[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-14562 March 6, 2007
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-60298 CR-KAM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JASON LUNTAY TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(March 6, 2007)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
BLACK, Circuit Judge:
Jason Luntay Taylor appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to
interfere with interstate commerce by means of robbery, in violation of the Hobbs
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute at
least 15 kilograms but less than 50 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846; possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and possession of ammunition by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
On appeal, Taylor contends the Government cannot establish a Hobbs Act
conspiracy because the object of the planned robbery, cocaine, did not exist.1
After careful review, we affirm, holding that the object of the robbery need not
exist for the Government to prove a Hobbs Act conspiracy.
I. BACKGROUND
Taylor’s convictions resulted from a reverse sting operation by the Bureau
of Alochol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). In October 2004, a confidential
informant contacted ATF Special Agent Mike Connors to report that George
Jackson was interested in committing an armed narcotics robbery. Connors, acting
1
Taylor raised three other issues on appeal, which we do not discuss. We have
determined the district court did not err by denying Taylor’s motion for acquittal on the
ammunition charge or by refusing to apply a minor role reduction to Taylor’s sentence. Further,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Taylor’s post-arrest statements.
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undercover, met with George Jackson several times to plan the robbery of fictional
cocaine dealers. Jackson agreed to steal approximately 15 kilograms of cocaine
from a stash house and enlisted the help of Percy Campbell, a trusted associate.
On November 8, 2004, Connors met with Jackson and the confidential
informant to notify them the cocaine would arrive the following day. On
November 9, 2004, Jackson contacted Connors to inform him he could not locate
Campbell but had recruited someone else, later identified as Jason Taylor.
Later that day, Connors gave the confidential informant a BMW equipped
with audio and video recording devices. The informant drove the BMW to pick
up Jackson and Taylor, took them to Outdoor World where Jackson bought
shotgun ammunition, and then met Connors and followed him to a warehouse.
Jackson, Connors, and Taylor discussed the robbery in the warehouse and Taylor
made statements indicating he intended to commit the planned armed robbery.
While Jackson and Taylor were still in the warehouse, ATF agents arrested
them. The agents found a loaded gun in Taylor’s possession. Later that night,
Taylor admitted he planned to rob the targeted house of 15 kilograms of cocaine
and expected to receive 4 kilograms of cocaine in payment.
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The narcotics organization, cocaine, guards, and house Connors described
to Jackson and Taylor were all fictional parts of the sting operation and never
existed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction de novo,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing
all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict.
United States v. Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th Cir. 2000). We will uphold
a district court’s denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal if a reasonable trier
of fact could conclude the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
The Hobbs Act prohibits the attempt or conspiracy to obstruct, delay, or
affect commerce by robbery or extortion. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The two required
elements for a substantive Hobbs Act conviction are “robbery and an effect on
[interstate] commerce.” United States v. Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th
Cir. 2000). The interstate nexus for “[a] Hobbs Act conspiracy can be proved by
showing a potential impact on interstate commerce.” United States v. Verbitskaya,
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406 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 1095 (2006).
If the cocaine in this case actually existed, a sufficient interstate nexus
would exist to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act. See United
States v. Bernard, 47 F.3d 1101, 1103 (11th Cir. 1995). The issue of first
impression in this Circuit is whether the Hobbs Act jurisdictional requirement is
met when the cocaine and cocaine traffickers are fictitious.
Only the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has squarely addressed this
jurisdictional challenge to a Hobbs Act conspiracy conviction. United States v.
Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 949, 955-57 (9th Cir. 2004). In Rodriguez, the defendant
argued there was no effect on interstate commerce because “neither the narcotics
nor the narcotics traffickers actually existed.” Id. at 957. The Rodriguez Court
rejected this argument concluding that “the non-existent status of the target drug
traffickers is inapposite. Impossibility is not a defense to the conspiracy charge.”
Id. at 957. The Court affirmed the Hobbs Act conviction based on the conspiracy
to rob fictitious drug traffickers.
Similarly, this Court has affirmed Hobbs Act convictions resulting from law
enforcement sting operations where the object of the charged crime was fictitious.
In United States v. Eaves, an FBI agent created a fictitious development project
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and offered a bribe to a County Commissioner in exchange for his favorable vote
to rezone the project site. 877 F.2d 943, 946 (11th Cir. 1989). The appellant
argued there was no impact on interstate commerce because “every aspect of the
. . . project was a pretense.” Id. at 946. This Court rejected the argument,
concluding the FBI’s role and the fabrication of the project did not destroy the
interstate nexus for a Hobbs Act conviction. Id.; see also United States v. Holmes,
767 F.2d 820, 824 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The fact that the FBI undercover agent
represented a fictitious business entity is not a defense to an extortion charge.”).
In this case, Taylor conspired to violently rob the stash house of a narcotics
organization. The fact that the intended victims and narcotics were fictional is
irrelevant. Accordingly, we hold the interstate nexus was sufficient to sustain
Taylor’s Hobbs Act conspiracy conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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