Attorneys for Appellant Attorney for Appellees
Steve Carter Katherine Cornelius
Attorney General of Indiana Marion County Public
Defender
Indianapolis, Indiana
Frances Barrow
Deputy Attorney General Attorney for
Appellee
Indianapolis, Indiana Child Advocates, Inc.
Loretta A. Olesky
Indianapolis, Indiana
____________________________________________________________________________
__
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________
No. 49S04-0305-JV-225
In The Matter Of
K.G., D.G., D.C.B., AND J.J.S.,
_________________________________
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
No. 49D09-0108-JD-3517
49D09-9911-JD-4707
49D09-0006-JD-2323
49D09-0009-JD-3486
The Honorable James W. Payne, Judge
_________________________________
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A04-0205-
JV-239
_________________________________
May 20, 2004
Rucker, Justice
We hold that although juveniles alleged to be delinquent have the
constitutional right to have their competency determined before they are
subjected to delinquency proceedings, the adult competency statute is not
applicable in reaching that determination.
Facts and Procedural History
This appeal arises out of four cases filed in the Marion County
Juvenile Court. On August 15, 2001, the State filed a delinquency petition
against then twelve-year-old K.G. alleging that he committed sexual
battery, a Class D felony if committed by an adult; on November 16, 1999,
the State filed a delinquency petition against then ten-year-old D.G.
alleging that he committed child molesting, a Class C felony if committed
by an adult; on June 6, 2000, the State filed a delinquency petition
against then eleven-year-old D.C.B. alleging that he committed arson, a
Class B felony if committed by an adult; and on September 12, 2000, the
State filed a delinquency petition against then thirteen-year-old J.J.S.
alleging that she committed burglary and theft, Class B and D felonies
respectively if committed by an adult.
Represented by counsel, on September 12, 2001, K.G. filed a “motion
for psychiatric examination to determine competence to stand trial.”
Appellant’s App. at 47. Invoking the provisions of Indiana Code section 35-
36-3-1, the motion sought the appointment of “two or three disinterested
psychiatrists or other qualified practitioners to examine Respondent . . .
and report to this Court on his competence to stand trial . . . .” Id. On
June 7, 2000, counsel for D.C.B. filed a similar motion. On November 22,
1999, on behalf of D.G., counsel filed a motion captioned “Notice of
Insanity Defense and Incompetency to Stand Trial.” Id. at 62. Also
invoking Indiana Code section 35-36-3-1 the motion alleged among other
things that D.G. was “unable [to] understand the trial process and the role
of the judge, attorney and prosecutor and that he will not be able to
assist [the attorney] in his defense . . . .” Id.
Although the record is not altogether clear, apparently the trial
court granted each of the foregoing motions appointing various health care
professionals to evaluate the juveniles. In October 2001, two different
health care professionals evaluated K.G. Dr. David J. Posey, a Child and
Adolescent Psychiatrist, concluded, “It is clear that [K.G.] has little to
[no] knowledge about court proceedings, understanding of matters essential
to cooperating with one’s lawyer, or range of possible consequences . . . .
Based on the results of this competency evaluation as well as his mild to
moderate mental retardation and autism, an opinion that [K.G.] is not
competent to stand trial would find support.” Appellee’s App. at 14. In
similar fashion, Dr. Paul Aleksic, a clinical psychologist, reported that
K.G. is autistic and moderately to mildly mentally handicapped. According
to Dr. Aleksic, “[K.G.] is marginally able to comprehend the wrongfulness
of his action but is not competent to control his actions. He further is
not sufficiently mentally competent to aid in his court defense.” Id. at
12.
In July 2000, Dr. Posey examined D.C.B. noting that the juvenile
functioned significantly below average intelligence. Dr. Posey noted a
recent psychiatric diagnosis that included “major depression, oppositional
defiant disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and mild
to moderate mental retardation.” Id. at 19. Dr. Posey concluded that
D.C.B. did not have an adequate understanding of court proceedings,
possible consequences, or the ability to cooperate with his lawyer.
According to Dr. Posey, “[g]iven [D.C.B.]’s young age, mental retardation,
and demonstrated lack of understanding of the proceedings against him, an
opinion that [D.C.B.] is incompetent to stand trial would find support.”
Id. at 20. In September 2000, Dr. Aleksic also examined D.C.B. and noted
that he “appears to present a psychotic disorder along with at least a mild
mental handicap.” Id. at 22. Among other things Dr. Aleksic concluded
that D.C.B “is not viewed as competent to aid in his court defense or to
understand the consequences of his actions.” Id.
In December 1999, Dr. Aleksic examined D.G. and concluded that he was
mildly mentally handicapped, had limited intellectual ability, and that
“the overall finding[s] do not suggest that he is competent to aid in his
defense.” Appellant’s App. at 67. In May 2000 and again in September
2000, Dr. Posey also examined D.G. Although concluding that D.G. did not
meet the legal definition of insanity, Dr. Posey determined that D.G. is
mildly mentally retarded, exhibited symptoms of ADHD, and concluded that
D.G. is “largely ignorant of court proceedings and how he could best work
with his lawyer” and consequently D.G. was “not competent to stand trial.”
Appellee’s App. at 32.
As for J.J.S., the record shows that on November 20, 2000, she entered
a plea agreement with the State under which she admitted committing
burglary and the State dismissed the charge of theft. The trial court
accepted the agreement and scheduled a dispositional hearing for December
20, 2000. The record is unclear as to whether a hearing was conducted on
that date or what might have transpired. In any event the record shows
that at some point the court entered an order for a psychological
evaluation to determine J.J.S.’ competency to understand the proceedings.
The evaluation, conducted by Dr. Aleksic on March 28, 2001, revealed that
J.J.S. is moderately to mildly mentally handicapped and functionally
illiterate. Id. at 5. Dr. Aleksic concluded that “[J.J.S.] is not
accountable for her actions and is not viewed as competent to understand
the court process.” Id. at 7.
The record shows that all four juveniles were placed in various
residential treatment centers.[1] In March 2002, the trial court entered
an order finding that each of the juveniles lacked the ability to
understand the proceedings and to assist in the preparation of their
respective defenses. The trial court thus ordered the juveniles committed
to the division of mental health for confinement in an appropriate
psychiatric institution.
Thereafter the State of Indiana, through the mental health division of
the Family and Social Services Administration, filed a motion to intervene
in this action. The trial court granted the motion. Subsequently, the
State filed a motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule
60(B) requesting the trial court to vacate its order. The trial court
denied the motion and the State appealed. On review the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s judgment. In re K.G., 781 N.E.2d 700 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002). Having previously granted transfer, we now reverse the
judgment of the trial court.
Discussion
The trial court proceeded under the adult competency statute, which
provides:
(a) If at any time before the final submission of any criminal
case to the court or to the jury trying the case, the court has
reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant lacks the
ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the
preparation of his defense, the court shall immediately fix a
time for a hearing to determine whether the defendant has that
ability. The court shall appoint two (2) or three (3)
competent, disinterested psychiatrists, psychologists endorsed
by the Indiana state board of examiners in psychology as health
service providers in psychology, or physicians, at least one (1)
of whom must be a psychiatrist, who shall examine the defendant
and testify at the hearing as to whether the defendant can
understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of the
defendant’s defense.
(b) At the hearing, other evidence relevant to whether the
defendant has the ability to understand the proceedings and
assist in the preparation of the defendant’s defense may be
introduced. If the court finds that the defendant has the
ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the
preparation of the defendant’s defense, the trial shall proceed.
If the court finds that the defendant lacks this ability, it
shall delay or continue the trial and order the defendant
committed to the division of mental health and addiction, to be
confined by the division in an appropriate psychiatric
institution.
Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1. The State contends here, as it did before the Court
of Appeals, that the trial court’s reliance on the adult competency statute
was improper because the juvenile code provides procedures that permit a
court to make competency determinations for children and place them in
treatment centers when necessary. The Court of Appeals rejected this
argument, concluding (1) juveniles have a constitutional right to have
their competency determined before they are subjected to delinquency
proceedings, and (2) because the juvenile code provides no procedure for
determining the competency of children, the adult competency statute
applies.
We agree that a juvenile alleged to be delinquent has the
constitutional right to have her competency determined before she is
subjected to delinquency proceedings. A juvenile charged with delinquency
is entitled to have the court apply those common law jurisprudential
principles which experience and reason have shown are necessary to give the
accused the essence of a fair trial. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30
(1967). Without question, these include the right to adequate notice of
the charges, appointment of counsel, the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination, and the right to confront opposing witnesses. Id. at
31, 34, 39, 41, 42, 56. The cornerstone of these substantive rights is
competence to understand the nature of the charge and to assist in a
defense. In our view the want of competence renders the other rights
meaningless. “[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is
for adults alone.” Id. at 13. “It has long been accepted that a person
whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel,
and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); see also Wallace v. State, 486
N.E.2d 445, 453 (Ind. 1985) (“An accused has a constitutional right not to
be tried if he does not have the ability to comprehend the proceedings or
to assist in his defense.”). Principles of fundamental fairness require
that this right be afforded in juvenile proceedings. Thus, we summarily
affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals on this issue. We disagree with
our colleagues, however, on the applicability of the adult competency
statute.
The juvenile court system is founded on the notion of parens patriae,
which allows the court the power to step into the shoes of the parents.
“Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care
of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their
parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as
parens patriae.” Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); see also
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (The State has “a parens
patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child”).
The parens patriae doctrine originated in fifteenth-century England in the
King’s Court. Sarah Ramsey & Daan Braveman, “Let Them Starve”:
Government’s Obligation to Children in Poverty, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1607, 1634
(1995). The King’s Court would take the place of parents who had neglected
or abandoned their children. Id.
The parens patriae doctrine originally emphasized the importance
of maintaining the family unit by allowing parents to raise
their children as they saw fit without interference by the
state. The state’s role was supplementary and was justified
only when there was a compelling reason, such as protecting the
child from parental abuse. Yet, when a benevolent court was
precluded from acting in its parens patriae role, juvenile
offenders faced punishment akin to hardened criminals.
Reformers’ efforts to change this practice resulted in the
establishment of a separate court system that replaced
traditional notions of punishment with a “clinical” approach
emphasizing rehabilitation and treatment.
Kristina H. Chung, Note, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating
Juveniles in Adult Jails, 66 Ind. L.J. 999, 1009 (1991) (footnotes
omitted).
Adopted by American common law, the parens patriae doctrine gives
juvenile courts power to further the best interests of the child, which
implies a broad discretion unknown in the adult criminal court system. See
Joyce L. Alexander, Aligning the Goals of Juvenile Justice With the Needs
of Young Women Offenders: A Proposed Praxis For Transformational Justice,
32 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 555, 560 (1999) (noting “the broad discretion
afforded to juvenile court judges and the case-by-case treatment
orientation of the juvenile court”). “[T]he rationale for a separate
juvenile court is to a large extent grounded in the concept of
individualized sentencing, and the broad discretion given to juvenile court
judges that it implies.” Donald J. Harris, Due Process v. Helping Kids in
Trouble: Implementing the Right to Appeal From Adjudications of Delinquency
in Pennsylvania, 98 Dick. L. Rev. 209, 217 (1994).
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Warren and Burger Courts decided a number
of cases that broadened juveniles’ rights under the Constitution and
limited juvenile courts’ discretion. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519 (1975) (juveniles have right against double jeopardy); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (juveniles must be convicted on proof beyond reasonable
doubt); Gault, 387 U.S. at 31, 34, 39, 41, 42, 55, 56 (juveniles have right
to sufficient notice, right to counsel, right to be informed of the right
to counsel, right against self-incrimination, and right to confrontation
and cross-examination); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (full
investigation required before waiver to adult court); Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. 49 (1962) (minors protected from coerced confessions).
Despite these broadened protections, the U.S. Supreme Court has
affirmed that the state maintains “a parens patriae interest in preserving
and promoting the welfare of the child.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766. The
differences between adult and juvenile courts remain; this is because
“although children generally are protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is
entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability
and their needs for ‘concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal
attention.’” Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (quoting McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)). Chief Justice Burger noted
that a difference between the adult criminal system and the juvenile system
is “the flexibility and informality of juvenile proceedings . . . .”
Breed, 421 U.S. at 535 n.15; see also Chung, supra, at 1011 (observing that
parens patriae power “grant[s] substantial leeway to officials in the
judicial system to justify their determination of what constitutes
rehabilitation or treatment”); John D. Goetz, Note, Children’s Rights Under
the Burger Court: Concern for the Child But Deference to Authority, 60
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1214, 1223 (1985) (noting “the informality and
flexibility of the juvenile justice system”). “Affording juvenile courts
broad discretion throughout all phases of the juvenile court proceedings is
widely considered central to the rehabilitative model.” Deel v. Jago, 967
F.2d 1079, 1091 (6th Cir. 1992).
The juvenile court’s purpose is more reformative than punitive.
Thus, in juvenile court, technicalities and formalities are
largely done away with, and its simple procedure is designed to
gain the confidence of those coming within its operations, and
to enable the judge thereof to best guide and control its wards
. . . . The due process clause applies in juvenile proceedings,
but a juvenile [court] must respect the informality and
flexibility that characterize juvenile proceedings while
insuring that such proceedings comport with the fundamental
fairness demanded by the due process clause. [T]he rules of
procedure in a juvenile proceeding where the life and liberty of
the juvenile delinquent are at stake should be measured by the
gravity of the situation and the exigencies the case may impel,
with every safeguard against rendering the child the victim of
oppression and skullduggery.
47 Am. Jur. 2d “Juvenile Courts” § 6 (1995).
Indiana Code section 31-32-1-1 provides, “If a child is alleged to be
a delinquent child, the procedures governing criminal trials apply in all
matters not covered by the juvenile law.” It is true that the juvenile
code does not provide an explicit procedure for handling juvenile
competency issues. Nonetheless, in construing a statute our main objective
is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the
legislature. Neal v. DeKalb County Div. of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d
280, 284 (Ind. 2003). As a matter of statutory interpretation, and
considering the history and purpose underlying the juvenile code, we do not
believe the Legislature intended that the adult competency statute should
apply to juveniles.
The policy of this State and the purpose of our juvenile code are to
“ensure that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as
persons in need of care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation.” I.C.
§ 31-10-2-1(5). The code must be liberally construed to that end. To
promote this policy and purpose, our Legislature has created a
comprehensive civil forum for treating and protecting juveniles, replete
with distinctions between criminal matters and matters concerning alleged
delinquents. Under the juvenile code, the juvenile court acts not only as
adjudicator of legal responsibility but also as administrator of probation,
detention, and many related child and family social service programs.
State ex rel. Camden v. Gibson Circuit Court, 640 N.E.2d 696, 698 (Ind.
1994). In fact the Legislature has delegated to our juvenile courts the
principal responsibility, in conjunction with the Indiana Family and Social
Services Administration and our public school corporations, of achieving
the purposes of our juvenile code. The responsibility includes: protecting
the public by enforcing the legal obligations children have to society,
insuring that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as
persons in need of care, treatment, rehabilitation, or protection, and
strengthening family life by assisting parents to fulfill their parental
obligations. Id. at 698; see also I.C. § 31-10-2-1.
In essence the code affords juvenile courts a degree of discretion and
flexibility, unparalleled in the criminal code, to address the needs of
children and to act in their best interests. That flexibility is severely
compromised by resorting to the procedures set forth in the adult
competency statute when resolving questions concerning juvenile competency.
More specifically, the statute mandates that where a defendant is found to
be incompetent to stand trial, the trial court “shall . . . order the
defendant committed to the division of mental health and addiction, to be
confined by the division in an appropriate psychiatric institution.” I.C.
§ 35-36-3-1(b) (emphasis added). There certainly are occasions where it
may not be in the child’s best interest to be committed to the division of
mental health. For example, as the State points out the division currently
operates only three facilities that provide care for children: Larue Carter
Memorial Hospital in Indianapolis, Evansville State Psychiatric Treatment
Center for Children, and Richmond State Hospital.[2] And although the
juvenile court judge made no specific factual finding, he did note that he
“is aware that the division of mental health has acknowledged that it does
not currently have available appropriate facilities or programs to meet the
mental health needs of these Respondents . . . .” Appellant’s App. at 34
(order of court dated March 19, 2002); see also I.C. § 12-26-1-4 (declaring
in the context of voluntary or involuntary commitment proceedings, “The
juvenile court may not commit or temporarily place a child under this
article in a facility other than a child caring institution”).
In addition to the lack of adequate facilities or programs, because of
the physical location of these state run facilities, a juvenile committed
to the division of mental health under the auspices of the adult competency
statute could be confined in an institution hundreds of miles from home and
family. This could not have been the intent of the Legislature. Even in
the context of a child found to be delinquent, the trial court is
prohibited from placing the child in a facility outside of the child’s
county of residence “unless placement of the child in a comparable facility
with adequate services located in the child’s county of residence is
unavailable or the child’s county of residence does not have an appropriate
comparable facility with adequate services.” I.C. § 31-37-19-23; see also
I.C. § 31-37-18-6 (requiring the juvenile court to enter a dispositional
decree that, among other things, is “in the least restrictive (most family
like) and most appropriate setting available; [is] close to the parents’
home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;
[and] provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child’s
parent, guardian, or custodian”). In our view no less is required for
juveniles only alleged to be delinquent.
This is not to say that a juvenile court is prohibited from entering
an order committing a child found to be incompetent to an appropriate
facility operated by the department of mental health. We merely hold that
the adult competency statute is not the proper vehicle to accomplish this
end. Rather we believe Indiana Code section 31-32-12-1 is sufficient to
the task.[3] If narrowly construed the statute allows for the examination
and treatment of children under only three circumstances: (1) before the
filing of a delinquency or CHINS petition, if an emergency exists, the
court may order an examination or treatment; (2) after the filing of a
delinquency or CHINS petition, the court may order an examination of the
child to provide information for the dispositional hearing; and (3) after a
child has been adjudicated a delinquent or CHINS, the court may order
examination or treatment as a part of the dispositional decree. This is
the view advanced by Marion County on behalf of the juveniles in this case
and to which the Court of Appeals agreed.
Viewed slightly differently, however, the statute is more
comprehensive. More specifically the statute provides “[t]he court may
also order medical examinations and treatment of the child under any
circumstances otherwise permitted by this section.” I.C. § 31-32-12-1(3).
Although the statute does not specifically mention “competency,” given a
juvenile court’s flexibility in addressing the needs of children and acting
in their best interest, we conclude that this statute allows for the
examination and/or treatment of a child after a delinquency petition has
been filed in order to determine the child’s competency.
Conclusion
We conclude that juveniles alleged to be delinquent have the
constitutional right to have their competency determined before they are
subjected to delinquency proceedings. However, the adult competency
statute is not applicable in reaching that determination. We therefore
reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand this cause for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson and Boehm, JJ., concur.
Sullivan, J., not participating.
-----------------------
[1] D.G. was initially placed at the Valle Vista Residential Treatment
Center and later placed at Lutherwood. D.C.B. was also placed at
Lutherwood. Both K.G. and J.J.S. were placed at the Options Treatment
Center. Lutherwood is a residential treatment center for children who are
recovering from the effects of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. See
http://lutheranfamily.org/lutherwood.htm. Valle Vista provides treatment
for children, adolescents as well as adults and offers a variety of
outpatient and inpatient services for psychiatric and chemical dependency
disorders. See http://bhcvallevista.com. Options Treatment Center is a
residential facility providing programs designed for the treatment of
children and adolescents with mental retardation-developmental disabilities
and co-concurring mental illness. See
http://www.yfcs.com/facilities/options.
[2] Services for children at Richmond are limited to male adolescents with
conduct or adjustment disorders.
[3] The statute provides:
If the procedures under IC 31-32-13 are followed, the juvenile court
may authorize mental or physical examinations or treatment under the
following circumstances:
(1) If the court has not authorized the filing of a petition but a
physician certifies that an emergency exists, the court:
(A) may order medical or physical examination or treatment of
the child; and
(B) may order the child detained in a health care facility while
the emergency exists.
(2) If the court has not authorized the filing of a petition but a
physician certifies that continued medical care is necessary to
protect the child after the emergency has passed, the court:
(A) may order medical services for a reasonable length of time;
and
(B) may order the child detained while medical services are
provided.
(3) If the court has authorized the filing of a petition alleging that
a child is a delinquent child or a child in need of services, the
court may order examination of the child to provide information for
the dispositional hearing. The court may also order medical
examinations and treatment of the child under any circumstances
otherwise permitted by this section.
(4) After a child has been adjudicated a delinquent child or a child
in need of services, the court may order examinations and treatment
under IC 31-34-20 or IC 31-37-19.