Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee
Steve Carter Ralph E. Dowling
Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
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__
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
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No. 05S02-0311-CV-497
State of Indiana,
Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
T. Eric Evans,
Appellee (Defendant below).
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Interlocutory Appeal from the Blackford Circuit Court, No. 05C01-0202-CC-25
The Honorable Jan L. Chalfant, Special Judge
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On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 05A02-0210-
CV-875
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June 15, 2004
Shepard, Chief Justice.
After an audit by the State Board of Accounts, the Attorney General
sued former prosecutor T. Eric Evans to recover public money spent on
alcohol, hotel rooms, ammunition for personal use, personal phone calls,
and the like. Evans contends he is entitled to counsel at public expense.
We hold he is not.
On February 12, 2002, the Attorney General filed a complaint against
Evans and Western Surety Company to recover public funds “which were found
to be misappropriated, diverted or unaccounted for by an examination of the
books, accounts and records of the Office of the Prosecutor, Blackford
County, Indiana, by the State Board of Accounts.” Appellant's App. at 8.
The allegations arose from Evans’ activities as prosecuting attorney of
Blackford County from January 1, 1993, through December 31, 1998. The
complaint reads in relevant part:
COUNT I
. . .
4. T. Eric Evans was an employee of the Office of the
Prosecutor, Blackford County, Indiana, during the period of the
loss and had a duty to properly account for and deposit all
funds of the Office of the Prosecutor, Blackford County, Indiana
which came into his possession and assure that the funds of the
Office of the Prosecutor, Blackford County, Indiana were only
expended as authorized by law and commit no acts of misfeasance,
malfeasance or nonfeasance in management of said funds.
5. That during the audit period, T. Eric Evans, wrongfully or
negligently failed to properly account for, expend and deposit
the funds of the Office of the Prosecut[or], Blackford County,
Indiana or otherwise committed several acts of misfeasance,
malfeasance and nonfeasance which acts resulted in the
misappropriation, diversion and misapplication of public funds.
6. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of T. Eric
Evans, he is indebted to the State of Indiana and the Office of
the Prosecutor, Blackford County, Indiana in the amount [of]
Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Eighteen Dollars ($16,218.00).
. . .
COUNT II
. . .
10. That Plaintiff, State of Indiana, is a party suffering a
pecuniary loss as a result of a violation by Defendant T. Eric
Evans, of one or more of the following I.C. 35-43-4-2 [theft],
I.C. 35-43-4-3 [criminal conversion] or I.C. 35-43-5-3
[deception], which loss consists of the sum of . . .
($16,218.00) and Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of treble
damages in the amount of . . . ($48,654.00) plus costs, attorney
fees and all other just and proper relief.
11. That Plaintiff, State of Indiana, is a party suffering a
pecuniary loss as a result of a breach by Defendant, T. Eric
Evans, of his contract and trust, both real and constructive, .
. . and a violation of the resultant trust imposed on him by law
and equity to collect, administer, bank and disburse public
funds belonging to the State of Indiana and the Office of the
Prosecutor, Blackford County, Indiana.
Id. at 9-10. The State attached to the complaint the audit performed by
the Board of Accounts and Evans’ fourteen-page response to the allegations.
Before answering the complaint, Evans filed a motion pro se seeking
appointment of counsel. He cited Indiana Code § 4-6-2-1.5, Indiana Code §
33-2.1-9-1, and Indiana Code § 34-13-3-15. In an attached affidavit, Evans
averred as follows:
That these claims were all handled and processed in exactly the
same manner, as prescribed by law and as directed by the Auditor
of Blackford County and the Commissioners of Blackford
County.
That all claims submitted by the affiant were in the ordinary
and usual course of business, were advertised as required by
law, approved by the Auditor, and approved by the County
Commissioners and paid by the Treasurer.
That each and every act of submitting claims for payment by the
affiant was within the scope of the duties of the affiant as
Prosecutor, as prescribed and required by law and practice, and
done in good faith by the affiant in his capacity as Prosecutor.
Id. at 63.
The trial court granted his motion, saying: “The Attorney General
should be directed to comply with the statutory procedure set forth in
Indiana Code [§ 33-2.1-9-1(c)(2)] within thirty days, giving priority to
this case as a consideration in the hiring of private counsel for Defendant
Evans.” Id. at 70. The State moved to stay all proceedings and asked the
court to certify the order for interlocutory appeal. On October 8, 2002,
the trial court granted the State’s motion to stay and certified the
interlocutory order. The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Evans, 790
N.E.2d 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We granted transfer.
Must the Attorney General Supply Counsel?
The trial court relied on Indiana Code Annotated § 33-2.1-9-1(c)(2)
(West Supp. 2003), in determining that Indiana’s Attorney General must
provide private counsel for Evans. The statute at issue reads in relevant
part:
If a judge or prosecuting attorney is sued for civil damages or
equitable relief and the suit would be construed, under notice
pleading, as arising out of an act performed within the scope of
the duties of the judge or prosecuting attorney, the attorney
general shall:
(1) defend the judge or prosecuting attorney in the suit; or
(2) authorize the executive director of the division of state
court administration to hire private counsel to provide the
defense.
Ind. Code Ann. § 33-2.1-9-1(c).
While Evans, as a prosecuting attorney, enjoys the protections that
this statute provides, we cannot ignore the incongruous result that a
literal reading would render under the present facts: the Attorney
General’s office would be either litigating or financing both sides of this
suit. Our method of analyzing statutes on such occasions is this:
When interpreting a statute, appellate courts independently
review a statute's meaning and apply it to the facts of the case
under review. If a statute is unambiguous, that is, susceptible
to but one meaning, we must give the statute its clear and plain
meaning. If a statute is susceptible to multiple
interpretations, however, we must try to ascertain the
legislature's intent and interpret the statute so as to
effectuate that intent. We presume the legislature intended
logical application of the language used in the statute, so as
to avoid unjust or absurd results.
Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind. 2002) (citations omitted). We
conclude that the interpretation urged by Evans would produce an absurd
result. The statute’s objective is to protect officeholders from
litigation by those dissatisfied with the decisions they make (typically,
in the case of judges and prosecutors, lawsuits by prisoners). We think
the General Assembly’s intent for situations like the present case is
reflected by its explicit rule for statewide officials. See Ind. Code Ann.
§ 4-6-2-1 (2002) (Attorney General “shall defend all suits brought against
the state officers in their official relations, except suits brought
against them by the state”).
Requiring the Attorney General to finance both sides of this suit is
akin to the dog chasing its own tail and an absurdity that the General
Assembly could not have intended. See, e.g., Livingston v. Fast Cash USA,
Inc., 753 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 2001) (applying the “absurd result rule” to the
Indiana Uniform Consumer Credit Code).[1] Whether the statute would afford
reimbursement to a defendant who prevails we leave for another day.
Evans also contends that Indiana Code Annotated § 33-14-11-4 (West
1996) entitles him to a defense provided by the State. The statute
provides in relevant part: “The state shall pay the expenses incurred by a
prosecuting attorney from a threatened, pending, or completed action or
proceeding[.]” We conclude that this section is unavailing to Evans for
reasons substantially similar to those mentioned above.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s grant of Evans’s motion to appoint
counsel and remand for proceedings on the merits.
Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
Dickson, J., dissents without opinion
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[1] Our Rules of Professional Conduct instruct us as follows: “As a
general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking
representation directly adverse to that client without that client's
consent.” Ind. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. (1987). While full
disclosure or the hiring of private counsel might resolve the Attorney
General’s ethical dilemma, the questionable use of public funds to
prosecute and defend the same person would still give great concern.