Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion
Chief Justice Justices
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED OCTOBER 26, 2004
TAMMY SUE STEWART,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and No. 124676
CARLA K. AMY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM.
The issue presented in this appeal is whether, under
the parked vehicle provisions of the no-fault act, MCL
500.3106(1), a police cruiser that is parked at least
partially on a roadway, for the purpose of aiding a stalled
vehicle and with its emergency lights flashing, presents an
unreasonable risk of bodily injury, such that the state may
be held liable under the no-fault act. The Court of
Appeals concluded that a disabled vehicle that had come to
rest in the right-hand lane of a highway and a state police
cruiser that stopped behind it were both vehicles parked in
such a way as to cause an unreasonable risk within the
meaning of MCL 500.3106(1)(a). We reverse the portion of
the Court of Appeals decision pertaining to the state
police cruiser.1
I
The facts are not in dispute. On March 26, 1998, at
about 8:20 p.m., Linda Jones was operating an automobile in
a northbound lane of Dixie Highway in Saginaw County. In
the area where Jones was driving, Dixie Highway is a five-
lane road (two southbound lines, two northbound lines, and
a middle turn lane) with a speed limit of forty-five miles
an hour. A state police trooper at the scene described the
area as well lit. A curb runs along the edge of the
highway; there is no shoulder.
After her vehicle stalled, Jones maneuvered it into
the right lane. She activated the vehicle’s flashers.
Another driver saw her and stopped behind her to offer
help. A state trooper came upon the scene, and he stopped
1
The only appeal before us is that filed by the state
of Michigan on behalf of the state police. This opinion
does not address liability issues related to the disabled
vehicle.
2
his police cruiser behind the other two vehicles. The
trooper activated his cruiser’s emergency lights and the
driver-side spotlight. The trooper placed his police
cruiser in park, got out of his cruiser, and talked to
Jones and the other driver. After the other driver left,
the trooper decided that he would try to use his cruiser to
push Jones’s vehicle off the road.
As the trooper was returning to his cruiser, a
motorcycle operated by Douglas Amy, and with Tammy Sue
Stewart as a passenger, approached the scene from behind.
The motorcycle struck the rear of the police cruiser with
considerable force. Amy was killed, and Stewart was
seriously injured. Stewart had no insurance of her own,
and many of her medical bills were paid by Medicaid.
Numerous lawsuits were filed in the Saginaw Circuit
Court and the Court of Claims seeking no-fault benefits
from the insurer of the vehicle driven by Ms. Jones and
from the state of Michigan, as the self-insurer of the
state police cruiser. Carla Amy, the widow of Douglas Amy,
sought to recover survivor’s benefits. MCL 500.3108.
Stewart sought to recover first-party personal protection
insurance (PIP) benefits. MCL 500.3107; MCL 500.3114(5).
The Michigan Department of Community Health (MDCH), acting
as the collection agent for Medicaid, sought to recover
3
amounts paid for Stewart’s medical care. This appeal
concerns the potential liability of the state of Michigan
arising from the involvement of the police cruiser.
The circuit court determined that the police cruiser
was a parked vehicle, within the meaning of MCL 500.3106,
at the time of the accident and that the parked cruiser did
not cause an unreasonable risk of bodily injury within the
meaning of MCL 500.3106(1)(a).2 Accordingly, the circuit
court granted the state’s motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10).3
The Court of Appeals agreed that the police cruiser
was a parked vehicle. However, the Court concluded that,
although the cruiser was legally parked under MCL 257.603,4
2
MCL 500.3106(1)(a) provides:
Accidental bodily injury does not arise out
of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use
of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle unless any
of the following occur:
(a) The vehicle was parked in such a way as
to cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury
which occurred.
3
As for the disabled vehicle, the circuit court found
that it was also a parked vehicle, but that it posed an
unreasonable risk.
4
MCL 257.603(3), part of the Michigan Vehicle Code,
provides:
(continued…)
4
it posed an unreasonable risk by virtue of the fact that it
was parked on the traveled portion of the highway. Amy v
MIC Gen Ins Corp, 258 Mich App 94, 133-136; 670 NW2d 228
(2003). The Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s
summary disposition ruling in favor of the state.
II
This is an appeal from a decision on a motion for
summary disposition, which we review de novo. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). The
underlying question before this Court is whether under §
3106(1) the police cruiser, which was parked on the roadway
for the purpose of aiding a stalled vehicle and with its
emergency lights flashing, presented an unreasonable risk
of bodily injury. When “the facts are undisputed, the
determination of whether an automobile is parked in such a
(continued…)
The driver of an authorized emergency
vehicle may do any of the following:
(a) Park or stand, irrespective of this act.
(b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or
stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be
necessary for safe operation.
(c) Exceed the prima facie speed limits so
long as he or she does not endanger life or
property.
(d) Disregard regulations governing
direction of movement or turning in a specified
direction.
5
way as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily injury
within the meaning of § 3106(1)(a) is an issue of statutory
construction for the court.” Wills v State Farm Ins Cos,
437 Mich 205, 208; 468 NW2d 511 (1991). We likewise review
such statutory construction issues de novo. Cardinal
Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n,
437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991).
III
A no-fault insurer is responsible for paying first-
party PIP benefits “for accidental bodily injury arising out
of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . .” MCL 500.3105(1). For
purposes of this appeal, the parties agree that the police
cruiser was “parked” at the time of the accident. Under
the no-fault act, accidental bodily injury “does not arise
out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a
parked vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . ,” MCL 500.3106(1),
except in the three situations set forth in MCL
500.3106(1)(a), (b), and (c). Relevant to this case is the
first of these exceptions:
The vehicle was parked in such a way as to
cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury
which occurred. [MCL 500.3106(1)(a).]
6
IV
Contrary to the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, the
statutory language in MCL 500.3106(1)(a) that is at issue
(i.e., a vehicle may be parked in such a way “as to cause
unreasonable risk . . .”) recognizes that there are degrees
of risk posed by a parked vehicle. The statutory language
does not create a rule that whenever a motor vehicle is
parked entirely or in part on a traveled portion of a road,
the parked vehicle poses an unreasonable risk. In each
case cited by the Court of Appeals it was determined that
the vehicle involved posed an unreasonable risk (because it
was parked partly or entirely on the traveled portion of a
road). But that does not mean that the same result must
necessarily obtain in a situation such as this, in which
the parked vehicle was a police cruiser performing
emergency services. Indeed, we find that the police
cruiser in this case was not parked in such a fashion as to
pose an unreasonable risk. We have no doubt that the
cruiser posed a risk to other northbound vehicles and their
occupants, and we have no doubt that, as the Court of
Appeals said, the operator of the motorcycle had to
perceive, react to, and navigate around the police cruiser.
But none of this answers the question whether the parked
police cruiser constituted an unreasonable risk.
7
The policy underlying the parked vehicle exclusion was
explained in Miller v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 411 Mich 633,
639-641; 309 NW2d 544 (1981):
Injuries involving parked vehicles do not
normally involve the vehicle as a motor vehicle.
Injuries involving parked vehicles typically
involve the vehicle in much the same way as any
other stationary object (such as a tree, sign
post or boulder) would be involved. There is
nothing about a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle
that would bear on the accident.
The stated exceptions to the parking
exclusion clarify and reinforce this construction
of the exclusion. Each exception pertains to
injuries related to the character of a parked
vehicle as a motor vehicle—characteristics which
make it unlike other stationary roadside objects
that can be involved in vehicle accidents.
Section 3106(a), which excepts a vehicle
parked so as to create an unreasonable risk of
injury, concerns the act of parking a car, which
can only be done in the course of using the
vehicle as a motor vehicle, and recognizes that
the act of parking can be done in a fashion which
causes an unreasonable risk of injury, as when
the vehicle is left in gear or with one end
protruding into traffic.
* * *
Each of the exceptions to the parking
exclusion thus describes an instance where,
although the vehicle is parked, its involvement
in an accident is nonetheless directly related to
its character as a motor vehicle. The underlying
policy of the parking exclusion is that, except
in three general types of situations, a parked
car is not involved in an accident as a motor
vehicle. It is therefore inappropriate to
compensate injuries arising from its non-
vehicular involvement in an accident within a
system designed to compensate injuries involving
motor vehicles as motor vehicles. [Emphasis in
original.]
8
As even the Court of Appeals recognized, factors such
as the manner, location, and fashion in which a vehicle is
parked are material to determining whether the parked
vehicle poses an unreasonable risk.5 In this case, a police
cruiser was parked in a travel lane, but it was parked in
an area that was well lit, with its emergency lights
flashing, with its spotlight on, and it was parked there
for the purpose of providing necessary emergency services
to a stalled vehicle that itself posed a risk of bodily
injury. The stalled vehicle ahead of it also had its
flashing lights on. The speed limit was forty-five miles
an hour. Moreover, there was another northbound lane
available, and the middle turn lane was potentially
available for other vehicles to use. There is nothing in
the record to suggest that an oncoming northbound driver
would not have ample opportunity to observe, react to, and
avoid the hazard posed by the police cruiser. In short, we
find that the parked police cruiser in this case did not
pose an unreasonable risk within the meaning of MCL
500.3106(1)(a).
5
258 Mich App 133-134.
9
V
The Court of Appeals decision is reversed to the
extent it holds that the police cruiser was parked in such
a way as to cause an unreasonable risk within the meaning
of MCL 500.3106(1)(a). The circuit court’s order of
summary disposition in favor of the state of Michigan, as
the self-insurer of the state police cruiser, is
reinstated.
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
10