[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ JANUARY 24, 2002
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 00-16345 CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 97-01976-CV-T-26E
VENCOR HOSPITALS, INC.,
d.b.a. VENCOR HOSPITAL-TAMPA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STANDARD LIFE AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 24, 2002)
Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, BLACK, Circuit Judge, and MORENO*,
District Judge.
BLACK, Circuit Judge:
*
Honorable Frederico A. Moreno, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida,
sitting by designation.
Appellant Vencor Hospitals, Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration
following the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee Standard Life and
Accident Insurance Company. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
district court; however, neither party received notice of the order. After
discovering the denial of its motion for reconsideration almost a year later,
Appellant sought relief from judgment. The district court determined relief was
precluded based on the 1991 amendment adopting Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(6). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant commenced this action to recover the balance due for hospital
services rendered to Etha Good, a Florida resident to whom Appellee had issued an
insurance policy providing benefits supplementing her Medicare coverage. At
issue was whether the terms of the insurance policy limited reimbursement to the
discounted rates accepted by the hospital from Medicare, or whether the policy
obligated payment at Appellant’s standard rates. Following cross-motions for
summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Appellee, holding the policy unambiguously mandated payment at Medicare rates.
Appellant timely moved for reconsideration. On October 26, 1999, the
district court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration. Neither
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party, however, received notice of the order. Nearly a year later, on or about
October 6, 2000, Appellant first learned its motion for reconsideration had been
denied.1
On October 17, 2000, Appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). In this motion, Appellant asked
the district court to vacate its October 26, 1999 order denying reconsideration and
re-enter the order on or about October 6, 2000, the date of actual notice. In effect,
Appellant sought an extension of the time period for filing a notice of appeal from
the order denying its motion for reconsideration. Based on the 1991 amendment
adopting Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6), the district court concluded
relief from judgment – almost a year after its entry – was not available under Rule
60(b). Appellant’s motion for relief from judgment, thus, was denied.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1
On October 6, 2000, the district court issued an order denying an October 2, 2000 motion
for relief from summary judgment filed by Appellant. The basis of the October 2, 2000 motion was
a recent opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Vencor,
Inc. v. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In its October 6, 2000 order, the
district court concluded the District of Columbia Circuit’s opinion did not affect its summary
judgment in favor of Appellee. Discussing denial of the motion for relief, however, the district court
noted its earlier denial of Appellant’s motion for reconsideration. This was the first notice received
by Appellant indicating its motion for reconsideration had been denied.
3
A district court’s interpretation of federal procedural rules is subject to de
novo review. See Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir.
2000) (holding a district court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is a question of law subject to de novo review); Silvious v. Pharaon, 54
F.3d 697, 700 (11th Cir. 1995) (same); Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086,
1096-97 (11th Cir. 1996) (same).
III. DISCUSSION
This appeal concerns the circumstances under which a district court can
extend the time for filing an appeal when a party does not receive actual notice of
the judgment. Appellant argues the district court erred in denying its motion for
relief from judgment, arguing Rule 60(b) may be used to circumvent the deadlines
for appeal set forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). Alternatively,
Appellant argues it should be given additional time to file an appeal based on the
unique circumstances arising from its lack of notice.2
A. Relief from Judgment Based on Lack of Actual Notice
2
Appellant also contends the district court should have granted its motion for relief from
judgment based on a change in the law set forth in Vencor, Inc. v. Physicians Mutual Insurance Co.,
211 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 2000). As discussed infra in footnote 1, the District of Columbia Circuit’s
opinion served as the basis of Appellant’s October 2, 2000 motion for relief from summary
judgment, not as a basis of Appellant’s later October 17, 2000 motion for relief from judgment based
on lack of notice. The district court denied Appellant’s October 2, 2000 motion for relief on October
6, 2000. The district court’s October 6, 2000, order denying relief was not appealed and, thus, the
change-of-law argument raised by Appellant is not properly before this Court.
4
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) prescribes strict time limits for
filing a notice of appeal after entry of a final judgment or order by the district
court. Generally, notice of an appeal must be filed within 30 days after the
judgment or order being appealed is entered. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
Although the district court clerk’s office is obligated to serve parties with notice of
judgments and orders, “[l]ack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the
time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to
appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted in Rule 4(a) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d).
Prior to 1991, neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure contained provisions permitting an extension of the
time limit for filing an appeal when a party entitled to receive notice of the entry of
a judgment or order fails to receive such notice. In 1991, however, Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a) was amended to include subsection (6), which states:
(6) Reopening the Time to File an Appeal. The district court may
reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of 14 days after the date
when its order to reopen is entered, but only if all the following
conditions are satisfied:
(A) the motion is filed within 180 days after the
judgment or order is entered or within 7 days after the moving
party receives notice of the entry, whichever is earlier;
(B) the court finds that the moving party was entitled to
notice of the entry of the judgment or order sought to be
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appealed but did not receive the notice from the district court or
any party within 21 days after entry; and
(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). By providing a limited opportunity to reopen the time for
appeal, Rule 4(a)(6) balances the inequity of foreclosing appeals by parties who do
not receive actual notice of a dispositive order against the need to protect the
finality of judgments.
Having failed to receive actual notice of the district court’s October 26, 1999
order denying its motion for reconsideration until almost a year after the order was
entered, Appellant did not appeal the order within the 30-day time period set forth
in Rule 4(a). Unfortunately for Appellant, the deadline for seeking to reopen its
time for appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6) also had passed. Although Appellant
likely could meet the second and third conditions for reopening the time for appeal,
the first condition could not be satisfied because more than 180 days had elapsed
since the judgment was entered.
Unable to seek an extension of time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(6), Appellant
filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b) allows
a district court to relieve a party from final judgment for “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect, . . . or . . . any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Prior to 1991, relief from
6
judgment under Rule 60(b) was a recognized method of avoiding the otherwise
harsh results imposed upon parties failing to receive actual notice of a judgment
until after the time for appeal had passed. See, e.g., Harnish v. Manatee County,
Florida, 783 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir. 1986) (“By availing itself of the escape
valve provided by Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in vacating
and reentering its order on the Rule 59 motion, the court avoided the manifest
injustice worked by a rigid application of the provisions of Rule 77(d) to the
above-recited facts.”).
At issue is whether, in light of the 1991 amendment adopting Rule 4(a)(6),
Rule 60(b) continues to be a viable means of de facto granting an extension of the
time in which a party failing to receive notice of a final judgment or order may file
an appeal.3 The amendment itself acknowledges the unfairness of enforcing the
strict Rule 4(a) deadlines for filing an appeal when a party does not receive notice
of a judgment or order. By way of remedying such inequities, the amendment
permits an extension of the time to appeal. Such extension, however, is not
unlimited. In the interest of protecting the finality of judgments, Rule 4(a)(6)
specifically conditions extension on the filing of a motion for relief within 180
3
Although this issue previously was recognized by the Court in Villano v. City of Boynton
Beach, its resolution was not necessary for reaching a decision in that matter. 254 F.3d 1302, 1313
(11th Cir. 2001) (“Whether the Eleventh Circuit will join the circuits that have already addressed
the effect of the 1991 addition to Rule 4 is a question for another case.”).
7
days after the judgment or order is entered. Under the plain meaning of Rule
4(a)(6), district courts are authorized to reopen the time for filing an appeal based
on lack of notice solely within 180 days of the judgment or order.
Also instructive on the effect of Rule 4(a)(6) are the explanatory notes of the
advisory committee adopting the 1991 amendment:
The amendment provides a limited opportunity for relief in
circumstances where the notice of entry of a judgment or order,
required to be mailed by the clerk of the district court pursuant to Rule
77(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is either not received by
a party or is received so late as to impair the opportunity to file a
timely notice of appeal. The amendment adds a new subdivision (6)
allowing a district court to reopen for a brief period the time for
appeal upon a finding that notice of entry of a judgment or order was
not received from the clerk or a party within 21 days of its entry and
that no party would be prejudiced. . . .
Reopening may be ordered only upon a motion filed within 180
days of the entry of a judgment or order or within 7 days of receipt of
notice of such entry, whichever is earlier. This provision establishes
an outer time limit of 180 days for a party who fails to receive timely
notice of entry of a judgment to seek additional time to appeal . . . .
Fed. R. App. P. 4 advisory committee’s notes to 1991 amendment (emphasis
added). As with the language of the amendment itself, the advisory committee’s
notes evidence an intent to provide an exclusive, limited opportunity for relief
when a party fails to receive notice of the entry of a judgment or order. To permit
extensions of the time to appeal beyond the 180-day limit set forth in Rule 4(a)(6)
would effectively thwart the purpose of the amendment.
8
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Rule 4(a)(6) provides the exclusive
method for extending a party’s time to appeal for failure to receive actual notice
that a judgment or order has been entered. We further conclude Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) cannot be used to circumvent the 180-day limitation set forth
in Rule 4(a)(6). In so holding, we join all of the other circuits examining this
issue.4 See, e.g., Clark v. Lavallie, 204 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding Rule
4(a)(6) trumps Rule 60(b)); Servants of the Paraclete v. Does I-XVI, 204 F.3d 1005
(10th Cir. 2000) (same); In re Stein, 197 F.3d 421 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Zimmer
St. Louis, Inc. v. Zimmer Co., 32 F.3d 357 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); see also 16A
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3950.6
at 228 (3d ed. 1999) (“Rule 4(a)(6) provides the exclusive means for extending
appeal time for failure to learn that judgment has been entered. Once the 180-day
period has expired, a district court cannot rely on the one-time practice of vacating
the judgment and reentering the same judgment in order to create a new appeal
period.”).
4
Appellant cites Lewis v. Alexander, 987 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1993) for the proposition there
is a circuit split on this issue. Although Lewis was issued after 1991 and involves application of
Rule 60(b) to reopen the time for appeal, the Sixth Circuit did not address the 180-day limitation set
forth in Rule 4(a)(6). Rather, the issue in Lewis concerned use of Rule 60(b) to provide an exception
to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5). Importantly, Lewis did not involve an untimely
appeal based on lack of notice of a final judgment.
9
Appellant undisputedly did not learn of the district court’s order denying its
motion for reconsideration until almost a year after entry of the order. After
becoming aware of the order, Appellant promptly sought relief; however, the
judgment could not be reopened under Rule 4(a)(6) because more than 180 days
had elapsed since entry of the order. Although Appellant found itself in the
unenviable position of having failed to file a timely notice of appeal because it
lacked notice, the district court held Rule 60(b) could not be used to accomplish
what Rule 4(a)(6) expressly forbade. We conclude the district court correctly
determined its inability to grant relief under Rule 60(b) and affirm.
B. Unique Circumstances Arising from Lack of Notice
Even if Rule 60(b) is no longer a viable means of obtaining relief for failure
to timely appeal due to lack of notice, Appellant argues the district court
nevertheless had the ability to extend its time for appeal based on the unique
circumstances doctrine. The unique circumstances doctrine was first recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat
Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 83 S. Ct. 283 (1962), and Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S.
384, 84 S. Ct. 397 (1964), wherein the Court acknowledged the inequity of
foreclosing appeals by parties whose failure to file timely notices of appeal results
from reliance upon assurances of the court. More recently, in Osterneck v. Ernst &
10
Whitney, 489 U.S. 169, 109 S. Ct. 987 (1989), the Supreme Court clarified the
limited circumstances under which the doctrine arises: “By its terms, [the unique
circumstances doctrine] applies only where a party has performed an act which, if
properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received
specific assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been properly done.” 489
U.S. at 179, 109 S. Ct. at 993.
This Court traditionally has construed the unique circumstances doctrine in a
broad manner. For example, the doctrine has been applied when misleading
assurances were made by the clerk’s office, rather than a judicial officer. See
Willis v. Newsome, 747 F.2d 605 (11th Cir. 1984) (applying unique circumstances
doctrine when employee of clerk’s office assured counsel his notice of appeal
would be stamped as received on date of mailing). Additionally, the doctrine has
not been limited to verbal assurances, but has been applied to any judicial action
upon which a party reasonably relied, “so long as the judicial action occurred prior
to the expiration of the official time period such that the appellant could have given
timely notice had he not been lulled into inactivity.” Butler v. Coral Volkswagen,
Inc., 804 F.2d 612, 617 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Hollins v. Dept. of Corrs., 191
F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying unique circumstances doctrine where clerk’s
11
office failed to enter final order onto PACER docketing system, which petitioner
regularly monitored based on encouragement from clerk’s office).
Crucial to the application of the unique circumstances doctrine is the
occurrence of a judicial action upon which a party relies in failing to file a timely
notice of appeal. As a result, the mere failure of the district court clerk’s office to
serve Appellant with notice of the October 26, 1999 order, standing alone, does not
constitute a judicial assurance or action sufficient to warrant relief under the unique
circumstances doctrine.5 In addition to the lack of notice, however, Appellant
contends it was lulled into inactivity by specific actions of the district court clerk’s
office. In the months following entry of the district court’s October 26, 1999
order, Appellee filed two separate notices of supplemental authority in opposition
to the motion for reconsideration. By virtue of the clerk’s accepting the two
notices, Appellant suggests it was led to believe no order had been issued.
Appellant contends this false belief constitutes a unique circumstance warranting
relief.
5
Such circumstances are specifically contemplated by, and relief is provided under, Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d). Even prior to the
1991 amendment adopting Rule 4(a)(6), however, such circumstances would not have warranted
relief under the unique circumstances doctrine because they do not involve judicial actions or
assurances.
12
Under the facts of this case, we conclude the acceptance of the notices of
supplemental authority do not warrant relief under the unique circumstances
doctrine. As an initial matter, the notices of supplemental authority were filed by
Appellee, not Appellant. More significantly, the notices were filed on January 6,
2000, and March 29, 2000, respectively. Thus, even if the mere acceptance of the
notices by the clerk’s office was sufficient to constitute a judicial action, and even
if any reliance on such acceptance was reasonable, the acceptance occurred after
expiration of the time period for appeal of the district court’s October 26, 1999
order. As a result, the clerk’s acceptance of Appellee’s notices could not have
prevented Appellant from giving timely notice.
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court correctly denied Appellant’s motion for relief from
judgment. In light of the 1991 amendment to Rule 4(a)(6), Rule 60(b) is no longer
a viable means of extending a party’s time to appeal based on failure to receive
notice of a judgment or order. Furthermore, the circumstances of this case do not
warrant application of the unique circumstances doctrine.
AFFIRMED.
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