United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-8313.
Eugene E. POWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Joyce Marie POWELL; John Dalton, Secretary of the Navy,
Defendants-Appellees.
April 15, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia. (No. 7:94-00110-CA-VAL), Wilbur D. Owens, Jr.,
Judge.
Before KRAVITCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior
Circuit Judge.
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
Pursuant to the Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection
Act (the "FSPA"), 10 U.S.C. § 1408, a state court awarded part of
Eugene Powell's naval retirement pay to his ex-wife, Joyce Powell,
as alimony. Instead of appealing that award, Mr. Powell filed a
complaint in federal district court against Mrs. Powell and John
Dalton, who is Secretary of the Navy, contending that the FSPA is
unconstitutional as applied to him, because it amounts to an
unconstitutional taking of his property.
The district court entered summary judgment against Mr.
Powell, holding that the FSPA is not unconstitutional as applied to
him, and, alternatively, that he was barred from bringing his
action under principles of res judicata. The court did not address
the Secretary's Rooker-Feldman defense. Nonetheless, for the
reasons stated below, we hold that under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Mr. Powell's complaint.1 Accordingly, we vacate the district
court's judgment and remand to that court with instructions to
dismiss the complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1974, Eugene Powell signed his last re-enlistment contract
with the Navy, which, like his prior contracts, promised that he
would receive certain benefits including retirement pay. He
retired from the Navy in 1975, after honorably serving for
approximately twenty-four years.
On June 26, 1981, the Supreme Court ruled in McCarty v.
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 232, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 2741, 69 L.Ed.2d 589
(1981), that "the application of community property principles to
military retired pay threatens grave harm to "clear and
substantial' federal interests," and therefore that the application
of community property principles is federally preempted. Although
the McCarty Court spoke in terms of the application of community
property principles to military retirement pay, the Court's
reasoning appeared to apply equally to the application of equitable
distribution principles to such pay. See McCarty, 453 U.S. at 224-
28, 101 S.Ct. at 2737-39 (holding that, under federal law, military
retirement pay is a "personal entitlement" and that Congress
intended that military retirement pay reach the veteran and no one
else). When it acted to override the McCarty decision, Congress
assumed that that decision applied to community property and
equitable distribution states alike.
1
Because of our Rooker-Feldman holding, we need not address
the other issues raised on appeal.
In 1982, Congress enacted the FSPA, to reverse the effect of
McCarty and allow the application of both community property and
equitable distribution principles to military retirement pay. See
Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 584 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 2026 n.
2, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989) (stating that the FSPA "covers both
community property and equitable distribution States"). The FSPA
allows state courts to treat military retirement pay "for pay
periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of
the [retiree] or as property of the [retiree] and his spouse in
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction." 10 U.S.C.A. §
1408(c) (West.Supp.1995). The FSPA created a payment mechanism,
whereby the spouse who is awarded a portion of the ex-spouse's
military retirement pay in the state court may seek direct payment
of it through the Secretary of the concerned armed forces branch.
Id. at § 1408(d)(1).
Eugene Powell and Joyce Powell, who were married during
nineteen of Mr. Powell's twenty-four years of military service,
were divorced in a Georgia trial court in 1993 after almost
thirty-seven years of marriage. In their divorce trial, the jury
awarded Mrs. Powell $480.00 per month of Mr. Powell's naval
retirement pay, which constituted forty percent of that pay.
Pursuant to a provision in the FSPA, the Secretary of the Navy has
taken that amount out of Mr. Powell's retirement pay each month and
paid it directly to Mrs. Powell. The jury declined to award Mrs.
Powell any of Mr. Powell's other retirement pay, which came from
his employment with a private corporation.
Mr. Powell never raised in the Georgia trial court any issue
about the FSPA being unconstitutional as applied to him. Nor did
Mr. Powell seek review of the trial court's judgment before the
Georgia appellate court, the Georgia Supreme Court, or the United
States Supreme Court.
Instead, Mr. Powell filed this action in the federal district
court against the defendants, Mrs. Powell and the Secretary of the
Navy. In his complaint, Mr. Powell claimed that the FSPA is
unconstitutional as applied to him because it amounts to an
unconstitutional taking of his property.2 Mr. Powell sought to
enjoin the Secretary from distributing his naval retirement pay to
Mrs. Powell, and to have the FSPA declared unconstitutional as
applied to him and others similarly situated. Mrs. Powell filed an
answer to the complaint, and the Secretary moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the district court was without
jurisdiction under three theories: (1) Younger abstention; (2)
Barber abstention; and (3) Rooker-Feldman. The Secretary argued
alternatively that even if the district court had jurisdiction,
there was no unconstitutional taking.
The district court treated the Secretary's motion to dismiss
as one for summary judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), and granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the FSPA
was not unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Powell. In the
alternative, the district court held that Mr. Powell's claim was
barred under principles of res judicata. The court did not address
2
Although Mr. Powell made several other claims in his
complaint before the district court, he did not appeal the
district court's judgment rejecting those other claims, and we do
not address them here.
the Secretary's Rooker-Feldman defense. Mr. Powell filed this
appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Powell argues that his claim is not barred under
principles of res judicata, and that the FSPA is unconstitutional
as applied to him. However, before reaching either of those
issues, we first address whether the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction over Mr. Powell's claim. That inquiry requires
us to decide if, as the Secretary contends, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars Mr. Powell's claim from federal court.
According to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, "a United States
District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a
state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may
be had only in [the United States Supreme Court]." District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct.
1303, 1315, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The doctrine has two statutory
bases: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which limits federal review of state
court proceedings to the United States Supreme Court, and (2) 28
U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that federal district courts are
courts of original jurisdiction. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). The
doctrine applies not only to claims actually raised in the state
court, but also to claims that were not raised in the state court
but are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court's judgment.
Feldman, 460 at 482 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1315 n. 16. This Court has
recognized an "important limitation" on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
when the plaintiff had no "reasonable opportunity to raise his
federal claim in state proceedings." Wood v. Orange County, 715
F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210, 104
S.Ct. 2398, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984). In that situation, we consider
that the federal claim was not "inextricably intertwined" with the
state court's judgment. Id.
In this case, the state trial court, in accordance with
Georgia principles of equitable division, awarded $480.00 of Mr.
Powell's naval retirement pay, or forty percent of it, to Mrs.
Powell. The court made that award pursuant to authorization
contained in the FSPA. Mr. Powell's present federal claim that the
FSPA is unconstitutional as applied to him is "inextricably
intertwined" with the issue of whether the state court could award
Mrs. Powell part of his naval retirement pay. If a federal
district court were now to hold in Mr. Powell's favor on his
federal claim, that holding would "effectively nullify" the state
court's judgment that Mrs. Powell is to receive a portion of his
naval retirement pay. See Liedel v. Juvenile Court of Madison
County, 891 F.2d 1542, 1545 (11th Cir.1990); see also Stern v.
Nix, 840 F.2d 208, 211-12 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 826,
109 S.Ct. 77, 102 L.Ed.2d 53 (1988) (holding that because district
court holding would "effectively reverse the state court judgment,"
the federal claim was "inextricably intertwined" with the state
court judgment). The result would be that the state court's
judgment, insofar as it pertains to money to be received by Mrs.
Powell, would be collaterally reviewed and reversed in federal
court, which is precisely what the Rooker-Feldman doctrine exists
to prevent.
Mr. Powell contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
inapplicable for several reasons. First, he argues that the
doctrine does not apply here because he seeks to challenge the
constitutionality of a federal, not a state, statute. Mr. Powell
maintains that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only "concerns subject
matter jurisdiction in cases where direct review is sought of a
state appellate court's decision involving state law." We
disagree. Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has limited the
scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to state court judgments based
solely on state law. Even if the federal court collateral attack
on the state court judgment is premised on the unconstitutionality
of a federal statute, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine still applies.
It still applies for reasons that go to the heart of our system of
federalism—the dual dignity of state and federal court decisions
interpreting federal law. "In our federal system, a state trial
court's interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than
that of the federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial
court is located." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376, 113
S.Ct. 838, 846, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Moreover, the doctrine is not limited to state appellate court
judgments. A litigant may not escape application of the doctrine
by merely electing not to appeal an adverse state trial court
judgment.
Mr. Powell also contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
not apply because he did not have a "reasonable opportunity" to
bring his claim in the state court proceeding. He argues that such
an opportunity was lacking because: (1) the Secretary was not, and
could not have been, a party to that proceeding, and (2) even if
the Secretary had been a party to that proceeding, the state court
could not have enjoined the Secretary from making the payments to
Mrs. Powell. Mr. Powell's argument is without merit. There is no
reason that he could not have challenged the constitutionality of
the FSPA as applied to him in the state court proceeding. Mr.
Powell could have raised that claim in the state trial court, and
he could have requested that court, if it agreed with his claim, to
instruct the jury not to award any of his naval retirement pay to
Mrs. Powell. Or, after the jury's verdict, he could have moved for
modification of the jury's award, insofar as it divided his naval
retirement pay. If he had raised the issue before the state trial
court, Mr. Powell could have appealed any adverse judgment
pertaining to the division of his naval retirement pay to the
Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court, or the United
States Supreme Court.
The absence of the Secretary from the state court proceeding
did not deprive Mr. Powell of an opportunity to press his claim.
If Mr. Powell had prevailed on his claim, the state court would not
have awarded any of the naval retirement pay to Mrs. Powell, and
the Secretary's absence would have been immaterial.
In Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104
L.Ed.2d 675 (1989), the Supreme Court reviewed on direct appeal a
similar state court judgment, in a case in which the plaintiff
challenged the payment of Air Force retirement pay to a former
spouse. The Court had to "decide whether state courts, consistent
with the [FSPA], may treat as property divisible upon divorce
military retirement pay waived by the retiree in order to receive
veterans' disability benefits." Id. at 583, 109 S.Ct. at 2025.
The Secretary of the Air Force was not a party to that case, and at
no time did the Supreme Court, or any of the state courts that
reviewed the case, suggest that the Secretary was a necessary
party. Just as the plaintiff in Mansell had a "reasonable
opportunity" to raise that retirement pay claim in state court in
the absence of the Secretary, so too did Mr. Powell have a
reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim regarding the
FSPA in the state court proceeding.3
Accordingly, we hold that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Powell's claim that
the FSPA is unconstitutional as applied to him. That claim could,
and should, have been raised in the state court, not in a federal
court in what amounts to a collateral attack on the state court
judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
We VACATE the judgment of the district court, and REMAND to
that court with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
3
Mr. Powell also seems to suggest that this case is
distinguishable from Feldman because it, unlike Feldman, involves
a general challenge to a statute, instead of a particularized
challenge. However, the essence of Mr. Powell's claim is that
the FSPA is unconstitutional as applied to him, which clearly is
a particularized challenge to the Georgia state trial court's
judgment.