ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Susan K. Carpenter Steve Carter
Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
David P. Freund Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
In The
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
)
RICKY LEE JACKSON, )
Defendant-Appellant, )
)
v. ) 83S00-0010-CR-00567
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
Plaintiff-Appellee. )
)
________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE VERMILLION CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Bruce V. Stengel, Judge
Cause No. 83C01-9803-CF-20
________________________________________________
On Direct Appeal
August 8, 2001
DICKSON, Justice
When the defendant, Ricky Lee Jackson, appealed his murder
conviction[1] and 55-year sentence, this Court affirmed his conviction but,
finding no basis to determine whether the trial court properly weighed the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, remanded for resentencing on the
record. Jackson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 147 (Ind. 2000). Upon remand the
trial court once again sentenced the defendant to the presumptive
sentence[2] of 55 years.
The defendant again appeals, asserting that the trial court abused
its discretion in determining the sentence and that the sentence is
manifestly unreasonable. We affirm the trial court.
The applicable principles are clearly recognized. In Jackson's first
appeal, we stated:
It is well established that sentencing decisions lie within the
discretion of the trial court. Echols v. State, 722 N.E.2d 805, 808
(Ind. 2000). When a trial court imposes the presumptive sentence, on
appeal this Court presumes that the trial court considered the proper
factors in making its sentencing determination. Jones v. State, 698
N.E.2d 289, 291 (Ind. 1998). When a court identifies aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, however, it is obligated to include a
statement of its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed. See
Ind.Code § 35-38-1-3 (1998); Jones, 698 N.E.2d at 291; Widener v.
State, 659 N.E.2d 529, 533 (Ind. 1995) (citing Hammons v. State, 493
N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. 1986)); Townsend v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1198,
1201 (Ind. 1986). This statement of reasons must contain three
elements: (1) identification of all significant mitigating and
aggravating circumstances; (2) the specific facts and reasons that
lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance; and
(3) reflection of an evaluation and balancing of the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances in fixing the sentence. Widener, 659 N.E.2d
at 533 (citing Hammons, 493 N.E.2d at 1254); Townsend, 498 N.E.2d at
1201.
Jackson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 147, 154 (Ind. 2000). Upon remand the trial
court's sentencing statement demonstrates that the court thoughtfully
considered and found six mitigating circumstances:
(1) The defendant was employed and a good employee as pointed out by
the pre-sentence report and Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2, being
letters from a superintendent and foreman.
(2) The defendant had a lack of criminal history as is pointed out in
the pre-sentence report for this case.
(3) Members of the defendant's family testified that he is needed at
home and a jail sentence would be hard on the family. Further that
the defendant was a good father and provider for his family.
(4) The defendant expressed remorse for what happened.
(5) The father of the victim by a handwritten note attached to the
pre-sentence report requested the Court to be lenient on the
defendant, who is the father of his grandsons. He requested leniency
on behalf of his grandsons who were hurting.
(6) After the shooting, the defendant was trying to give aid to the
victim and was still doing so when police officers arrived at the
scene.
Record at 10-11.
In considering whether to impose the presumptive or a reduced
sentence, the trial court stated:
The Court finds that imposition of a reduced sentence in this matter
would depreciate the seriousness of the crime—murder. When the courts
[sic] weighs the mitigating factors as against the depreciation of the
seriousness of this offense by reducing the standard sentence, the
Court finds the standard sentence should not be reduced. The record
reveals the defendant shot and killed his wife by shooting her in the
head. This occurred during a domestic disturbance between the two of
them in their home. This occurred while their son was upstairs. The
son heard his parents arguing,[[3]] heard the fatal shot and observed
his mother laying on the floor bleeding.
Record at 11-12. The defendant argues that, if the trial court would have
given proper aggregate weight to the mitigating circumstances, "the only
conclusion it could have logically reached was that a sentence
substantially less than the standard sentence was warranted because there
were no aggravating circumstances to weigh against." Br. of Defendant-
Appellant at 18.
In determining what sentence to impose for a crime, one of the
statutory factors for consideration by the trial court is whether
"[i]mposition of a reduced sentence or suspension of the sentence and
imposition of probation would depreciate the seriousness of the crime."
Ind.Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(4). Consideration of this factor is available
when the trial court contemplates reducing a sentence from the presumptive.
See Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1242 (Ind. 2000). As indicated
above, the trial court expressly found that a reduced sentence would
depreciate the seriousness of the crime. Although the trial court's
language elsewhere states, "there were no aggravating factors," Record at
11, considered in context,[4] we understand the trial court's use of the
phrase "there were no aggravating factors" to mean only that the judge
found no aggravating factors favoring an enhanced sentence. The trial
court's express finding that a reduced sentence would depreciate the
serious of this crime constitutes the finding of a statutory aggravating
circumstance that may weigh against the imposition of a sentence less than
the presumptive term. We decline to find that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding and applying the "depreciate the seriousness"
aggravator to outweigh the mitigating circumstances and to thus impose the
presumptive sentence in this case.
The defendant also asks this Court to reduce his sentence on grounds
that his sentence is manifestly unreasonable. This Court is empowered to
review and revise criminal sentences we find to be "manifestly unreasonable
in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender."
Former Ind. Appellate Rule 17(B).[5] Citing the mitigating circumstances
found by the trial court, the defendant urges that because of his
individual conduct, characteristics, and history, the presumptive sentence
is manifestly unreasonable. The defendant shot and killed his wife with a
handgun during an episode of domestic violence in which the defendant was
chasing her throughout their home, knocking over and breaking furniture,
and yelling at her. The imposition of the presumptive sentence in this
case is not manifestly unreasonable.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1.
[2] Upon a conviction for murder, a person "shall be imprisoned for
a fixed term of fifty-five (55) years, with not more than ten (10) years
added for aggravating circumstances or not more than ten (10) years
subtracted for mitigating circumstances." Ind.Code § 35-50-2-3.
[3] The defendant quarrels with this statement as contrary to the
evidence which he alleges indicated that the son heard the shot but not any
arguing. The defendant acknowledges, however, that this has "little
bearing or impact on what the appropriate sentence should be." Br. of
Defendant-Appellant at 10 n.3. We agree and decline to further evaluate
the accuracy of this finding.
[4] The court stated: "The Court in its prior ruling found that
there were no aggravating factors. Since there are no aggravating factors
herein, an enhanced sentence would not be proper." Record at 11.
[5] As this appeal was initiated before January 1, 2001, the former
appellate rules apply. This rule is now Ind.Appellate Rule 7(B).