Attorney for Appellant
John Pinnow
Special Assistant to the
State Public Defender
Indianapolis, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Attorney General of Indiana
Timothy W. Beam
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
CHARLES SMITH,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
)
) Supreme Court No.
) 33S00-9911-CR-644
)
)
)
)
)
)
APPEAL FROM THE HENRY SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Michael D. Peyton, Judge
Cause No. 33D01-9811-CF-33
ON DIRECT APPEAL
September 10, 2001
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Defendant Charles Smith was convicted of murder for shooting his
cousin and slitting his throat. He argues that the trial court improperly
prevented him from contending that another person was the killer when it
excluded evidence that the victim had threatened his wife's family and had
used drugs. We affirm his conviction, finding the evidence he sought to
present not relevant because it did not suggest the existence of another
suspect.
Background
The facts favorable to the judgment indicate that on August 30, 1998,
Defendant Charles Smith and his friends Verlie and Bruce Hinton, Joshua
Hinton, Barbara Reno, and Tammy Denny gathered at the Hintons’ residence.
Tammy began discussing her marital problems. Defendant and her husband,
Melvin Denny, were cousins. In particular, she revealed that Melvin
verbally abused her and her children. Bruce Hinton and Defendant
contemplated whether Melvin had been molesting Tammy’s children. Defendant
began striking his fist against his hand and said that something had to be
done. He told Reno that “everything’s going to be alright.” (R. at 2197-
98.) And he informed Joshua Hinton that he was going to “take care of
business.” (R. at 2259.)
The next morning at approximately 2:00 a.m., Defendant appeared at
the residence of Melinda Westrater, the niece of his then-girlfriend,
Sheila Pierce. Defendant told Westrater that one of his family members had
been killed and that no one else in the family had been notified.
Defendant also stated that his relative’s throat had been “slashed.”
That evening, Defendant went to the residence of Mandy Ashley,
another of Defendant’s cousins. Defendant told Ashley that he was in
trouble and that he was going to leave town. Defendant admitted that he
had “offed” someone. Defendant revealed that that person was his cousin.
When Ashley thought Defendant was joking, Defendant said that because he
had “already ‘offed’ one family member,” she could be next. (R. at 2387.)
He continued with his confession, explaining that he rode to the victim’s
house on his bicycle, emptied his gun into his head, and cut his throat.
He stated that the victim deserved to die because the victim was a child
molester. Defendant also told Ashley that he took that personally because
he had also been molested as a child.
That night, Tammy’s sister, Debbie Thatcher, and Debbie’s fiancé,
Ryan Gross, found Melvin dead inside his home. Melvin had died from
multiple gunshots to the head and suffered a laceration to the throat.
During a warrant search of Defendant’s house, officers discovered several
.22 caliber rifles but found no murder weapon. The officers did find shell
casings that matched the type of weapon used to commit the killing.
The State charged Defendant with Murder[1] and with being a Habitual
Offender.[2] A jury found Defendant guilty of murder. Defendant pled
guilty to the habitual offender charge. A trial court sentenced Defendant
to a total of 95 years imprisonment.
Additional facts will be recited as necessary.
Discussion
I
Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error
when it excluded evidence showing “that [the] murder victim Melvin Denny
had repeatedly threatened his mother-in-law and other members of his wife’s
family.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. He argues that such evidence was relevant
to establish that members of the victim’s wife’s family had a motive to
kill and thus made it less probable that Defendant committed the killing.
See id. at 15, 21.
Evidence is relevant when it has “any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Ind.
Evidence Rule 401. In the context of Defendant’s claim here, we have said
that “evidence which tends to show that someone else committed the crime
logically makes it less probable that the defendant committed the crime,
and thus meets the definition of Rule 401.” Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d
386, 389 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied. We review a trial court’s
determination of admissibility for an abuse of discretion and will reverse
only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances. Id. at 390.
After the trial court granted the State’s motion in limine excluding
evidence of alleged threats made by the victim to his wife’s family,
Defendant tendered the following: (1) Ryan Gross’s testimony that he had
heard from an unidentified person that the victim had threatened to hit
Thatcher; (2) Reno’s testimony that Tammy told Reno that the victim had
previously threatened to shoot his mother-in-law; and (3) Verlie Hinton’s
testimony that the victim threatened his mother-in-law and brother-in-law.
See Appellant’s Br. at 19-20. Defendant also argues that the “trial
court’s categorical and arbitrary exclusion of relevant and competent
evidence that [the victim] repeatedly threatened members of his wife’s
family prevented [him] from presenting his defense that other people had
the motive and opportunity to kill the victim.” Appellant’s Br. at 27.
Defendant cites to our decision in Joyner in support of his contention
that this evidence should have been admitted to show that another person
may have committed the crime. But in Joyner, the defendant had sought to
present specific factual evidence concerning a possible other suspect, the
possible other suspect’s having been seen with the victim, and an argument
between the possible other suspect and the victim. See Joyner, 678 N.E.2d
at 389-90. In this case, Defendant only sought to present (mostly hearsay)
evidence of various threats made by the victim himself; there was
absolutely no effort to present any evidence of any behavior by any other
person suggesting the existence of another suspect. In sum, there is
nothing in the fact standing alone of the victim having made threats that
suggests the existence of another suspect. For that reason, the evidence
Defendant sought to present falls well short of the test for admissibility
enunciated by Joyner. See also Cook v. State, 734 N.E.2d 563, 568 (Ind.
2000), reh’g denied; Hauk v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994, 1001-02 (Ind. 2000);
McIntyre v. State, 717 N.E.2d 114, 123-24 (Ind. 1999), reh’g denied.
II
Defendant makes a similar claim in respect of his assertion that the
trial court committed reversible error when it excluded evidence of the
victim’s drug use because “part of [his] defense was that [the victim’s]
drug use played a role in his death.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. He argues
that such evidence would have allowed him to put on a proper defense that
the victim’s “drug use rather than his alleged mistreatment of his children
led to his death.” Id. at 30.
In support of this argument, Defendant sought to introduce at trial
the following evidence of the victim’s alleged prior drug use: (1) Ryan
Gross’s testimony that he had once observed the victim smoke marijuana and
that the victim had told him that he had previously used heroin; (2) John
Hicks’s testimony that he had smoked marijuana with the victim; (3) Debbie
Thatcher’s testimony that she had seen the victim smoke marijuana; and (4)
Verlie Hinton’s testimony that the victim told her that he had “50 dollars
worth” and she presumed that the victim was referring to drugs. The trial
court sustained the State’s objection, ruling such evidence as irrelevant.
We find that excluding evidence of the victim’s alleged drug use was
proper. As in the preceding section, Defendant’s asserted purpose in
presenting this evidence was to suggest that persons other than the
Defendant had a motive to kill the victim. But much like the threats
against in-law evidence, Defendant only sought to present evidence of drug
use by the victim himself; there was absolutely no effort to present any
evidence of any behavior by any other person suggesting the existence of
another suspect. Again, the evidence Defendant sought to present falls
well short of the applicable test for admissibility. See Williams v.
State, 681 N.E.2d 195, 198-99 (Ind. 1997) (ruling that evidence of a
victim’s drug use is generally irrelevant except in relation to the
victim’s mental capacity to recall the crime and to testify about it); see
also Pannell v. State, 686 N.E.2d 824, 826 (Ind. 1997) (holding that
evidence of a murder victim’s past drug use was irrelevant).
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ. concur.
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[1] Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (1998).
[2] Id. § 35-50-2-8.