Loretta Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc.

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
June 30, 2004
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 03-14909 CLERK

D.C. Docket No. 01-09107-CV-JEM

LORETTA WILSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

B/E AEROSPACE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida

(June 30, 2004)

Before ANDERSON, HULL and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

The key issue in this appeal is whether an admission by the decisionmaker

that a female employee was “the obvious choice” and “most qualified” for a
pending promotion creates a genuine issue of material fact of sex discrimination

after the promotion is given to a male employee on the basis that he was allegedly

the most qualified. Because this admission could lead a reasonable factfinder to

disbelieve the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting

the employee and infer discrimination, we reverse the summary judgment entered

against the employee on that claim. We affirm the summary judgment against the

employee’s claim that her termination, more than a year after the denial of her

promotion, was based on sex discrimination, and we remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Loretta Wilson began her employment with B/E Aerospace, Inc. (B/E), a

manufacturer of airplane cabin interior products, on April 28, 1997, at its facility

in Delray Beach, Florida. The Delray facility was divided into five operating

groups. Wilson worked in the Interior Systems Group (ISG) during her tenure at

B/E. Wilson was recruited to B/E as an Engineering Business Manager by

Michael Stelmat, ISG Vice President. On July 6, 1998, Wilson was promoted to

Engineering Manager, and on April 4, 2000, she was promoted to Engineering

Director. In all three of these positions, Wilson’s supervisor was Stelmat. Wilson

received her last promotion immediately before taking maternity leave. When she

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returned from leave, Wilson was given the position of Director of Commercial

Operations with the same salary and benefits as her previous position.

A Group Vice President and General Manager managed each of the five

operating groups and had responsibility for multiple facilities. Below the Group

Vice President, the Site Vice President managed a single facility. Subordinate to

the Site Vice President, directors and managers supervised the hourly and non-

managerial employees.

Roman Ptakowski was the Group Vice President with supervisory

responsibility for the Delray facility. It is undisputed that Ptakowski had the

ultimate authority to hire, fire, and promote employees at the facility. Ptakowski

made the promotion and termination decisions at issue in this appeal.

Although B/E does not have a formal application process for vacancies at

the vice presidential level and above, in the fall of 1999, Wilson expressed to

Ptakowski an interest in the open Site Vice President position at the Delray

facility. Wilson was then the Engineering Manager. Wilson testified that when

she inquired about the position, Ptakowski told her that she was “the obvious

candidate” for Site Vice President, and “even though women aren’t typically in

that type of position we’ll see what happens when we throw your name out there

to corporate.” Wilson also testified that Ptakowski told her that she was qualified

3
for any vice president position. Wilson’s supervisor, Stelmat, also testified that

Ptakowski admitted that Wilson was an excellent candidate for the position.

Philip Pelfrey, Wilson’s immediate subordinate and the person who ultimately

succeeded her as Engineering Director, testified that Ptakowski told him that

Wilson was “the obvious choice” for the Site Vice President position, and that she

was the “most qualified based on her accomplishments in the engineering

department.” Ptakowski denies making any of these statements.

Ptakowski asserts that he went through a series of steps in November 1999

to select the Site Vice President. He first contacted the corporate department of

human resources and inquired about possible candidates. He gave human

resources the following three minimum requirements for the potential candidates:

(1) prior profit and loss responsibility; (2) experience with customers; and (3)

knowledge of the aerospace industry. Human resources provided Ptakowski two

candidates for the position: Joseph Baker, then Vice President of Marketing and

Sales, at the Delray facility, and Norm Jordan, then Vice President or Director of

the Seating Products Group, at a Connecticut facility. According to Ptakowski,

Wilson was not qualified for the position. Ptakowski interviewed Baker and

Jordan for the position and chose Baker as the new Site Vice President at the

Delray facility because he met all three requirements. As Site Vice President,

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Baker was Wilson’s supervisor when she became Director of Commercial

Operations.

More than a year later, in late January 2001, Baker asked Wilson to move

her office closer to the majority of the employees who worked for her in her

position as Director of Commercial Operations. When Baker first asked her to

move, Wilson protested the move and told Baker that she did not understand this

request. Baker replied that “co-locating would help [her] to better manage the

department.” Wilson told him that she disagreed with his decision, but Wilson

agreed to move her office. Although Wilson told Baker that she would move her

office, Wilson went to Ptakowski to discuss Baker’s decision. Ptakowski told

Wilson, however, that he supported Baker’s decision to move Wilson’s office.

Wilson replied that, although she did not like the decision, she would move her

office.

On Thursday, January 25, 2001, Wilson packed the contents of her office,

locked the door, left the facility, and took some of her belongings home. She

asked for copies of her performance appraisals as she left. As she was leaving,

Wilson sent an e-mail to Baker stating, “I have an immediate personal issue to

address and will be out of the office,” but she did not state when she would return.

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 Ptakowski was out of the office that day and received a phone call from

someone at the Delray facility. He was informed that Wilson packed the contents

of her office, took her personal belongings, locked the door, and closed the blinds.

Ptakowski told human resources to open her office and investigate the

circumstances. He also told human resources to contact Wilson and ask her what

happened.

On Friday, January 26, 2001, Ptakowski returned to the Delray facility. He

visited Wilson’s office and found that Wilson had removed almost all of the

contents of her office. It appeared to Ptakowski that Wilson had vacated her

office. Ptakowski and others inferred from Wilson’s conduct that she quit. Two

other employees contacted Wilson and told her about Ptakowski’s concern over

the way she left the facility. Wilson, however, did not make any attempt to contact

B/E. She testified that she did not think it was necessary to contact anyone

because she informed Baker that she would be out of the office, he had her phone

number, and he could have called her if he needed to reach her.

That same day, the Vice President of Human Resources, Barbara Latimer,

contacted Wilson and told her not to perform any further work for B/E until she

explained her actions. Latimer asked Wilson to come to the facility to meet with

her on Monday. During the meeting, Wilson stated that she packed her office in

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preparation to move offices. Latimer did not believe Wilson’s story, and

Ptakowski was not satisfied with Wilson's explanation of her actions. The

following Friday, February 2, 2001, after consultation with Baker, Latimer, and

other corporate representatives, Ptakowski terminated Wilson for insubordination.

Wilson then filed this employment discrimination action against B/E and

alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended 42 U.S.C. sections 2000e et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights

Act, Fla. Stat. sections 760.01 et seq. She contends that B/E discriminated against

her on the basis of sex by not promoting her to the position of Site Vice President

and by terminating her. At the end of discovery, B/E filed a motion for summary

judgment. The district court entered summary judgment for B/E on all of Wilson’s

claims. Wilson now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Damon v. Fleming

Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1357 (11th Cir. 1999). Summary

judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

. . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); see Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552

(1986). A genuine factual dispute exists “if the jury could return a verdict for the

7
non-moving party.” Damon, 196 F.3d at 1358 (quoting United States v. Four

Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). In

examining the record, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1358.

III. DISCUSSION

A plaintiff may establish a claim of illegal disparate treatment through either

direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. See Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d

1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999). Wilson alleges that B/E discriminated against her

because of her sex when it did not promote her to Site Vice President and when it

terminated her. Wilson argues that both direct and circumstantial evidence

support her promotion claim. Wilson argues that circumstantial evidence supports

her termination claim.

Before we turn to each of her claims, we reject Wilson’s contention that

“[s]ummary judgment is especially questionable and should seldom be used in

employment discrimination cases because they involve examination of motivation

and intent.” In Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1026 (11th Cir. 2000)

(en banc), we explained “that the summary judgment rule applies in job

discrimination cases just as in other cases. No thumb is to be placed on either side

of the scale.” Id. at 1026. Within that framework, we address Wilson’s promotion

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and termination claims.

A. Promotion Claim

Wilson alleges that, in November 1999, B/E did not promote her to Site

Vice President because of her sex in violation of Title VII. The district court

found that Wilson failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In the

alternative, the district court found that, even if Wilson established a prima facie

case of discrimination, she did not rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

of B/E for promoting Baker over Wilson to Site Vice President. Although this

Court has held that promotions claims like Wilson’s are untimely,1 B/E did not

object to the timeliness of this claim, and, therefore, has waived that objection.

See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1132

(1982).

1. Direct Evidence of Discrimination

This Court defines direct evidence of discrimination as “evidence which

reflects ‘a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or

retaliation complained of by the employee.’” Damon, 196 F.3d at 1358 (quoting

1
The promotion occurred in November 1999. Wilson did not file with the EEOC a
charge of discrimination until April 2001, more than 300 days after the denial of promotion. See
EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2002) (“only those claims
arising within 300 days prior to the filing of the EEOC's discrimination charge are actionable”).

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Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir.

1998). Direct evidence is “evidence, that, if believed, proves [the] existence of [a]

fact without inference or presumption.” Burrell v. Bd. of Trustees of Ga. Military

Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). As our precedent illustrates, “only

the most blatant remarks, whose intent could mean nothing other than to

discriminate on the basis of” some impermissible factor constitute direct evidence

of discrimination. Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (11th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Shoenfield, 168 F.3d at 1266) (citations and quotations omitted); see

Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1989). If the alleged

statement suggests, but does not prove, a discriminatory motive, then it is

circumstantial evidence. See Burrell, 125 F.3d at 1393.

Ptakowski’s alleged statements are not direct evidence of discrimination.

The comment that she was “the obvious choice” does not evidence bias or the

intent to discriminate on the basis of sex. It is neutral.

Ptakowski’s alleged comment that “even though women aren’t typically in

that type of position we’ll see what happens when we throw your name out there

to corporate” does not directly correlate with an intent to discriminate on the basis

of sex. See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1358. The statement allows an inference of

discrimination, but a factfinder could also infer reasonably that the statement was

10
nothing more than an observation of a fact. The statement, therefore, does not

prove discrimination “without inference or presumption.” Burrell, 125 F.3d at

1393.

In similar instances, this Court has refused to classify such comments as

direct evidence of discrimination. In Damon, an age discrimination case, the

decisionmaker’s comment that “the company needed . . . young men . . . to be

promoted” did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. 186 F.3d at 1359.

In Burrell, a sex discrimination case, evidence that the decisionmaker told the

plaintiff that “he wanted to hire a man for the position because too many women

filled First Federal’s officer positions” was not direct evidence that she was

terminated because of her sex. 125 F.3d at 1393-34. In contrast, in Caban-

Wheeler v. Elsea, we held that a statement by the decisionmaker that he wanted a

black person to have a white employee’s job was direct evidence that the white

employee was terminated for racially discriminatory reasons. 71 F.3d 837, 842-43

(11th Cir. 1996). We also found direct evidence of discrimination in Haynes v.

W.C. Caye & Co., Inc., where the decisionmaker stated that women were simply

not tough enough to do the job from which the plaintiff had been removed. 52

F.3d 928, 930 (11th Cir.1995). The district court, therefore, correctly held that

Wilson did not present direct evidence of discrimination.

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 2. Circumstantial Evidence of Discrimination

In evaluating disparate treatment claims supported by circumstantial

evidence, we use the framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), and Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089

(1981). Under this framework, the plaintiff first has the burden of establishing a

prima facie case of discrimination, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the

employer acted illegally. See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1527-

28 (11th Cir. 1997). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate

treatment by showing that she was a qualified member of a protected class and was

subjected to an adverse employment action in contrast with similarly situated

employees outside the protected class. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at

802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824; Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997).

The methods of presenting a prima facie case are not fixed; they are flexible and

depend to a large degree upon the employment situation. See, e.g., Nix v. WLCY

Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1984).

When the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, which creates the

presumption of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Rojas, 285

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F.3d at 1342; Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528. The employer “need not persuade the

court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.” Burdine, 450 U.S.

at 254-55, 101 S. Ct. at 1094. If the employer satisfies its burden by articulating

one or more reasons, then the presumption of discrimination is rebutted, and the

burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to offer evidence that the alleged reason

of the employer is a pretext for illegal discrimination. Id. at 255-26, 101 S. Ct. at

1094-95.

If the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, a

plaintiff cannot recast the reason but must meet it head on and rebut it. See

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. Quarreling with that reason is not sufficient. See id.

The evidence of pretext may include, however, the same evidence offered initially

to establish the prima facie case. See Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528.

Despite the shifting of the burden of production between the plaintiff and

the defendant under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “[t]he ultimate burden of

persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against

the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 256,

101 S. Ct. at 1093, 1095. A plaintiff may prevail on an employment

discrimination claim by either proving that intentional discrimination motivated

the employer or producing sufficient evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to

13
disbelieve the legitimate reason proffered by the employer, which permits, but

does not compel, the trier of fact to find illegal discrimination. See Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108-09

(2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993);

Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1303, 1336 (11th Cir. 2000); Alexander v. Fulton

County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1336 (11th Cir. 2000).

a. Prima Facie Case

Wilson makes three arguments in her attempt to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination. Wilson first argues that she has a lighter burden of proof

because B/E used subjective criteria in the promotion process. She next contends

that the statistical disparity between the percentage of women in high positions

and the percentage of qualified women in the work force establishes a prima facie

case of disparate treatment. Finally, Wilson contends that she established a prima

facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework because she is a woman, was

qualified for the position, expressed interest in the position and was rejected, and a

male with lesser qualifications received the position.

Wilson’s argument that she has a lighter burden of proof because B/E used

subjective criteria in the decisionmaking process is erroneous. This Court has

refused to adopt a lower standard when employers use subjective criteria. See

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Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1033-35 (en banc). Chapman “confirmed beyond doubt the

appropriateness of an employer using legitimate, non-discriminatory subjective

factors in its decision-making.” Denney, 247 F.3d at 1186 n.7. We have

explained that “an employer’s use of subjective factors in making a hiring or

promotion decision does not raise a red flag. Certainly nothing in our precedent

established that an employer’s reliance upon legitimate, job-related subjective

considerations suggests in its own right an intent to facilitate discrimination.” Id.

at 1186.

Wilson next erroneously cites statistical evidence of an alleged “glass

ceiling” as evidence of her prima facie case. She contends that, from May 1999

through July 2002, there were only two female vice presidents, and since 1995,

only two females have been chosen for vice president out of 44 open positions.

The three cases Wilson wrongly cites in support of her argument, however, are

inapposite, although venerable, disparate impact cases, which involved challenges

of employment practices and procedures. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,

422 U.S. 405, 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975); Rowe v. Gen. Motors, 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir.

1972); Stewart v. Gen. Motors, 542 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1976). Wilson’s claim is

different from these cases because Wilson asserts an individual claim of disparate

treatment regarding the denial of a promotion.

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 The statistical evidence presented by Wilson does not have any probative

value in establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment. This statistical

evidence is not even probative of pretext because Wilson has not provided any

other relevant information, including the number of women who expressed interest

in vice president positions. See, e.g., Howard v. B.P. Oil Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 520,

524 (11th Cir. 1994). “Statistics without any analytical foundation are ‘virtually

meaningless.’” Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 963 (11th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Brown v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 939 F.2d 346, 352-53 (11th Cir.), cert.

denied, 502 U.S. 1058, 112 S. Ct. 935 (1992)).

Wilson’s final argument is more promising. Under the McDonnell Douglas

framework, to prevail on a claim of failure to promote, a plaintiff may establish a

prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing that: (1) she is a member of a

protected class; (2) she was qualified and applied for the promotion; (3) she was

rejected despite her qualifications; and (4) other equally or less qualified

employees who were not members of the protected class were promoted. See Lee

v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000). The parties do not

dispute that Wilson is a member of a protected class, she applied for the promotion

to Site Vice President, and the position was given to a male.

The only remaining issues involve Wilson’s qualifications and those of

16
Baker. B/E presented substantial evidence that Wilson was not qualified for the

promotion and that Baker had superior qualifications. The district court agreed

and found that Wilson was not qualified for the position and that she was not

equally or more qualified than Baker. The problem for B/E is that this evidence is

disputed by Wilson with other evidence.

Wilson presented substantial evidence that she was qualified for the

promotion. Wilson testified that Ptakowski, the decisionmaker, told Wilson that

she “was the obvious candidate for the Vice President position and even though

women aren’t typically in that type of position we’ll see what happen when we

throw your name out there to corporate.” Pelfrey, a co-employee, testified that

Ptakowski told him that Wilson was “the obvious choice” for Site Vice President

and the “most qualified” for the promotion “based on her accomplishments in the

engineering department.” Stelmat also testified that Ptakowski admitted that

Wilson was an excellent candidate for the promotion.

The two alleged statements by Ptakowski to Pelfrey also created an issue of

fact whether Baker was equally or more qualified for the position than Wilson.

Ptakowski’s alleged statements to Pelfrey that she was “the obvious choice” and

the “most qualified” allow an inference that Ptakowski thought that Baker was less

qualified than Wilson. B/E lists objective factors in Baker’s background to prove

17
that he was more qualified, but that evidence creates a genuine issue of material

fact for the jury to decide. Because a reasonable factfinder could believe

Ptakowski’s admissions that Wilson was qualified for Site Vice President and that

Baker was less qualified than Wilson, the district court erred in holding that

Wilson did not present a prima facie case of discrimination.

b. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason and Pretext

When the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the

employer must articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

employee’s rejection. See Lee, 226 F.3d at 1253. If the employer meets this

burden of production, the plaintiff must then establish that the proffered reasons

for promoting another instead of the plaintiff were pretextual. Id. Accordingly,

we must decide whether Wilson created a genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether Ptakowski selected Baker based on an unlawful motive.

B/E articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not choosing

Wilson for the position: Baker was more qualified. At the time of the promotion,

Baker was serving as Vice President of Sales and Marketing. According to B/E,

he had significant profit and loss responsibility for many areas of business,

including engineering, marketing, purchasing, and support functions. He also had

management responsibility for two locations with over 70 employees. As Vice

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President of Sales and Marketing, Baker had extensive contact with customers of

B/E.

Because B/E offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not

promoting Wilson, the burden of production shifts to Wilson, who must prove that

the articulated reason is a pretext for sex discrimination. See Holifield, 115 F.3d

at 1565. Wilson relies on two forms of evidence to satisfy her burden. First, she

contends that she was objectively more qualified than Baker. Second, she relies

on Ptakowski’s alleged statements as evidence of pretext.

Wilson’s first argument fails. Wilson cannot prove pretext by asserting

baldly that she was better qualified than the person who received the position at

issue. See Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000).

Wilson must instead adduce evidence that the disparity in qualifications was “so

apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face.” Cofield v.

Goldkist, Inc., 267 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Denney, 247 F.3d at

1187 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Lee, 226 F.3d at 1253-54); accord Alexander, 207

F.3d at 1339-40 (all quoting Denies v. Texas Dept. of Protective & Reg. Servs.,

164 F.3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1999)). For the discrepancies to “jump off the page

and slap you in the face,” they must be of such weight and significance that no

reasonable person could have chosen Baker over Wilson. Lee, 226 F.3d at 1254.

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This Court must not “judge which employee was more qualified, but . . . determine

whether any disparity . . . is so great that a reasonable fact-finder could infer that

[B/E] did not believe” that Baker was better qualified. Cofield, 267 F.3d at 1268.

The district court correctly determined that Wilson failed to produce

sufficient evidence that the disparities between her qualifications and Bakers were

so great that they “jump off the page and slap you in the face.” Id. A review of

their objective qualifications actually suggests that Baker was more qualified than

Wilson. Before the promotion, Baker was Vice President of Marketing and Sales.

Wilson was the Engineering Manager and had not yet served at the director level.

Wilson did not have as much managerial experience as Baker, nor did she have as

much experience with customers of B/E. Wilson’s background was primarily in a

single division, engineering, and Baker had experience in multiple divisions.

Wilson’s self-serving assertions about her own qualifications and leadership

abilities would not allow “a reasonable fact-finder [to] infer that [B/E] did not

believe” that Baker was better qualified under the stringent standard of this Court.

Id.

Wilson’s second argument has merit. Wilson presented admissions of

Ptakowski, the decisionmaker, that he believed that Wilson was more qualified

than Baker. When Wilson expressed her interest in the position, Ptakowski

20
allegedly told her that she was “the obvious candidate” for the position of Site

Vice President. Pelfrey testified that Ptakowski told him that Wilson was the

“most qualified” and “the obvious choice” for the position. Stelmat testified that

Ptakowski admitted Wilson was an excellent candidate for the position.

These alleged admissions of Ptakowski are accompanied by some evidence

of discriminatory animus. “Language not amounting to direct evidence, but

showing some [discriminatory] animus, may be significant evidence of pretext

once a plaintiff has set out the prima facie case.” Jones v. Bessemer Carraway

Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998). Ptakowski’s alleged

statement that “women aren’t typically in that type of position” could allow a

reasonable factfinder to infer discriminatory animus.

These admissions of Wilson’s qualifications and Ptakowski’s discriminatory

animus together could lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Ptakowski did

not believe that Baker was more qualified than Wilson and discriminated against

Wilson on the basis of sex. In Reeves, the Supreme Court explained that “it is

permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the

falsity of the employer’s explanation.” 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S. Ct. at 2108. A

plaintiff may be able to establish that the employer’s asserted justification is false

and a pretext for discrimination based on some of the same evidence that

21
established a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. A plaintiff need not “always

introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination.” Id. at 148, 120 S.

Ct. 2109.

After carefully examining the record, we conclude that Wilson’s “prima

facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted

justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer

unlawfully discriminated.” Id. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding

whether the failure to promote Wilson was based on her sex. The district court,

therefore, erred in granting summary judgment for B/E on Wilson’s promotion

claim.

B. Termination Claim

Wilson also alleges that B/E terminated her because of her sex in violation

of Title VII. A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination through

circumstantial evidence by proving that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2)

she was subjected to adverse employment action; (3) her employer treated

similarly situated employees outside her classification more favorably; and (4) she

was qualified to do the job. See Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562 (citing McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824; Coutu v. Martin County Bd. of

County Commissioners, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11th Cir.1995); Turnes v. AmSouth

22
Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir.1994)). The plaintiff and the employee

she identifies as a comparator must be similarly situated “in all relevant respects.”

Id. The comparator must be nearly identical to the plaintiff to prevent courts from

second-guessing a reasonable decision by the employer. See Silvera v. Orange

County Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001).

The district court found that Wilson failed to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination in the termination of her employment. Although Wilson is a

member of a protected class, was subjected to an adverse employment action when

B/E terminated her, and was qualified for her job, Wilson failed to identify any

male employee who was similarly situated and treated more favorably than she

was treated. Wilson’s failure to identify a comparator does not end the analysis of

her termination claim, however.

“If a plaintiff fails to show the existence of a similarly situated employee,

summary judgment is appropriate where no other evidence of discrimination is

present.” Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562 (citing Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,

871 F.2d 179, 182 (1st Cir.1989) (emphasis added)). Wilson attempts to prove

that she was terminated because of her sex in two ways. She first asserts that she

was not guilty of insubordination. She next speculates that B/E terminated her

because “she was discriminatorily passed over for promotion, knew it, and

23
discomfited her superiors by complaining of it[.]”

Wilson’s self-serving assertion that she was not insubordinate does not

alone establish that she was terminated because of her sex. “A plaintiff must show

not merely that the defendant’s employment decisions were mistaken but that they

were in fact motivated by sex.” Lee, 226 F.3d at 1253. The role of this Court “is

to prevent unlawful hiring practices, not to act as a super personnel department

that second-guesses employers’ business judgments.” Id. at 1254. “Our sole

concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged

employment decision.” Damon, 196 F.3d at 1361. Whether Wilson’s conduct was

insubordinate is not an issue for this Court to referee.

Wilson also attempts to link her termination with her denial of the

promotion to Site Vice President. These events, however, are too remote to allow

a reasonable inference of sex discrimination. The denial of the promotion

occurred in November 1999, and B/E terminated Wilson in February 2001, more

than one year later. Although Wilson presented evidence of a contentious

relationship with Baker, she provided no evidence of a connection between the

denial of the promotion and her termination. Wilson also offered no evidence that

her termination was based on her sex. The district court, therefore, properly

entered summary judgment for B/E on Wilson’s termination claim.

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 IV. CONCLUSION

We reverse the summary judgment against Wilson on her promotion claim.

Ptakowski’s admissions that Wilson was the most qualified for the promotion,

combined with an admission of discriminatory animus, if believed, are sufficient

evidence to allow a trier of fact to conclude that Wilson was not promoted because

of her sex. We affirm the summary judgment for B/E on Wilson’s termination

claim. Wilson failed to present evidence that her termination was disparate

treatment in contrast with a similarly situated male employee, and she failed to

present any other evidence of discrimination.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED

IN PART, and REMANDED.

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