not so rigid. In United States
v. Frumento, this Court recognized that a case is not moot if a
litigant contesting his detention takes “prompt, diligent, and
timely” action to perfect his appeal, especially “when
fundamental personal liberties are at issue and review of an
order of confinement as a practical matter is not available[.]”
552 F.2d 534, 541 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc); see also Lee v.
Stickman, 357 F.3d 338, 343 (3d Cir. 2004). Diop had been
detained for one year, four months, and sixteen days before
he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus complaining that
detention for this length of time was unreasonable and hence,
unauthorized. Once filed, his actions in that proceeding were
“prompt, diligent and timely,” as was his conduct in the
subsequent appeal to this court. Assuming, without deciding,
that his claim was ripe on the day he filed his petition, Diop‟s
detention for another year, six months, and twenty days was
less than the two years the Supreme Court has found to be too
short to be fully litigated in other contexts, see Turner, 564
U.S. ---, slip op. at 6 (citing S. Pac. Terminal Co., 219 U.S. at
514-516 (1911) for the proposition that a two-year period can
be too short), and is the type of claim that, given the practical
reality of its highly contingent nature, will always evade
review.

Diop‟s claim is also capable of repetition. The
Government, which bears the burden of proving that this
appeal is moot, Princeton Cmty. Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate,
582 F.2d 706, 710 n.9 (3d Cir. 1978), argues that there is no
“reasonable expectation” or “demonstrated probability” that
Diop will again be the subject of prolonged detention. See
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 483 (1982). In Murphy, the
named plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting
the unconstitutionality of a Nebraska constitutional provision
requiring pretrial detention without bail for those accused of
sex crimes. Before the case could be heard on appeal,
Murphy‟s trial for the underlying sex crimes ended with his
conviction on three counts. Nevertheless, he argued that the

10
challenge to his pretrial detention was not moot because his
convictions were still on appeal. The Supreme Court
disagreed. It reasoned that there was no evidence in the
record that his convictions would be overturned, and hence
the possibility that they might be was “wholly speculative.”
Id., 455 U.S. at 483 & n.7.

Diop is in a different situation because the prospect of
his once again being detained by the Government is not
wholly speculative. His case is closer to the one presented in
Frumento, where a criminal defendant was held in contempt
and imprisoned until he either complied with a court order to
testify in a trial or that trial was finished. Before his appeal
could be heard, the trial ended and he was released.
Nevertheless, we held that his appeal was not moot for two
reasons. First, he might once again be subpoenaed to give
testimony at trial and, upon his refusal, would once again be
held in contempt and detained; second, holding his appeal to
be moot would make it impossible to evaluate the significant
issues of personal liberty at stake. 552 F.2d at 540.

The Government doggedly pursued Diop‟s detention
and removal for three years. Should the vacatur of his 1995
conviction be overturned on the ground that Padilla is not
retroactive—a possibility that is far from remote5—Diop
would once again be ineligible for withholding of removal
and the Government‟s position in this appeal—that 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c) requires Diop‟s detention without a bond hearing—
would lead it to once again place Diop in confinement. In
addition, the Government‟s current litigating position that the
vacatur is immediately effective is contrary to its position in
other similar cases, see, e.g., McLeod v. Mukasey, 287 F.

5
We recently held that the Supreme Court‟s decision in
Padilla v. Kentucky is retroactive. United States v. Orocio, --
- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 2557232, at *7 (3d Cir. June 29, 2011).
However, there is no judicial consensus on the issue and
many lower courts have come to a contrary conclusion. See
United States v. Shafeek, 2010 WL 3789747 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 22, 2010); Martin v. United States, 2010 WL 3463949
(C.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2010); Gacko v. United States, 2010 WL
2076020 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010).

11
App‟x 562, 563 (9th Cir. 2008), lending further support to the
conclusion that Diop‟s freedom is based on little more than
governmental grace, subject to change at its discretion. 6 And
finally, in its briefs here the Government argued that Diop
could be detained on the basis of his 2005 conviction. In
short, it is reasonable for Diop to fear that he might once
again be the subject of lengthy removal proceedings and pre-
removal detention at any time. His appeal falls into an
exception to the mootness rule.

Even if Diop‟s case did not fall into the exception for
cases capable of repetition yet evading review, we would still
conclude that he maintains his standing in this appeal. In
Camreta v. Greene, the Supreme Court held that government
officials retained standing to challenge an appellate court
ruling that they had violated the Fourth Amendment, even
though that same court found that the government officials
had immunity and, therefore, could not be ordered to pay
money damages. 564 U.S ---, slip op. at 5-7. The Supreme
Court reasoned that in situations where an official regularly
engages in the conduct deemed unconstitutional, the
judgment results in a continuing injury because the official
then operates in the shadow of potential liability. “So long as
[the judgment] continues in effect, [the official] must either
change the way he performs his duties or risk a meritorious
damages action.” Id. at 7. “Only by overturning the ruling on
appeal can the official gain clearance to engage in the conduct
in the future. . . . [C]onversely, if the person who initially
brought the suit may again be subject to the challenged
conduct, she has a stake in preserving the court‟s holding.”
Id.

Camreta differs from this case in important respects.
Here, there are no money damages at issue. Also, the District
Court found that the Government‟s conduct did not violate
the Constitution. Nevertheless, Camreta provides a helpful
lesson in standing that is applicable to this case. Here, even
without the potential for monetary damages that existed in

6
This court has a longstanding policy of not citing to not-
precedential decisions. We cite to McLeod not to make any
substantive legal point, but only to show that the Government
has assumed a different litigating position in similar cases.

12
Camreta, the Government and its officials retain an interest in
ensuring that they operate within the bounds of the
Constitution, see id. at 7 n.4 (explaining that government
officials have a stake in the outcome of a case “independent
of any future suit brought by a third party” because a ruling
that its conduct is not constitutional will change their
behavior).

Additionally, in this case, “the person who initially
brought the suit” (Diop) “may again be subject to the
challenged conduct” (prolonged pre-removal detention by
ICE). Diop‟s newfound freedom is the fragile result of
several precarious conditions. First, if the vacatur of his 1995
conviction is overturned on appeal, Diop would once again be
subject to mandatory detention by ICE. Second, the
Government‟s consistent position throughout this appeal has
been that Diop‟s detention is required not only because of his
1995 drug conviction, but also because of his 2005 conviction
for recklessly endangering another person. (Respondent-
Appellee‟s Answ. Br. 16 n.8; Respondent-Appellee‟s Resp. to
Brief for Amici Curiae 27). That 2005 conviction has not
been vacated, which means that Diop “may again be subject
to the challenged conduct” and hence continues to have “a
stake in preserving the court‟s holding.” Camreta, 564 U.S. -
--, slip op. at 7. The Government has, for over three years,
zealously guarded its power to detain Diop while pursuing its
removal case against him; as explained above, the record
provides a strong basis for the conclusion that Diop may
again be subject to detention.

The issues raised in Diop‟s appeal are capable of
repetition and are the kinds of issues that would almost
always evade review by this court. Moreover, under
Camreta, he retains an interest in this appeal despite his
release. For these reasons, we conclude that there is a case or
controversy over which we must exercise jurisdiction.

III.

We liberally construe Diop‟s pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus and his appellate briefs to argue that his
detention cannot be authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) because
(1) neither his 1995 nor his 2005 convictions provide a basis
for detaining him under the statute; and (2) even if they do

13
provide such a basis, any purported authority to detain him
for a prolonged period of time without a bond hearing would
be unconstitutional. The Government resists each of these
conclusions.

A.

We begin with the argument that neither of Diop‟s
prior criminal convictions authorizes his detention because, if
they do not, then his detention is unlawful independent of any
constitutional concerns. See Doe v. Pennsylvania Bd. Of
Probation and Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 102 (3d Cir. 2008) (“As a
first inquiry, we must avoid deciding a constitutional question
if the case may be disposed of on some other basis.”).

Section 236(a) of the IIRIRA, now codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), provides that “on a warrant issued by the Attorney
General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States.”7 The statute then authorizes the Attorney
General to release an alien on bond “except as provided in
subsection (c).” Subsection (c), in turn, states that “[t]he
Attorney General shall take into custody,” “when released”
following his sentence, “any alien who . . . is deportable by
reason of having committed,” among other crimes, one
“involving moral turpitude” or one “relating to a controlled
substance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (emphasis added) (cross-
referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), for crimes involving
moral turpitude and § 1227(a)(2)(B) for crimes relating to a
controlled substance).

Subsection (a) of this statute expressly provides that
the Attorney General “may release the alien on bond”
pending a decision as to whether that alien is to be removed.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Subsection (c) contains no such
language. Instead, it says that aliens detained under that
subsection may be released only if the Attorney General

7
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred most of the
Attorney General‟s immigration-related responsibilities to the
newly formed Department of Homeland Security. See
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135 (2002); Alli v. Decker, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL
2450967, at *1 n.2 (June 21, 2011).

14
decides that they should be part of the federal witness
protection program. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2).

Diop asserts that his 1995 conviction for possessing a
controlled substance cannot be the basis of his detention
under the authority of § 1226(c) because he was not taken
into custody “when released” for that offense; and his 2005
conviction is no reason to detain him without bond because
that conviction is not one involving moral turpitude. The
Government ignores Diop‟s argument regarding his 1995
conviction and instead relies on the assertion that the 2005
conviction is one involving moral turpitude. (Respondents‟-
Appellees‟ Answering Br. 16 n.8).

The dispute over whether Diop‟s conviction is, as a
definitive legal matter, one involving moral turpitude, is
irrelevant. If the statute required certitude that an alien was
deportable before that alien could be detained, then no alien
could ever be detained because the question of removability
cannot be answered until after proceedings in the immigration
courts are resolved. The appropriate question is whether
applicable regulations, and interpretations of the governing
statutes by the BIA, allow ICE to detain Diop with some level
of suspicion, but no definitive legal conclusion, that he is
covered by § 1226(c). They do. According to the regulations
and the commentary accompanying them, an authorized ICE
agent may detain an alien if there is “reason to believe that
this person was convicted of a crime covered by the statute.”
63 Fed. Reg. 27444; 8 C.F.R. § 236.1; In re Joseph I, 22 I. &
N. Dec. 660, 668 (B.I.A. 1999). Immigration judges then
have the authority to review the ICE agent‟s initial
determination that a person is subject to detention at a Joseph
hearing. See In re Joseph II, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (B.I.A.
1999); see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 n.3 (explaining that
a Joseph hearing gives an alien the opportunity to avoid
mandatory detention by establishing that he is not an alien,
was not convicted of a crime requiring mandatory detention,
or is otherwise not subject to mandatory detention). Because
neither party attacks the constitutionality of these regulations,
or the BIA‟s interpretation of the applicable statutes, we will
assume, without deciding, that they are valid and that they
authorize Diop‟s pre-removal detention because “there is
reason to believe”—even if we do not know for sure—that

15
the 2005 conviction was for a crime involving moral
turpitude.8

B.

The Government asserts that § 1226(c) says that aliens
can be detained for as long as removal proceedings are
“pending,” even if they are “pending” for prolonged periods
of time. (Respondents‟-Appellees‟ Answ. Br. at 17). Diop
counters that his detention is unlawful because § 1226(c) does
not authorize prolonged detention without a bond hearing. In
support, amicus ACLU notes that courts interpret statutes
with the presumption that Congress does not intend to pass
unconstitutional laws. For this reason, “it is a cardinal
principle of statutory interpretation . . . that when an Act of
Congress raises a serious doubt as to its constitutionality, . . .
[courts] will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001).
Applying this principle to § 1226(c), we conclude that the
statute implicitly authorizes detention for a reasonable
amount of time, after which the authorities must make an
individualized inquiry into whether detention is still necessary
to fulfill the statute‟s purposes of ensuring that an alien
attends removal proceedings and that his release will not pose
a danger to the community.

1.

Our Constitution forbids the Government from
depriving “any person” of “life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. This Due

8
Because the Government relies solely on the 2005
conviction for its authority to detain Diop, we do not reach
the issue of whether he can be detained because of his 1995
conviction. In addition, because the parties do not question
the constitutional adequacy of a Joseph hearing, we decline to
address it here. We note, however, that the issue is an open
one, see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.2 (2003), and
that at least one circuit judge has expressed grave doubts as to
whether Joseph is consistent with due process of law, see
Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Tashima, J., concurring).

16
Process Clause refers to “any person,” which means that
aliens, no less than native-born citizens, are entitled to its
protection. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 693. Thus, §
1226(c) raises a serious risk of running afoul of this command
unless it is premised on a “sufficiently strong special
justification.” Id. at 690.

The Supreme Court has concluded that it is, at least on
its face. Reading through the legislative history in Demore v.
Kim, the Supreme Court noted that Congress was concerned
with the immigration authorities‟ “wholesale failure” to “deal
with the increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens.” 538
U.S. at 518. Section 1226(c) was intended to remedy this
perceived problem by ensuring that aliens convicted of
certain crimes would be present at their removal proceedings
and not on the loose in their communities, where they might
pose a danger. Demore, 538 U.S. at 519; id. at 531
(Kennedy, J., concurring).

The Supreme Court‟s opinion emphasized Congress‟s
broad power to pass laws relating to immigration. Id. at 521
(“In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.” (quoting Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976))). It reasoned that, although
Congress‟s powers are limited by the Due Process Clause,
aliens‟ due process rights are not necessarily violated when
they are initially detained without a specific, individualized,
finding that a particular alien poses a flight risk or a risk of
danger to the community. Id. at 523-34 (citing Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)).

Justice Kennedy concurred in the Supreme Court‟s
opinion, but highlighted an important limitation on the scope
of its holding. In his view, Congress‟s broad immigration
powers allow it to pass a law authorizing an alien‟s initial
detention, so long as those implementing the statute provide
individualized procedures through which an alien might
contest the basis of his detention—a requirement satisfied in
Demore when the petitioner, Hyung Joon Kim, received a
Joseph hearing. Id. at 532. Critically, Justice Kennedy added
that even if an alien is given an initial hearing, his detention
might still violate the Due Process Clause if “the continued

17
detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” Id. “Were
there to be an unreasonable delay by the [Immigration and
Naturalization Services (“INS”)]9 in pursuing and completing
deportation proceedings, it would become necessary then to
inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation,
or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to
incarcerate for other reasons.” Id. at 532-33.

Justice Kennedy‟s opinion provides helpful guidance
on how to interpret the Demore opinion. Under the Supreme
Court‟s holding, Congress did not violate the Constitution
when it authorized mandatory detention without a bond
hearing for certain criminal aliens under § 1226(c). This
means that the Executive Branch must detain an alien at the
beginning of removal proceedings, without a bond hearing—
and may do so consistent with the Due Process Clause—so
long as the alien is given some sort of hearing when initially
detained at which he may challenge the basis of his detention.
However, the constitutionality of this practice is a function of
the length of the detention. At a certain point, continued
detention becomes unreasonable and the Executive Branch‟s
implementation of § 1226(c) becomes unconstitutional unless
the Government has justified its actions at a hearing inquiring
into whether continued detention is consistent with the law‟s
purposes of preventing flight and dangers to the community.10

9
The responsibilities of the INS were assumed by three
different agencies—ICE, Customs and Border Protection, and
Citizenship and Immigration Services—within DHS when
Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002. See
Lin-Zheng v. Attorney General, 557 F.3d 147, 152 n.4 (3d
Cir. 2009) (citing Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)).
10
Although it did not frame the issue this way, we read
Justice Kennedy‟s decision to uphold the statute on its face,
while leaving open the possibility that it might be
unconstitutional as applied. In other words, Congress did not
violate the Constitution when it passed the law, but the
Executive Branch might violate the Constitution in individual
circumstances depending on how the law is applied. See
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution,

18
This will necessarily be a fact-dependent inquiry that will
vary depending on individual circumstances. We decline to
establish a universal point at which detention will always be
considered unreasonable. 11

The Supreme Court‟s opinion in Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 524 (1952), does not conflict with the result we
reach in this case.12 According to Demore, Carlson held that
it was constitutional to detain the aliens in that case—deemed
deportable because of their participation in Communist
activities—without an individualized determination of their
dangerousness or their likelihood of flight. 538 U.S. at 524.
However, this reading of Carlson—permitting an alien to be
initially detained without an individualized hearing—is
consistent with Justice Kennedy‟s view that, at some point
past this initial period, detention can become unreasonable,
and hence unconstitutional, unless there is an individualized
inquiry into whether detention advances the purposes of the
statute.

For the same reason, we conclude that the Supreme
Court‟s holding in Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), does
not control the outcome of this case. There, a class of alien

62 Stan. L. Rev. 1209, 1230-35 (2010) (describing “as
applied” and facial challenges in this manner).
11
In this regard, we note that our decision today differs from
our prior decision in Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir.
2001), which was overruled by the Supreme Court in
Demore. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 516. Patel‟s holding was
much broader. In Patel, this Court held that §1226(c) was
unconstitutional in all circumstances unless all aliens
detained pursuant to that statute received an individualized
bond hearing. Our much narrower holding today, by contrast,
is that the statute is only unconstitutional when it is applied to
detain someone for an unreasonable length of time without
further individualized inquiry into whether detention is
necessary to carry out the purposes of the statute.
12
The parties do not address the substance of this decision in
their briefs. However, as binding Supreme Court precedent,
we are required to address it.

19
juveniles argued that it was unconstitutional for the
immigration authorities to detain juveniles and release them
only into the care of a parent, legal guardian or other
specified adult relative. The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the detention. However, the detention in
that case was not mandatory. Moreover, just like Carlson, a
reading of Flores that purported to uphold detention for an
unreasonable length of time without further individualized
inquiry would be contrary to Justice Kennedy‟s concurrence
in Demore.

In short, when detention becomes unreasonable, the
Due Process Clause demands a hearing, at which the
Government bears the burden of proving that continued
detention is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the detention
statute.

2.

This leaves us with the question of whether Diop‟s
prolonged detention in this case was unconstitutionally
unreasonable and, therefore, a violation of the Due Process
Clause. We conclude that it was. Demore emphasized that
mandatory detention pursuant to § 1226(c) lasts only for a
“very limited time” in the vast majority of cases. 538 U.S. at
529 & n.12. In fact, Demore relied on statistics showing that
detention under § 1226(c) “lasts roughly a month and a half in
the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about
five months in the minority of cases in which an alien chooses
to appeal.” Id. at 530. This leads us to believe that the result
may well have been different had the petitioner in Demore
been detained for significantly longer than the average.
Indeed, the petitioner in Demore had been detained for only
slightly longer than the average (6 months) when his habeas
petition was decided. Assuming, without deciding, that this
was a presumably reasonable period of detention, and
comparing it to Diop‟s 35 months of detention, which was
nearly six times longer, leads us to conclude that Diop‟s
detention, without any post-Joseph hearing inquiry into
whether it was necessary to accomplish the purposes of §
1226(c), was unreasonable.

The Government argues that there was no
“unreasonable delay” in Diop‟s proceedings because he was

20
given continuances to find an attorney, to draft an application
for asylum and withholding of removal, and because he took
several appeals. Diop responds that the delay is attributable
to the immigration judge‟s continued errors, which
necessitated the appeals and remands. We agree with the
Government that the reasonableness determination must take
into account a given individual detainee‟s need for more or
less time, as well as the exigencies of a particular case. But
we also conclude that reasonableness must take into account
errors in the proceedings that cause unnecessary delay. No
system of justice can be error-free, and those errors require
time to fix. Nevertheless, in this case the immigration judge‟s
numerous errors, combined with the Government‟s failure to
secure, at the earliest possible time, evidence that bore
directly on the issue of whether Diop was properly detained,
resulted in an unreasonable delay.

We cannot simply rely on the Government‟s
determination of what is reasonable. Although judicial
deference to the Executive Branch in the immigration context
is “of special importance” because officials “exercise
especially sensitive political functions that implicate
questions of foreign relations,” Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct.
1163-64 (2009), courts reviewing petitions for writ of habeas
corpus must exercise their independent judgment as to what is
reasonable, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (“Whether a set of
particular circumstances amounts to detention within, or
beyond, a period reasonably necessary to secure removal is
determinative of whether the detention is, or is not, pursuant
to statutory authority. The basic federal habeas corpus statute
grants the federal courts authority to answer that question.”).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court adopted a presumption that
six months of detention pursuant to the post-removal statute
was reasonable. It reasoned that Congress had previously
doubted the constitutionality of detention for longer than this
period and observed that such a six-month window would
free the Executive Branch from excessive interference by the
judiciary. Amicus ACLU urges us to adopt a similar position
in this case. We decline to adopt such a one-size-fits-all
approach. Reasonableness, by its very nature, is a fact-
dependent inquiry requiring an assessment of all of the
circumstances of any given case. That being said, we note
that the reasonableness of any given detention pursuant to §

21
1226(c) is a function of whether it is necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the statute, and, given that Congress and the
Supreme Court believed those purposes would be fulfilled in
the vast majority of cases within a month and a half, and five
months at the maximum, see Demore, 538 U.S. at 530, the
constitutional case for continued detention without inquiry
into its necessity becomes more and more suspect as
detention continues past those thresholds. In this case, there
can be no question that Diop‟s detention for nearly three
years without further inquiry into whether it was necessary to
ensure his appearance at the removal proceedings or to
prevent a risk of danger to the community, was unreasonable
and, therefore, a violation of the Due Process Clause.

3.

It was unconstitutional to detain Diop for nearly three
years under the authority granted by Congress in § 1226(c).
Nevertheless, “if Congress has made its intent in the statute
clear, we must give effect to that intent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 696 (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not believe
that Congress intended to authorize prolonged, unreasonable,
detention without a bond hearing. For one, the parties have
not provided any legislative history in support of such a
conclusion. Furthermore, in Demore, the Supreme Court
observed that Congress directed the INS to “complete
removal proceedings against [criminal aliens] as promptly as
possible.” 538 U.S. at 530 n.13. This, combined with
statistics showing that detention is often for only a brief
period of time, leads us to believe that Congress did not
intend to authorize prolonged detention pursuant to § 1226(c)
without, at some point, requiring further inquiry into whether
detention is necessary to carry out that statute‟s purpose.
Accordingly we conclude that § 1226(c) contains an implicit
limitation of reasonableness: the statute authorizes only
mandatory detention that is reasonable in length. After that, §
1226(c) yields to the constitutional requirement that there be a
further, individualized, inquiry into whether continued
detention is necessary to carry out the statute‟s purpose. Cf.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, 699 (reading § 1231 to contain an
implicit “reasonable time” limitation on the length of post-
removal detention).

22
 IV.

Diop maintains a reasonable expectation that he may,
once again, find himself imprisoned while the authorities sort
through the complicated laws and procedures governing the
removal of criminal aliens. Should he be detained once
again, our holding provides that he may only be detained for a
reasonable length of time. Should the length of his detention
become unreasonable, the Government must justify its
continued authority to detain him at a hearing at which it
bears the burden of proof. For all of the foregoing reasons,
we will vacate the District Court‟s decision and order
dismissing Diop‟s petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

23