Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C h i e f J u s ti c e J u s t ic e s
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED JULY 2, 2003
GWENDOLYN COLLINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 121563
COMERICA BANK and CATHY MASALSKIS,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
The issue presented in this case concerns when the period
of limitation begins to run for a claim of discriminatory
termination of employment under the Civil Rights Act, MCL
37.2101 et seq.
I. Background
Plaintiff Gwendolyn Collins was employed by defendant
Comerica Bank as a customer-service representative. In August
1996, defendant1 notified plaintiff that an investigation was
1
For ease of reference, defendants Comerica Bank and
Cathy Masalskis will collectively be referred to as
“defendant.”
being conducted to determine whether she had accepted cash
gifts from customers or disclosed customer account balances to
third parties.
On September 5, 1996, defendant suspended plaintiff,
apparently for failing to cooperate with the investigation.
While suspended, plaintiff was required to be available during
normal working hours.2 After the investigation was completed,
defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment on September 25,
1996.
On September 24, 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint
alleging, inter alia, that the termination of her employment
was the product of race and gender discrimination. Defendant
moved for summary disposition on several grounds. One of the
arguments advanced by defendant was that plaintiff failed to
meet the applicable three-year period of limitation on filing
discrimination claims, MCL 600.5805(10).
The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that
plaintiff’s causes of action for discriminatory termination
arose on the date of termination, September 25, 1996.
Therefore, plaintiff’s filing of the complaint on
September 24, 1999, satisfied the statute of limitations.
The Court of Appeals granted defendant interlocutory
2
Plaintiff signed the following agreement:
I, Gwen Collins, understand effective
Thursday, Sept. 5, 1996, I am being suspended
indefinitely with pay pending further
investigation. I understand that I must be
available to the bank during my normal scheduled
working hours.
2
leave to appeal. Relying primarily on Parker v Cadillac Gage
Textron, Inc, 214 Mich App 288; 542 NW2d 365 (1995), the Court
reversed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that
plaintiff’s causes of action for discriminatory termination
accrued on the last day plaintiff actually worked, September
5, 1996. Because plaintiff’s complaint was filed on September
24, 1999, the Court of Appeals held that it was time-barred.
Plaintiff sought leave to appeal with this Court.
II. Standard of Review
Whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of
limitations is a question of law, which we review de novo.
Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 663
(2002). Similarly, we review de novo decisions on summary
disposition motions. First Public Corp v Parfet, 468 Mich
101, 104; 658 NW2d 477 (2003).
III. Discussion
In Parker, the plaintiffs were advised on December 3,
1990, that they would be among the next group of employees to
be laid off pursuant to a work force reduction plan. On
December 21, 1990, the plaintiffs worked their last day.
However, the defendant’s records indicated that the
plaintiffs’ “effective date of separation” was January 7,
1991. The plaintiffs filed claims for discriminatory
termination on January 7, 1994, and the defendant moved for
summary disposition on the ground that the period of
limitation had expired.
The Court of Appeals in Parker rejected the proposition
3
that the period of limitation on a discriminatory employment
termination claim begins to run on the “effective date of
separation,” writing:
A claim of discriminatory discharge accrues on
the date the plaintiff is discharged. The last day
worked is the date of discharge. Subsequent
severance or vacation pay does not affect the date
of discharge. In this case, plaintiffs filed their
case more than three years after the date they were
discharged. Despite the fact that January 7, 1991,
may have been plaintiffs’ “effective” date of
separation, it is undisputed that the last day they
actually worked was December 21, 1990. [Parker,
supra at 290 (internal citations omitted).]
Relying on Parker, the Court of Appeals in the present
case held that plaintiff’s causes of action for discriminatory
termination accrued on the last day she actually performed
work for defendant. Because plaintiff was a suspended
employee on the date of her termination, the Court of Appeals
held that the day of her suspension served as her last day
worked and, according to Parker, the date of her discharge.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial
of defendant’s motion for summary disposition, disagreeing
with the trial court that the applicable period of limitation
began to run on the date plaintiff was actually terminated
from employment as a result of the investigation. The Court
of Appeals concluded:
Because plaintiff’s last day of work was
September 5, 1996, claims of race and gender
discrimination were required to be filed on or
before September 5, 1999. Since plaintiff’s
complaint was not filed until September 24, 1999,
her discrimination claims were time-barred and the
trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion
for summary disposition on these claims.
[Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 30,
4
2002 (Docket No. 227834), p 3.]
In sum, the Court of Appeals held that the limitation
period for plaintiff’s discrimination claims began to run on
the date of her suspension, September 5, 1996, even though
plaintiff’s employment was not terminated until September 25,
1996. The Court did so because the last day plaintiff
“actually worked” was the date of her suspension on September
5, 1996, and the Court read Parker as instructing that the
last day worked is always the date of discharge. We disagree.
Properly understood, Parker’s “last day worked” holding
is limited to situations where a discriminatory discharge
claim has already surfaced. We agree with Parker’s holding
because the “effective date of separation” there was not the
date of discharge. Rather, where a plaintiff has already been
subjected to an alleged discriminatory termination, a cause of
action naturally accrues on the last day an employee worked.
However, if a discharge has yet to occur, it cannot be
said that the last day worked represents the discharge date.
Simply put, a claim for discriminatory discharge cannot arise
until a claimant has been discharged. Accordingly, the “last
day worked” cannot represent the date of discharge, as held in
Parker, where a claimant’s last day actually worked precedes
the discharge.
In the present case, even though plaintiff was suspended
on September 5, 1996, and in retrospect that date represents
the last day she actually worked, it was not until September
25, 1996 that she was actually discharged, or terminated, from
5
employment. Unlike the plaintiffs in Parker who knew on the
last day they worked that their employment had been terminated
and that they were being discharged as employees on that date,
on September 5, 1996, plaintiff in this case only knew that
she had been suspended indefinitely.
On September 5, 1996, plaintiff had not been terminated
and thus had no causes of action based on her discharge on
that date. In fact, although it may have been a foregone
conclusion that the investigation would lead to plaintiff’s
termination, it is clear that plaintiff’s official status as
an employee was nothing other than “suspended” until September
25, 1996, when her employment was terminated as a result of
the investigation. “Suspended” does not equate with
“terminated” or “discharged,” and, thus, being suspended does
not create a cause of action for discharge or termination.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s causes of action for
discriminatory termination had yet to arise on the date of her
suspension, September 5, 1996, and the limitation period does
not begin to run before a cause of action accrues. Plaintiff
had no causes of action for discriminatory termination on
September 5, 1996.3
Because we hold that plaintiff’s causes of action for
3
We note that Sumner v The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co,
427 Mich 505; 398 NW2d 368 (1986), does not compel a different
result. Sumner concerned the “continuing violation theory,”
which is not relevant to a cause of action for discriminatory
termination of employment, because a termination occurs at a
fixed time and is not susceptible to being a continuing
violation. Plaintiff has filed suit for discriminatory
termination, not discriminatory suspension.
6
discriminatory termination did not arise until the date she
was discharged as an employee, September 25, 1996, plaintiff’s
filing of her complaint on September 24, 1999 satisfied the
three-year period of limitation. Accordingly, the trial court
properly denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition on
this ground.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, we reverse in part the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand to that Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.4 In all other
respects, leave to appeal is denied.5
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ.
We concur in the result only.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
4
Because the Court of Appeals dismissed plaintiff’s
discrimination claims on the basis of a statute of limitations
analysis, it did not address defendant Masalskis’s alternative
issue concerning whether she was properly served.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should address this matter
on remand.
5
We do not disrupt the judgment of the Court of Appeals
regarding the timeliness of plaintiff’s claims for tortious
interference of contract and business relations and invasion
of privacy.
7