People v. Knox

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 48909

Chief Justice Justices

Opinion
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

FILED FEBRUARY 4, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 123970

DANNY LEE KNOX, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

PER CURIAM

The defendant was charged in the death of his four-

month-old son, Xavier Knox, and convicted of first-degree

felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), with first-degree child

abuse, MCL 750.136b(2), as the predicate. He was sentenced

to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We

must determine whether the admission of evidence regarding

defendant’s past anger directed at the child’s mother, the

child’s prior injuries, and the mother’s good character

were plain errors affecting defendant’s substantial rights.

The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. We reverse the conviction of

defendant and remand for a new trial.

I

On July 22, 1998, defendant was in the apartment of

LaToya Kelley, the mother of his son. The couple argued

during the evening, and Kelley later fed Xavier a bottle of

formula and put him to bed. Defendant testified that

Xavier seemed fine at that time. After Xavier went to

sleep, Kelley left the apartment around 9:30 p.m. to visit

a friend and neighbor. According to defendant, he checked

on Xavier at around 9:45 p.m. and then sent Kelley’s two-

year-old child to the bathroom. When defendant returned to

the bedroom, he noticed Xavier making gurgling noises and

saw that his eyes had rolled back into his head. Xavier

would not respond, so defendant ran to the balcony to call

out for Kelley and then telephoned Kelley’s mother to tell

her that something was wrong with the baby. Defendant took

his son to a neighbor, who in turn called 911. Emergency

personnel arrived at the apartment around 10:15 p.m., at

which point Xavier still had a heartbeat. By 10:25 p.m.,

the child’s heartbeat had stopped.

Medical experts determined that the boy had died from

being severely shaken and from his head coming into contact

with an object several times. The boy suffered from

retinal hemorrhaging, subdural and subarachnoid hematoma,
2

and three distinct skull fractures from three separate

contacts with an unknown object. The experts opined that

Xavier’s injuries were not accidental, that the child most

likely lost consciousness within one or two minutes of

being injured, and that it would have been impossible for

Xavier to consume formula after being injured. An expert

also opined that Xavier’s respiratory problems could have

stabilized for an hour or more before his heart rate

collapsed. There was also evidence that he had suffered

prior abusive injuries, including recently sustained

factures to the right arm and left leg, as well as healed

rib fractures that were between three- and six-weeks-old.

Defendant’s first trial resulted in a deadlocked jury.

At his second trial, defendant denied killing or ever

abusing his son and argued that it was Kelley who must have

abused Xavier before leaving the apartment. Kelley

testified that she and defendant had many arguments, with

defendant becoming increasingly angry, shouting and kicking

physical objects. On one occasion, he allegedly shoved

her. Kelley also testified that she told defendant to get

help for his anger and urged him to take anger-management

classes. Defendant claimed that these were, in fact,

parenting classes, but admitted that he took them at

Kelley’s urging. Kelley admitted that she, too, had a

temper and that she had thrown items and torn a shower
3

curtain in anger. The prosecutor, however, also elicited

testimony from her about how she had cared for her eleven

brothers and sisters from the age of eight, and how she

loved children in general and treasured her own two

children. Kelley’s parents and friends testified that she

had a caring nature and loved her children.

Defendant did not object at trial to the testimony

regarding his angry confrontations with Kelley, the prior

injuries sustained by his son, or the testimony regarding

Kelley’s good character. After the jury convicted

defendant, defendant appealed of right.1 Defendant accused

the prosecutor of misconduct in presenting the evidence

regarding defendant’s prior acts, Xavier’s prior injuries,

and Kelley’s good character, and accused his trial counsel

of ineffective assistance in failing to object. Defendant

also questioned the propriety of his felony-murder

conviction where the acts comprising the predicate felony

also comprised the murder.

The Court of Appeals treated defendant’s first issue

as a purely evidentiary one and, in a divided decision,

1
Defendant first sought a remand for an evidentiary
hearing on the effectiveness of the assistance of his trial
counsel on the basis of counsel’s failure to challenge the
prosecutor’s submission of this evidence. The Court of
Appeals denied defendant’s motion because it was not
persuaded that a remand was necessary at that time.
Unpublished order, entered May 21, 2001 (Docket No.
226944).
4
affirmed defendant’s conviction.2 In ruling that defendant

was not entitled to relief, the majority relied heavily on

this Court’s decision in People v Hine, 467 Mich 242; 650

NW2d 659 (2002), and the majority’s belief that this

decision compelled a finding that there was no showing by

the defendant of plain error affecting his substantial

rights. The majority found the evidence of defendant’s

angry behavior against Kelley sufficiently similar to the

alleged abuse of the child to be either admissible or not

harmful in admission. It found the evidence of the past

abuse of defendant’s son probative of whether the injuries

the boy suffered were inflicted intentionally. It found

the admission of the evidence of Kelley’s good character

improper under MRE 608 and 609, as well as MRE 404, but saw

no showing of plain error affecting defendant’s substantial

rights because the prosecutor had a reasonable likelihood

of convicting defendant by demonstrating that defendant was

alone with the boy when the fatal injuries were sustained.

The dissenting judge disagreed with the majority’s

assessment of the effect of Hine, stating that Hine was

consistent with precedent, and that application of that

precedent required a reversal in this case. The dissenting

judge opined that the evidence of defendant’s past anger

2
256 Mich App 175; 662 NW2d 482 (2003).
5
and abuse served the improper purpose of demonstrating that

defendant must have abused his son, resulting in the boy’s

death, because defendant had a bad character. The

dissenter agreed that the evidence of past abuse of the

child was admissible under MRE 404(b), but stated that the

prosecutor put this evidence to improper use by indicating

to the jury that the prior injuries were not just

intentionally caused, but were caused by defendant.

Finally, the dissenting judge opined that admission of the

evidence regarding Kelley’s good character prejudicially

undermined defendant’s credibility and defense. The

dissenter argued that these plain errors were outcome-

determinative and required the reversal of defendant’s

conviction and a remand for a new trial.

Although we agree with the Court of Appeals majority’s

assessment that this matter should be analyzed from the

standpoint of whether admission of the contested evidence

discussed above constituted plain error affecting

defendant’s substantial rights, we agree with the

dissenting judge that plain error requiring reversal did,

in fact, occur.

II

In order to preserve the issue of the improper

admission of evidence for appeal, a party generally must

object at the time of admission. Because defendant did not
6

object to the admission of the challenged evidence in this

case, he must demonstrate plain error affecting his

substantial rights, meaning that he was actually innocent

or that the error seriously affected the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings

independent of his innocence. People v Carines, 460 Mich

750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

III

MRE 404(b) provides in part:

(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan,
or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same
is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs,
or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or
subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.

In People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508 NW2d

114 (1993), this Court articulated the factors that must be

present for other acts evidence to be admissible. First,

the prosecutor must offer the "prior bad acts" evidence

under something other than a character or propensity

theory. Second, "the evidence must be relevant under MRE

402, as enforced through MRE 104(b)[.]" Id. Third, the

probative value of the evidence must not be substantially

outweighed by unfair prejudice under MRE 403. Finally, the

7

trial court, upon request, may provide a limiting

instruction under MRE 105.

In People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 385; 582 NW2d 785

(1998), this Court explained that the prosecution bears the

initial burden of establishing the relevance of the

evidence to prove a fact within one of the exceptions to

the general exclusionary rule of MRE 404(b). “Relevance is

a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at

issue that must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences

that make a material fact at issue more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence.” Crawford,

supra at 387. Where the only relevance of the proposed

evidence is to show the defendant’s character or the

defendant’s propensity to commit the crime, the evidence

must be excluded.

In People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43; 614

NW2d 888 (2000), this Court specifically examined the

exception in MRE 404(b) for evidence showing a “scheme,

plan, or system.” We clarified that “evidence of similar

misconduct is logically relevant to show that the charged

act occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the charged

offense are sufficiently similar to support an inference

that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or

system.” Sabin, supra at 63. We cautioned both that

“[l]ogical relevance is not limited to circumstances in
8

which the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single

continuing conception of plot,” and that “[g]eneral

similarity between the charged and uncharged acts does not,

however, by itself, establish a plan, scheme, or system

used to commit the acts.” Id. at 64.

These decisions continue to form the foundation for a

proper analysis of MRE 404(b). The case upon which the

instant Court of Appeals majority placed so much emphasis,

Hine, focused very specifically and narrowly on a

particular application of the “scheme, plan, or system”

principles discussed in Sabin to the facts presented. This

Court concluded in Hine that the Court of Appeals had

improperly imposed a standard of a high degree of

similarity between the proffered other acts of the

defendant and the charged acts. Specifically, this Court

observed that the particular type of assaults on the

defendant’s former girlfriends were sufficiently similar to

the method or system that could have caused the marks on

the child victim to be admissible in that case. The trial

court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in

determining that the assaults by the defendant on his

former girlfriends and the charged offenses regarding the

9

child victim shared sufficient common features to permit

the inference of a plan, scheme, or system.3

Contrary to the Court of Appeals majority’s conclusion

that Hine “presents a formidable obstacle to reversing on

the basis of a trial court’s error in admitting prior-bad-

acts evidence” and has “reduced the value parties opposing

prior-bad-acts evidence once derived from the first and

third prongs of the VanderVleit test,” 256 Mich App 188-

189, Hine merely applied the rule that prior bad acts

evidence that is probative of something other than the

defendant’s character or propensity to commit the charged

crime is admissible. Hine neither announced new law nor

did it signify a retreat from the VanderVliet principles;

rather, it simply rejected an interpretation of Sabin that

would have required an impermissibly high level of

3
This Court commented in Hine, supra, on the odd
circumstance that the Court of Appeals chose to recite the
facts from defendant’s point of view. We observed that it
was not appropriate for an appellate court to discount the
evidence presented to the trial court in support of the
prosecution’s theory. Id. at 251. As the dissenting judge
in the instant case recognized, our concern in Hine was
that the Court of Appeals had based its analysis on the
erroneous conclusion that the evidence presented was
insufficient to support the conviction. The Court of
Appeals majority’s apparent interpretation of this
criticism found in Hine as the establishment of a new
appellate standard of review for trial court rulings on
relevancy under MRE 404(b) is not warranted. Rather, this
Court in Hine simply stated the unremarkable principle
that, when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a conviction, the evidence must be considered in
the light most favorable to the prosecution.
10
similarity between the proffered other acts evidence and

the charged acts.

IV

With this understanding of the continued validity of

this Court’s MRE 404(b) jurisprudence, we now examine the

propriety of the admitted prior acts, injury, and

reputation evidence. We conclude that the admission of

this evidence was erroneous and raises sufficient concern

about the fairness of the trial and the integrity of the

jury’s verdict to require the reversal of defendant’s

conviction and a remand for a new trial.

The evidence of defendant’s past demonstrations of

anger were not relevant to any material fact at issue and

did not meet the requirements set forth in Sabin for

admissibility. Unlike the acts at issue in Hine, none of

defendant’s alleged manifestations of anger had any

similarity to the acts that resulted in Xavier’s death.

The evidence showed that defendant had damaged walls and

doors and, on one occasion, had shoved Kelley during an

argument. Nothing about the evidence offered demonstrated

any prior acts by defendant that were similar to the acts

that were determined to have caused Xavier’s injuries.

Further, no evidence suggested that defendant was ever

angry with his son or that he redirected his anger with

Kelley to either Xavier or Kelley’s other child. No one
11

testified to ever seeing defendant harm his son. The fact

that defendant took classes (either for parenting or for

anger management) showed that he was trying to deal with

Kelley’s perception that he had an anger problem, not that

he had committed prior acts similar to those inflicted on

Xavier.

Under these circumstances, the evidence of defendant’s

past anger could only serve the improper purpose of

demonstrating that he had the bad character or propensity

to harm his son. The prosecutor specifically argued that

defendant’s anger-management problem was a plausible

explanation for what happened to Xavier. As the dissenting

judge below correctly noted, the prosecutor did not use the

evidence of defendant’s anger for any other reason except

to make an impermissible propensity argument. In this

case, in which defendant’s abuse of his son was implied

from defendant having been the last adult to be alone with

his son, the improper admission of the evidence was highly

prejudicial. The trial court committed plain error when it

admitted this evidence.

Turning to the evidence of Xavier’s prior injuries, we

agree with both the Court of Appeals majority and the

dissent that the signs of past physical abuse of the child

were relevant to prove that his subsequent fatal injuries

were not inflicted accidentally. We concur, however, with
12

the dissent that the trial court committed error requiring

reversal in permitting the prosecutor to use this evidence

for an improper purpose. The prosecutor introduced the

evidence of prior injury not only to show that the earlier

events were abusive, but also to convince the jury that

defendant had caused those prior injuries, despite the

absence of any evidence that defendant had committed the

past abuse.

As the Court of Appeals dissent correctly noted, “this

was a close credibility contest with little hard evidence

and the prosecutor improperly sought to establish

[defendant’s] bad character rather than risk an acquittal

as a result of the slim evidence of his guilt.” 256 Mich

App 208. The trial court committed plain error in failing

to prevent the prosecutor from improperly using the

evidence of prior abuse.

Finally, we agree with both the Court of Appeals

majority and dissent that it was plain error to permit the

introduction of the evidence regarding Kelley’s good

character. We agree with the dissent that this evidence

improperly undermined defendant’s credibility.

The prosecution presented this evidence as part of its

case-in-chief. Eight witnesses testified positively about

Kelley’s background and parenting skills. This evidence

was logically irrelevant to the prosecution’s case-in-
13

chief, was improper character evidence under MRE 404(a),

and did not serve one of the noncharacter purposes listed

in MRE 404(b). Character evidence related to witnesses is

governed under MRE 404(a)(4) by MRE 607, 608, and 609. MRE

608(a) limits opinion and reputation evidence to character

for truthfulness or untruthfulness after the character of

the witness has been attacked. MRE 608(b) then allows the

trial court to admit evidence of specific witness conduct

to support the witness’s credibility. In this case, the

evidence of Kelley’s character had nothing to do with her

truthfulness or untruthfulness. The evidence was

improperly introduced to demonstrate that Kelley acted in

conformity with her alleged good character, in contrast to

defendant acting in conformity with his alleged bad

character.

The improper admission of the evidence of Kelley’s

good character, like the admission of the evidence of

defendant’s anger problems and the improper use of the

evidence regarding Xavier’s prior injuries, created far too

great a risk of affecting the outcome of the case, given

the absence of any direct evidence that defendant committed

the acts that resulted in Xavier’s death. Consequently, we

14

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand

this case to the circuit court for a new trial.4

Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

4
In light of this reversal, we need not address
defendant’s second argument, questioning the sufficiency of
the evidence for a felony-murder conviction.
15