[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 31, 2009
No. 08-15888 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-00162-CV-2-IPJ
STEVEN GREEN,
MARK PERSALL,
CHARLES HORTON,
JAMES PHILLIPS,
CASSIE BELL,
SHERRY J. AMICK,
WILLIAM V. ARNOLD,
LYNN G. BASWELL,
PHILLIP A. BAILEY,
SAMUEL R. BEARD,
and all those similarly situated as related to
Jefferson County Resolution No. 2006-683
and District Court case 2:08-00162-IPJ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION,
GENERAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM FOR
EMPLOYEES OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA, THE,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(March 31, 2009)
Before HULL, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
In this case, Jefferson County employees challenge as unconstitutional and
violative of federal law certain amendments made by the Jefferson County
Commission to its retirement system. The district court dismissed the employees’
claims, finding that (1) the claims constituted a de facto appeal from a previous
state court judgment which rejected similar arguments and that, therefore, under
the Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine, the district court did not have jurisdiction to
consider these claims; and (2) because the related state court judgment was on
appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court, any ruling by the district court would be an
“undue interference with state proceedings” and that, therefore, the district court
must abstain from exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to the Younger doctrine.2
Both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Younger doctrine are extremely
1
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1986).
2
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2
narrow exceptions to the federal courts’ “virtually unflagging” duty “to adjudicate
claims within their jurisdiction.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the
City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989) (“NOPSI”). Upon review of the
parties’ briefs and the record, we conclude that neither of these limited exceptions
to our jurisdiction applies. We conclude, however, that the doctrine of res judicata,
as applicable through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, does require dismissal of
this case. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the disposition, although on a different
ground than that relied upon by the district court.3
BACKGROUND
The General Retirement System for Employees of Jefferson County,
Alabama (the “Retirement System”) was created in 1965 by an act of the Alabama
legislature. It is funded by yearly contributions from the participating Jefferson
County employees which are matched by yearly contributions from the County and
by the income generated from the investment of those contributions. At some
point during the 1970s, approximately 238 Jefferson County sheriff’s deputies
voluntarily withdrew from the Retirement System and removed their contributions,
with interest.
3
“We may affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground that appears in the record,
whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the court below.” Thomas v.
Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007).
3
In 2003, the Alabama Legislature approved a local law, Alabama Act 2003-
343 (the “Act”), allowing Jefferson County employees who had previously
withdrawn from the Retirement System to rejoin and “make up” for up to 20 years
in which they did not contribute to or participate in the Retirement System. The
Act also allowed Jefferson County employees who had not withdrawn to convert
periods of unpaid service to paid service upon making an additional contribution to
the Retirement System. The Act then required the County to contribute matching
funds for any employee taking advantage of the Act and to pay any additional
amounts necessary to make the Retirement System actuarially sound. In other
words, the Act required the County to contribute additional funds to replicate
investment earnings that would have occurred had the employees in question
continually contributed to the Retirement System.
After the Act was passed, two groups of county employees filed suit in state
court to establish the constitutionality of the Act and to force the County to
implement it. Sheriff Deputy Jimmy Black brought one of the class-action
lawsuits on behalf of all deputies who had opted out of the Retirement System and
who were seeking to rejoin as allowed under the Act. Certain other Jefferson
County employees also sought a hearing before a special master when the County
did not allow them to convert unpaid service to paid service under the Act.
4
Employee-members who had not opted out of the Retirement System brought a
separate lawsuit seeking to invalidate the Act. These cases were all consolidated in
the Jefferson County Circuit Court, with Black identified as the lead plaintiff
(“Black”). In November of 2005, the Black court ruled that the Act, which created
additional pension benefits for certain employees of Jefferson County, was
constitutional and due to be enforced (the “November 2005 Order”). Thereafter,
the court set deadlines for the County’s compliance with the terms of the Act.
In an effort to offset the costs of funding the enhanced pension benefits
mandated by the Act, the Jefferson County Commission passed Resolution No.
2006-683 on June 7, 2006 (the “Resolution”). The Resolution states that if a
member of the Retirement System elects to take advantage of the additional
pension benefits provided by the Act, he or she will no longer be eligible to receive
the discretionary, non-pension benefits of retiree health insurance and sick leave
retirement benefits. The County distributed the Resolution to persons eligible
under the Act, giving them the opportunity to elect between (1) obtaining the Act’s
enhanced benefits and foregoing the non-pension benefits or (2) remaining eligible
for retiree health insurance coverage and sick leave retirement benefits and
foregoing the enhanced pension benefits available under the Act.
On June 19, 2006, the Black plaintiffs made a motion for supplemental relief
5
before the Jefferson County Circuit Court, arguing that the Resolution
“impermissibly impairs and impedes” the November 2005 Order, which instructed
the County to implement the Act. Specifically, the Black plaintiffs argued that the
Resolution discourages those entitled to enhanced benefits under the Act from
electing to receive those benefits, impermissibly imposes additional burdens upon
the exercise of the rights established under the Act, and frustrates the enforcement
and implementation of the Act as ordered by the court. Accordingly, the plaintiffs
asked the court to enjoin the County from enforcing the Resolution as inconsistent
with its Order to implement the Act.
The Black court held an evidentiary hearing on this motion for supplemental
relief and, on September 14, 2006, it issued an order stating, in pertinent part:
The Jefferson County Commission has been vested with the
responsibility for maintaining a balanced budget for the County and
funding and overseeing vital public services for the citizens of the
County. In adopting the Resolution, the Commission did not abuse
their vested discretion, and did not engage in fraud. This Court’s
inquiry must end there, as the authority to determine the
appropriations necessary for the performance of government function
is a legislative power, not a judicial power. This Court would infringe
upon the boundaries between our State’s branches of government
delineated in Sec. 43 of the Alabama Constitution if it were to enjoin
this Resolution. This Court also finds that the issues presented in
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Resolution are completely separate and
involve different facts, issues and theories than the previous action
challenging Act 03-343. Thus, the Court finds that there is no
justiciable issue involved in the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Supplemental
Relief. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
6
DECREED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Supplemental Relief is
DENIED.
(citations omitted, emphasis added). The Black plaintiffs did not appeal the denial
of their motion for supplemental relief. On November 17, 2006, the court certified
its judgment in the Black litigation as final. Neither party appealed from this final
judgment.
On May 18, 2007, six Jefferson County employees, including lead plaintiff
Steven Green,4 filed a class action lawsuit against the Retirement System and the
County in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County, Alabama (“Green I”). The
Green I plaintiffs sought to represent the class of “107 Jefferson County
employees” who had elected to receive the additional pension benefits provided
under the Act. They argued that, by adopting the Resolution, the County had
retaliated against and treated the putative class unequally. Accordingly, the Green
I plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Resolution was invalid, a permanent
injunction preventing the operation of the Resolution, and damages measured by
the value of the sick leave retirement credit and retiree health insurance they had
been forced to forego by the Resolution. The County moved for summary
judgment, arguing (1) that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrines of res
4
Throughout the state and federal suits at issue, the lead plaintiff is referred to as both
“Steven Green” and “Steven Greene.” For the sake of consistency, we refer to this plaintiff as
“Steven Green.”
7
judicata and collateral estoppel; (2) that Art. III, § 43, Ala. Const. 1901, prevented
the trial court from hearing the plaintiffs’ challenge to the Resolution; (3) that
Alabama law does not recognize an equal-protection challenge; and (4) that the
plaintiffs’ claims are due to be dismissed because the plaintiffs did not present their
claims to the Jefferson County Commission before commencing their action and,
thereby, violated § 6-5-20 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.
On September 17, 2007, the Green I court issued a brief order stating, in
toto:
For the reasons stated therein, the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is due to be GRANTED. Neither the named class
representatives nor any member of the putative class may maintain the
claims raised in the complaint.
This action is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice, costs taxed as
paid.
The Green I plaintiffs moved the trial judge to recuse himself and moved for
a new trial or, in the alternative, to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment or for
relief from judgment. The trial court denied these motions without comment. On
November 1, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal with the Alabama
Supreme Court.
On January 29, 2008, while Green I was pending on appeal before the
Alabama Supreme Court, 104 Jefferson County employees, again led by Steven
Green, filed the instant lawsuit against the Retirement System and Jefferson
8
County Commission in the federal district court for the Northern District of
Alabama (“Green II”). All six of the named plaintiffs from Green I are plaintiffs in
this litigation; 98 other employees are named as plaintiffs in Green II, all of whom
elected to receive the additional pension benefits provided under the Act and were
therefore members of the putative class in Green I. In their complaint, the Green II
plaintiffs allege that, by adopting the Resolution, the defendants discriminated
against them and violated their “procedural due process rights under the First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution” and
“establish[ed] a policy of discriminating against them” in violation of the Public
Health Services Act (“PHSA”), 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-1 to 8. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs assert two causes of action: (1) for equitable relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 300bb-75 and (2) for equitable relief and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Green II. The district court referred the
motion to a magistrate judge. After converting the motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment and allowing the parties to submit additional briefing, the
magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending
that the defendants’ motion be granted. The R&R found that res judicata did not
5
The PHSA provides individuals with a private cause of action for violations of its terms.
42 U.S.C. § 300bb-7 (“Any individual who is aggrieved by the failure of a State, political
subdivision, or agency or instrumentality thereof, to comply with the requirements of this
subchapter may bring an action for appropriate equitable relief.”).
9
require dismissal, but (1) pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district
court had no jurisdiction to consider the claims brought by the six plaintiffs who
were a party to Green I and (2) the Younger doctrine required the court to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over the claims asserted by the remaining ninety-eight
plaintiffs. Accordingly, the R&R suggested that summary judgment was
appropriate as to all of the plaintiffs’ claims.
The plaintiffs filed objections to the R&R, to which the defendants
responded. On October 7, 2008, in a brief opinion, the district court adopted the
R&R in full and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The plaintiffs
timely filed their notice of appeal to this court.
On November 14, 2008, while this appeal was pending before this court, the
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the state trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in Green I. — So.2d —, 2008 WL 4892051 (Ala. Nov. 14, 2008). The
Alabama Supreme Court held that the decision in Black was on the merits such that
the claims asserted in Green I were barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.
Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). We review a district
court’s decision to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction for an abuse of
10
discretion. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). An
error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion. Major League Baseball v. Crist,
331 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d
1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “We can affirm a
judgment on any legal ground, regardless of the grounds addressed and relied upon
by the district court.” Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235-36
(11th Cir. 2004).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in finding that
Rooker Feldman and Younger – which represent narrow exceptions to a district
court’s jurisdiction – divested the court of jurisdiction in this case. For the reasons
stated herein, we agree. Nonetheless, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in
this case because, based on the res judicata principles of Alabama law, the state
court’s final judgments in the related cases of Black and Green I preclude our
consideration of the plaintiffs’ claims.
11
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Generally speaking, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that federal
district courts do not have jurisdiction to act as appellate courts and precludes them
from reviewing final state court decisions. The underlying rational for this
doctrine comes from two federal jurisdictional statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28
U.S.C. § 1257. First, section 1331 provides that federal district courts “shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising” under federal law, but does not
provide for appellate jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Second, section 1257
provides for Supreme Court review of state court judgments when certain federal
questions arise. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.”). “Taken together, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine draws a ‘negative inference’ from section 1257: ‘because Congress only
provided for review of state court judgments by the Supreme Court, Congress
therefore intended to preclude lower federal courts from exercising such review.’”
Nicholson v. Shafe, Nos. 08-11426, 08-13058, — F.3d —, 2009 WL 385579 at *4
(11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009) (quoting Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta
de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2005)).
In the recent case of Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court warned the lower
12
courts that we have extended this narrow doctrine “far beyond the contours of the
Rooker and Feldman cases.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Court instructed that the doctrine is “confined to cases
of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Id. The Court further noted that Rooker-Feldman
does not prohibit a “district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction
simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously
litigated in state court.” Id. at 293. Rather, “[d]isposition of the federal action,
once the state-court adjudication is complete, would be governed by preclusion
law.” Id.
Having received the Supreme Court’s guidance in Exxon Mobil, the
Eleventh Circuit recently considered the application of Rooker-Feldman in
Nicholson, — F.3d at —. In Nicholson, we adopted the rule followed by several
other circuits “that state proceedings have not ended for purposes of Rooker-
Feldman when an appeal from the state court judgment remains pending at the time
the plaintiff commences the federal court action that complains of injuries caused
by the state court judgment and invites review and rejection of that judgment.” Id.
13
(citing Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027 (10th Cir. 2006), Federacion de
Maestros de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d at 17, Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919 (8th
Cir. 2005)). We explained that “confining the scope of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine to instances where the state proceedings have ended, in line with both the
Rooker and Feldman cases,” heeds the Supreme Court’s warning that the doctrine
is limited and should be applied narrowly. Id. (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at
283).
Applied here, the chronology of significant dates is as follows: the state
court granted summary judgment in Green I on September 17, 2006; the Green I
plaintiffs appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Alabama Supreme Court
on November 1, 2007; the Green II plaintiffs filed the instant federal action on
January 29, 2008; and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the state trial court’s
ruling in Green I on November 14, 2008, nearly one year after the commencement
of these federal proceedings. As such, because an appeal of Green I remained
pending in the state court at the time the Green II plaintiffs filed the instant case,
the state court proceedings had not ended for purposes of Rooker-Feldman, as
clarified by Exxon Mobil and Nicholson. Accordingly, this case was not a de facto
appeal from a final state court judgment and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not
divest the federal district court of jurisdiction.
14
B. Younger Abstention
In Younger v. Harris, a federal plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a
state statute under which he was being prosecuted in state court as a defendant.
401 U.S. at 39. The Supreme Court, concluding that the state criminal proceeding
offered a sufficient forum for the plaintiff to raise his constitutional defense,
abstained from hearing the plaintiff’s claim and stated the general rule that a
federal district court must refrain from enjoining a pending criminal state court
proceedings except under certain special circumstances. Id. at 53-54. Such
abstention, the Supreme Court recognized, is required by “[o]ur Federalism[’s]”
notion of comity, that is, “a proper respect for state functions” and “the belief that
the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.” Id.
The abstention doctrine derived from Younger applies most often in cases
involving pending state criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., O’Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (rejecting challenge to state criminal justice system “aimed at
controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events that might take place in
the course of future state criminal trials”); Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 677-78
(11th Cir. 1992) (abstaining from an attempt to “restrain every indigent
prosecution and contest every indigent conviction until the systemic improvements
15
[plaintiffs] seek are in place”). Early on, the Court expanded Younger abstention
to apply to pending civil proceedings that are “akin to a criminal prosecution,” see,
e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (nuisance statute), Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. V. Garden State Bar, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (state bar
disciplinary hearing), and, more recently, in strictly civil proceedings which
implicate state courts’ “important interests in administering certain aspects of their
judicial systems.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1987)
(requirement for the posting of bond pending appeal); see Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 334 (1977) (state contempt process).
Even as the principles of Younger have expanded, however, the Supreme
Court has made clear that the abstention doctrine is not triggered in a civil context
unless the federal injunction requested would create an “undue interference with
state proceedings.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359 (emphasis added). The Younger
doctrine, like the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, is “an extraordinary and narrow
exception to the duty of a district court to adjudicate a controversy properly before
it.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813
(1976) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89
(1959)). Accordingly, a district court should not lightly shirk its “virtually
unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given [to it].” Id. at 818. In
16
addition, the Supreme Court has instructed that Younger only applies where the
state proceeding at issue involves “orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the
state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions . . . it has never been
suggested that Younger requires abstention in deference to a state judicial
proceeding reviewing legislative or executive action.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368
(emphasis added); Wexler v. Lepore, 385 F.3d 1336, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a pending state civil action does not require the federal court to
abstain “unless the requested federal relief would result in meticulous and
burdensome federal oversight of state court or court-like functions”).
In this case, the district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s R&R, found
that Younger barred its consideration of the remaining 98 plaintiffs’ claims,
explaining that because Green I was pending before the Alabama Supreme Court at
the time, “if this court were to grant the relief requested by the plaintiff, it would
effectively bar any action taken by the state courts.” Furthermore, the district court
noted that “the proceedings most certainly implicate a number of important state
interests.” However, as the district court itself noted, “The crux of the [Green II]
complaint turns on the validity of a legislative enactment of the Jefferson County
Commission, a political subdivision of the state, which affected discretionary
employee benefits of government employees.” Accordingly, it is clear that the
17
plaintiffs in this case did not ask the district court to enjoin or otherwise interfere
with the pending state court action; rather, they challenged a legislative act of the
Jefferson County Commission under federal law while, at the same time, state law
challenges to the same legislative act were pending on appeal with the Alabama
Supreme Court. Nothing in Younger or in any of its progeny requires a district
court to abstain under these circumstances. See Wexler, 385 F.3d at 1340 (noting
that “generally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that the pendency of
an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in
the Federal court having jurisdiction”). Accordingly, the district court erred and
thereby abused its discretion in finding that Younger required abstention in this
case.
C. Res Judicata
Although neither party challenges the district court’s finding that res judicata
does not apply in this case, we review de novo all portions of a district court’s
order granting summary judgment and may affirm on any legal ground. See Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Roundtree Transp. and Rigging, 286 F.3d 1233, 1263
(11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that an appellate court may affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment “as long as the judgment entered is correct on any
legal ground regardless of the grounds addressed, adopted, or rejected by the
18
district court”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). After reviewing this case
and the related state court cases of Black and Green I – including the Alabama
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Green I – we conclude that, as a matter of law,
consideration of this case is precluded by the state courts’ judgments in Black and
Green I under the doctrine of res judicata.
When we are considering whether to give res judicata effect to a state court
judgment, we “must apply the res judicata principles of the law of the state whose
decision is set up as a bar to further litigation.” Kizzire v. Baptist Health System,
Inc., 441 F.3d 1306, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract
& Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1509 (11th Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, in this case,
Alabama’s res judicata principles apply. Under Alabama law, “the essential
elements of res judicata are (1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with substantial identity of the parties, and (4)
with the same cause of action presented in both actions.” Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc.
v. Vinson, 723 So.2d 634, 636 (Ala. 1998). If all four elements are met, any claim
that was, or could have been, adjudicated in the prior action is barred from future
litigation. Id.
When the Alabama Supreme Court ruled on the appeal in Green I, it
considered whether the decision in Black barred the claims asserted by the
19
plaintiffs in Green I. In considering this issue, the Court addressed the four
elements of res judicata. First, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the Black
court’s “denial of the motion for supplemental relief was a final judgment on the
merits for res judicata purposes.” Green I, 2008 WL 4892051 at *5. Second, it
ruled that this final judgment “was a decision rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction.” Id. at *7. Third, the Alabama Supreme Court found that the “parties
in the Black litigation are substantially identical to the parties involved in [Green
I].” Id. at *8. The Court explained that under Alabama law, “[a] person may be
bound by a judgment even though not a party to a suit if one of the parties to the
suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual representative.” Id.
(citing Gonzalez, LLC v. DiVincenti, 844 So.2d 1196, 1203 (Ala. 2002)).
Applying this rule, the Court found that “[i]n the Black litigation, the subclass of
Jefferson County deputies and the subclass of Jefferson County employees had an
identical interest in seeking the invalidation of the resolution because, under the
terms of the resolution, members of both subclasses would have been required to
forfeit certain discretionary benefits in order to opt back into the retirement
system.” Therefore, even though the Green I plaintiffs were not named plaintiffs
in Black, the Alabama Supreme Court found that the third element of res judicata
was met because the parties in Green I had “identical interests” as the parties
20
involved in the Black litigation. Id.
Finally, addressing the fourth element of res judicata, the Court found that
the same cause of action was presented in both Black and Green I. It reasoned that
“[r]es judicata applies not only to the exact legal theories advanced in the prior
case, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same nucleus of
operative facts.” Id. (citing Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 790 So. 2d 922, 928
(Ala. 2000)) (emphasis in original). Two causes of action are the same for res
judicata purposes “when the same evidence is applicable in both actions.” Id.
(citing Old Republic Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d at 928). Because the Green I plaintiffs
sought “a judgment declaring that the sole purpose of the resolution is to punish
Jefferson County employees who convert unpaid service to paid service under the
Act and a permanent injunction to prevent the County from enforcing the
resolution” and the plaintiffs in the Black litigation “likewise sought to enjoin the
County from enforcing the resolution,” the Court found “the claims in the two
cases arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts.” Id. at *9. Additionally, the
Court noted that the Green I plaintiffs, in seeking to prevent the County from
enforcing the Resolution, “rely on the same evidence and advance many of the
same arguments raised in the plaintiffs’ motion for supplemental relief in the Black
litigation.” Id. Accordingly, the Court found that the final element of res judicata
21
was met because the cause of action asserted in Green I was the same cause of
action raised in Black. For these reasons, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded
that the claims raised by the Green I plaintiffs were barred and it affirmed the state
trial court’s judgment. Id.
Applying the decision in Green I to the case before us, we must conclude
that the Alabama Supreme Court would find that the claims asserted by the Green
II plaintiffs are also barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Regarding the first
and second elements of the doctrine, we are bound by the Alabama Supreme
Court’s finding that Black was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San
Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323, 348 (2005) (holding that a plaintiff is precluded by
the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, from relitigating those issues
which were adjudicated by a state court). Similarly, following the Alabama
Supreme Court’s guidance, we must also conclude that the plaintiffs in the case
before us – 104 Jefferson County employees who elected to receive the additional
pension benefits provided under the Act – are “substantially identical” to the
plaintiffs involved in both the Black and Green I actions.6 This is so because the
plaintiffs in all three cases share an identical interest in “seeking the invalidation of
6
As we noted above, six of the Green II plaintiffs are the same as the named Green I
plaintiffs; the remaining Green II plaintiffs are members of the putative class named in Green I.
22
the resolution because . . . [they all] would have been required to forfeit certain
discretionary benefits in order to opt back into the retirement system.” Green I at
*8. This shared interest makes these parties “substantially identical” for purposes
of preclusion under Alabama law. Id.
The only remaining question, therefore, is whether the causes of action in
Black and Green I are identical to the causes of action asserted in the case at bar.
Clearly, the plaintiffs in Black and Green I did not assert causes of action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the PHSA; however, the Alabama Supreme Court has
explained that, regardless of the “exact legal theory” advanced in the prior case,
claims are “identical” for purposes of res judicata if they “aris[e] out of the same
nucleus of operative facts” and if “the same evidence is applicable in both actions.”
Id. In this case, the plaintiffs – like the plaintiffs in Green I – sought a permanent
injunction of the enforcement of the Resolution and damages measured by the
value of the sick leave retirement credit and retiree health insurance. Following the
Alabama Supreme Court’s recent decision, we must conclude that because the
relief sought is identical, the “claims in the two cases arise out of the same nucleus
of operative facts.” Additionally, a review of the plaintiffs’ complaint shows that,
in seeking to prevent the County from enforcing the Resolution, the plaintiffs rely
on the same evidence and advance many of the same arguments raised by both the
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Black and the Green I plaintiffs. Therefore, we conclude that the final element of
res judicata is met.
Applying Alabama preclusion law, as described by the Alabama Supreme
Court in Green I, we conclude that there was a prior final judgment on the merits in
the Black litigation, that that judgment was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction, that the parties in the Black litigation, the Green I litigation, and this
action are substantially identical, and that the cause of action was the same in all
three disputes. Thus, the four elements of res judicata are met and the claims
raised by the plaintiffs are barred as a matter of law.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
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