[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
February 17, 2004
No. 03-11104
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 91-03052 CR-3-RV-01
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM MICHAEL ADKINSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(February 17, 2004)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, DUBINA and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
William Michael Adkinson appeals the district court’s order awarding him
$100,169.75 in attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L.
No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2003),
historical and statutory notes). United States v. Adkinson, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1297
(N.D. Fla. 2003).
Adkinson presents three arguments on appeal. He contends that (1) the district
court erred in subjecting the award to the limitations on attorney’s fees contained in
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (2003); (2) the district court abused its discretion in
determining that no special factors warranted payment of fees at the prevailing market
rate rather than the rate specified in § 2412(d)(2)(A); and (3) the district court abused
its discretion in calculating the reasonable number of hours expended by Adkinson’s
various attorneys.
Adkinson’s first argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in United States
v. Aisenberg, 11th Cir., ___ F.3d ___ (No. 03-10857, Feb. 6, 2004), which holds that
fee awards under the Hyde Amendment are subject to the limitations in §
2412(d)(2)(A). Of the award, $50,000 represented a flat fee which Adkinson agreed
to pay his trial counsel. Adkinson, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1319. This amount, when
divided by the number of hours Adkinson’s lawyer spent litigating the trial, results
in an hourly rate substantially lower than the fee cap provided in § 2412(d)(2)(A).
Nonetheless, because $50,000 represented the total fees of his trial counsel, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Adkinson that amount.
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Turning to Adkinson’s second argument, we find no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s determination that no special factors justified payment of fees in
excess of § 2412(d)(2)(A)’s limitations. The district court properly rejected
Adkinson’s argument that special factors existed, setting out its reasons for rejecting
this argument in its thorough opinion, Adkinson, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1313-14.
Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s calculation of the
reasonable number of hours expended by Adkinson’s various attorneys. See id. at
1314-18 (calculating carefully a reasonable number of hours, applying the correct
legal standards).
AFFIRMED.
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