In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-22-00010-CR
KEITH ROYCE IVERY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 6th District Court
Lamar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 29228
Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and Carter,* JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Stevens
________________
*Jack Carter, Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Keith Royce Ivery pled guilty to driving while intoxicated, third or more,1 as a repeat
offender.2 Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Ivery was sentenced to twenty years’
imprisonment. In addition, Ivery waived his right of appeal when he signed the following waiver
of his rights: “I freely, voluntarily and knowingly waive and give up any and all rights to appeal,
file a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment and/or my right to seek an application
for writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” The trial
court certified that this was a plea-agreement case and that Ivery, therefore, had no right of
appeal.
Even though Ivery entered into a plea agreement with the State and otherwise waived his
right of appeal, he nevertheless, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal. Because we find that we
are without jurisdiction over this case as a result of Ivery’s plea agreement with the State and his
waiver of the right of appeal, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The Texas Legislature has granted a very limited right of appeal in plea-bargain cases.
Rule 25.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure details that right as follows:
(2) . . . . In a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea
was guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment
recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a defendant
may appeal only:
1
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(b) (Supp.).
2
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42.
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(A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and
ruled on before trial, [or]
(B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal . . . .
TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). There is no indication in the record before this Court that Ivery either
(1) filed a motion that was ruled on before trial or (2) obtained the trial court’s permission to
appeal. To the contrary, the trial court’s certification of Ivery’s right of appeal indicates that he
has no right of appeal. Pursuant to Rule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, this
Court is required to dismiss an appeal if, as in this case, the trial court’s certification indicates no
right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d).
On February 17, 2022, we informed Ivery of the apparent defect in our jurisdiction over
this appeal and afforded him an opportunity to respond and, if possible, cure such defect. Ivery’s
response to our letter did not cure the defect in our jurisdiction over this appeal.
Because Ivery has no right of appeal as a result of his plea agreement with the State and
as a further result of his explicit, written waiver of that right, and because the trial court’s
certification correctly indicates that he is without a right of appeal, we dismiss this appeal for
want of jurisdiction.
Scott E. Stevens
Justice
Date Submitted: March 9, 2022
Date Decided: March 10, 2022
Do Not Publish
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