ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Robert J. Kopka David Paul Allen
Lawrence M. Hansen Hammond, Indiana
Gregory M. Bokota
Merrillville, Indiana
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
LCEOC, INC., and GREATER HAMMOND )
COMMUNITY SERVICES, Inc., )
) 45S03-9904-CV-223
Appellants (Defendants Below),) in the Supreme Court
)
v. ) 45A03-9710-CV-356
) in the Court of Appeals
FREDDIE GREER, )
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). )
APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Jeffery J. Dywan, Judge
Cause No. 45D01-9604-CT-429
September 21, 2000
SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
We hold here that the Lake County Equal Opportunities Council is a
governmental entity entitled to protection under the Tort Claims Act, and
that Greater Hammond Community Services is not.
Facts and Procedural History
On May 3, 1994, Freddie Greer, an amputee, used a bus service
provided through Greater Hammond Community Services, Inc. (GHCS). Bruce
Lewis, a driver employed by GHCS, transported Greer to his doctor’s
appointment without incident. On the return trip, however, while Greer was
strapped into his wheelchair, Lewis dropped Greer down some concrete
stairs. The resulting injuries eventually caused Greer’s death.
Greer’s estate brought a wrongful death suit against GHCS and the Lake
County Equal Opportunities Council (LCEOC), an organization affiliated with
GHCS. Both defendants later moved for summary judgment alleging that they
were governmental entities under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, and that
Greer’s claim was therefore barred for failure to comply with the Act’s
requirement to give early notice of the claim. The trial court denied
summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether LCEOC and GHCS were governmental entities.
The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals held that both were
governmental entities entitled to the protection of the Tort Claims Act.
LCEOC, Inc. v. Greer, 699 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). On the same day
a different panel of the Court of Appeals decided Greater Hammond Community
Serv. v. Mutka, 699 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (Mutka), which held
that GHCS was not a governmental entity. We accepted transfer to resolve
the contradiction.
Discussion
The Indiana Tort Claims Act provides that a claim against a political
subdivision is barred unless notice is filed with (1) the governing body of
the political subdivision and (2) the Indiana Political Subdivision Risk
Management Commission, within 180 days after a loss occurs. Ind. Code Ann.
§ 34-4-16.5-7(a) (West Supp. 1994).[1] The Act further provides that a
“governmental entity” is the state or a political subdivision of the state.
Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-16.5-2(c) (West Supp. 1994).[2]
Defendants GHCS and LCEOC claim that they are political subdivisions
(and therefore governmental entities) entitled to receive notice as
specified by section 34-4-16.5-7(a).
Standard of Review
A grant of summary judgment requires that no genuine issue of material
fact exist and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). On appeal from summary judgment, the reviewing
court analyzes the issues in the same fashion as the trial court, de novo.
Carie v. PSI Energy, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 853, 855 (Ind. 1999). The court must
also view the pleadings and designated materials in the light most
favorable to the non-movant, in this case, Greer.
I. LCEOC as a Political Subdivision
The Indiana Tort Claims Act provides that a community action agency
shall be treated as a political subdivision, Ind. Code § 34-4-16.5-20, and
must meet the following conditions:
1) Is any of the following:
A) A political subdivision of the State.
B) A combination of political subdivisions.
C) An agency of a political subdivision.
D) A private nonprofit agency.
2) Has the authority under state or federal law . . . to support
community action programs . . . .
3) Is designated as a community action agency by the governor or by
federal law.
Ind. Code Ann. § 12-14-23-2 (West 1994) (emphasis added). It is apparent
that LCEOC is a private nonprofit agency with authority to conduct
community action programs, so the dispute between the parties focuses on
whether the governor has “designated” LCEOC as a community action agency
under Ind. Code § 12-14-23-2(3). In a letter to LCEOC dated June 12, 1990,
Governor Evan Bayh wrote in pertinent part, “your organization is
recognized as the Community Action Agency of your area: Lake County
Economic Opportunity Council Serving Jasper, Lake, Newton and Porter
counties.” (R. at 488.)
Greer argues that this “recognition” is an insufficient “designation”
under Ind. Code § 12-14-23-2(3). (Appellee’s Br. at 13.) Greer is
certainly correct that designation and recognition have slightly different
meanings, but pushing these nuances too far is just lexicographic hair-
splitting. The words have the same effect here. By designation, the
governor means, “I say that LCEOC is a community action agency,” by
recognition, “I see that LCEOC is a community action agency.” The result
of both statements is to say, “LCEOC is a community action agency.”
II. GHCS as a Political Subdivision
The parties appear to agree, as they do in Mutka that GHCS does not
fit the statutory definition of a community action agency as set out in
Ind. Code § 12-14-23-2. See Appellant’s Br. at 5-6 (GHCS does not attempt
to argue that it satisfies the three requirements in section 12-14-23-2);
Appellee’s Br. at 8-9. GHCS thus advances alternative grounds on which it
should be deemed a political subdivision or governmental entity.
GHCS makes two arguments identical to those we disposed of today in
Mutka, (1) that because GHCS provides “essential governmental services,” it
is entitled to Indiana Tort Claims Act protection under Ayres v. Indian
Heights Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 493 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. 1986), (Appellant’s Br.
at 10-15); and (2) that because GHCS is engaged in a joint venture with
LCEOC, it is entitled to Indiana Tort Claims Act protection pursuant to
Brunton v. Porter Mem’l Hosp. Ambulance Serv., 647 N.E.2d 636 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994), (Appellant’s Br. at 15-19). We refer the parties to our
disposition of those contentions in Mutka, as we reach the same result
here. Greater Hammond Community Serv. v. Mutka, No. 45S03-9904-CV-224,
slip op. (Ind. September 21, 2000).
GHCS makes one additional argument in its brief in the present case:
that it is a governmental entity for the purposes of the Indiana Tort
Claims Act because it is a public agency for the purposes of the Public
Records Act. (Appellant’s Br. at 19-28.) Assuming GHCS is a public agency
for the purposes of one statute, it does not necessarily follow that it is
a governmental entity for the purposes of another. GHCS advances two
subarguments to support its claim that a public agency should also be
deemed a governmental entity: (1) GHCS is publicly controlled, and (2) GHCS
is controlled by LCEOC. (Appellant’s Br. at 25-26, 27.)
GHCS says that it is publicly controlled because it receives the
majority of its funds from public sources, is subject to the Public Records
Act, and has a board with one-third of the members as elected officials.
(Appellant’s Br. at 25-26 (citing World Prods., Inc. v. Capital Improvement
Bd., 514 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), trans. denied).) This level of
control does not, however, rise to the level of public control of the
Capital Improvement Board discussed in World Productions. The statute
creating the CIB provides that the city and county appoint all the Board
members and may remove them for cause, the property acquired by the Board
is held in the name of the city and may not be sold without approval by the
executive of the city, the Board’s budget must be approved of by the city-
county legislative body, and the Board is subject to audit by the State
Board of Accounts. Id. at 637.
While GHCS is subject to some governmental supervision due to its
receipt of public funds, the only other factor GHCS mentions is the
composition of its board, which is determined by agreement with LCEOC, not
by statute. See R. at 178 (GHCS “shall comply . . . with all LCEOC
administrative procedures, guides, manuals, program rules and
regulations.”). Designated community action agencies have historically
been required to select elected officials as one-third of their board
members. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9904 (West 1995).[3] The Capital
Improvement Board, on the other hand, does not select its own elected-
official members; instead the city and county appoint them. For purposes
of measuring the extent of governmental control, this is the difference
between night and day.
GHCS claims that it “is a ‘subordinate creature’ of LCEOC.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 27 (footnote omitted).) LCEOC’s control of GHCS is,
again, the product of contractual arrangements rather than statute. (R. at
178-89.)[4] “A group that is neither specifically named a governmental
entity or political subdivision by statute nor engaged in the provision of
uniquely governmental services may not receive the protection of the
Indiana Tort Claims Act by contracting to be managed by an established
governmental entity.” Mutka, slip op. at 10 (citing Perry County Dev.
Corp. v. Kempf, 712 N.E.2d 1020, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).
III. Tort Claims Notice
A. Notice to LCEOC. The plaintiff, Patricia Greer, acting as the
administratrix of Freddie Greer’s estate, stated in her brief that she
“conceded the absence of tort claim notice while contesting the claim of
ITCA coverage.” (Appellee’s Br. at 1.) In other words, she agrees that
she has waived any contention issue of compliance with the notice
requirements of the Act. The complete absence of argument regarding notice
sufficiency in her Memorandum on Issue of Summary Judgment, (R. at 327-45),
her argument at the hearing on summary judgment, (R. at 592-604), and her
brief to the Court of Appeals and this Court supports her statement that
she has conceded that issue.[5]
The Indiana Tort Claims Act provides that a claim against a political
subdivision is barred unless the plaintiff meets the notice requirements of
Ind. Code § 34-4-16.5-7(a). Because we hold that LCEOC is a governmental
entity as that term is defined by statute, and because Greer agrees she
waived the issue of compliance with the notice requirements of the Act, her
claim against LCEOC is barred.
B. Notice to GHCS. Because we hold that GHCS is not a governmental
entity for the purposes of the Indiana Tort Claims Act, however, Greer’s
claim against GHCS is not barred for failure to comply with the notice
provisions of the Act.
Conclusion
We therefore reverse in part, directing the trial court to grant
summary judgment for LCEOC. We affirm its denial of summary judgment as to
GHCS and remand for further proceedings on Greer’s claim against GHCS.
Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
Sullivan, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
Attorneys for Appellants
Robert J. Kopka
Lawrence M. Hansen
Gregory M. Bokota
Merrillville, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee
David Paul Allen
Hammond, Indiana
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
LCEOC, INC., and GREATER HAMMOND COMMUNITY
SERVICES, INC.,
Appellants (Defendants below),
v.
FREDDIE GREER,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
)
) Supreme Court No.
) 45S03-9904-CV-223
)
)
) Court of Appeals No.
) 45A03-9710-CV-356
)
)
)
APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Jeffery J. Dywan, Judge
Cause No. 45D01-9604-CT-429
September 21, 2000
SULLIVAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that Lake County Equal Opportunities Council (LCEOC) is a
political subdivision for purposes of the Indiana Tort Claims Act and that
tort claims notice to LCEOC was inadequate. However, I believe that the
nature of the relationship between LCEOC and Greater Hammond Community
Services (GHCS) is such that GHCS is also entitled to Tort Claims Act
immunity.
Unlike the parent and subsidiary corporations in McQuade v. Draw Tite,
Inc., 659 N.E.2d 1016 (Ind. 1995), LCEOC and GHCS are integrated, not-for-
profit entities as a result of federal laws and regulations that encouraged
local community control of service provision and decision-making regarding
federal social service grant funds.[6] In particular, LCEOC serves as the
Area Agency on Aging under the federal Older Americans Act. The Older
Americans Act requires a comprehensive, coordinated social services
delivery system that includes an identified service focal point in target
communities. 42 U.S.C. § 3026(a)(3)(A) (“Each area agency on aging . . .
shall . . . prepare and develop an area plan [that] . . . designate[s],
where feasible, a focal point for comprehensive service delivery in each
community . . . .”).
The record shows that LCEOC provides services to the poor and elderly
in six counties of Northwest Indiana through an organized network of
service providers. The six-county area includes both highly industrialized
urban areas and sparsely populated rural communities. Because of the
diversity of the area and the requirements of the Older Americans Act,
LCEOC divided the region into ten sub-areas and designated in each area a
non-profit organization (including GHCS) to provide most of the services
contained in its six basic programs. There is a single funding stream from
LCEOC to its ten service providers; the services GHCS provides are
determined solely by LCEOC; GHCS budgets and budget amendments are
submitted to and approved by LCEOC; GHCS must obtain prior written approval
of LCEOC prior to entering into any subcontract and all GHCS subcontractors
must comply with the provisions of the agreement between LCEOC and GHCS;
and LCEOC has full access to and the right to examine or audit all GHCS
papers, documents, books, and records.
The record presents a picture of LCEOC serving as the headquarters or
home office and GHCS and its sister organizations actually delivering the
early childhood, nutrition, transportation, and other social services. I
find this administrative structure highly analogous to that of a civil city
where the mayor’s office is “headquarters” but the actual municipal
services are delivered by the police department, fire department, street
department, etc. Just as those departments are covered by a city’s Tort
Claims Act immunity, so should GHCS and its sister organizations be covered
by LCEOC’s.
Because I believe that GHCS is a governmental entity for purposes of
the Tort Claims Act, I would hold that Greer’s claim against GHCS is also
barred for failure to comply with the Tort Claims Act notice requirements.
-----------------------
[1] A claim is not barred, however, for failure to file notice with the
Indiana Political Subdivision Risk Management Commission if the political
subdivision was not a member of the Political Subdivision Risk Management
Fund when the act causing the loss took place. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-16.5-
7(b) (West Supp. 1994) (currently Ind. Code Ann. § 34-13-3-8 (West Supp.
1999)).
[2] Currently Ind. Code Ann. § 34-6-2-49 (West Supp. 1999).
[3] Revised; Pub. L. No. 105-285, § 201, 112 Stat. 2730 (1999).
[4] This Agreement entered into by and between LCEOC, Inc. . . . and
GREATER HAMMOND COMMUNITY SERVICES, INC., . . . is executed pursuant
to the terms and conditions set forth herein. In consideration of
those mutual undertakings and covenants, the parties agree as follows:
. . . .
[GHCS] shall commence performance of services required by this
Agreement on January 1, 1993, and shall complete performance on June
30, 1994.
. . . .
LCEOC may suspend or terminate this Agreement, in whole or in part,
for cause.
. . . .
If [GHCS] is unable or unwilling to comply with any provisions of this
Agreement, [it] may terminate this Agreement by providing 30 working
days notice to LCEOC of such termination.
(R. at 178, 179, 183, 184.)
[5] The fact that the Court of Appeals dealt with this issue does not mean
that we must. Greer says she yields the point, and nothing in the record
or her brief indicates otherwise.
[6] See, e.g., Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-
222, § 210(a), 81 Stat. 672, 691 (1967) (repealed 1981 and recodified at 42
U.S.C. § 9901-9912 (2000)) (defining community action agency as a “State or
political subdivision of a State . . . or a combination of such political
subdivisions . . . .”) (amending the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964); id.
§ 211(c), 81 Stat. at 693 (repealed 1981 and recodified at 42 U.S.C. § 9901-
9912 (2000)) (“Where a community action agency places responsibility for
major policy determinations with respect to the character, funding, extent
and administration of and budgeting for programs to be carried on in a
particular geographic area within the community in a subsidiary board,
council, or similar agency, such board, council, or agency shall be broadly
representative of such area, subject to regulations of the director which
assure adequate opportunity for membership . . . . Each community action
agency shall be encouraged to make use of neighborhood-based organizations
composed of residents of the area, or members of the groups served to
assist such agency in the planning, conduct, and evaluation of components
of the community action program.”) (amending same).