Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
O pinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED MAY 7, 2002
ROBERT C. LESNER, Father of
Randy Lee Lesner, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116205
LIQUID DISPOSAL, INC., and
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
YOUNG, J.
The plaintiff’s son was fatally injured in the course of
employment. Plaintiff, a partial dependent of the decedent,
sought worker’s compensation benefits. Through extended
proceedings, there has been uncertainty with regard to the
proper amount of the benefits to be paid to plaintiff under
the formula established by this Court in Weems v Chrysler
Corp, 448 Mich 679; 533 NW2d 287 (1995).
We hold that the formula for calculating worker’s
compensation death benefits for surviving partial dependents
established in Weems is inconsistent with the governing
statute, MCL 418.321. Accordingly, we overrule that portion
of the Weems opinion. However, the portion of this opinion
that overrules Weems is to have limited retroactive effect.
We further hold that Weems correctly held that the
minimum and maximum limits in MCL 418.355 (2) and MCL
418.356(2) do not require an alteration after the partial
dependent benefits calculation. In addition, we hold that the
500-week limitation on benefits applies to benefits for a
partially dependent person.
Set forth in this opinion is the proper method for
determining partial dependent benefits in keeping with the
controlling statutory language. Accordingly, we remand this
case to the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts and Proceedings
In January 1982, plaintiff lived with his wife and two
adult sons. All four individuals made financial contributions
to the household as plaintiff drew a small pension and the
others earned money from employment. Plaintiff, then 57 years
old and disabled from employment since 1978, was partially
dependent on the contributions of his sons and wife. One of
the plaintiff’s sons died as the result of a work-related
accident in mid-January 1982.
2
The following month, plaintiff, as a survivor and partial
dependent of the deceased son, sought benefits pursuant to §
321 of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.321.
A hearing referee found that plaintiff was a partial
dependent, and ordered a weekly benefit of $170.21 until
further order of the bureau.
After both sides appealed to the former Worker’s
Compensation Appeal Board, a two-member panel affirmed the
referee’s decision, with some modification.1
The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal2 and
affirmed in part and reversed in part.3
While defendants’ application for leave to appeal was
pending in this Court, we decided Weems, supra, which provided
a formula for calculating benefits for a partial dependent.
Then, in lieu of granting leave to appeal in the present case,
1
The WCAB ordered compensation “at the rate of $170.23
per week from January 13, 1982 [in accordance with MCL
418.356(2)] for a period not to exceed 500 weeks from the date
of the employee’s death” and further ordered a reduction of
that benefit amount, in accordance with the formula set forth
in Franges v General Motors Corp, 404 Mich 590; 274 NW2d 392
(1979). Franges concerned allocation of the cost of obtaining
a third-party tort recovery.
2
Unpublished order, entered July 6, 1993 (Docket No.
136338).
3
The Court of Appeals remanded for application of a
formula it had employed in LePalm v Revco DS, Inc, 202 Mich
App 33, 43-46; 507 NW2d 771 (1993). The Court directed that
the plaintiff receive “the greater of the amount calculated
under the LePalm formula or fifty percent of the average
weekly wage in 1982" and that the award “be reduced
appropriately pursuant to Franges.”
3
we directed the WCAC to recalculate death benefits using the
formula set forth in Weems. 449 Mich 901 (1995).
On remand, the WCAC once again recalculated the benefit
amount. A further recalculation occurred when the case
returned to the Court of Appeals.4
We granted leave to appeal in order to clarify this area
of the law and consider whether the formula for the
calculation of worker’s compensation death benefits for
surviving partial dependents established in Weems is
consistent with the governing statute, MCL 418.321.
II. Standard of Review
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation,
which we review de novo as a question of law. Levy v Martin,
463 Mich 478, 482, n 12; 620 NW2d 292 (2001); Donajkowski v
Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).
III. Analysis
A. The Statute at Issue
Death benefits for a dependent are governed by MCL
418.321. In 1982, when the plaintiff’s decedent died, the
language for this section, drawn from 1980 PA 357, read:
4
The Court of Appeals initially denied leave to appeal
for lack of merit in the grounds presented. Unpublished
order, entered June 5, 1997 (Docket No. 199205). In lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. 457 Mich 856
(1998). The Court of Appeals then decided this matter in an
unpublished opinion per curiam, entered December 28, 1999
(Docket No. 211230).
4
If death results from the personal injury of
an employee, the employer shall pay, or cause to be
paid, subject to [MCL 418.375], in 1 of the methods
provided in this section, to the dependents of the
employee who were wholly dependent upon the
employee's earnings for support at the time of the
injury, a weekly payment equal to 80% of the
employee's after-tax average weekly wage, subject
to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation
under this act, for a period of 500 weeks from the
date of death. If at the expiration of the
500-week period any such wholly or partially
dependent person is less than 21 years of age, a
hearing referee may order the employer to continue
to pay the weekly compensation or some portion
thereof until the wholly or partially dependent
person reaches the age of 21. If the employee
leaves dependents only partially dependent upon his
or her earnings for support at the time of injury,
the weekly compensation to be paid shall be equal
to the same proportion of the weekly payments for
the benefit of persons wholly dependent as the
amount contributed by the employee to such partial
dependents bears to the annual earnings of the
deceased at the time of injury.
Later, the section was amended by 1985 PA 103 and 1994 PA
271. One significant change was made to the final sentence of
the section to provide an eighty-percent multiplier in the
formula for the calculation of benefits.5
5
The current language, as enacted in 1994 PA 271, reads:
If death results from the personal injury of
an employee, the employer shall pay, or cause to be
paid, subject to [MCL 418.375], in 1 of the methods
provided in this section, to the dependents of the
employee who were wholly dependent upon the
employee's earnings for support at the time of the
injury, a weekly payment equal to 80% of the
employee's after-tax average weekly wage, subject
to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation
under this act, for a period of 500 weeks from the
date of death. If at the expiration of the
500-week period any such wholly or partially
dependent person is less than 21 years of age, a
worker's compensation magistrate may order the
5
B. The Weems Formula is Inconsistent with the Formula
Provided by the Plain Language of the Statute
As we have indicated with great frequency, our duty is to
apply the language of the statute as enacted, without
addition, subtraction, or modification. See, e.g., Helder v
Sruba, 462 Mich 92, 99; 611 NW2d 309 (2000); Robinson v
Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 459; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). We may not
read anything into an unambiguous statute that is not within
the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the
words of the statute itself. Omne Financial, Inc v Shacks,
Inc, 460 Mich 305, 311; 596 NW2d 591 (1999). In other words,
the role of the judiciary is not to engage in legislation.
Tyler v Livonia Public Schools, 459 Mich 382, 392-393, n 10;
590 NW2d 560 (1999).
Interpreting the plain language of MCL 418.321 at the
time of the work related death of the plaintiff’s son in 1982,
that statute provided that the weekly benefit to be paid to a
partially dependent person (BPD) was calculated by multiplying
the benefit that would be paid if the person were wholly
employer to continue to pay the weekly compensation
or some portion thereof until the wholly or
partially dependent person reaches the age of 21.
If the employee leaves dependents only partially
dependent upon his or her earnings for support at
the time of injury, the weekly compensation to be
paid shall be equal to the same proportion of the
weekly payments for the benefit of persons wholly
dependent as 80% of the amount contributed by the
employee to the partial dependents bears to the
annual earnings of the deceased at the time of
injury.
6
dependent (BWD) by a percentage figure (“the proportion”). The
benefit for a wholly dependent person (BWD) was eighty percent
of the decedent’s after-tax average weekly wage (WWAT)6. The
proportion (P) was calculated by dividing the amount the
decedent contributed to the partial dependent (C)7 by the
decedent’s annual earnings (AE). Thus:
BPD = (BWD)(P), where
P = (C/AE), and
BWD = (.80)(WWAT).
Accordingly,
BPD = (C)(.80)(WWAT)/(AE), or
Benefit = (decedent’s contribution)(.80)(decedent’s weekly wage after taxes)
(decedent’s annual earnings)
This equation is the proper one; it is directly based on
the plain language of MCL 418.321 as it was in force in 1982.8
6
MCL 418.321 calls for “a weekly payment equal to 80% of
the employee's after-tax average weekly wage, subject to the
maximum and minimum rates of compensation under this act, for
a period of 500 weeks from the date of death.” These
limitations, to which the weekly payment is “subject,” are
respectively the maximum benefit of MCL 418.355(2), the
minimum benefit of MCL 418.356(2), and the 500-week limitation
that is expressly stated in MCL 418.321. When these
limitations are applicable, they can be substituted into the
formula for (BWD). We will discuss these limitations later in
the opinion.
7
The “amount” of a contribution must be computed with
respect to a period and, given the ratio being described by
the Legislature, it surely meant an annual amount.
8
As indicated above, the Legislature added, in 1985 PA
103, a second .80 multiplier that remained in effect after
1994 PA 271. See the final lines of the statutory language
quoted in footnote 5 and Justice BOYLE ’s partial
concurrence/partial dissent in Weems, 448 Mich 719.
With that change, P = (.80)(C)/(AE), so that:
7
In our view, the statute on its face requires a factual
determination of “the amount contributed by the employee” to
the partial dependent, that is, the amount actually
contributed by that deceased worker, in order to calculate the
amount of benefits to which the partial dependent is entitled.
However, in Weems, supra at 695-697, this Court created
its own formula for determining benefits payable to a partial
dependent under MCL 418.321, despite the plain language of the
statute.9 Rather than merely examining, as the statute
directed, “the amount contributed by the employee” to the
partial dependent, the Weems Court substituted other factors
to determine the level of benefits. In particular, it
concluded that the partial dependent would receive the amount
obtained by dividing the deceased employee’s annual after-tax
earnings by the sum of those earnings and the partial
BPD = (.80)(C)(.80)(WWAT)/(AE), or
Benefit = (decedent’s contribution)(.64)(decedent’s weekly wage after taxes)
(decedent’s annual earnings)
This modified formulation, currently applicable, would
have been appropriately applied in Weems, where the fatal
accident occurred in March 1986, well after the effective date
of 1985 PA 103. In the present case, however, the accident
occurred in 1982, so the statutory modification is not
applicable.
9
While we recognize that MCL 418.321 requires
significant study to parse, we also recognize that the
complexity and density of a statute does not in itself cause
the statute to be ambiguous and thus warrant construction of
the statute.
8
dependent’s regular and substantial annual income.10 See
Weems, supra at 696. The problem with this calculation is
that it is not derived from the language of the statute. MCL
418.321 includes no mention of the income of a partial
dependent as a factor in the calculation of the benefits due
that partial dependent.11
As explained by Justice CAVANAGH in his partial dissent in
Weems, in order to determine the benefits due a partial
dependent, a faithful application of MCL 418.321 “would
10
Like the present case, Weems involved a situation with
only one partial dependent. In a footnote, the Weems majority
seemed to indicate that the formula it adopted should be
modified in a case involving multiple partial dependents. See
Weems, supra at 697, n 22 (discussing treatment of a situation
with multiple partial dependents). Because we are overruling
the Weems formula and the present case involves only one
partial dependent, this opinion does not address situations
involving multiple partial dependents.
11
Moreover, the Weems formula distorts the evident
legislative goal of allowing different levels of benefits on
the basis of the different circumstances of otherwise
similarly situated partial dependents. This is illustrated by
considering that the Weems formula, by eschewing any
determination of the amount that the deceased employee
actually contributed to the partial dependent’s support, would
provide the same benefit level to a partial dependent in each
of the following two hypothetical cases. Assume that in both
cases A and B, the deceased employees had exactly the same
after-tax earnings and had a partial dependent who had the
same regular and substantial income. Now consider that in
case A, the partial dependent had substantial medical or
educational expenses that the partial dependent in case B did
not and that these expenses were paid for by the deceased.
This would mean that the employee in case A contributed more
to the partial dependent’s support than in case B. That no
allowance for the difference in the level of support actually
contributed by the deceased employee to the partial dependent
is made by the Weems formula demonstrates its inconsistency
with the language of MCL 418.321.
9
require a factual determination by the trier of fact” to
establish the amount contributed by the employee to the
partial dependent. Id. at 709. We agree. This is necessary
for the simple reason that the amount contributed by the
deceased employee to the partial dependent will vary from case
to case and cannot be determined by any blanket formula.
The Weems majority rejected such a factual inquiry,
apparently primarily on the basis of the view that such a
factual determination would be “unworkable”:
Such a determination is absolutely unworkable
in practice. It would be impossible in most cases
to even roughly estimate which portion of the
decedent’s income was used for the sole support of
the dependent. [Weems, supra at 698.]
We acknowledge that, in many cases, the factfinder will
be presented with a difficult task in determining what amount
of money to consider as having been contributed by the
deceased employee to the partial dependent. In large part,
this is because household expenses are often paid in
essentially a lump sum for items that benefit multiple members
of the household.12 Yet the difficulty of an administrative
tribunal in making a factual determination called for by a
statute is not a justification for ignoring the statute. The
reason is that the Legislature, the policy-making arm of our
government, in taking up this matter, is held to have
12
For example, a rental payment might allow both an
employee and a partial dependent to live in the same
apartment. Similarly, groceries might be purchased for a
household with all of its members sharing in the food.
10
considered this issue and settled on this approach. It is not
within our authority to disregard that choice. See, e.g.,
Helder, supra at 99 (when a statute is clear on its face, the
judicial role is to apply the statute in accord with its plain
language, not to articulate its view of “policy”).
Accordingly, we overrule Weems to the extent that it is
inconsistent with this opinion. In particular, we overrule
the Weems formula for calculating benefits due a partial
dependent because it is inconsistent with the plain language
of MCL 418.321.13
C. Statutory Limitations
In deducing the proper formula to be employed,
consideration must also be given to the limitations stated in
the opening sentence of MCL 418.321.14
1. Maximum and Minimum Benefits
Recall that an element of the calculation for a partial
dependent is the benefit that would be paid if the survivor
had been wholly dependent on the decedent (BWD). If one were
determining the benefit for a wholly dependent person, the
first sentence of MCL 418.321 instructs that it might be
necessary to reduce the benefit in light of the maximum
benefit of MCL 418.355(2) or to raise it to reach the minimum
13
Specifically, we note that we have not overruled the
Weems analysis regarding determining whether a person is
partially dependent.
14
See n 6.
11
benefit specified by MCL 418.356(2).
The majority in Weems held that no separate adjustment
should be made after the benefits for a partially dependent
person are calculated. The majority said that “a partially
dependent person’s weekly benefits are inherently subject to
the maximum and minimum rates of compensation because the
calculation of a wholly dependent person’s weekly benefit is
included in the partially dependent person’s calculation.”
448 Mich 684-685. We agree.
The minimum or maximum benefit language in MCL 418.321 is
located in the sentence discussing benefits for wholly
dependent persons, not the calculation for partially dependent
persons.15 Therefore, where the maximum or minimum is
applicable, it is to be inserted at the step where (BWD) is
determined.
For that reason, when (BWD) is more than the maximum or
less than the minimum, it will be necessary to substitute the
minimum or maximum for (BWD), which is calculated using the
15
Unlike our concurring colleague, we do not believe
that MCL 418.321 is ambiguous concerning the introduction of
the minimum or maximum benefit rate into a partially dependent
person’s benefit calculation. The maximum or minimum benefit
clause is directed solely at the calculation for a wholly
dependent individual and is the only reference to the minimum
or maximum benefit rate in the statute. Since, under the
plain language of the statute, a partial dependent’s benefit
calculation first requires the calculation of the benefit that
the partial dependent would have received if wholly dependent,
we conclude there is no ambiguity about the point of
introduction of a minimum or maximum benefit rate into the
calculation of a partial dependent’s weekly compensation.
12
formula stated ante at page 7. That change would mean that
the usual value of (BWD), which is (.80)(WWAT) or 80% of the
decedent’s weekly wage after taxes, would be replaced by the
statutory maximum or minimum (SM) under MCL 418.355(2) or MCL
418.356(2). This change would be necessary because in such
cases the benefit level of a partial dependent is tied by the
language of MCL 418.321 to the benefits that would be provided
a wholly dependent person. Ordinarily, a wholly dependent
person would be entitled to 80% of the deceased employee’s
after-tax earnings, but that is not the case in situations in
which such a wholly dependent person’s benefits would be
subject to the maximum or minimum benefit restrictions.
Thus, where the minimum or maximum applies, as the law
existed in 1982, the statutory formula would be:
BPD = (C)(SM)/(AE), or
Benefit = (decedent’s contribution)(statutory maximum or minimum)
(decedent’s annual earnings)
In a case arising under the amended language of 1985 PA
103 and currently applicable, it would be:
BPD = (.80)(C)(SM)/(AE), or
Benefit = (.80)(decedent’s contribution)(statutory maximum or minimum)
(decedent’s annual earnings)
2. 500-Week Limitation
The first sentence of MCL 418.321 also states a 500-week
limitation of benefits for a wholly dependent person. This
limitation also applies to benefits for a partially dependent
person. The second sentence of MCL 418.321 provides a
13
specific means for partially (and wholly) dependent persons to
seek an extension of benefits beyond 500 weeks. In light of
the entire structure of MCL 418.321--
--in which the benefit for
a partially dependent person is derived arithmetically from
the benefit that would be paid if the person were wholly
dependent--
--the second sentence communicates the Legislature’s
intent that the 500-week limitation is likewise applicable to
partially dependent persons.
V. Retroactivity
The general rule is that judicial decisions are given
complete retroactive effect. Michigan Ed Emp Mut Ins Co v
Morris, 460 Mich 180, 189; 596 NW2d 142 (1999). However,
recognition of the effect of changing settled law has led this
Court to consider limited retroactivity when overruling prior
case law. In examining the potential effect of a retroactive
decision, this Court gauges (1) the purpose served by the new
rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the
effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice. Id.
at 190.
The purpose of the rule adopted in this opinion is to
correct what we believe to be the flawed construction of MCL
418.321 in Weems. However, Weems has been controlling
authority for over six and one-half years. Thus, it appears
that there has been widespread reliance on the Weems formula
in calculating worker’s compensation benefits for partial
dependents of deceased employees. Further, attempting to
14
revisit the benefit levels finally determined or agreed upon
during the period that Weems was controlling authority could
have a detrimental effect on the administration of justice by
imposing an enormous burden on the worker’s compensation
system, not to mention the reliance of the beneficiaries on
the benefits previously awarded under Weems.
For these reasons, we hold that the present opinion is to
be given only limited retroactive effect. The interpretation
of MCL 418.321 articulated in this opinion is to be applied
only to the present case; to other cases pending decision by
a worker’s compensation magistrate or on appeal, to either the
WCAC or the Court of Appeals, in which the determination of
the level of benefits to be paid a partial dependent is in
issue; and to future cases in which the level of benefits due
a partial dependent under MCL 418.321 needs to be initially
determined.
VI. Conclusion
In the present case, the WCAC and the Court of Appeals,
as they were bound to do, attempted to apply Weems as binding
precedent from this Court. However, for the above reasons, we
overrule the portion of Weems that provides a formula for
calculating worker’s compensation death benefits for surviving
partial dependents. The portions of this opinion that
overrule the Weems opinion are to have limited retroactive
effect.
15
We further hold that the minimum and maximum benefit
limits do not require an alteration after the partial
dependent benefits are calculated, but rather are to be
inserted before that calculation. In addition, we hold that
the 500-week limitation on benefits applies to partially
dependent persons.
For these reasons, it is necessary to again remand this
case to the WCAC. On remand, the commission shall calculate
the plaintiff’s benefits as a partial dependent in accordance
with MCL 418.321 as explained in this opinion, and in
accordance with other provisions of law, including those
stated in Franges, supra. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
CORRIGAN , C.J., and TAYLOR and MARKMAN , JJ., concurred with
YOUNG , J.
16
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
ROBERT C. LESNER, father of
Randy Lee Lesner, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116205
LIQUID DISPOSAL, INC., and
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY,
Defendants-Appellants.
___________________________________
KELLY, J. (concurring).
I agree with the formula that the majority has adopted to
be used for determining death benefits of a partial dependent.
However, it is obvious to me that § 321 of the Worker's
Disability Compensation Act1 is ambiguous. Consequently, the
majority's plain meaning analysis is inadequate to determine
the Legislature's intentions in writing it.
The majority has adopted the formula proposed in Justice
1
MCL 418.321.
Cavanagh's dissent in Weems v Chrysler Corp,2 except that it
retains the Weems majority's application of the maximum and
minimum rates of compensation for injuries. Sometimes, the
formula yields a benefit for a whole dependent that falls
above the maximum rate or below the minimum rate. In those
cases the statutory maximum or minimum is substituted for the
figure representing eighty percent of the decedent's after-tax
weekly wage in the formula.3
When the maximum and minimum amounts do not apply, the
majority's formula for a partial dependent is as follows:4
Benefit =(.80)(decedent's annual contribution)(.80)(decedent's after-tax weekly wage)
(decedent's annual earnings)
Whenever the maximum or minimum is substituted, the benefit
for a partial dependent is computed as follows:5
Benefit = (.80)(decedent's annual contribution)(statutory maximum or minimum)
(decedent's annual earnings)
Justice Cavanagh's formula in Weems differs in this
2
448 Mich 679; 533 NW2d 287 (1995).
3
In 2002, the minimum is $357.56 per week and the
m a x i m u m i s $ 6 4 4 . 0 0 p e r w e e k .
Http://www.cis.state.mi.us/wkrcomp/82_
now.htm, on April 19, 2002.
4
There are two 80% multipliers in this formula. The
first is the multiplier in the whole dependent's benefit,
which is 80% of the after-tax weekly wage of the decedent.
The second 80% multiplier, which was added by a 1985 amendment
of the act, is found in the partial dependent's formula. Slip
op at 7, n 8.
5
The 80% multiplier in this formula is the one found in
the formula for a partial dependent's benefit.
2
respect: The death benefit for a partial dependent is
calculated without regard to the maximum and minimum rates.
Then, whenever the resulting death benefit falls outside the
maximum-minimum benefit range, the benefit is adjusted upward
to the minimum or downward to the maximum, as the case may be.
Both interpretations are reasonably derived from the
language of the statute. Section 321 of the Worker's
Disability Compensation Act states that a wholly dependent
survivor's benefit is calculated as follows:
If death results . . . the employer shall pay
. . . a weekly payment equal to 80% of the
employee's after-tax average weekly wage, subject
to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation
under this act, for a period of 500 weeks from the
date of death. [MCL 418.321.]
Another part of the same section then directs how the
benefit is adjusted for a partially dependent survivor:
If the employee leaves dependents only
partially dependent upon his or her earnings for
support at the time of injury, the weekly
compensation to be paid shall be equal to the same
proportion of the weekly payment for the benefit of
persons wholly dependent as 80% of the amount
contributed by the employee bears to the annual
earnings of the deceased at the time of injury.
[MCL 418.321.]
The majority reasons that, because the clause "subject to the
maximum and minimum rates of compensation" appears only in the
whole dependents part of § 321, it refers only to the benefit
paid to a whole dependent. On the other hand, the Weems
dissent rejects that logic because the 500-week limitation of
3
§ 321 appears in the whole dependents part. Yet it applies to
partial dependents and is not repeated in the partial
dependents part. Also, the partial dependents part does not
state that the partial benefit is subject to the maximum and
minimum rates of compensation, whereas the fact that it is so
subject is undisputed.
Both constructions are antagonized by additional
ambiguity in the wording of §§ 355 and 356. Section 355(2),
which defines the maximum rate of compensation, states:
[T]he maximum weekly rate of compensation for
injuries within the year shall be established as
90% of the state average weekly wage . . . .
Proponents of the Weems dissent can rely on the fact that the
rate referred to is called the maximum rate of compensation.
That suggests that they should adjust the result of all
benefit calculations, whole or partial. On the other hand,
the statutory language can reasonably be read to mean that
placement of the maximum rate within the formula is determined
by § 321.
The language of § 356(3) also can be read in two
different manners. It states:
The minimum weekly benefit for death under
section 321 shall be 50% of the state average
weekly wage as determined under section 355.
Proponents of the Weems dissent argue that, because the
minimum weekly benefit is referred to as the minimum "for
death under section 321," it should replace any death benefit
4
calculated under § 321 that is lower than it. It should be
the smallest sum that a partial or whole dependent could
possibly receive. On the other hand, one can again point to
the minimum benefit as only one factor in the partial
dependent's benefit calculation.
I find that both are reasonable interpretations of the
language of §§ 321, 355 and 356. Therefore, § 321 is
ambiguous as regards application of the maximum and minimum
benefit rates, and rules of statutory construction must be
applied to determine the Legislature's intent.
It is undisputed that the overarching intention of the
Legislature was to award a death benefit that is less than the
amount that the employee contributed to the dependent. If the
Weems dissent formula reflected legislative intent, it would
yield that result. However, the contrary is true. Using it,
in cases where an employee contributed a small but not de
minimus amount before his death, a partial dependent would
receive the minimum rate of compensation. Thus, the benefit
could be significantly higher than the amount the decedent
contributed to the dependent during his lifetime.6
6
This is demonstrated by an example from the Weems
dissent:
. . .[I]f, for instance, twenty percent of Mr.
Weems' after-tax earnings were contributed to Mrs.
Weems, the formula yields:
(continued...)
5
By contrast with the Weems dissent's formula, the
majority's formula yields a death benefit that is normally
eighty percent of the amount that the employee contributed to
the dependent.
Because it satisfies the Legislature's purpose of
compensating part, but not one hundred percent or more, of the
dependent's loss, I agree with the majority's formula. Of the
possible interpretations of § 321, it alone conforms with the
legislative intent to calculate a death benefit that is
normally less than the decedent employee's contribution.
Therefore, I concur in the result of the majority opinion.
6
(...continued)
80% X $ 8,558 X $822.91 = $131.66
$42,791
However, applying § 356, which sets the
statutory minimum for death benefits, the payable
death benefit would be $207.35, the applicable
minimum rate for these parties. [Id. at 718, n 17
(Cavanagh, J. dissenting).]
In this example, the calculated benefit of $131.66 was raised
to $207.35 a week, which was the minimum rate for death
benefits in 1986. However, the employee had contributed only
$8,558 annually before death. Hence, under the Weems dissent
formula, the dependent received only $164.57 a week from the
decedent and would receive $207.35 a week after.
6
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
ROBERT C. LESNER, Father of
Randy Lee Lesner, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116205
LIQUID DISPOSAL, INC., and
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY,
Defendants-Appellants.
___________________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
While I agree that the formula the majority adopts today
for calculating worker’s compensation death benefits for
surviving partial dependents is the correct formula under MCL
418.321, I do not agree with the majority’s interpretation of
the minimum and maximum benefit language located in MCL
418.321. Also, I write separately because I believe that
leave was improvidently granted in this case.
The procedural history of this case is substantial.
Plaintiff first sought benefits in connection with his son’s
death in 1982. In 1995, after this Court decided Weems v
Chrysler Corp, 448 Mich 679; 533 NW2d 287 (1995), this case
was remanded to the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission
to recalculate death benefits using the formula set forth in
Weems. 449 Mich 901 (1995). Today, the majority overrules
the Weems formula and remands for yet another recalculation
using a new formula.
This case has been up and down the worker’s compensation
and appellate court systems for over twenty years and has been
remanded once already to calculate benefits under the now
abandoned Weems formula. While I remain committed to the
formula set forth in my partial dissent to Weems, which this
Court adopts today, I believe that it is time to put this case
to rest. Leave was improvidently granted. Further, I remain
committed to the interpretation of the application of the
minimum and maximum benefits as expressed in my partial
dissent to Weems. Weems, 448 Mich 711-712, 716-717 (1995).
2
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
ROBERT C. LESNER, Father of
Randy Lee Lesner, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116205
LIQUID DISPOSAL, INC., and
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY,
Defendant-Appellants.
____________________________________
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).
I dissent from the majority’s decision to overrule the
formula established by this Court in Weems v Chrysler Corp,
448 Mich 679; 533 NW2d 287 (1995). As noted by the Weems
majority, in most instances it is difficult, if not
impossible, to calculate the amount contributed by the
decedent solely to the support of the partial dependent. Id.
at 698. The formula articulated in Weems, which takes into
consideration the dependent person’s regular and substantial
income, represents a practical, workable formula that gives
effect to the statute, MCL 418.321, and is faithful to its
intent.1 Therefore, I would not overrule this aspect of the
Weems opinion.
1
At oral argument, counsel for both plaintiff and
defendants agreed that the formula established in Weems has
proven workable since the decision was made over six years
ago.
2