Attorney for Appellant
Robert W. Hammerle
HAMMERLE & ALLEN
Indianapolis, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Steve Carter
Attorney General of Indiana
Grant H. Carlton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
JASON RATLIFF,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
)
) Supreme Court No.
) 49S02-0112-CR-656
)
) Court of Appeals No.
) 49A02-0010-CR-677
)
)
)
APPEAL FROM THE MARION COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Michael Jensen, Judge
Cause No. 49G20-9910-CF-180114
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
June 28, 2002
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Defendant Jason Ratliff appeals the trial court’s denial of his
request that evidence discovered in a search of the truck he crashed while
fleeing police not be used against him. Finding that the evidence was
discovered in a lawful inventory of the truck’s contents, we affirm the
trial court’s decision.
Background
In October, 1999, the Louisiana State Police stopped a vehicle in
which they found approximately sixty-four thousand doses of valium. The
occupants of the car, Roberto Hernandez and Claudia Ortega, indicated that
they intended to deliver the valium to Defendant in Indianapolis, Indiana.
Detectives in Indianapolis secured a room in a motel to conduct a
controlled buy from Defendant. Hernandez contacted Defendant who agreed to
conduct the transaction at the motel. When Defendant arrived at the motel,
Hernandez gave him a bag containing the valium. Defendant put the bag in
his truck, but told Hernandez that he didn’t have the money at the time and
would have to return to make payment. At that point, officers approached
Defendant’s vehicle to arrest him, but Defendant attempted to flee in his
truck. Defendant crashed into another vehicle in the parking lot and was
subsequently arrested.
Shortly after Defendant’s arrest, Detective Shapiro drove Defendant’s
truck to a nearby police facility. Once at the facility, Detective Shapiro
conducted an inventory of the Defendant’s truck. During the inventory of
items in the truck, Detective Shapiro found a suitcase. The detective
opened the suitcase, finding approximately $30,000.
Defendant was charged with Dealing a Schedule IV Controlled
Substance, a class C felony;[1] Possession of a Controlled Substance, a
class D felony;[2] and Resisting Law Enforcement, a class D Felony.[3]
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the $30,000 found
in the suitcase, contending that Detective Shapiro conducted an illegal
search of his vehicle at the police facility. The prosecution argued that
the search fell under the “inventory exception” to the warrant requirement,
and that it was also valid as a search incident to an arrest and the
“automobile exception” to the warrant requirement. The trial court denied
Defendant’s motion to suppress on the grounds that it was valid under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Having found the search
valid on those grounds, the trial court did not reach the issue of whether
the evidence was obtained as a result of a valid inventory.
Defendant filed a motion to certify the issue for interlocutory
appeal, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court, finding that the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement did not apply. See Ratliff v. State, 753 N.E.2d 38, 45
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The Court of Appeals ordered the case remanded to
the trial court to determine whether the search of Defendant’s vehicle was
conducted as a result of a proper inventory.
Discussion
As an appellate court, we may affirm a trial court’s judgment on any
theory supported by the evidence. See Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146,
1152 (Ind. 1999). We will sustain the trial court if it can be done on any
legal ground apparent in the record. See Jester v. State, 724 N.E.2d 235,
240 (Ind. 2000). Here, the record reflects that the evidence in question
was found as a result of a proper inventory of Defendant’s vehicle.
The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable search and
seizures and this protection has been extended to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
650 (1961). Generally, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches
and seizures. See Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 143 (Ind.1999),
reh'g denied. When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has
the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed
at the time of the search. See Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 465
(Ind.1998) (citing Brown v. State, 691 N.E.2d 438, 443 (Ind.1998)). One
exception to the warrant requirement is an inventory search of an impounded
vehicle vehicle. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976); Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d
427, 430 (Ind. 1993).
In determining the propriety of an inventory search, the threshold
question is whether the impoundment itself was proper. See Fair, 627
N.E.2d at 431. An impoundment is warranted when it is part of “routine
administrative caretaking functions” of the police, see Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 370 n. 5, or when it is authorized by state statute, see Goliday v.
State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 7 (Ind.1999); see, e.g., Ind. Code § 9-18-2-43 (1998).
To show that the inventory search was part of the community caretaking
function, the State must demonstrate that: “‘the belief that the vehicle
posed some threat or harm to the community or was itself imperiled was
consistent with objective standards of sound policing, and ... the decision
to combat that threat by impoundment was in keeping with established
departmental routine or regulation.’” Woodford v. State , 752 N.E.2d 1278,
1281 (Ind. 2001) (citing Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 433 (Ind. 1993)).
Impounding Defendant’s vehicle was consistent with Indiana State
Police guidelines. Standard operating procedures regarding abandoned
vehicles direct that “[d]epartment personnel shall cause abandoned vehicles
or parts of vehicles to be removed to a place of safekeeping.” The
standard operating procedures state that “an inventory of the property
within a vehicle or parts of a vehicle shall be conducted prior to the
release of the vehicle and/or parts to a storage area.” The guidelines
indicate that the policy applies to vehicles that are “involved in
accidents [or] traffic hazards.”
It is apparent from the record that the inventory search in this case
was proper. When the police approached Defendant’s truck, he attempted to
flee but crashed into another car before he could get out of the motel
parking lot. The truck was in the parking lot obstructing traffic because
it was not in a parking space. Detective Harshman stated that the truck
was removed “to get it out of the middle of the parking lot.” An officer
took the truck to a nearby police facility where the inventory occurred.
The record includes the inventory sheet filled out by Detective
Shapiro. Upon Defendant’s arrest, his vehicle had just been in an accident
and was abandoned in the middle of the motel parking lot creating a traffic
hazard. It was therefore consistent with state police operating procedures
to secure the car and inventory the contents. The police impoundment and
inventory of Defendant’s vehicle was therefore conducted as part of its
community care taking function. See Stephens v. State, 735 N.E.2d 278, 282
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding it reasonable to impound a vehicle that faced
the wrong way on a narrow residential street near a high-traffic
intersection); U.S. v. Rodriquez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991)
(finding the community caretaking function applicable where the arrest of a
driver left his vehicle unattended on a public highway).
Conclusion
Having granted transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to
suppress.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] Ind. Code § 35-48-4-3 (1998).
[2] Id. § 35-48-4-7.
[3] Id. Code § 35-44-3-3.