Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED JULY 17, 2002
MICHAEL STANTON and JOY STANTON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v No. 115909
CITY OF BATTLE CREEK, and
ALLEN MAYNARD HOWARD,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CAVANAGH, J.
This case calls into question whether a forklift is a
“motor vehicle” within the ambit of the motor vehicle
exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405. We hold
that it is not, and, therefore, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s order
granting summary disposition in favor of defendants.
I. Facts And Proceedings
On April 28, 1995, plaintiff Michael Stanton1 was working as
a truck driver for Hover Trucking Company and delivered
hardware to a site defendant city of Battle Creek owned.
Defendant Allen M. Howard, a city employee, drove a forklift
owned by the city to plaintiff’s truck and loaded the hardware
onto the forklift. After the hardware was removed from
plaintiff’s truck, Howard prepared to back up and drive away,
and plaintiff lowered the truck door and stepped down. The
brakes on the forklift stuck and the forklift stayed in
neutral, rolled forward, and struck plaintiff. Plaintiff
alleges he suffered numerous injuries as a result.
In August 1996, plaintiff sued the city, alleging
negligent maintenance and operation of the forklift, and sued
Mr. Howard, alleging negligent or grossly negligent
maintenance and operation of the forklift. Defendants moved
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7),(8), and (10).
The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
disposition on governmental immunity grounds, MCR 2.116(C)(7),
and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 237 Mich App 366; 603 NW2d
285 (1999). When the plaintiff initially appealed to this
Court, we denied leave to appeal. 461 Mich 1019 (2000).
1
The claim for loss of consortium, brought by plaintiff’s
wife Joy Stanton, is derivative.
2
Plaintiff, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration,
which we granted.2
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo decisions on summary disposition
motions. Sewell v Southfield Pub Schs, 456 Mich 670, 674; 576
NW2d 153 (1998).
Similarly, we review questions of statutory
interpretation de novo. In re MCI Telecommunications, 460
Mich 396, 413; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
III. Discussion
A. Liability of the City of Battle Creek
The governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1401 et
seq., provides immunity from tort liability to governmental
2
The order granting plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration directed the parties to brief the following
five issues:
(1) whether a forklift is a “motor vehicle” as
that term is used in MCL 691.1405; (2) whether, in
light of 1995 PA 140, Mull v Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States, 444 Mich
508 (1994), affects the answer to the previous
question; (3) whether, if the answer to (2) is in
the affirmative, language in Mull not affected by
1995 PA 140 should be disavowed; (4) whether a
decision by this Court to disavow such parts of
Mull would affect the outcome in this case; and (5)
whether the “vehicle exception” in MCL 691.1405
creates a cause of action against governmental
agencies, or merely defines an exception to the
immunity conferred by MCL 691.1407(1). [465 Mich
855 (2001).]
3
agencies3 engaged in a governmental function.4 MCL
691.1407(1). The act provides immunity from tort liability to
governmental employees if, inter alia, the employee’s conduct
does not amount to gross negligence.5 The legislative
immunity granted to governmental agencies and their employees
is broad. This immunity, however, is subject to five narrowly
drawn statutory exceptions.6 Ross v Consumers Power (On
3
The municipal defendant is a governmental agency, as
noted by the following statutory definitions:
(a) “Municipal corporation” means a city,
village, or township or a combination or 2 or more
of these when acting jointly.
(b) “Political subdivision” means a municipal
corporation, county, county road commission, school
district, community college district, port
district, metropolitan district, or transportation
authority or a combination of 2 or more of these
when acting jointly; a district or authority
authorized by law or formed by 1 or more political
subdivisions; or an agency, department, court,
board, or council of a political subdivision.
* * *
(d) “Governmental agency” means the state or a
political subdivision. [MCL 691.1401.]
4
Neither party disputes that the city was engaged in a
governmental function at the time of the incident.
5
MCL 691.1407(2).
6
The five statutory exceptions are: the “highway
exception,” MCL 691.1402; the “motor vehicle exception,” MCL
691.1405; the “public building exception,” MCL 691.1406; the
“governmental hospital exception,” MCL 691.1407(4); and the
“proprietary function exception,” MCL 691.1413.
4
Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 593-595, 622; 363 NW2d 641 (1984).
Plaintiff asserts that he may recover from the city for
his injuries suffered as a result of the negligent operation
of the government-owned forklift under the motor vehicle
exception. Thus, we must examine the language of the motor
vehicle exception to determine whether a forklift is a “motor
vehicle” as that term is used in the exception.
Whether the Legislature intended that the term “motor
vehicle” include a forklift is an issue of statutory
interpretation. The primary rule of statutory interpretation
is that we are to effect the intent of the Legislature.
Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d
686 (2001). To achieve this task, we must first examine the
statute’s language. Id. If the language is clear and
unambiguous, we assume the Legislature intended its plain
meaning, and the statute is enforced as written. People v
Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702 (2001).
The motor vehicle exception does not define “motor
vehicle.” Further, contrary to the interpretation of the
Court of Appeals, the governmental tort liability act does not
refer to the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 et seq., for the
definition. Section 1405, the motor vehicle exception,
provides:
5
Governmental agencies shall be liable for
bodily injury and property damage resulting from
the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or
employee of the governmental agency, of a motor
vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner,
as defined in [the Michigan Vehicle Code], as
amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the
Compiled Laws of 1948.
The Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that the
definitional phrase in § 1405 refers to the term “motor
vehicle.” Grammatically, the final clause of § 1405 sends the
reader to the Michigan Vehicle Code only for the definition of
“owner.” The “last antecedent” rule of statutory construction
provides that a modifying or restrictive word or clause
contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately
preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the
statute requires a different interpretation. Sun Valley Foods
Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 237; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). Applying
this rule, the reference to §§ 257.1 to 257.923 in § 1405
defines “owner,”7 not “motor vehicle,” and nothing in the
statute demands a different interpretation. Haveman v Kent Co
Rd Comm’rs, 356 Mich 11, 18-22; 96 NW2d 153 (1959).8
7
The parties do not dispute that defendant city was the
“owner” of the forklift.
8
This very construction was utilized in Haveman, in which
this Court had to determine whether a “Gradall” road
maintenance machine was a “motor vehicle” within the meaning
of an earlier version of what has become the GTLA’s motor
vehicle exception. Construing nearly identical language, this
Court held that the reference clause in the prior version of
6
Accordingly, because the motor vehicle exception does not
provide a definition of “motor vehicle,” we are required to
give the term its plain and ordinary meaning. MCL 8.3a;
People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147, 153; 599 NW2d 102 (1999).
When determining the common, ordinary meaning of a word or
phrase, consulting a dictionary is appropriate. Horace v City
of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 756; 575 NW2d 762 (1998).
It is possible to find varying dictionary definitions of
the term “motor vehicle.” For example, the Random House
Webster’s College Dictionary (2001) defines a “motor vehicle”
as “an automobile, truck, bus, or similar motor-driven
conveyance,” a definition that does not include a forklift.9
In our view, this definition appropriately reflects the
§ 1405 applied to only the term “owner.” Id. at 18-22. We
note that although the earlier version of the statute has been
repealed and replaced by § 1405, the definitional reference
has remained virtually unchanged by the Legislature since
Haveman was decided.
9
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (OnLine ed) and
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary define motor vehicle
as “an automotive vehicle not operated on rails, esp: one with
rubber tires for use on highways.” [Emphasis added.]
Webster’s New World Dictionary (2d College ed) defines
motor vehicle as “a vehicle on wheels having its own motor and
not running on rails or tracks, for use on streets or
highways, esp. an automobile, truck, or bus.” [Emphasis
added.]
7
commonly understood meaning of the term.10 The American
Heritage Dictionary (2d College ed), on the other hand,
defines “motor vehicle” as “self-propelled, wheeled conveyance
that does not run on rails,” a definition, which would
arguably include a forklift. Given these divergent
definitions, we must choose one that most closely effectuates
the Legislature’s intent. Fortunately, our jurisprudence
under the governmental tort liability act provides an answer
regarding which definition should be selected. As previously
noted, it is a basic principal of our state’s jurisprudence
that the immunity conferred upon governmental agencies and
subdivisions is to be construed broadly and that the statutory
exceptions are to be narrowly construed. Nawrocki v Macomb Co
Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 158; 615 NW2d 702 (2000). Thus, this
Court must apply a narrow definition to the undefined term
“motor vehicle.”
The definition of a “motor vehicle” as “an automobile,
truck, bus, or similar motor-driven conveyance” is the
10
This definition is also consistent with other analogous
legislative provisions concerning “motor vehicles.” For
example, a forklift is expressly excluded from the statutory
definition of “motor vehicle” for purposes of the civil
liability act. MCL 257.33. Nor does the definition of motor
vehicle in our no-fault act–a “vehicle . . . operated or
designed for operation upon a public highway”–encompass
construction equipment such as a forklift. MCL
500.3101(2)(e).
8
narrower of the two common dictionary definitions. Therefore,
we apply it to the present case. A forklift–which is a piece
of industrial construction equipment–is not similar to an
automobile, truck, or bus. Thus, the motor vehicle exception
should not be construed to remove the broad veil of
governmental immunity for the negligent operation of a
forklift.
B. Liability of the Employee
Plaintiff also brought claims asserting that the city’s
employee, Mr. Howard, negligently maintained and operated the
forklift.11
Mr. Howard is entitled to immunity as a city employee
from the negligent maintenance and operation claims if §
1407(2) is satisfied. Section 1407(2) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section,
and without regard to the discretionary or
ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each
officer and employee of a governmental agency, each
volunteer acting on behalf of a governmental
agency, and each member of a board, council,
commission, or statutorily created task force of a
11
Even if we concluded § 1405 applied to this case,
because § 1405 only applies to the negligent operation of
motor vehicles, plaintiff’s claim for negligent maintenance
against the city is barred by the general immunity statute, §
1407(1).
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a
governmental agency is immune from tort liability
if the governmental agency is engaged in the
exercise or discharge of a governmental function.
9
governmental agency is immune from tort liability
for an injury to a person or damage to property
caused by the officer, employee, or member while in
the course of employment or service or caused by
the volunteer while acting on behalf of a
governmental agency if all of the following are
met:
(a) The officer, employee, member, or
volunteer is acting or reasonably believes he or
she is acting within the scope of his or her
authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the
exercise or discharge of a governmental function.
(c) The officer’s, employee’s, member’s, or
volunteer’s conduct does not amount to gross
negligence that is the proximate cause of the
injury or damage. As used in this subdivision,
“gross negligence” means conduct so reckless as to
demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for
whether an injury results.
There is no dispute that subsections (a) and (b) are
satisfied, thus, the question is whether Mr. Howard was
grossly negligent in maintaining and operating the forklift
under subsection (c). Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Howard was
grossly negligent in failing to check the brakes after knowing
the brakes were faulty and in driving the forklift without a
valid license to operate the lift. We reject plaintiff’s
arguments. As the Court of Appeals noted, once Mr. Howard
noticed the problematic brakes, he notified his supervisor.
Once Mr. Howard retrieved the forklift, he thought the brakes
had been fixed, as there was no indication otherwise.
Moreover, once the forklift began to roll forward at the time
10
of the accident, Mr. Howard used his toe to unstick the brakes
and the forklift retreated backward, as intended. Even though
Mr. Howard did not have a valid license to operate the lift at
the time plaintiff was injured, the above evidence shows that
Mr. Howard was not otherwise unqualified to operate the
forklift. Additionally, Mr. Howard maintained the forklift as
best he could by reporting the problem, taking the forklift
for repairs, and retrieving and operating the lift after he
thought repairs were completed, since there was no red flag on
the forklift, which would have indicated a faulty lift. We
agree with the Court of Appeals that no reasonable mind could
conclude that this amounts to reckless conduct showing Mr.
Howard’s substantial lack of concern of whether an injury
would occur when Mr. Howard used the forklift. Thus, we hold
that summary disposition for defendants on the negligent
maintenance and operation claims was proper.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, we hold that a forklift is not a
“motor vehicle” for purposes of the motor vehicle exception to
governmental immunity; therefore, the exception does not apply
to plaintiff’s case and the city is immune from liability. We
additionally hold that summary disposition was properly
granted to the city’s employee because no reasonable juror
could conclude that he maintained or operated the forklift in
11
a grossly negligent manner. Accordingly, for the reasons
stated, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and WEAVER , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and MARKMAN , JJ.,
concurred with CAVANAGH , J.
12
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
MICHAEL STANTON and JOY STANTON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v No. 115909
CITY OF BATTLE CREEK and
ALLEN MAYNARD HOWARD,
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________________
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I disagree with the majority's construction of the term
"motor vehicle" and would hold that a forklift truck falls
within the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity,
MCL 650.1405. I would reverse the Court of Appeals conclusion
to the contrary and therefore must dissent. In all other
respects, I concur with the majority opinion.
Two basic maxims of statutory construction collide in
this case. The words in a statute must be given their
ordinary meaning according to common usage. Western Michigan
Univ Bd of Control v Michigan, 455 Mich 531, 539; 565 NW2d 828
(1997); Tryc v Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135
136; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). At the same time, certain statutes,
such as the exception to governmental immunity, must be
narrowly construed. See Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463
Mich 143, 158; 615 NW2d 702 (2000). Neither rule
predominates, and this Court has not established a methodology
for applying both to the same statute.
When the two principles of statutory construction are
properly applied, neither should be rendered nugatory. Thus,
although care must be taken not to apply an expansive meaning
to "motor vehicle," we must ensure that the term is not given
too narrow a meaning, thereby departing from its commonly
understood meaning. I believe that happened in this case. By
narrowly construing MCL 691.1405, the majority improperly
departs from the ordinary meaning of the term "motor vehicle."
It considers the dictionary definition of "motor vehicle"
and recognizes that dictionaries vary in the definition. It
settles on Webster's definition: "an automobile, truck, bus,
or similar motor-driven conveyance." It reads this definition
as excluding a forklift truck. However, if one examines the
definition of "vehicle," one finds that the notion of a "motor
vehicle" is more broad. Webster's defines "vehicle" as "any
means in or by which someone or something is carried or
conveyed; means of conveyance or transport: a motor vehicle."
2
I believe that this suggests that a forklift truck is commonly
understood to be a motor vehicle.
Moreover, the majority begs the question what "motor
driven conveyance" is "similar" to an automobile, truck or
bus, if not a forklift. One may read together Webster's
definition with The American Heritage Dictionary definition,
rejected as overly broad by the majority. Then, a "motor
vehicle" is "any self-propelled, wheeled conveyance that does
not run on rails." It appears that the factor that makes
nonautomobiles "similar" to automobiles, cars, and trucks, is
that they have wheels and are designed to transport something
on a road. Thus, I believe that the commonly understood
meaning of the term "motor vehicle" is any self-propelled
device that is used to transport someone or something on a
road.
This Court came to the same conclusion when it considered
the term "motor vehicle" in the context of the civil liability
act.1 At that time, the Court determined that the term
included a front-end loader, a machine strikingly similar to
a forklift. See Mull v Equitable Life Assur Soc, 444 Mich
508, 514-519; 510 NW2d 184 (1994). Most significantly, this
Court recognized that the term "motor vehicle" has a broader
meaning than "automobile," stating that "[i]t is a generic
1
MCL 257.401 et seq.
3
term for all classes of self-propelled vehicles not operated
on stationary rails or tracks." Id. at 515, citing Jernigan
v Hanover Fire Ins Co of New York, 235 NC 334, 335-336; 69
SE2d 847 (1952). I believe that this Court was correct to
recognize a difference in meaning between "motor vehicle" and
"automobile," a distinction that is ignored in the majority
opinion.
The majority departs from the commonly understood meaning
of "motor vehicle" when it applies to MCL 691.1405 a narrow
definition of the term in an attempt to narrowly construe the
statute. Under the majority's construction, MCL 650.1405
becomes the automobile exception, rather than the motor
vehicle exception. The most plain meaning of the term "motor
vehicle" includes any self-propelled vehicle used to transport
materials on a road and is not limited to automobiles.
Because a forklift truck is indisputably a self-propelled
vehicle driven on a road to transport materials, I would
conclude that it is a motor vehicle within the meaning of MCL
650.1405. I believe that plaintiff is entitled to bring a
cause of action for the negligent operation of a forklift
truck and that it should survive a governmental immunity
challenge.
4