United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 94-10345.
Issam HASSAN, as next friend of Ameen Hassan, a minor child,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LUBBOCK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants,
Lubbock Independent School District, Joe Williams, Vincent
Thomas, and Ricky Atkins, Defendants-Appellants.
June 27, 1995.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas.
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GARWOOD and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
POLITZ, Chief Judge:
Issam Hassan, on behalf of his son Ameen Hassan, sued the
Lubbock Independent School District; the principal of Whiteside
Elementary School, Joe Williams; a teacher at Whiteside
Elementary, Vincent Thomas; and a juvenile probation officer at
the Lubbock County Youth Center, Ricky Atkins; asserting fourth
and fourteenth amendment claims. LISD, Williams, Thomas, and
Atkins appeal the district court's denial of their motion for
summary judgment based on their claim of qualified immunity. We
dismiss the appeal of the LISD for lack of appellate jurisdiction
and reverse the denial of summary judgment for the remaining
defendants and render judgment in their favor.
Background
On February 27, 1992, approximately 103 sixth graders from
James A. Whiteside Elementary School in Lubbock, Texas, visited the
1
Lubbock County Youth Center, a facility housing both the Lubbock
County Probation Office and a detention center for minors between
the ages of 10 and 17 who are either in custody awaiting
adjudication on criminal offenses or being detained thereafter.
Williams and Thomas accompanied the children.
At the outset of the tour, Center employees explained to the
children that the Center expected all visitors to comply with
Center rules concerning deportment and respect, and that they
should listen carefully and not talk inside the facility. Center
personnel then divided the schoolchildren into groups, one of which
consisted of 15 boys, Williams, Thomas, and a Center employee,
Ricky Atkins. As this group made its way through the facility
Ameen Hassan was cautioned repeatedly for being inattentive and
disrespectful. When he persisted, Williams and Thomas asked Atkins
to place him in a holding room so that the other students could
continue the tour without distraction.1
Atkins took Hassan to a room used to hold juveniles brought to
the facility pending retrieval by their parents or admission into
the Center. The room, located at the front of the facility outside
the detention area, contained a bed and a toilet, but was otherwise
bare. Its metal door had a glass partition. Hassan was locked in
this room for approximately 50 minutes, monitored continuously by
Center employees and Thomas who returned to the area to check on
1
The defendants describe the facility as a series of locked
sections which must be keyed to enter or exit any section.
Atkins apparently escorted Hassan back through several sections
to a holding room, also described as an "intake" room.
2
him.
When the other students finished their tour, school officials
led them by the room in which Hassan was waiting and allegedly told
them to look at Hassan. Thomas then escorted Hassan to the bus
where he joined the other students for the return trip to Whiteside
Elementary. Once back at the school, Thomas had Hassan tell the
class about his behavior and the resulting punishment, informing
them what, if anything, he had learned from the experience.
The next day Williams met with Hassan's parents to explain the
incident. He apologized for placing Hassan in a situation of which
they did not approve, but insisted that the trip had been a
positive experience for Hassan. Manifesting disagreement, Hassan's
parents removed him from Whiteside Elementary and enrolled him in
another school.
The instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 followed, claiming
that LISD, Williams, Thomas, and Atkins violated Ameen Hassan's
fourth amendment right against unreasonable seizures, fourteenth
amendment due process rights, and eighth amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment.2 The complaint also claims that
Thomas violated Hassan's first amendment right to free association
by ordering Hassan to leave the school grounds when he went there
to play with his friends after transferring schools. The district
court dismissed the eighth and first amendment claims under
2
The amended original complaint also alleges false
imprisonment, but Hassan maintains that all of his claims are
based on federal law and we accordingly treat the false
imprisonment claim as part of the fourth amendment seizure claim.
3
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Hassan did not appeal those dismissals.
The LISD, Williams, Thomas, and Atkins moved for summary
judgment on the fourth and fourteenth amendment claims on two
grounds: (1) the LISD could not be held liable because its
employees did not act pursuant to an official policy or custom, and
(2) the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
The district court denied the motions for summary judgment and the
defendants timely appealed.
Analysis
At the outset, we note that we have jurisdiction over the
appeal by Williams, Thomas, and Atkins of the district court's
denial of qualified immunity under Mitchell v. Forsyth,3 which held
that such denials, to the extent that they turn on a question of
law, were final judgments for the purposes of appellate
jurisdiction. The LISD appeals the district court's denial of its
defense of absolute immunity to Hassan's apparent state law false
imprisonment claim.4 Hassan, however, maintains in brief that all
of his claims arise under federal law. Because of this
clarification, the LISD no longer advances its claim of absolute
immunity. LISD offers no other jurisdictional basis for its
appeal. We therefore dismiss same for lack of appellate
jurisdiction.
3
472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)
(allowing interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity
under the collateral order doctrine).
4
See Loya v. Texas Dep't of Corrections, 878 F.2d 860 (5th
Cir.1989) (allowing entity to appeal denial of absolute
immunity).
4
We review a district court's denial of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standard as the district court. "Summary
judgment is proper when no issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In
determining whether summary judgment was proper, all fact questions
are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.
Questions of law are reviewed ... de novo."5
In examining the claims of qualified immunity on summary
judgment, we first inquire whether Hassan has alleged "the
violation of a clearly established constitutional right."6 For a
right to be clearly established, there does not have to be a prior
case directly on point, but the unlawfulness of the precipitating
acts must be apparent in light of the existing law.7 We then
inquire whether the defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable
" "in light of the legal rules clearly established at the time' of
5
Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co., 990 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir.)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 467,
126 L.Ed.2d 419 (1993).
6
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793,
114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991) (outlining two step process for evaluating
qualified immunity claims).
7
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97
L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Hassan insists his rights under the fourth
and fourteenth amendments were clearly established at the time of
the incident and that the first inquiry is therefore satisfied.
The determination whether a right is "clearly established" is a
more particularized inquiry than Hassan suggests; otherwise,
plaintiffs could "convert the rule of qualified immunity ... into
a rule of virtually unqualified liability." Id. at 639, 107
S.Ct. at 3039. The proper inquiry is whether a reasonable
official would know that the act in question was unlawful. Id.
at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. It necessarily follows that a right
is not clearly established if there is no actual constitutional
violation alleged. Siegert.
5
the incident in issue."8 Thus, even if we find a violation of
Hassan's constitutional rights, the individual defendants are
immune from liability if reasonable public officials could differ
on the lawfulness of their actions.9 The court need not reach this
second inquiry, however, if Hassan fails to tender the requisite
summary judgment evidence that the individual defendants violated
a clearly established constitutional right.10
In his first claim, Hassan alleges that the acts of Williams,
Thomas, and Atkins violated his fourth amendment right to be free
from an unreasonable seizure. This constitutional right extends to
seizures by or at the direction of school officials, but whether
such a seizure is unreasonable depends on all relevant contextual
circumstances.11 The Supreme Court has recognized the unique
backdrop that schools present for the operation of the fourth
amendment, specifically noting that "the preservation of order and
a proper educational environment requires close supervision of
schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct
that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult."12
Thus, while school officials are subject to the limitations of the
8
Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir.1993) (citing
Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir.1992)).
9
Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298 (5th Cir.1994).
10
Siegert; Blackwell.
11
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83
L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (finding search of student by principal
constitutional).
12
Id. at 339, 105 S.Ct. at 741.
6
fourth amendment, the reasonableness of seizures must be determined
in light of all of the circumstances, with particular attention
being paid to whether the seizure was justified at its inception
and reasonable in scope.13
At the time of the instant seizure, Hassan was touring a
juvenile detention center as part of a school-sponsored educational
field trip. The two school officials supervising the trip,
Williams and Thomas, were charged with the care and control of all
of the students. The detention center contained both older and
younger youths awaiting adjudication for criminal offenses, or
residing at the center following adjudication for criminal
offenses; these surroundings understandably heightened the need
for a disciplined attitude by the visiting students to ensure their
safety and to maintain order among the residents of the facility.
In this setting Hassan misbehaved.14 We are fully cognizant that
teachers routinely find it necessary to punish such behavior.
Williams and Thomas, aware of their responsibilities, responded to
Hassan's behavior by separating and isolating him until the other
students had finished their tour. We entertain no doubt that these
actions properly furthered the mandated maintenance of discipline
within the touring group, thus making it possible for the other
13
Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882 (10th Cir.1989) (applying
reasonableness test announced in T.L.O. for school searches to a
school seizure case); Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist., 377, 669
F.Supp. 1519 (D.Kan.1987) (applying T.L.O. framework to seizure
claim of student), rev'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 809 (10th
Cir.1989).
14
Hassan concedes in his affidavit that he was uncooperative
and was reprimanded by Thomas.
7
students to continue their valuable educational experience.15 We
conclude that Hassan's seizure was reasonably justified at its
inception.
The placement of Hassan in the holding room at the detention
center was also reasonably related in scope to the relevant
circumstances, thus justifying the action. The presence of other
potentially dangerous juveniles militated against Hassan being left
alone in an easily accessible area. The room into which Hassan was
placed both protected him and allowed for his easy supervision.
Further, this restriction of his freedom of movement lasted no
longer than absolutely necessary.16 He was released from the room
as soon as the other students completed their visit. Under these
circumstances, we find no violation of any of Hassan's clearly
established constitutional rights by either Williams or Thomas.
Nor do we perceive anything in Atkins' role as a Center
employee, or his actions in this incident, that warrants the
15
We reject the suggestion that the location of this seizure
heightens the otherwise relaxed fourth amendment standards
applicable to school searches and seizures. School field trips
often present greater, not lesser, challenges to school officials
trying to maintain order and discipline than do the relatively
orderly confines of a school. See Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d
1151 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that the greater challenges
presented by field trips justify in loco parentis authority as
well as official authority).
16
While the duration of a seizure is normally irrelevant to
the determination of its constitutionality, see United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607
(1975), the Supreme Court's command in T.L.O. to examine all of
the circumstances in the context of school searches and seizures
leads us to conclude that the duration of a seizure is relevant
to its constitutionality in the school setting. See Edwards
(noting seizure of student lasted for 20 minutes).
8
application of a different standard to his conduct. He acted at
the behest of school officials and at all times his control over
Hassan remained subject to the direction of Thomas and Williams.
There is no summary judgment evidence that Atkins used the school
trip as a subterfuge for incarcerating Hassan;17 rather, the
evidence supports the conclusion that Atkins acted reasonably. We
therefore conclude that Hassan has not shown that Atkins violated
a clearly established fourth amendment right.
Hassan also claims that Williams, Thomas, and Atkins
"incarcerated" him in a "jail cell" in violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. It is well established that
children do not " "shed their constitutional rights' at the
schoolhouse door"18 and that deprivations of liberty in the school
context may implicate both procedural and substantive due process
liberty interests.19 These rights, however, are circumscribed by
the need for effective and often immediate action by school
17
See Martens v. Dist. No. 220, Bd. of Educ., 620 F.Supp.
29, 32 (N.D.Ill.1985) (noting that there was "no basis for
thinking that school official action was a subterfuge to avoid
warrant and probable cause requirements").
18
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 736, 42
L.Ed.2d 725 (1975) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731
(1969)).
19
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1003,
43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) ("Public high school students do have
substantive and procedural rights while at school."); Goss
(recognizing that discipline can implicate procedural due process
rights); Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303
(5th Cir.1987) (finding allegations of teacher tying a student to
a chair during school to allege a substantive due process
violation).
9
officials to maintain order and discipline.20 De minimis or trivial
deprivations of liberty in the course of the disciplining of a
student do not implicate procedural due process requirements.21
Likewise, punishment does not implicate substantive due process
concerns unless the action is "arbitrary, capricious, or wholly
unrelated to the legitimate state goal of maintaining an atmosphere
conducive to learning."22
We perceive no constitutional violation inherent in the
detention of Hassan in the Center's intake room. The room was
20
Goss; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51
L.Ed.2d 711 (1977); T.L.O.
21
See Goss (recognizing that de minimis deprivations do not
implicate due process concerns); Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674, 97
S.Ct. at 1414 ("There is, of course, a de minimis level of
imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned."); Dunn
v. Tyler Indep. Sch. Dist., 460 F.2d 137, 144 (5th Cir.1972)
("Obviously school officials have available to them in day-to-day
operation of schools a scope of summary punishment without even
the limited type of hearing required in more serious
circumstance[s]."). See also Dickens v. Johnson County Bd. of
Educ., 661 F.Supp. 155 (E.D.Tenn.1987) (finding that segregation
of child to "timeout" box (refrigerator box) without notice or
hearing did not implicate either procedural or substantive due
process); Fenton v. Stear, 423 F.Supp. 767 (W.D.Pa.1976)
(holding that assignment to a particular room and prohibition of
participation with school trip to be de minimis interference with
rights).
22
Ysleta, 817 F.2d at 305-06 (citing Woodard v. Los Fresnos
Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.1984)); Wise v. Pea
Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560 (8th Cir.1988) (holding in-school
confinement to small room did not violate substantive due process
rights); Edwards, 883 F.2d at 885 (rejecting a "cryptic"
complaint of "right to be free from the restraints of the
criminal justice system"); Mitchell v. Bd. of Trustees of Oxford
Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 625 F.2d 660, 665 (5th Cir.1980)
("Because the rule and the punishment for violating the rule
clearly are rationally related to the goal of providing a safe
environment in which children can learn, it comports with
substantive due process.").
10
relatively large with 80 square feet of space and was furnished
with a toilet and a bed and had a glass partition in the door.
Although Hassan could not leave the room, he was not otherwise
physically restrained.23 He remained under adult supervision and
protection.
Nor do we equate the request of Williams and Thomas that
Atkins physically remove Hassan so that the other students could
proceed with their educational field trip with the turning of
Hassan over to the state authorities for incarceration.24 Hassan
was not placed with the residents of the facility and the intake
room was not located within the detention area. Putting Hassan in
that room was done in response to his behavior and was a measure of
punishment in a safe and supervised manner. This action made it
possible for the other children to finish the planned visit to the
facility. As noted above, Hassan's restraint was terminated
immediately upon cessation of its need. Under these circumstances,
we are persuaded beyond peradventure that the actions of Thomas,
Williams, and Atkins amount to a de minimis deprivation of Hassan's
liberty that does not implicate either procedural or substantive
due process guarantees. We also conclude that Hassan's punishment
was within the range of discretion accorded school officials and
that the punishment bore a rational relationship to the goal of
23
Cf. Ysleta (finding physical restraint of child by tying
him to chair to be unconstitutional).
24
The school officials clearly retained ultimate authority
over Hassan at all times, even though they delegated that
authority to Atkins to detain and watch Hassan while the other
children completed the tour.
11
providing a valuable and safe educational experience for the other
102 children.
Hassan insists, and we do not disagree, that more appropriate
means of punishment were available to the school officials. This
argument, however, lacks persuasive force. That a better
punishment may have been available does not establish that the
punishment administered was unconstitutional. To so hold would run
counter to the Supreme Court's affirmance of "the comprehensive
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools."25 Perceiving no summary judgment evidence
of a constitutional violation, we conclude, as we must, that there
is no violation of a clearly established constitutional right. We
therefore need inquire no further. The trial court erred in
denying qualified immunity to Thomas, Williams, and Atkins.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the denial of summary judgment for
Williams, Thomas, and Atkins and render judgment in their favor.
The trial court is to enter the appropriate decree. We DISMISS the
appeal of LISD for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
DISMISSED IN PART, REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.
25
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507, 89 S.Ct. at 737.
12