United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 94-30357.
Jack R. SALLEY, individually and on behalf of his minor daughter,
Margaret Danielle Salley, Margaret R. Salley, individually and on
behalf of their minor daughter, and Margaret Danielle Salley,
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees,
v.
The ST. TAMMANY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD and Carole Smith, Defendants-
Appellees-Cross-Appellants.
Charles N. Branton, Movant-Appellant.
July 10, 1995.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana.
Before WOOD, JR.,* JOLLY and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge:
Jack R. Salley, individually and on behalf of his minor
daughter, Margaret Danielle Salley ("Danielle"); Margaret R.
Salley;1 and Danielle ("the Salleys") appeal the decision of the
district court. The district court rejected the Salleys' claims
for residential placement for Danielle, compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and attorneys' fees, but found that the
defendants, St. Tammany Parish School Board and Carole Smith ("St.
Tammany"), had committed certain procedural violations of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA," or "the Act"),
*
Circuit Judge of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by
designation.
1
Mrs. Salley died in May 1993. Mr. Salley was subsequently
named the succession's representative in this suit.
1
20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. The district court further found,
however, that the violations committed by St. Tammany did not
negatively affect the actions taken by the Salleys regarding
Danielle's education. Accordingly, the district court awarded only
nominal damages to the Salleys. St. Tammany appeals the decision
of the district court to the extent that it found St. Tammany
liable for committing procedural violations of the Act.
I. BACKGROUND
We need not re-state the factual background and procedural
history of this case in detail here as it was well-documented by
the district court in its two opinions. See Salley v. St. Tammany
Parish Sch. Bd., No. 92-1937, 1993 WL 386299 (E.D.La. Sept. 20,
1993); Salley v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., No. 92-1937, 1994 WL
148721 (E.D.La. Apr. 18, 1994). In summary, the Salleys moved to
Louisiana from Pennsylvania in April or May of 1985, when Danielle
was in the fourth grade. The Salleys enrolled Danielle in Carolyn
Park Elementary School ("Carolyn Park"), a public school located in
St. Tammany Parish, on May 8, 1985. Danielle had been receiving
special educational services in Pennsylvania pursuant to an
individualized education program ("IEP") during the three years
immediately prior to moving to Louisiana. Upon enrolling Danielle
in Carolyn Park, Mrs. Salley provided copies of Danielle's records,
including her IEP's; Mrs. Salley also orally informed school
officials that Danielle had been diagnosed as learning disabled.
Pending an evaluation, Danielle was placed in a regular classroom
setting for the remaining fourteen days of the 1984-85 school year.
2
St. Tammany later returned Danielle's Pennsylvania school records
to the Salleys without examining them.
The Salleys were not provided with notice of their rights
under IDEA or Louisiana law, and no further action was taken
regarding Danielle's educational status during the summer of 1985.
The Salleys then removed Danielle and her siblings from St. Tammany
and enrolled them in Our Lady of Lourdes Catholic School
("Lourdes"), a private school. Danielle completed the fifth grade
and a portion of the sixth grade at Lourdes, but she showed no real
progress and her conduct deteriorated.
In the fall of 1986, the Salleys re-enrolled Danielle in the
St. Tammany public school system. At this time, the Salleys
informed the school counselor that Danielle had been experiencing
difficulty in a regular school environment. The Salleys again
provided St. Tammany with copies of Danielle's educational records,
but the Salleys were still not provided with written notification
of their rights under federal and state law. In lieu of formally
evaluating Danielle or preparing an IEP for her, St. Tammany
instead developed an informal educational plan to accommodate
Danielle. Danielle's teachers were aware of Danielle's
difficulties and the Salleys fully consented in the formulation of
the informal plan. Under this arrangement, Danielle fulfilled the
requirements of the sixth and seventh grades, and she began the
eighth grade. She scored well on standardized tests during this
period, but Danielle's overall classroom work suffered due to her
behavioral problems and poor study habits.
3
Danielle's problems continued and she was eventually admitted
to the psychiatric unit at DePaul Northshore Hospital in September
1988. Danielle was evaluated at this time and it was determined
that she qualified for Louisiana's hospital/homebound program2 as
she had been admitted to DePaul Hospital. It was also determined,
however, that Danielle was not suffering from a learning disorder.
Although Danielle demonstrated little academic progress while at
DePaul Hospital, she was able to satisfy the requirements of the
eighth grade. Danielle was discharged from DePaul Hospital in the
summer of 1989, after the Salleys were fully informed of their
right under state and federal law to have Danielle formally
evaluated to determine her eligibility for special educational
services.3
The Salleys enrolled Danielle in another private school, St.
Scholastic Academy, in the fall of 1989, but she was re-admitted to
DePaul Hospital in January 1990, after she developed a substance
abuse problem and failed several courses. Danielle completed the
ninth grade in DePaul Hospital as a hospital/homebound patient.
After Danielle was discharged from DePaul Hospital in the summer of
1990, the Salleys sought to re-enroll Danielle in the St. Tammany
2
Louisiana's hospital/homebound program allows children to
receive special educational services while they are hospitalized
or confined to their homes because of health or emotional
problems. See La. Bulletin 1706 § 449.
3
From this point on, the Salleys do not deny that they were
informed of their rights under state and federal law at every
appropriate juncture in Danielle's educational history—the
district court documented at least seven occasions when the
Salleys were presented with formal, written notification of their
rights.
4
public school system.
St. Tammany school officials screened Danielle prior to the
school year and determined that she did not qualify for special
educational services. The Salleys were then informed of their
right to request a formal evaluation. Instead of requesting a
formal evaluation, the Salleys instead approached a school
psychologist and expressed their concern regarding Danielle's
ability to handle a regular curriculum. Danielle attended
approximately three days of classes at St. Tammany before an
interim IEP conference was held on August 28, 1990. The Salleys
disagreed with the interim IEP proposed by St. Tammany because
Danielle was to receive instruction in a common resource room with
other children. The Salleys instead demanded residential placement
for Danielle pending a full evaluation. St. Tammany rejected this
proposal and the Salleys withheld their consent for a full
evaluation of Danielle.
Due to her continuing difficulties, Danielle was again
admitted to DePaul Hospital in September 1990. On October 6, 1990,
the Salleys exercised their right to request a due process hearing
to review Danielle's educational placement. In January 1991, while
the due process hearing was pending, the Salleys sent Danielle to
the Darrow School, a residential facility in New York. Before
Danielle was able to complete her first semester at the Darrow
School, she was again admitted to DePaul Hospital on May 17, 1991.
The Salleys re-enrolled Danielle in the Darrow School in the fall
of 1991, but then transferred her to the Meeting High School in New
5
Hampshire, another private residential facility, that same fall.
Danielle eventually graduated from Meeting High School in December,
1993.
This matter was initially heard before a due process hearing
officer pursuant to the Salleys' request of October 6, 1990. After
two days of testimony, the hearing officer recessed the hearing so
that a formal evaluation of Danielle could be conducted. Prior to
the evaluation ordered by the hearing officer, Danielle had not
been formally evaluated since she had moved to Louisiana. Those
informal evaluations and screenings which had been conducted by
doctors at DePaul Hospital and by school officials at St. Tammany
prior to this time had not resulted in Danielle being diagnosed as
learning disabled because she consistently tested at or above her
grade level.
After the evaluation, a formal IEP conference was held and St.
Tammany drafted a proposed IEP. The Salleys rejected the proposed
IEP as it did not provide residential placement for Danielle. The
hearing officer eventually denied the Salleys' request for
residential placement for Danielle after concluding that St.
Tammany's proposed IEP met IDEA's requirements and that the
proposed IEP was less restrictive than the requested residential
placement. The Salleys appealed the hearing officer's decision to
a state level review panel. The review panel upheld the hearing
officer's conclusion that St. Tammany's proposed IEP was
appropriate and less restrictive than the residential placement
sought by the Salleys. The Salleys then filed suit in district
6
court pursuant to IDEA's provision for judicial review. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(e)(2). The district court rejected most of the Salleys'
claims, but found that St. Tammany had committed certain procedural
violations of the Act. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court's decision that an IEP fulfills the
requirements of IDEA is a mixed question of fact and law and, as
such, we subject this determination to a de novo review.
Christopher M. v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 F.2d 1285,
1289 (5th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). In this regard, we must
remain mindful of our proper role in this area:
Congress left the choice of educational policies and methods
where it properly belongs—in the hands of state and local
school officials. Our task is not to second-guess state and
local policy decisions; rather, it is the narrow one of
determining whether state and local school officials have
complied with the Act.
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th
Cir.1989). The district court's underlying factual findings are
subject to the clearly erroneous standard. Christopher M., 933
F.2d at 1289 (citation omitted).
For the reasons given below, we reverse in part and affirm in
part the district court's finding that St. Tammany committed
certain procedural violations of IDEA; we affirm the finding that
Danielle was not harmed as a result of the violation that did
occur. We affirm the district court's determination that the IEP
proposed by St. Tammany was sufficient under IDEA. We also affirm
the district court's finding that the Salleys are not entitled to
an award of attorneys' fees.
7
III. PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS
A. Whether Procedural Violations Occurred
The district court found that St. Tammany had committed the
following procedural violations: (1) Danielle was not evaluated or
placed on an IEP when she moved from Pennsylvania and first
enrolled at Carolyn Park Elementary School in May 1985; (2)
Danielle was not evaluated by St. Tammany when she returned to the
public school system during the 1986-1987 school year; and (3) the
Salleys were not provided with written notice of their rights under
IDEA by St. Tammany at a sufficiently early date. See Salley, 1993
WL 386299 at *7-*10. We find that the district court clearly erred
with respect to the first two findings, and we affirm the last
finding.
1. May 1985
Turning first to the issue of Danielle's initial enrollment
in May 1985, we take note of the district court's findings
regarding the time constraints facing St. Tammany: At the time of
Danielle's initial enrollment at Carolyn Park, only fourteen school
days remained of the 1984-85 school year. Federal and state
regulations, however, allow schools thirty days to hold a meeting
to develop an IEP once it is determined that a child needs special
education services. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(c); La. Bulletin
1508. The time constraints involved in this case were further
exacerbated by the fact that Pennsylvania school officials did not
forward Danielle's official records until after the end of the
1984-85 school year—although Mrs. Salley did provide St. Tammany
8
with an unofficial copy of Danielle's records upon Danielle's
enrollment.
Then, before Danielle could be evaluated in the fall of 1985,
the Salleys unilaterally removed Danielle from the public school
system, severed all lines of communication with public school
officials, and enrolled Danielle in a private school for the 1985-
86 school year.4 Under these circumstances, we cannot uphold the
finding that St. Tammany violated IDEA by failing to evaluate
Danielle or place her on an IEP before the conclusion of the 1984-
85 school year.5
2. Fall 1986
Second, we find that the district court clearly erred when it
found that St. Tammany had procedurally violated IDEA by failing to
4
In light of the fact that the private school wherein the
Salleys enrolled Danielle, Lourdes, offered no special education
services, the district court concluded that the Salleys may have
withdrawn Danielle from St. Tammany for the specific purpose of
avoiding a formal evaluation:
Considering Mrs. Salley's concerns regarding the
development of an IEP program for Danielle who was a
bright child, the decision to withdraw her from the
public school system during the summer of 1985, was
more likely motivated by her concern that upon
evaluation, Danielle might indeed be placed in [a
learning disabilities] classroom at Carolyn Park
Elementary with slow learners.
1994 WL 148721, at *5.
5
The district court cited Jackson v. Franklin County Sch.
Bd., 806 F.2d 623, 628 (5th Cir.1986), in support of its holding
that the school district was obligated to either enroll Danielle
in a special educational curriculum or convene an IEP conference
before the end of the 1985-86 school year. 1993 WL 386299, at *9
n. 71. Jackson is distinguishable, however, as in that case
"over a month of school still remained in the spring term." 806
F.2d at 628.
9
evaluate Danielle when she returned to the public school system in
the fall of 1986. Where, as here, a child is not currently
enrolled in special education,6 Louisiana law does not require the
initiation of an individual evaluation unless a parent, the school
system, or a hearing officer has requested such an evaluation. La.
Bulletin 1706 § 431(A). None of these parties requested an
evaluation in this case.
The district court found, moreover, that St. Tammany could not
be faulted for failing to request that Danielle be evaluated in the
fall of 1986: At this time, the bulk of credible evidence
indicated that Danielle was not learning disabled under Louisiana
law. As the district court found, "[t]he resounding opinion of the
educational professionals rendering evaluation and/or diagnostic
services to Danielle up until this time i.e., May 1990, was that
she was not learning disabled within the meaning of Louisiana law
and thus did not qualify for special education or related
services." 1994 WL 148721, at *15.
The district court further found that an educational strategy,
instead of a formal IEP, was prepared for Danielle upon her
re-enrollment in the fall of 1986 at the direction of the Salleys
because the Salleys were loath to stigmatize Danielle.7 Although
6
As discussed above, the district court found that Lourdes,
the private school where Danielle was enrolled prior to her
return to St. Tammany, did not offer any special educational
services. 1994 WL 148721, at *5.
7
The district court found:
Mrs. Salley's close cooperation with [St. Tammany]
to the end of accommodating Danielle in a regular
10
Danielle's school performance slipped during the period that this
informal arrangement was in place, the district court nonetheless
concluded that Danielle received adequate educational benefits
during this time.8
classroom in conjunction with her later statements
regarding placing a bright student such as Danielle in
[a learning disabilities] classroom with slow learners,
have convinced the Court that from the outset Mrs.
Salley was "anti-IEP," and thus, did not request a
formal educational evaluation of Danielle or an interim
IEP. It is this Court's opinion that even if
Danielle's teachers at Slidell Junior High had
recommended early on that she be fully evaluated and/or
suggested an interim IEP for Danielle, considering Mrs.
Salley's mind-set she would not have consented to such
an evaluation or an interim IEP.
1994 WL 148721, at *10.
8
As the district court found:
[T]he uncontested fact that Danielle progressed from
the sixth to the eighth grade at Slidell Junior High
with passing marks in combination with the
psychoeducational evaluation/assessment conducted by
Dr. Margaret Hagan in April of 1988 ... noting that
Danielle was functioning at or above grade level in
every subject, demonstrate that Danielle derived
educational benefits from the modified regular
educational program implemented by the teachers and
school officials at Slidell Junior High in cooperation
with Mrs. Salley....
....
... Danielle's below average but passing final
performance marks during the seventh grade at Slidell
Junior High appeared to be due to a combination of her
lack of effort, refusal to turn in the required
assignments, an "oppositional" component to her
personality quite possibly stemming from personal
problems at home with her parents, and not the result
of the allegedly inadequate educational program devised
by Slidell Junior High school officials/teachers in
cooperation with Mrs. Salley.
1994 WL 148721, at *8, *14.
11
3. Failure to Notify
We affirm the district court's finding that St. Tammany
violated the procedures of IDEA by failing to provide the Salleys
with formal notice of their rights under the Act in May 1985. We
reverse, however, the district court's finding that St. Tammany
violated IDEA by failing to notify the Salleys of their rights when
Danielle re-enrolled in the fall of 1986.
Turning first to Danielle's initial enrollment in May 1985,
we find that St. Tammany was required to notify the Salleys of the
Act's protections under the facts of this case, even though there
was insufficient time in which to prepare an IEP in May 1985.
"Surely parents should, and are expected to, vigilantly oversee
their handicapped child's educational progress. However, under the
Act the burden rests squarely on the school or agency to safeguard
handicapped children's rights by informing their parents of those
rights." Jackson v. Franklin County Sch. Bd., 806 F.2d 623, 629
(5th Cir.1986). Section 1415 states, in pertinent part, that a
state is required to provide
(C) written prior notice to the parents or guardian of
the child whenever such agency or unit—
(i) proposes to initiate or change, or
(ii) refuses to initiate or change, the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the
provision of a free appropriate public education to the child;
(D) procedures designed to assure that the notice
required by clause (C) fully informs the parents or guardian
..., unless it clearly is not feasible to do so, of all the
procedures available pursuant to this section.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C)-(D).
12
In this case, Danielle had been diagnosed as learning
disabled and was receiving educational services in Pennsylvania
pursuant to an IEP immediately prior to her enrollment at Carolyn
Park in May 1985. While this fact did not necessarily obligate St.
Tammany to continue those services, St. Tammany's discontinuance of
those services did, at least, obligate St. Tammany to inform the
Salleys of their rights under IDEA.9 In short, we agree with the
district court's holding that a state is obligated under IDEA to
follow the Act's procedural requirements when a child has been
determined to be handicapped under another state's laws, even
though that child has not been identified as learning disabled
under the state's own laws. Our holding is, however, limited to
situations such as this one, where a child has recently moved from
a state where he or she was receiving special educational services
pursuant to an IEP. In this situation, the second state must
inform the parents or guardian of the child if that second state
proposes to change "the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C). Notice of
such change is required even in situations where the child would
never have qualified for special educational services under the
9
That there was insufficient time in which to evaluate or
prepare a new IEP for Danielle does not excuse St. Tammany. St.
Tammany could have continued to provide special educational
services to Danielle in conformity with her last Pennsylvania IEP
for the remainder of the 1985-86 school year. Furthermore,
notice is required here as students in Louisiana may receive
special educational services on an interim basis where time does
not permit an in-depth evaluation—but parental approval, and
hence notice, is required for the interim placement. See La.
Bulletin 1706 § 416.
13
second state's laws.
We find, however, that Danielle's re-enrollment in the fall
of 1986 did not obligate St. Tammany to inform the Salleys of the
Act's protections. The procedural safeguards of § 1415 are
designed to protect "children with disabilities and their parents
or guardians." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). The preliminary evaluations
and screenings of Danielle that had been conducted in Louisiana as
of the fall of 1986 did not reveal any evidence of a learning
disability. Although Danielle later required hospitalization, in
part because of emotional difficulties, and although Danielle was
later diagnosed as suffering from dyslexia, the record indicates
that she was not suffering from these problems in the fall of 1986.
Furthermore, when Danielle re-enrolled in the fall of 1986, she had
most recently attended Lourdes, where there was no IEP in place and
where she did not receive special educational services. For these
reasons, the procedural protections provided by the Act did not
apply to her at this time and St. Tammany can not be faulted for
failing to follow those procedures.
As the issue is not properly before us, we express no opinion
regarding whether St. Tammany may have violated its responsibility
to search for children suspected of being in need of special
educational services in this case. See La. Bulletin 1706 §§ 411-
12.
We agree with the district court's conclusion that, under the
facts of this case, St. Tammany is liable for failing to provide
the Salleys with notice of IDEA's procedural safeguards when
14
Danielle was initially enrolled in May 1985; we reverse the
district court's finding that St. Tammany is liable for failing to
notify the Salleys of their rights when Danielle was re-enrolled in
the fall of 1986.
B. Appropriate Remedy
Despite its findings regarding these procedural violations,
the district court awarded only nominal damages to the Salleys
after concluding that the violations did not affect the Salleys'
decisions regarding the education of Danielle. The district court
reached this conclusion after first finding that the Salleys were
very familiar with the IEP process, as they had been exposed to it
on three previous occasions in Pennsylvania. The district court
further found that, despite their familiarity with the IEP process,
the Salleys did not request that Danielle be evaluated to determine
her eligibility for special educational services, nor did the
Salleys request that an IEP or an interim IEP be prepared, once
they had moved to Louisiana and enrolled Danielle in Carolyn Park
Elementary School. Evidently, the Salleys did not want an IEP
prepared for Danielle because they were afraid of the impact that
an IEP would have on Danielle's education. In Mrs. Salley's own
words: " "I knew IEPs could be done, but to me an IEP just means
going in a classroom for learning disabled kids. Usually those
classrooms are usually and honestly for slow kids.' " 1994 WL
148721, at *5 (quoting the testimony of Mrs. Salley).
Based upon these findings, which we do not find to be clearly
erroneous, we must affirm the conclusion of the district court that
15
the procedural violation committed by St. Tammany did not affect
the Salley's decisions regarding Danielle's education.10 Although
St. Tammany did not advise the Salleys of their right to have
Danielle formally evaluated at the time of her initial enrollment
at Carolyn Park, the Salleys were already well aware of this right,
given their past experiences in Pennsylvania. St. Tammany's
procedural violations therefore can not be said to have harmed
Danielle. The district court acted correctly when it awarded only
nominal damages to the Salleys.
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE PROPOSED IEP
In brief, IDEA provides federal money to states in order to
assist them in providing "a free appropriate public education" to
children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). The federal
funding is conditioned upon a state's compliance with the Act's
provisions. 20 U.S.C. § 1416. In Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), the Supreme Court
provided the following two-part test to determine whether a state
has met the requirements of IDEA: "First, has the State complied
with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the
individualized educational program developed through the Act's
procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
10
This conclusion is bolstered by the district court's
finding that the Salleys were later provided with written
notification of their rights, on at least seven occasions, but
that the Salleys nonetheless never requested that Danielle be
evaluated or that an IEP be prepared for her. 1994 WL 148721, at
*21. "[E]ven after having been thoroughly notified of their
rights, the Salleys chose to skirt the system, and chart the
course of Danielle's educational history without taking advantage
of their rights." Id. at *19.
16
educational benefits?" Id. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. at 3051 (footnotes
omitted).
The Act seeks to ensure that each disabled child receives a
free appropriate public education by requiring the preparation of
an IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18). The Act defines an IEP as
follows:
The term "individualized education program" means a
written statement for each child with a disability developed
in any meeting by a representative of the local educational
agency ..., the teacher, the parents or guardian of such
child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which statement
shall include—
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational
performance of such child,
(B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term
instructional objectives,
(C) a statement of the specific educational services to
be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child
will be able to participate in regular educational programs,
(D) a statement of the needed transition services for
students beginning no later than age 16 ... before the student
leaves the school setting,
(E) the projected date for initiation and anticipated
duration of such services, and
(F) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation
procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an
annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being
achieved....
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20). The Supreme Court has held, however, that
the Act does not require a state to maximize each disabled child's
educational potential. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200, 102 S.Ct. at 3047-
48. Rather, the IEP need only be "reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive educational benefits." Id. at 207, 102 S.Ct.
at 305 (footnote omitted).
17
Turning to the IEP proposed by St. Tammany, we agree with the
district court's finding that it satisfies the Act's requirements.
The proposed IEP sought, in part, to provide: (1) individualized
instruction in problem areas, particularly writing; (2) oral,
untimed testing; (3) academic subjects one subject at a time, at
a pace set by Danielle; (4) an hour of individualized counseling
twice a week, as needed; and (5) enrollment in a certain number of
regular classes with non-exceptional children. We have previously
held that the Act creates a presumption in favor of the educational
plan established by the IEP and that the party attacking the IEP
bears the burden of demonstrating its inappropriateness. See
Christopher M., 933 F.2d at 1290-91 (citations omitted). It is
evident that the Salleys have not carried their burden
here—especially in light of the Salleys' primary challenge to the
IEP.
The Salleys attempt to argue that only an IEP which provided
for the residential placement of Danielle could be viewed as
reasonably calculated to enable Danielle to receive educational
benefits. The district court found, however, that "many of
Danielle's difficulties stem from her relationship with her family
and that such matters are more properly resolved through counseling
rather than the removal of the child from the household." 1993 WL
386299, at *11. Even if we were to assume arguendo that a
residential placement could provide the best possible education for
18
Danielle,11 we would not necessarily be required to reject St.
Tammany's proposed IEP. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200, 102 S.Ct. at
3047-48. Moreover, our conclusion finds additional support in the
Act's requirement that an IEP must seek to educate a child in the
least restrictive environment. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5);12 see also La.
Bulletin 1706 § 448. The IEP proposed by St. Tammany, which would
have allowed Danielle to live at home and attend some regular
classes, is obviously less restrictive than the residential
placement in New York and New Hampshire sought by the Salleys.
We accordingly affirm the district court's finding that the
IEP proposed by St. Tammany passes muster under IDEA.
V. PREVAILING PARTIES
The Salleys also contest the district court's decision to
deny them attorneys' fees. The Act provides that "the court, in
its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the
costs to the parents or guardian of a child or youth with a
11
This is an assumption which is not supported by the
record—Danielle required readmittance to DePaul Northshore
Hospital, for example, before she could complete even one
semester at the Darrow School.
12
Section 1412(5) requires participating states, in
pertinent part, to establish
procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent
appropriate, children with disabilities ... are
educated with children who are not disabled, and that
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal
of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the nature or
severity of the disability is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
19
disability who is the prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. §
1415(e)(4)(B). The district court's decision regarding the award
of attorneys' fees under IDEA will be overturned only for an abuse
of discretion. Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary
Ed., 835 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir.1988).
In the context of determining "prevailing party" status under
42 U.S.C. § 1988,13 the Supreme Court has stated that "a plaintiff
"prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially
alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the
plaintiff." Farrar v. Hobby, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 566,
573, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). In this case, the Salleys did not
obtain residential placement for Danielle, which was their primary
objective. The Salleys' sole victory in the district court—a
finding that St. Tammany had procedurally violated the Act—did not
materially alter the legal relationship between parties, as
evidenced by the Salleys' receipt of only nominal damages.
Danielle was given a full evaluation as a result of the due process
hearing initiated by the Salleys, but this result could have been
obtained at any time and the Salleys were well aware of this fact.
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied the Salleys' request for an award of
attorney's fees.
13
We have previously held that we may look to other fee
shifting statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, for guidance in
interpreting the meaning of "prevailing party." See, e.g.,
Angela L. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188, 1193 (5th
Cir.1990).
20
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE in part, and
AFFIRM in part, the decision of the district court.
21