Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Chie f Justice Justices
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED APRIL 8, 2003
In re ESTATE OF
ABRAHAM KARMEY, Deceased
___________________________
MARIANNE KARMEY-KUPKA, GEORGE
KARMEY, and IRENE KARMEY,
Petitioners-Appellees,
v No. 121082
MARGARET KARMEY,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
In their petition to set aside a will, the children of
the decedent claimed that the beneficiary of the will,
decedent’s second wife, had exercised undue influence over the
decedent when he made her the sole beneficiary of his estate.
The probate judge ruled that petitioners had failed to present
sufficient evidence for a jury to find that decedent’s wife
unduly influenced her husband, and the judge therefore granted
respondent’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial, holding that
there was a question for the jury whether decedent and his
wife had a confidential or fiduciary relationship, which would
create a rebuttable presumption of undue influence.
The Court of Appeals reluctantly based its holding on
this Court’s decision in Kar v Hogan, 399 Mich 529; 251 NW2d
77 (1976), which the Court viewed as encompassing most
marriages within the test for applying the presumption. We
conclude that marriage does not give rise to a presumption of
undue influence. We reverse that portion of the Court of
Appeals decision necessitating a remand and reinstate the
probate court’s grant of a directed verdict.
I
Abraham Karmey died in 1997, leaving his entire estate to
his wife of twenty years, Margaret Karmey. Margaret was
Abraham’s second wife. The three children of his first
marriage, petitioners in this case, sought to have their
father’s will set aside, alleging that Margaret had exerted
undue influence over their father when he drafted the will.
They based their contention in large measure on statements he
had allegedly made a year before drafting the will in which he
expressed his intent to give each of them $25,000, as well as
a business to operate. The inventory prepared by Margaret
Karmey as the personal representative of her husband’s estate
showed a worth of only $57,000 at the time of his death.
The case proceeded to a jury trial in 1999, with the
petitioners presenting testimony that Abraham feared Margaret
2
and that she had control of the family finances, especially
after he became ill in his last years. Margaret’s position
was that she had a typical marriage in which she shared
confidences with her husband. At the close of petitioners’
proofs, Margaret moved for a directed verdict. The probate
judge granted the motion, noting that for influence to be
undue, it must have overpowered the decedent’s own free will.
The judge said, “[T]he decedent may be influenced in the
disposition of his property by specific or direct influences
without such influences being undue.” It is not improper,
said the judge, for a spouse to use her powers of persuasion
to shape the crafting of a will.
The judge rejected petitioners’ argument that Abraham and
Margaret were in a fiduciary relationship, so as to give rise
to a presumption of undue influence:
The Contestant——that’s you——has the burden of
proving that there was undue influence exerted on
the decedent in making the Will.
And part of your argument is the spousal
relationship becomes that of a fiduciary
relationship. I’m going to say that that is not
the law and that’s not the way I’m going to rule.
She admitted that there was a confidential
relationship but there should be a confidential
relationship between all spouses.
She also indicated that she didn’t handle his
finances and he paid the bills. So other than that one
statement the court does not believe that there’s
sufficient factual basis that I can find a confidential
relationship, therefore, the presumption doesn’t come
into play.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing
3
that the judge’s conduct in admonishing witnesses denied them
a fair trial and that the proofs of a trusting marital
relationship between Abraham and Margaret Karmey established
a mandatory presumption of undue influence that had not been
rebutted, making the directed verdict inappropriate. The
Court rejected the first argument, but on a two-to-one vote
agreed with the latter. Unpublished opinion per curiam,
issued February 8, 2002 (Docket No. 223270).
The Court majority noted that Margaret Karmey’s own trial
testimony had indicated that a trusting relationship existed
with her husband. Her relationship with Abraham, she agreed,
was a “typical marriage” in which they were “very close” and
he was her “closest friend,” sharing things with her that he
would not share with other people. Id. at 8. The Court
determined that Abraham, at least on occasion, relied upon
Margaret, and that she had an opportunity to influence him
“because they were married and because he was allegedly afraid
of her.” Id. Because there was evidence that Abraham and
Margaret had a “loving and trusting relationship,” it was
appropriate, said the Court, for a jury to resolve the undue
influence issue, including the question whether a fiduciary
relationship existed. Id.
The Court of Appeals majority recognized that under its
holding, a presumption of undue influence could attach to all
wills where one spouse leaves property exclusively to the
remaining spouse, especially when to the exclusion of other
4
family members. The majority admitted that it was “not
particularly enamored of the possibility of such a result.”1
Id. at 9. However, it felt compelled to reach its conclusion
on the basis of this Court’s decision in Kar.
II
Kar concerned an action to set aside a property deed
between a wife and husband on the ground that it was procured
through undue influence. The action was brought by the
stepchildren of the deceased, Julia Merkiel, who had married
their father in 1914. The father died in 1951, and Julia
married Edward Merkiel in 1953. In 1969, property owned by
Julia was deeded to her and Edward as tenants by “their
entireties,” thereby precluding the children from gaining an
interest in the property upon her death.
After completion of the proofs, the trial judge found
that Julia and Edward met the test for a confidential or
1
This concern was echoed by the dissent, which warned:
Were we to apply the three-part test to a will
contest where a spouse leaves everything to a
surviving spouse, then a factual finding of a good
marriage would automatically mean that a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence would arise. This
surely cannot nor should it be the law. More
should be shown to raise a presumption of undue
influence between spouses than a good confidential
relationship where each understandably looked to
the other for advice and took the advice of the
other. To hold as the majority does and as the
majority interprets Kar to have ruled, simply
serves to penalize a good marriage by requiring a
will contest trial if a third party objects to one
spouse leaving virtually the entire estate to the
surviving spouse.
5
fiduciary relationship and, as a result, applied a presumption
of undue influence to the case. He further found that
defendant had rebutted the presumption, and he therefore ruled
in defendant’s favor.
The judge’s utilization of the presumption of undue
influence was based on a widely applied three-factor test,
which this Court detailed in Kar as follows:
The presumption of undue influence is brought
to life upon the introduction of evidence which
would establish (1) the existence of a confidential
or fiduciary relationship between the grantor and a
fiduciary, (2) the fiduciary or an interest which
he represents benefits from a transaction, and
(3) the fiduciary had an opportunity to influence
the grantor’s decision in that transaction. [399
Mich 537.]
Although Kar accepted the trial judge’s utilization of
the presumption of undue influence, that was not the focus of
Kar. Instead, the critical issue for discussion concerned the
burden of proof and the shifting evidentiary obligations of
the parties when the presumption of undue influence has been
found. Kar did not discuss what type of proofs were necessary
to meet the three-part test. It simply operated on the
premise that the marriage at issue was subject to the
presumption.
The Court of Appeals majority in this case, recognizing
that the Court in Kar had accepted the trial judge’s finding
that the three-part test was met, concluded that Kar had
established a rule that all spousal relationships of trust and
confidence meet the three-part test, thereby bringing forth
6
the presumption of undue influence. We reject this
implication in Kar.
III
“Fiduciary relationship” is a legal term of art,2 as is
the phrase “confidential or fiduciary relationship.”3
2
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed) defines the term as
[a] relationship in which one person is under a
duty to act for the benefit of the other on matters
within the scope of the relationship. Fiduciary
relationships—such as trustee-beneficiary,
guardian-ward, agent-principal, and attorney
client—require the highest duty of care. Fiduciary
relationships [usually] arise in one of four
situations: (1) when one person places trust in
the faithful integrity of another, who as a result
gains superiority or influence over the first,
(2) when one person assumes control and
responsibility over another, (3) when one person
has a duty to act for or give advice to another on
matters falling within the scope of the
relationship, or (4) when there is a specific
relationship that has traditionally been recognized
as involving fiduciary duties, as with a lawyer and
a client or a stockbroker and a customer.
3
Although a broad term, “confidential or fiduciary
relationship” has a focused view toward relationships of
inequality. This Court recognized in In re Wood Estate, 374
Mich 278, 287; 132 NW2d 35 (1965), that the concept had its
English origins in situations in which dominion may be
exercised by one person over another. Quoting 3 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed, 1941), § 956a, this Court said
a fiduciary relationship exists as fact when “‘there is
confidence reposed on one side, and the resulting superiority
and influence on the other.’” 374 Mich 283.
Common examples this Court has recognized include where
a patient makes a will in favor of his physician, a client in
favor of his lawyer, or a sick person in favor of a priest or
spiritual adviser. 374 Mich 285-286. In these situations,
complete trust has been placed by one party in the hands of
another who has the relevant knowledge, resources, power, or
moral authority to control the subject matter at issue.
7
Marriage, however, is a unique relationship, treated in law
differently from other relationships, for a host of obvious
reasons.
In the context of this case and the analysis provided in
Kar, it can be said that marriage is not a relationship that
has traditionally been recognized as involving fiduciary
duties. It is a unique relationship based on mutual trust and
commitment. We do not believe the presumption of undue
influence is applicable to such a relationship.
One should not lose sight of the basic principles
underlying the concept of undue influence. As this Court said
in Kar:
To establish undue influence it must be shown
that the grantor was subjected to threats,
misrepresentation, undue flattery, fraud, or
physical or moral coercion sufficient to overpower
volition, destroy free agency and impel the grantor
to act against his inclination and free will.
Motive, opportunity, or even ability to control, in
the absence of affirmative evidence that it was
exercised, are not sufficient. [399 Mich 537.]
The influence of a husband or a wife over that person’s
spouse could be great--at times almost overwhelming--without
- -
being “undue.” Although we agree with the standard for
application of the presumption of undue influence established
in Kar, we hold that this presumption is not applicable to
marriage.4
4
To be clear, we hold that no presumption of undue
influence arises by the fact of marriage. We do not exclude
the possibility that, under facts other than those presented
in this particular case, a person might exercise undue
8
IV
In this case, the probate judge found that the proofs
presented by the petitioners did not raise a question of fact
about whether the relationship between Abraham and Margaret
Karmey was a confidential or fiduciary relationship. The
record supports this finding. Further, the marriage
relationship between Abraham and Margaret Karmey was not shown
by any factual allegations to be a relationship of undue
influence.
Because the presumption of undue influence is not
applicable to marriage, that portion of the Court of Appeals
decision remanding this case for trial is reversed, and the
probate court’s grant of a directed verdict is affirmed. MCR
7.302(F)(1).
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
influence over a weakened or vulnerable spouse.
9