ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ruth Johnson Steve Carter
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
______________________________________________________________________________
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________
No. 49S04-0508-JV-356
J.D.,
Appellant (Respondent below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Petitioner below).
_________________________________
Appeal from the Marion County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, Room 1,
No. 49D09-0406-JD-003077
The Honorable James W. Payne, Judge
_________________________________
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A04-0410-JV-528
_________________________________
September 12, 2006
Sullivan, Justice.
In this delinquency case, J.D. was sentenced to a fixed term of one year. He seeks credit
against that one-year term for the 35 days he was confined prior to sentencing. We hold that re-
quiring credit for the time a juvenile has spent in pre-disposition confinement would impermissi-
bly impinge upon the juvenile court’s broad authority to fashion dispositional alternatives.
Background
Fifteen-year-old J.D. was arrested and alleged to be a delinquent child for committing
acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute burglary, theft, and resisting law enforce-
ment. He already had two unrelated prior adjudications of delinquency for acts that would have
been felonies if committed by an adult. He was confined in the county juvenile detention center.
Thirty-five days later, all of which J.D. spent in confinement, he admitted to the act that would
constitute burglary. In return, the State dismissed the remainder of the allegations.
As recommended by the State, the trial court concluded J.D. was eligible to be sentenced
under Indiana Code section 31-37-19-10 (described in footnote 3 below) and ordered J.D. to
serve a one-year determinate sentence. J.D. then requested time-served credit for the 35 days he
was detained prior to sentencing. The trial court denied J.D.’s request, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. J. D. v. State, 826 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We granted transfer. 841 N.E.2d
181 (Ind. 2005).
Discussion
When a child under the age of 18 is alleged to have committed an act that would consti-
tute a crime if committed by an adult, the General Assembly has mandated that the child’s case
proceed in accordance with law and procedures that we refer to in this opinion as the “Juvenile
Code.” While the Juvenile Code has a vocabulary all its own and is distinct in many other re-
spects from the law and procedures applicable to adults charged with crimes, it nevertheless in-
tersects at various points with criminal statutes applicable to adults. From time to time, a case
arises at one of those points of intersection. For example, several years ago we were presented
with a case that required us to evaluate whether certain language in the Juvenile Code dealing
with repeat offenders should be interpreted in the same way as similar language that appeared in
criminal statutes applicable to adults. See N.D.F. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1085, 1089 (Ind. 2002)
(holding that the law interpreting habitual offender provisions in the adult criminal statutes did
not govern interpretation of similar language in the Juvenile Code).
2
The case before us today also arises at a point of intersection between the Juvenile Code
and criminal statutes applicable to adults. It asks whether certain language that appears in crimi-
nal statutes applicable to adults concerning credit time for pre-trial confinement also applies to
juvenile offenders.
J.D.’s argument is a relatively straightforward syllogism:
1. A criminal statute applicable to adults, Indiana Code section 35-
50-6-3, provides that a person imprisoned for a crime is entitled to credit time for
each day the person was confined awaiting trial or sentencing.
2. There are no references in the Juvenile Code to credit time and a
provision in the Juvenile Code, Indiana Code section 31-32-1-1, specifies that in
juvenile delinquency cases, the “procedures governing adult criminal trials” apply
in all matters not covered by the Juvenile Code.
3. J.D. is entitled to credit time for the 35 days he was confined
awaiting sentencing.
The response of the Court of Appeals to this argument was also straightforward. It rea-
soned that because the credit time statute was “substantive,” not “procedural,” Indiana Code sec-
tion 31-32-1-1—which applies only to “procedures”—did not operate to import the credit time
provisions of Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3 into the Juvenile Code. J.D., 826 N.E.2d at 147.
We reach the same result as the Court of Appeals but our analysis takes a somewhat dif-
ferent route.
First of all, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3 pro-
vides substantive rights and is not, therefore, incorporated into the Juvenile Code by operation of
Indiana Code section 31-32-1-1. However, we do not think that disposes of the heart of J.D.’s
claim. What J.D. seeks is credit against his one-year sentence for the 35 days he was confined
prior to the date of his sentencing. That is, he seeks “credit for time served”—the credit toward
3
the sentence a prisoner receives for time actually served. As Purcell v. State explained, credit for
time served is different from “good time credit”—the additional credit a prisoner receives for
good behavior and educational attainment. 721 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ind. 1999). The rights pro-
vided a prisoner by Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3 are rights to good time credit; that statute
simply does not speak to the right to credit for time served. 1
We believe that the inherent differences between the juvenile delinquency and adult
criminal justice systems dictate that a juvenile offender is not entitled to credit for time served in
detention prior to sentencing. A key feature of the Juvenile Code is the broad range of alterna-
tives a juvenile court judge has available once a child has been found by the court to be “a delin-
quent child,” i.e., to have committed an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult. In
the vocabulary of the Juvenile Code, these alternatives are called “dispositions” and the judge
enters a “dispositional decree” (rather than a sentencing order). In its dispositional decree, de-
pending upon the circumstances of the particular case, the court can, e.g., order supervision of
the child by the probation department, order “wardship” of the child to the Department of Cor-
rection (“DOC”), or order confinement in a juvenile detention center, as well as order various
other sanctions and treatment. See Ind. Code §§ 31-37-19-5, 31-37-19-6, 31-37-19-8, 31-37-19-
9 & 31-37-19-10 (2004).
In a case several years ago, Justice Rucker explained the Legislature’s purpose in provid-
ing such flexibility in dispositional alternatives to juvenile judges:
Our legislature has declared that it is the policy of this State and the pur-
pose of our juvenile code to “ensure that children within the juvenile justice sys-
tem are treated as persons in need of care, protection, treatment, and rehabilita-
tion.” I.C. § 31-10-2-1(5). This policy is grounded in the Progressive Movement
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when American society rejected treating
juvenile law violators the same as adult criminals in favor of individualized diag-
nosis and treatment. State ex rel. Camden v. Gibson Cir. Ct., 640 N.E.2d 696,
1
Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3 provides that a “person assigned to Class I earns one (1) day of credit
time for each day he is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing”; a “person as-
signed to Class II earns one (1) day of credit time for every two (2) days he is imprisoned for a crime or
confined awaiting trial or sentencing”; and a “person assigned to Class III earns no credit time.” A person
imprisoned for a crime or imprisoned awaiting trial or sentencing is initially assigned to Class I but may
be reassigned to Class II or Class III for violating a rule of the penal facility. Ind. Code § 35-50-6-4
(2004).
4
697 (Ind. 1994). Consequently, a juvenile court judge:
must seek to instill in the child a sense of value, impart a feeling of
security and belonging, communicate the importance and dignity
of being a member of society and, hopefully, in this manner, pre-
vent the child from pursuing a criminal and anti-social career. A
juvenile court judge must, in a unique manner, establish a relation-
ship that will permanently alter the behavior patterns of the child.
He must have patience, understanding, and a genuine interest in the
welfare of the child and must direct all of his efforts toward reha-
bilitation.
Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, [389-90], 254 N.E.2d 319, 327 (1970) (citation omit-
ted). To aid juvenile court judges, the legislature has put at their disposal “a myr-
iad of dispositional alternatives to fit the unique and varying circumstances of
each child’s problems.” Madaras v. State, 425 N.E.2d 670, 671 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981).
N.D.F., 775 N.E.2d at 1088-89.
Because of the flexibility as to dispositional alternatives that juvenile courts possess, we
held in the N.D.F. case that in delinquency cases involving a special statute dealing with the dis-
position of cases involving recidivists, the State was not required to comply with the more exact-
ing requirements that it faces in adult habitual offender cases.
Another case making this same point is In re Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48 (Ind. 1991). In the
course of rejecting an argument that certain provisions of the Juvenile Code then in effect were
unconstitutional, we said:
Unlike the [adult] criminal justice system, where a defendant serves a finite sen-
tence and can anticipate release upon a day certain, a ward of the juvenile court
remains under the court’s continuing jurisdiction until he reaches the age of ma-
jority, the court discharges the ward in the exercise of its discretion, or guardian-
ship is awarded by the court to the Department of Corrections. I.C. 31-6-2-3.
Rather than a determinate term of imprisonment which can be shortened by good
time credit, the continuous judicial oversight of a ward under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court extends over a variety of settings and can be terminated at any
point at which the court determines that it is no longer necessary or appropriate.
Even if the ward is committed to Boys or Girls School and guardianship is
awarded to the Department of Corrections, appellees themselves point out that
such commitment does not necessarily extend until the juvenile reaches the age of
5
majority, but may be terminated upon the determination of the DOC that a less re-
strictive placement has become appropriate.
Id. at 61. 2
The broad authority of the juvenile court to fashion dispositional alternatives for juvenile
offenders discussed in cases like N.D.F. and Tina T. leads us to conclude that the law does not
require that a juvenile offender be provided credit for time served in pre-disposition detention.
Expressed in the positive, the juvenile court’s broad authority to fashion dispositional alterna-
tives extends to discretion over how much, if any, of the time the juvenile offender has spent in
pre-disposition confinement is entitled to credit. Expressed in the negative, requiring credit for
the time a juvenile has spent in pre-disposition confinement would impermissibly impinge upon
the juvenile court’s broad authority to fashion dispositional alternatives.
We believe two additional matters warrant comment.
The quotation from the Tina T. case describes an adult sentence as a “determinate term of
imprisonment” in which “a defendant serves a finite sentence and can anticipate release upon a
day certain. . . .” Id. By contrast, the period of a juvenile’s detention can be “terminated at any
point” by the juvenile court (or the D.O.C.). Id.
In 1997, and subsequently, the Legislature has added to the Juvenile Code several sec-
tions that are often referred to as “determinate sentencing” provisions. For example, Indiana
Code section 31-37-19-9 provides that a juvenile court can order wardship of a child found to
have committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would be murder, kidnapping, rape, crimi-
nal deviate conduct, or aggravated robbery, to the DOC “for a fixed period that is not longer than
the date the child becomes 18 years of age.” In J.D.’s case, the court utilized one of the determi-
nate sentencing provisions, Indiana Code section 31-37-19-10, to sentence J.D. to a fixed term of
one year. 3
2
This passage is from a longer section in which the Court explained why a juvenile offender is not enti-
tled to good time credit.
3
Ind. Code § 31-37-19-10 provides that a juvenile court may place the child in an authorized penal or
detention facility for not more than two years. It applies to a child found to have committed an act that, if
6
At least implicit in J.D.’s claim in this appeal is the notion that because our determinate
adult sentencing regime provides credit for time served, credit for time served should also be
available at least with respect to a sentence imposed under the Juvenile Code’s determinate sen-
tencing provisions.
We do not believe that the enactment of these “determinate sentencing” provisions affects
our holding. It is true that once the juvenile court judge in this case imposed a sentence with a
fixed term of one year, the judge no longer had authority to terminate the sentence at an earlier
point in time. In this respect, “determinate sentencing” under the Juvenile Code does parallel
adult criminal sentencing. But there is a critical difference, too. The juvenile court judge had the
authority to decide whether to employ “determinate sentencing” in the first place; it was one of
the juvenile court’s “dispositional alternatives” to proceed under Indiana Code section 31-37-19-
10 but the court was not required to utilize this provision. In this respect, we note that Tina T.
referred to the fact that under certain circumstances the D.O.C., rather than the juvenile court,
made (and still makes today) the determination of when the child is released. It is the flexibility
that the juvenile court has in deciding whether the child will be placed with the D.O.C. at all,
rather than the manner in which such a placement is terminated, that distinguishes the juvenile
system from the adult—and makes credit for time served inapplicable.
The other matter warranting brief attention is J.D.’s contention that he is entitled to relief
under the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.T.S. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1193, 1204 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004), trans. denied, 792 N.E.2d 45 (Ind. 2003). We agree with the Court of Appeals in
this case when it said:
J.D. also asserts C.T.S. v. State entitles him to time-served credit. In C.T.S., this
court remanded C.T.S.’s indeterminate sentence to the trial court and ordered the
trial court to give C.T.S. time-served credit. However, C.T.S. involved an ex-
traordinary period of months awaiting disposition, more akin to the constitutional
committed by an adult, would be a felony against a person, an aggravated controlled substance offense, or
aggravated burglary. The child must have been at least 14 years of age at the time of the act and have had
two unrelated prior adjudications of delinquency for acts that would be felonies if committed by an adult.
7
right of speedy trial. Accordingly, J.D. may not rely upon C.T.S.’s unusual re-
mand order.
J.D., 826 N.E.2d at 147.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
8