(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DISTRICT ET AL. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04–169. Argued April 20, 2005—Decided June 20, 2005
The False Claims Act (FCA) prohibits a person from making false or
fraudulent claims for payment to the United States. 31 U. S. C.
§3729(a). That prohibition may be enforced in suits filed by the At-
torney General, §3730(a), and in qui tam actions brought by private
individuals in the Government’s name, §3730(b)(1). A 1986 amend-
ment to the FCA created a private cause of action for an individual
retaliated against by his employer for assisting an FCA investigation
or proceeding, §3730(h), and revised the FCA’s statute of limitations,
§3731(b). Section 3731(b) provides that “[a] civil action under section
3730 may not be brought . . . more than 6 years after the date on
which the violation of section 3729 is committed.” In 2001, respon-
dent Wilson brought an FCA qui tam action against petitioners,
along with an FCA retaliation claim. Petitioner Graham County Soil
and Water Conservation District employed Wilson as a secretary.
Wilson alleged that petitioner county officials retaliated against her
for alerting federal officials to the purported fraud and for cooperat-
ing with the ensuing investigation, ultimately forcing her 1997 resig-
nation from the District. Petitioners successfully moved to dismiss
the retaliation claim as untimely, on the ground that North Caro-
lina’s 3-year statute of limitations governed Wilson’s FCA action and
barred it. Reversing, the Fourth Circuit found it unnecessary to bor-
row a state limitations period because one was supplied by
§3731(b)(1).
Held: Section 3731(b)(1)’s limitations period does not govern §3730(h)
retaliation actions. Instead, the most closely analogous state statute
of limitations applies. Pp. 4–13.
(a) To determine the applicable statute of limitations for a cause of
2 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON
Syllabus
action created by federal statute, this Court asks first whether the
statute expressly supplies a limitations period. If not, the most
closely analogous state limitations period applies. Pp. 4–5.
(b) Section 3730(h) is a subsection of §3730, but §3731(b)(1) is
nonetheless ambiguous about whether a §3730(h) retaliation action is
“a civil action under section 3730” as that phrase is used in
§3731(b)(1). Another reasonable reading is that §3731(b)(1)’s limita-
tions period applies only to §§3730(a) and (b) actions. Section
3731(b)(1) starts the limitations period running on “the date on which
the violation of section 3729 is committed,” that is, on the date the
false claim was actually submitted. That language casts doubt on
whether §3731(b)(1) specifies a limitations period for retaliation ac-
tions. For even a well-pleaded retaliation complaint need not allege
that the defendant submitted a false claim, leaving the limitations
period without a starting point if §3731(b)(1) is applicable. By con-
trast, the section naturally applies to well-pleaded §§3370(a) and (b)
actions. Those actions require a plaintiff to plead that the defendant
submitted a false claim and therefore necessarily specify when
§3731(b)(1)’s time limit begins. At a minimum this anomaly shows
that §3731(b)(1) is ambiguous about whether “action under section
3730” means all actions arising under that section. Pp. 5–7.
(c) Two considerations show that the better way to resolve this am-
biguity is to read the 6-year period to govern only §§3370(a) and (b)
actions. First, the very next subsection, §3730(c), uses the similarly
unqualified phrase “action brought under section 3730” to refer only
to §§3370(a) and (b) actions. Second, reading §3731(b)(1) to apply
only to those actions is in keeping with the default rule that Congress
generally drafts statutes of limitations to begin when the plaintiff
has a complete and present cause of action. Where, as here, there are
two plausible constructions, this Court should adopt the construction
that starts the time limit running when the cause of action (here re-
taliation) accrues. This approach resolves §3731(b)(1)’s ambiguity in
petitioners’ favor. Reading §3731(b)(1) to exclude retaliation actions
will generally start the limitations period running when the cause of
action accrues, for the likely analogous state statutes virtually all
start when the retaliatory action occurs. However, under the reading
favored by Wilson and the Government, the limitations period would
begin at best on the date an actual or suspected FCA violation oc-
curred, which would precede the retaliatory conduct. Pp. 7–12.
(d) The Court of Appeals should determine in the first instance the
appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow. Pp. 12–13.
367 F. 3d 245, reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST,
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3
Syllabus
C. J., and O’CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, and in which
SOUTER, J., joined as to all but n. 2. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in the judgment. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which GINSBURG, J., joined.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–169
_________________
GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DISTRICT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED
STATES EX REL. KAREN T. WILSON
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 20, 2005]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.*
This case presents the question whether the 6-year
statute of limitations in the False Claims Act (FCA), see
31 U. S. C. §3731(b)(1), governs FCA civil actions for
retaliation, see §3730(h). We hold that it does not and
therefore conclude that the most closely analogous state
limitations period applies.
I
The FCA prohibits any person from making false or
fraudulent claims for payment to the United States.
§3729(a). Persons who do so are liable for civil penalties of
up to $10,000 per claim and treble damages. Ibid. The
Act sets forth two principal enforcement mechanisms for
policing this proscription. First, the Attorney General
may sue to remedy violations of §3729. §3730(a). Second,
private individuals may bring qui tam actions in the Gov-
ernment’s name for §3729 violations. §3730(b)(1); see
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
——————
* JUSTICE SOUTER joins all but footnote 2 of this opinion.
2 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 769–772 (2000). The qui tam relator
must give the Government notice of the action, and the
Government is entitled to intervene in the suit. §3730(b)(2).
The relator receives up to 30 percent of the proceeds of the
action, in addition to attorney’s fees and costs.
§§3730(d)(1), (2).
The 1986 amendments to the FCA created a third en-
forcement mechanism: a private cause of action for an
individual retaliated against by his employer for assisting
an FCA investigation or proceeding. §3730(h). Section
3730(h) provides in relevant part that
“[a]ny employee who is discharged, demoted, sus-
pended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner
discriminated against in the terms and conditions of
employment by his or her employer because of lawful
acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee
or others in furtherance of an action under this sec-
tion, including investigation for, initiation of, testi-
mony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed
under this section, shall be entitled to all relief neces-
sary to make the employee whole.”
Remedies for retaliation include reinstatement, two times
the amount of backpay plus interest, special damages,
litigation costs, and attorney’s fees. Ibid.
The 1986 amendments also revised the language of the
6-year statute of limitations applicable to FCA actions.
The previous version of the statute provided that “[a] civil
action under section 3730 of this title must be brought
within 6 years from the date the violation is committed.”
§3731(b) (1982 ed.). The 1986 amendments revised this
provision to read:
“(b) A civil action under section 3730 may not be
brought—
“(1) more than 6 years after the date on which the
violation of section 3729 is committed, or
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3
Opinion of the Court
“(2) more than 3 years after the date when facts ma-
terial to the right of action are known or reasonably
should have been known by the official of the United
States charged with responsibility to act in the cir-
cumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after
the date on which the violation is committed . . . .”
§3731.
In January 2001, respondent Karen T. Wilson brought
an FCA qui tam and retaliation action against petitioners.
Petitioners Graham County Soil and Water Conservation
District and Cherokee County Soil and Water Conserva-
tion District are special-purpose local government entities;
the other petitioners are various local and federal officials.
Graham County District employed Wilson as a secretary.
Wilson alleged that petitioners made numerous false
claims for payment to the United States in connection
with a federal disaster relief program, the Emergency
Watershed Protection Program, App. 17–20, and in con-
nection with agricultural programs administered by North
Carolina but funded by the Federal Government, id., at
17–24.
Wilson contended, in addition, that Graham County
District officials retaliated against her for aiding federal
officials in their investigation of these false claims. Id., at
25–30. Wilson alerted federal officials to petitioners’
suspected fraudulent activities in December 1995 and
cooperated with the ensuing investigation. Id., at 26–27.
Because of her cooperation, the complaint alleged, Gra-
ham County District officials repeatedly harassed her
from 1996 to 1997, eventually inducing her to resign in
March 1997. Id., at 28–30.
Petitioners successfully moved to dismiss Wilson’s re-
taliation action as untimely. They argued that the 6-year
limitations period provided in §3731(b)(1) did not apply to
Wilson’s retaliation action. Absent an applicable federal
4 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
limitations period, they asked the District Court to borrow
North Carolina’s 3-year statute of limitations for retalia-
tory-discharge actions. The District Court agreed and
dismissed the retaliation claim, since Wilson filed it more
than three years after her March 1997 discharge. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 67a–70a. The court certified that ruling for
interlocutory appeal. 224 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050–1051
(WDNC 2002).
On interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. In the majority’s
view, the plain language of §3731(b)(1) supplies a limita-
tions period for retaliation actions, making it unnecessary
to borrow one from North Carolina law. The court rea-
soned that §3731(b)(1) governs §3730(h) retaliation ac-
tions, because it applies its 6-year limitations period to
“[a] civil action under section 3730.” 367 F. 3d 245, 251
(2004) (brackets in original).
We granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement among
the Courts of Appeals regarding whether §3731(b)(1)’s 6-
year statute of limitations applies to §3730(h) retaliation
actions or whether, instead, the most closely analogous
state limitations period governs. 543 U. S. ___ (2005).
Compare Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F. 3d 860, 865–866
(CA7 1994) (holding that FCA 6-year period applies), with
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 162
F. 3d 1027, 1034–1035 (CA9 1998) (holding that most
closely analogous state limitations period governs).
II
To determine the applicable statute of limitations for a
cause of action created by a federal statute, we first ask
whether the statute expressly supplies a limitations pe-
riod. If it does not, we generally “borrow” the most closely
analogous state limitations period. See North Star Steel
Co. v. Thomas, 515 U. S. 29, 33–34 (1995); Reed v. Transpor-
tation Union, 488 U. S. 319, 324 (1989); Agency Holding
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5
Opinion of the Court
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 157–
165 (1987) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (tracing
history of borrowing state limitations periods). In the rare
case, we have even borrowed analogous federal limitations
periods in the absence of an expressly applicable one, see,
e.g., id., at 150–157, but no party points to a reason why we
should do so here, and we can think of none. The only
arguably applicable express statute of limitations is the 6-
year limit set forth in §3731(b)(1). The question, then, is
whether §3731(b)(1) applies by its terms to retaliation ac-
tions under §3730(h); if it does not, our cases dictate that
the most closely analogous state limitations period applies.
Under §3731(b)(1), “[a] civil action under section 3730
may not be brought . . . more than 6 years after the date
on which the violation of section 3729 is committed.”
Following the Court of Appeals’ lead and supported by the
United States appearing as amicus curiae, Wilson argues
that this language unambiguously applies to FCA retalia-
tion actions. She points out that §3731(b)(1) applies a 6-
year limitations period to “a civil action under section
3730,” and that §3730(h) actions arise under §3730; hence,
they claim, the 6-year period governs §3730(h) actions.
See Neal, supra, at 865–866 (arguing same). We think the
statute is more complex than this argument supposes.
Statutory language has meaning only in context, see, e.g.,
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. ___, ___ (2004) (slip op., at 7),
and §3731(b)(1), read in its proper context, does not govern
§3730(h) actions for retaliation.
Section 3731(b)(1) is ambiguous, rather than clear,
about whether a §3730(h) retaliation action is “a civil
action under section 3730.” Another reasonable reading is
that it applies only to actions arising under §§3730(a) and
(b), not to §3730(h) retaliation actions. That reading is
suggested by the language in §3731(b)(1) tying the start of
the time limit to “the date on which the violation of section
3729 is committed.” In other words, the time limit begins
6 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
to run on the date the defendant submitted a false claim
for payment. See supra, at 1. This language casts doubt
on whether §3731(b)(1) specifies a limitations period for
retaliation actions. For even a well-pleaded retaliation
complaint need not allege that the defendant submitted a
false claim, leaving the limitations period without a start-
ing point if §3731(b)(1) is applicable. A retaliation plain-
tiff, instead, need prove only that the defendant retaliated
against him for engaging in “lawful acts done . . . in fur-
therance of” an FCA “action filed or to be filed,” §3730(h),
language that protects an employee’s conduct even if the
target of an investigation or action to be filed was inno-
cent.1 Applying §3731(b)(1) to FCA retaliation actions, then,
sits uneasily with §3731(b)(1)’s language, which assumes
that well-pleaded “action[s] under section 3730” to which it
is applicable include a “violation of section 3729” certain
from which to start the time running. Section 3731(b)(1), by
contrast, naturally applies to well-pleaded §§3730(a) and (b)
actions. They require the plaintiff to plead that the defen-
dant submitted a false claim for payment, and therefore
necessarily specify when §3731(b)(1)’s time limit begins.
This textual anomaly, at a minimum, shows that
——————
1 See United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hospital,
360 F. 3d 220, 236 (CA1 2004) (holding that protected conduct is
“conduct that reasonably could lead to a viable FCA action”); United
States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F. 3d 731, 740 (CADC
1998) (same); Childree v. UAP/GA AG CHEM, Inc., 92 F. 3d 1140, 1146
(CA11 1996) (holding that disclosure to employer of possible FCA
violation protected conduct where litigation is a “distinct possibility” at
the time of the disclosure); Fanslow v. Chicago Mfg. Center, Inc., 384
F. 3d 469, 480 (CA7 2004) (protected conduct is where employee had
reasonable, good-faith belief that the employer is committing fraud
against the United States); Wilkins v. St. Louis Housing Auth., 314
F. 3d 927, 933 (CA8 2002) (same); Moore v. California Inst. of Tech. Jet
Propulsion Lab., 275 F. 3d 838, 845–846 (CA9 2002) (same). We
endorse none of these formulations; we note only that all of them have
properly recognized that proving a violation of §3729 is not an element
of a §3730(h) cause of action.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7
Opinion of the Court
§3731(b)(1) is ambiguous about whether “action under
section 3730” means all actions under §3730, or only
§§3730(a) and (b) actions.
Wilson and the United States dispute that the statute
contains this anomaly, and instead urge that it clearly
applies by its terms to all §3730 actions. They point out that
every §3730(h) action requires the plaintiff to prove that he
engaged in protected conduct related to at least a suspected
violation of §3729, and argue that §3731(b)(1)’s limitations
period simply begins to run on the date of the suspected
violation. Assuming, without deciding, that §3730(h) re-
taliation actions have as an element a suspected violation of
§3729, their interpretation indeed removes the anomaly, but
only at the cost of reading into the statute the word “sus-
pected” before the phrase “violation of section 3729.” Sec-
tion 3731(b)(1) speaks of “violation[s] of section 3729”—
actual, not suspected, ones. Wilson and the United States
answer that this argument proves too much, because even
§§3730(a) and (b) actions involve only “suspected” violations
of §3729 at the pleading stage of litigation; but this response
misses the point. Every §3730(a) or (b) plaintiff who states
or proves a valid claim for relief must allege or prove an
actual violation of §3729; retaliation plaintiffs need only
allege or prove a suspected violation of §3729 (or so we are
willing to assume). The point is that §3731(b)(1)’s language
applies naturally to all successfully pleaded or proved re-
taliation actions only if one reads “suspected” into its terms,
as the dissent essentially concedes. See post, at 4 (opinion of
BREYER, J.).
Section §3731(b)(1)’s literal text, then, is ambiguous.
Wilson and the Government ask us to read it as if it said
“the [suspected or actual] violation of section 3729.” Peti-
tioners ask us to read §3731(b) as if it said “civil action
under section 3730[(a) or (b)].”
Two considerations convince us that the better way to
resolve this ambiguity is to read the 6-year period to gov-
8 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
ern only §§3730(a) and (b) actions, and not §3730(h) re-
taliation actions. First, the very next subsection of the
statute, §3731(c), also uses the similarly unqualified
phrase “action brought under section 3730” to refer only to
§§3730(a) and (b) actions. Section 3731(c) provides that
“[i]n any action brought under section 3730, the United
States shall be required to prove all essential elements of
the cause of action, including damages, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.” As Wilson and the United States
concede, the context of this provision implies that the
phrase “any action brought under section 3730” is limited
to §3730(a) actions brought by the United States and
§3730(b) actions in which the United States intervenes as
a party, as those are the types of §3730 actions in which
the United States necessarily participates. Otherwise, the
United States would be “required to prove all essential
elements of the cause of action,” §3731(c), in all §3730
actions, regardless of whether it participated in the action
(a consequence the dissent implicitly embraces by claiming
that “any action brought under section 3730” in §3731(c)
means all §3730 actions, see post, at 2 (opinion of BREYER,
J.)). This implicit limitation of the phrase “action under
section 3730” shows that Congress used the term “action
under section 3730” imprecisely in §3731 and, in particu-
lar, that Congress sometimes used the term to refer only
to a subset of §3730 actions. It is reasonable to read the
same language in §3731(b)(1) to be likewise limited.
Second, reading §3731(b)(1) to apply only to §§3730(a)
and (b) actions is in keeping with the default rule that
Congress generally drafts statutes of limitations to begin
when the cause of action accrues. We have repeatedly
recognized that Congress legislates against the “standard
rule that the limitations period commences when the
plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Bay
Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v.
Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997) (internal
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9
Opinion of the Court
quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. United
States, 544 U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 9) (calling it
“highly doubtful” that Congress intended a time limit on
pursuing a claim to expire before the claim arose); Reiter
v. Cooper, 507 U. S. 258, 267 (1993) (declining to counte-
nance the “odd result” that a federal cause of action and
statute of limitations arise at different times “absen[t] . . .
any such indication in the statute”); TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U. S. 19, 37 (2001) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (“Absent other indication, a statute of limitations
begins to run at the time the plaintiff has the right to
apply to the court for relief” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Therefore, where, as the case is here, there are
two plausible constructions of a statute of limitations, we
should adopt the construction that starts the time limit
running when the cause of action (here retaliation)
accrues.2
This approach resolves the ambiguity in §3731(b)(1) in
petitioners’ favor. On the one hand, reading §3731(b)(1) to
exclude retaliation actions will generally start the limita-
tions period running when the cause of action accrues. If
§3731(b)(1) excludes retaliation actions, then no express
time limit applies to §3730(h) actions, and we borrow the
most closely analogous state time limit absent an ex-
——————
2 JUSTICE STEVENS, we believe, misapplies this interpretive rule. Post,
p. 1 (opinion concurring in judgment). He argues that §3731(b)(1) does
not govern §3730(h) actions because “it is so unlikely that a legislature
would actually intend” to start the statute of limitations running before
the cause of action accrues that he “would presume that the anomaly
was the product of a drafting error” regardless of whether the text is
ambiguous. Dodd v. United States, ante, at __, n. 1 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting). This is not the proper analysis. Section 3731(b)(1) is
ambiguous because its text, literally read, admits of two plausible
interpretations. Supra, at 5–7. We apply the rule that Congress
generally drafts statutes of limitations to begin when the cause of
action accrues to resolve that ambiguity, not to create it in the first
instance.
10 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
pressly applicable one. See supra, at 4–5. The likely
analogous state statutes of limitations virtually all start to
run when the cause of action accrues—in retaliation ac-
tions, when the retaliatory action occurs.3
——————
3 Ala. Code §6–2–38 (West 1993) (catchall for tort actions not other-
wise enumerated); §36–26A–4(a) (West 2001) (retaliation action for
whistle-blowers); Alaska Stat. §09.10.070 (Lexis 2004) (catchall); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §12–541 (West 2003) (wrongful termination); Ark. Code
Ann. §16–56–115 (Lexis 1987) (catchall); §21–1–604 (Lexis 2004)
(retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann.
§335.1 (West Supp. 2005) (personal injuries); §343 (West 1982) (catch-
all); Colo. Rev. Stat. §13–80–102(1)(g) (Lexis 2004) (catchall); Conn.
Gen. Stat. §§52–577, 31–51m (2005) (catchall for tort actions; retalia-
tion action for whistle-blowers); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, §8119 (Lexis
1999) (personal injuries); Tit. 29, §5115 (Lexis 2003) (retaliation action
for whistle-blowers); D. C. Code §12–301(8) (West Supp. 2004) (catch-
all); Fla. Stat. §§112.3187(8)(a), 448.103 (2003) (whistle-blower actions);
Ga. Code Ann. §9–3–33 (Lexis 1982) (personal injuries); Haw. Rev.
Stat. §378–63(a) (Supp. 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers);
Idaho Code §§5–224, 6–2105(2) (Lexis 1998) (catchall; retaliation action
for whistle-blowers); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 735, §5/13–202 (West
2003) (personal injuries); Ind. Code §34–11–2–4 (2004) (personal
injuries); Iowa Code §614.1 (2003) (personal injuries); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§§60–513, 75–2973(h) (Supp. 2003) (catchall; retaliation action for
whistle-blowers); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §413.120(7) (Lexis Supp. 2004)
(catchall); §61.103(2) (Lexis 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-
blowers); La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 3492 (West 1994) (“[d]elictual ac-
tions”; starts running on day injury or damage sustained, which is
when the cause of action generally accrues for retaliatory actions); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 14, §752 (West 1980) (catchall); Md. Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Code Ann. §5–101 (Lexis 2002) (catchall for civil actions at law);
Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 260, §2A, ch. 149, §185(d) (West 2004) (catchall
for tort actions for personal injuries; retaliation action for whistle-
blowers); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §15.363(1) (West 2004) (retaliation
action for whistle-blowers); Minn. Stat. §541.07 (2004) (personal inju-
ries); Miss. Code. Ann. §15–1–49 (Lexis 2003) (catchall); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§516.120 (2000) (catchall); Mont. Code Ann. §39–2–911(1) (2003)
(wrongful discharge); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§25–207, 25–212 (1995) (catch-
all); Nev. Rev. Stat. §11.190.4(e) (2003) (personal injuries); N. H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §508:4 (West 1997) (personal actions other than slander or
libel); N. J. Stat. Ann. §§2A:14–1, 34:19–5 (West 2000) (catchall; re-
taliation action for whistle-blowers); §2A:14–2(a) (West Supp. 2005)
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 11
Opinion of the Court
The interpretation favored by Wilson and the Govern-
ment, on the other hand, is in tension with this rule of
construction. Under their reading, the statute of limita-
tions for FCA retaliation actions begins to run, at best, on
the date the actual or suspected FCA violation occurred.
——————
(personal injuries); N. M. Stat. Ann. §37–1–4 (1990) (catchall); N. Y.
Civ. Prac. Law Ann. §215.4 (West 2003) (“action to enforce” a statute
“given wholly or partly to any person who will prosecute”); N. Y. Lab.
Law Ann. §740.4(a) (West 2002) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers);
N. C. Gen. Stat. §§1–52, 126–86 (Lexis 2003) (catchall; retaliation
action for whistle-blowers); N. D. Cent. Code §28–01–16 (Lexis 1991)
(catchall); §34–01–20.3 (Lexis 2004) (retaliation actions for whistle-
blowers); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2305.09 (Lexis Supp. 2003) (catchall for
torts); §4113.52(D) (Lexis 2001) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers);
Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, §95 (West Supp. 2005) (catchall); Ore. Rev.
Stat. §12.110(1) (2003) (catchall); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5524(7) (2002)
(catchall); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 43, §1424(a) (Purdon 1991) (retaliation
action for whistle-blowers); R. I. Gen. Laws §9–1–14(a) (Lexis 1997)
(injuries to the person); §28–50–4 (Lexis 2003) (retaliation action for
whistle-blowers); S. C. Code Ann. §15–3–530 (West 2005) (catchall);
§8–27–30(B) (West Supp. 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers);
S. D. Codified Laws §15–2–14(3) (West 2004) (action for personal
injury); Tenn. Code Ann. §28–3–104(a)(1) (Lexis 2000) (personal inju-
ries); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §16.003 (West 2002) (personal
injuries); Tex. Govt. Code Ann. §554.005 (West 2004) (retaliation action
for whistle-blowers); Utah Code Ann. §§78–12–29(1), (2) (Lexis 2002)
(liability created by statute of foreign state; liability created by statute);
§67–21–4(2) (Lexis 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Vt.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, §511 (Lexis 2002) (catchall); Va. Code Ann. §§8.01–
243(A), 8.01–248 (Lexis 2000) (personal injuries; catchall); Wash. Rev.
Code §4.16.080(2) (2004) (catchall for injuries to person); W. Va. Code
§55–2–12 (Lexis 2000) (catchall); §6C–1–4(a) (Lexis 2003) (retaliation
action for whistle-blowers); Wis. Stat. §893.57 (2003–2004) (intentional
torts); Wyo. Stat. §§1–3–105(a)(iv)(C), 9–11–103(c) (2003) (catchall;
retaliation action for whistle-blowers). But see Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12,
§512 (Lexis 2002) (personal injury statute of limitations starts on the
date of the discovery of the injury); D. C. Code §1–615.54 (West 2001)
(whistle-blower action may be brought within one year of the time the
employee learns of the retaliation). We stress that these are only the
likely candidates for analogous state statutes of limitations; it may well
not be an exhaustive or authoritative list of the possibilities.
12 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON
Opinion of the Court
Because that date will precede the retaliatory conduct,
their reading starts the time limit running before the
retaliation action accrues. Even more oddly, their reading
allows a retaliation action to be time barred before it ever
accrues—for example, if the employer discovers more than
six years after the suspected violation of §3729 that an
employee aided in investigating that fraud, then retali-
ates. As we have discussed, §3731(b)(1)’s text permits a
construction that avoids these counterintuitive results—
that “civil action under section 3730” means only those
civil actions under §3730 that have as an element a “viola-
tion of section 3729,” that is, §§3730(a) and (b) actions.
Granted, other textual evidence cuts against this read-
ing of §3731(b)(1). In particular, Congress used the phrase
“brought under subsection (a) or (b) of section 3730” in
§3731(d); this, it is argued, shows that Congress could
have been similarly precise in §3731(b)(1) if it wished. In
the context of this statute, however, that argument proves
too much, since the same could be said of §3731(c), which
all agree uses the phrase “action under section 3730” in
more limited, and less precise, fashion. See supra, at 8.
We do not doubt that Congress could have drafted
§3731(b)(1) with more precision than it did, but the pres-
ence of the same inexact wording in §3731(c) means that
the more precise language in §3731(d) casts little doubt on
our reading of the statute.
* * *
For the reasons we have discussed, the FCA’s express
limitations period does not apply to §3730(h) actions. The
most closely analogous state statute of limitations there-
fore applies. Judge Wilkinson, in his dissenting opinion
below, concluded that the most closely analogous state
statute of limitations in this case is North Carolina’s 3-
year statute of limitations governing wrongful-discharge
claims. See 367 F. 3d, at 261–262. The appropriate state
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 13
Opinion of the Court
statute of limitations to borrow, however, is not within the
scope of the question we granted certiorari to decide, and
the Court of Appeals did not pass on the point. We there-
fore leave that issue for remand. The judgment
of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1
STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–169
_________________
GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DISTRICT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED
STATES EX REL. KAREN T. WILSON
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 20, 2005]
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Dodd
v. United States, ante, at ___, I concur in the judgment.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1
BREYER, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–169
_________________
GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DISTRICT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED
STATES EX REL. KAREN T. WILSON
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 20, 2005]
JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,
dissenting.
As the Court points out, it is unusual to find a statute of
limitations keyed not to the time of the plaintiff’s injury,
but to other related events. Still, I believe that Congress
has written such a statute here, and we should respect its
decision.
The language of the statute, 31 U. S. C. §3731(b)(1), is
reasonably clear. It says that “[a] civil action under sec-
tion 3730 may not be brought . . . more than 6 years after
the date on which the violation” of federal false claims law
“is committed.” (Emphasis added.) Section 3730 lists
three kinds of civil actions, including a retaliation action
under §3730(h). Thus, a retaliation action is a “civil action
under section 3730,” and §3731(b)(1)’s 6-year limitations
period applies.
The Court tries to overcome the force of this syllogism
with the help of two textual arguments. First, it points to
the subsection that follows §3731(b)—§3731(c)—which
says that “ ‘[i]n any action brought under section 3730, the
United States shall be required to prove all essential
elements of the cause of action, including damages, by a
preponderance of the evidence.’ ” See ante, at 8. The
Court then reasons that, read in context, the phrase “ac-
2 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON
BREYER, J., dissenting
tion brought under section 3730” could not refer to all the
civil actions listed under §3730, for the United States is
not ordinarily a party to private retaliation suits brought
under §3730(h). Ibid. Rather, the phrase “action brought
under section 3730” must refer only to the false claims
actions listed in §§3730(a) and (b). Ibid. Thus, according
to the Court, if in §3731(c), the phrase “action brought
under section 3730” refers only to a subset of the actions
listed under §3730, one can read the similar phrase in
§3731(b)(1) to contain a similar limitation. Ibid.
The problem with this argument lies in its conclusion.
The reason that §3731(c) may apply only to §§3730(a) and
(b) actions has nothing to do with the phrase “action
brought under section 3730.” Rather, any limitation on
§3731(c)’s application comes from different words, namely,
“the United States.” These latter words make clear not
that the phrase “under section 3730” has a different mean-
ing than in (b), but that (c) comes into play only in cases in
which the United States is a party (and only in such cases,
compare ibid.). Because it is these words—the subject of
the subsection, “the United States”—that determines
whether (c) has application in any given case, there is
nothing in §3731(c) that would make it “reasonable,” ibid.,
to read the phrase “action under section 3730” in section
3731(b)(1) to apply, as the Court concludes, to only “two
out of three actions under section 3730.”
The subsections surrounding §§3731(b) and (c) further
undermine the Court’s extratextual limitation on “[a] civil
action under section 3730.” In §3731(a), Congress appar-
ently used the phrase “under section 3730” to mean all
three §3730 actions. §3731(a) (a “subpoena requiring the
attendance of a witness at a trial or hearing conducted
under section 3730 of this title may be served at any place
in the United States”). And in §3731(d), Congress used
the very words that the Court seeks to find in §3731(b),
but that do not there exist—namely, the words “under
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3
BREYER, J., dissenting
subsection (a) or (b) of section 3730”—when it meant to
narrow a provision’s compass to two out of the three §3730
causes of action. §3731(d) (“[A] final judgment rendered in
favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding
charging fraud or false statements . . . shall estop the
defendant from denying the essential elements of the
offense in any action which involves the same transaction
as in the criminal proceeding and which is brought under
subsection (a) or (b) of section 3730”); see also ante, at 12.
The statutory context therefore shows that Congress did
not intend for the phrase “[a] civil action under section
3730” to mean anything other than what it says.
Second, the Court points to language in §3731(b)(1) that
specifies when the limitations period begins to run: “the
date on which the violation” of the false claims provision,
§3729, “is committed.” See ante, at 5–7. It then points out
that a retaliation action does not necessarily involve an
actual false claims violation, because (it assumes) a re-
taliation plaintiff need only show “a suspected violation.”
Ante, at 7 (emphasis in original). Thus, adopting respon-
dent’s and the Government’s reading, the Court reasons,
would require reading some words into §3731(b)(1)—so
that it would say “the [suspected or actual] violation”—
which would distort the statute more than reading some
other, different words into the statute—so that it would
say “[a] civil action under section 3730[(a) or (b)].” Ibid.
The difficulty with the Court’s choice of the latter lin-
guistic addition is that the two sets of textual insertions—
on the one hand “suspected or actual,” on the other hand
“(a) or (b)”—are not equivalent. Statutes of limitations,
when referring to starting points, generally refer not to
actual events, but to alleged events. Thus, a plaintiff’s
tort action is timely if he files it within, say, three years of
the alleged negligently caused injury; a plaintiff’s breach-
of-contract action is timely if filed within, say, one year of
the alleged breach. And a plaintiff who loses such an
4 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON
BREYER, J., dissenting
action because the defendant shows, say, that there was
no such injury or no such breach, has not, for that reason,
brought the action outside the limitations period. Rather,
the suit is still timely even though the violation remains
nothing more than “alleged” after trial. Such a plaintiff
has simply lost a timely filed action on the merits.
The provision before us is no different. Section
3731(b)(1)’s 6-year time clock begins to run on “the date on
which the violation” of federal false claims law, §3729, “is
committed.” Thus, any §3730 plaintiff—even one bringing
a false claims action under §3730(a) or §3730(b)—has six
years from the moment of a suspected—that is, an un-
proven—violation of the False Claims Act’s antifraud
provision. Thus, as naturally interpreted, the words “the
date on which the violation . . . is committed” refer to the
date on which the suspected violation occurs.
I recognize that there is a relevant distinction in this
case. In the typical case (say, the tort or contract case) the
plaintiff must ultimately prove all the relevant allega-
tions. Here, the retaliation victim need not prove that her
employer did in fact violate federal false claims law, but
only that she believed that there was such a violation. See
ibid. But that distinction does not make the difference.
Given the clear link between claimed violations of federal
false claims law and retaliation actions (the latter depend
on the former) and given that triggering events in statutes
of limitations implicitly mean alleged triggering events,
§3731(b)(1) remains most naturally read as implicitly
referring to alleged or suspected violations of federal false
claims law. And at the very least, reading the statute in
this way, especially in light of the other statutory indica-
tors, see supra, at 1–3, does far less violence to
§3731(b)(1)’s text than does the Court’s addition of “(a) or
(b).”
The Court’s far stronger argument is not textual. It
concerns the limitations provision’s purpose. That pur-
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5
BREYER, J., dissenting
pose, after all, includes providing victims of retaliation a
reasonable time within which they can file an action to
vindicate their rights. Cf. S. Rep. No. 99–345, p. 34 (1986)
(addition of a retaliation cause of action intended “to halt
companies . . . from using the threat of economic retalia-
tion to silence ‘whistleblowers’ ” and to “assure those who
may be considering exposing fraud that they are legally
protected from retaliatory acts”). How can we reconcile
that purpose with a reading of the statute that, as a mat-
ter of logic, could allow the limitations period to begin to
run, perhaps even to terminate, before the forbidden
retaliation occurs? See ante, at 12.
The answer, in my view, is that Congress could have
had a particular qui tam-related purpose in mind. That is,
it could have intended to provide a fairly lengthy limita-
tions period, namely six years from the time the false
claims conduct occurs, applicable to all related actions,
and then to put an end to all such litigation. This makes
particular sense given the reasonable assumption that
false claims and retaliation actions are likely to be liti-
gated together. See, e.g., App. 11–35 (respondent’s com-
plaint pursuing both qui tam and retaliation claims in
same suit); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft
Co., 162 F. 3d 1027, 1030 (CA9 1998) (same).
Of course, as the Court emphasizes, such an unusual
provision exacts a price, namely possible injury to an
individual who suffers retaliation that comes late in the
day. But apparently there is no such individual. Neither
the Court nor petitioners have been able to find any actual
example. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, 6; see also Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 27–28 (United States is
unaware of any such example). Nor have I.
By contrast, the Court’s reading of the statute exacts a
different, but certain, price. It substitutes for a fairly
lengthy—and uniform—6-year limitations term, a crazy-
quilt of limitations periods stitched together from the laws
6 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DIST. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. WILSON
BREYER, J., dissenting
of 51 jurisdictions which, in some instances, might require
a plaintiff to bring a retaliation claim within 90 days, six
months, or one year after the retaliation takes place. See,
e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §61.103(2) (Lexis 2004) (90-day
limitations period for certain whistle-blower actions); Fla.
Stat. Ann. §112.3187(8)(a) (West Supp. 2005) (180-day
limitations period); Hughes Aircraft Co., supra, at 1035
(California’s 1-year limitations period for wrongful termi-
nation in violation of public policy applies to §3730(h)
action). Rather than shed crocodile tears for the imagined
plight of a nonexistent whistle-blower as petitioners ask
us to do, I would read the statute to do what the statute
says Congress wanted: to provide a relatively long, single,
uniform limitations period that, in practice, seems to
protect the many real potential plaintiffs, such as respon-
dent, who will otherwise find themselves shut out of court.
Such a reading also avoids the attendant practical difficul-
ties and uncertainties inherent in requiring federal courts
to borrow state statutes of limitations. See Jones v. R. R.
Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369, 377–380, and n. 13
(2004) (discussing problems with this practice).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.