SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CR-01-0275-AP
Appellee, )
) Maricopa County
v. ) Superior Court
) No. CR 1999-095294
SHAWN RYAN GRELL, )
)
Appellant. ) O P I N I O N
__________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Barbara M. Jarrett, Judge
AFFIRMED IN PART; SENTENCE VACATED;
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING
________________________________________________________________
TERRY GODDARD, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix
By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel,
Capital Litigation Section
Amy S. Pignatella Cain, Tucson
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Arizona
JAMES J. HAAS, MARICOPA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER Phoenix
By James R. Rummage, Deputy Public Defender
Attorneys for Shawn Ryan Grell
________________________________________________________________
B E R C H, Vice Chief Justice
¶1 Appellant Shawn Grell was convicted of first degree
murder in 2000 following a bench trial on stipulated facts.
After an aggravation and mitigation hearing, the judge sentenced
Grell to death. While Grell prepared his direct appeal, the
United States Supreme Court decided cases that held (1) that
juries must find the aggravating factors that allow the
imposition of a sentence of death, Ring v. Arizona (Ring II),
536 U.S. 584 (2002), and (2) that mentally retarded defendants
may not be executed, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
In addition to raising sentencing issues under Ring, Grell
claimed on appeal that, under Atkins, his mental retardation
should preclude a death sentence in his case. In lieu of
reviewing Grell’s sentence for harmless error, this court
ordered the trial court to re-examine the issue of Grell’s
mental retardation, applying the standards articulated in
Atkins. State v. Grell (Grell I), 205 Ariz. 57, 63, ¶ 41, 66
P.3d 1234, 1240 (2003). On February 2, 2005, the trial court
held another hearing and issued its ruling finding no mental
retardation.
¶2 For the appeal, this court ordered the parties to
combine briefings on both the sentencing issues and the mental
retardation issues. We have jurisdiction under Article 6,
Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-4031 (2001). We affirm the trial
court’s finding that Grell did not prove mental retardation, but
remand the case for jury sentencing.
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I. FACTS1
¶3 On December 2, 1999, Shawn Grell picked up his two-
year-old daughter, Kristen, from daycare. They drove around for
several hours, during which time Grell bought a plastic gas can
and gasoline. He then drove to a deserted area in Mesa, put his
sleeping daughter on the ground, poured gasoline on her, and lit
her on fire. She awoke and stumbled several feet while engulfed
in flames before eventually succumbing to the smoke and flames.
Grell drove to a nearby convenience store to buy beer. He told
the clerk he had seen some kids set a dog on fire in a vacant
lot. After driving around for several hours, Grell called the
police and turned himself in at five o’clock the next morning.
He later held a press conference at which he admitted killing
his daughter.
¶4 Grell was charged with first degree murder and child
abuse. He waived a jury trial and instead the parties submitted
to the trial judge a twenty-page narrative with forty-four
attachments to serve as a basis for determining guilt. In
September 2000, the judge convicted Grell of first degree
murder, but acquitted him of child abuse.
¶5 Grell agreed to the admission of the documents at the
1
A more complete account of the crime appears in Grell I,
205 Ariz. at 58-59, ¶¶ 3-15, 66 P.3d at 1235-36.
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sentencing hearing, but attempted to preserve his right to a
jury trial on sentencing issues by the following language:
“This stipulation shall in no way constitute a waiver of any
rights the defendant may have to have a jury empanelled to
determine the existence or absence of any aggravating and or
mitigating circumstances.” When Grell specifically requested
that a jury be empanelled for the sentencing proceeding,
however, the motion was denied.
A. Original Sentencing
¶6 The combined aggravation and penalty phase hearing
held in June 2001 included testimony from mental health experts,
law enforcement officers, a burn injury expert, and Grell’s
sister. The State asserted three statutory aggravating factors:
that Grell had previously been convicted of a serious offense;
that the crime was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved manner; and that the victim was younger than fifteen
years of age. See A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2), (F)(6), (F)(9) (1999).
The trial court found all three.
¶7 The prior serious offense was a 1996 conviction for
robbery. See A.R.S. § 13-703(H) (1999) (identifying robbery as
a “serious offense” for purposes of use as a death penalty
aggravator). That Kristen was younger than fifteen at the time
of the crime was proven by a birth certificate showing her 1997
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birthdate, which established that she was two years old at the
time of her death.
¶8 Citing the facts that Kristen was conscious when set
on fire, that she had to have suffered immense physical pain,
and that Grell should have foreseen the pain she would suffer,
the court also found the crime “especially cruel.” In addition,
while acknowledging that only a finding of cruelty was necessary
to satisfy the § 13-703(F)(6) aggravating factor, the court also
found the crime heinous and depraved.2 The court cited the
following factors in making these findings: (1) the crime was
senseless; (2) the victim was helpless; (3) the victim was the
defendant’s own child; (4) the method of killing ensured that
the victim would suffer “unimaginable pain”; (5) the method
ensured that the body would be disfigured; and (6) the defendant
made comments to a convenience store clerk after the murder
about seeing a dog set on fire.3 The court stated that these
2
The “heinous, cruel, or depraved” aggravator is written in
the disjunctive and the state need prove only one of the three
conditions to trigger application of the aggravating
circumstance. State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 51, 659 P.2d 1,
10 (1983). Heinousness and depravity are, however, frequently
analyzed together as both involve the defendant’s mental state.
Id.
3
The trial court’s Special Verdict does not explain the
import of this factor, but we infer from the subsequent citation
to Gretzler that the judge meant that the defendant relished his
crime. See Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 52, 659 P.2d at 11.
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facts satisfied the test set forth in State v. Gretzler, 135
Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1 (1983), and concluded that the manner of
killing, in addition to being cruel, was also heinous and
depraved.
¶9 In mitigation, Grell alleged the statutory mitigating
circumstance of mental impairment, see A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1), as
well as non-statutory mitigators of mental retardation, learning
disabilities, difficult childhood, and remorse. Much of the
evidence at the hearing centered on Grell’s claims of mental
impairment, mental retardation, and a cognitive disorder caused
by brain damage.
¶10 Drs. Globus and Wicks testified for the defense and
Drs. Mayberg and Scialli testified for the State. On the issues
of mental impairment and brain damage, Dr. Globus testified that
he initially diagnosed Grell with brain damage before having a
PET scan done and before having Dr. Wicks do a blind
neuropsychological evaluation of Grell. Dr. Globus is not
certified to read PET scans, and those who prepared the report
for him did not testify, facts noted by the court in its
sentencing decision. Dr. Mayberg, the State’s neuropsychologist
who is qualified to read PET scans, testified that Grell’s PET
scan showed no brain damage. Dr. Scialli testified that he
found no evidence of a cognitive disorder caused by brain
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damage, but instead diagnosed Grell as having only an anti-
social personality disorder.
¶11 The trial court ultimately found “no credible
evidence” that Grell suffered from brain damage. The court
instead accepted Dr. Scialli’s diagnosis that Grell suffered
from an anti-social personality disorder, symptoms of which
include acting impulsively and using poor judgment.
¶12 Drs. Globus and Wicks also testified regarding Grell’s
mental retardation, as did Dr. Scialli. The court acknowledged
Grell’s low IQ scores, ranging from 65 to 74, but weighted more
heavily Dr. Scialli’s testimony that Grell had adequate adaptive
skills.4 In addition, the trial court observed that no one
before Drs. Globus and Wicks had ever diagnosed Grell as having
mental retardation and that Grell had demonstrated good adaptive
skills by maintaining a false identity in order to be charged as
a juvenile after he was arrested for robbery in 1996 when he was
twenty years old.
4
The court did not state its criteria for determining mental
retardation, but the discussion of IQ scores and adaptive skills
covers two of the three factors cited by the Supreme Court in
Atkins and this court in Grell I as useful in determining the
existence of mental retardation: low IQ, poor adaptive skills,
and onset before age eighteen. The criteria are based on the
Diagnostic Criteria for Mental Retardation, Diagnostic &
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994) (“DSM-IV”)
and are substantially consistent with the statutory definition
in A.R.S. § 13-703.02(K)(2) (2002), which was enacted after
Grell’s sentencing.
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¶13 Finding no mitigation sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency, the judge sentenced Grell to death.
B. First Appeal
¶14 An automatic notice of appeal was filed. While the
parties prepared for oral arguments, the United States Supreme
Court handed down opinions in Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304, and Ring
II, 536 U.S. at 584. This case was consolidated with other
capital cases pending on direct appeal at the time for the
purpose of deciding common Ring issues. State v. Ring (Ring
III), 204 Ariz. 534, 65 P.3d 915 (2003). This court issued a
decision in Grell I without considering the sentencing issues.
205 Ariz. at 60, ¶ 25, 66 P.3d at 1237.
¶15 In Grell I, 205 Ariz. at 58, ¶ 2, 66 P.3d at 1235,
this court addressed Grell’s trial issue and affirmed his
conviction, but remanded the matter to the trial court for a re-
evaluation of Grell’s mental retardation claim in light of
Atkins. The trial court had evaluated the mental retardation
evidence as a mitigating factor rather than as a complete bar to
execution. This court suggested that, on remand, the trial
judge should apply A.R.S. § 13-703.02 as a guide in future
proceedings to ascertain the existence of mental retardation.5
5
Section 13-703.02, enacted before Atkins issued but after
Grell’s sentencing, defines the pretrial process for evaluating
mental retardation in capital cases. First, the trial judge
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Id. at 64, ¶ 42, 66 P.3d at 1241.
C. Remand for Mental Retardation Hearing
¶16 Attempting to follow the procedures in A.R.S. § 13-
703.02, the trial judge first suggested appointing a “pre-
screening expert” to test Grell’s IQ. Rather than subjecting
Grell to additional testing, the State and the defense
stipulated that Grell’s IQ was less than 70 and that further IQ
testing was unnecessary.
¶17 Before the mental retardation hearing, the parties
briefed and argued the issue of burden of proof. The statute
places the burden on the defendant to prove mental retardation
by clear and convincing evidence. A.R.S. § 13-703.02(G). Grell
argued, however, that because mental retardation serves as a
constitutional bar to execution, the standard should be no
appoints a pre-screening expert to administer an IQ test to the
defendant. A.R.S. § 13-703.02(B). If the resulting score is 75
or below, the judge picks one expert nominated by each party, or
one jointly nominated expert, to test the defendant again.
A.R.S. § 13-703.02(D). If any test result is 70 or below, the
court conducts a hearing at which the defendant must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he has “significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning [an IQ of 70 or
lower], existing concurrently with significant impairment in
adaptive behavior, where the onset of the foregoing conditions
occurred before the defendant reached the age of eighteen.”
A.R.S. § 13-703.02(G), (K). If the court finds that the
defendant’s IQ is 65 or below, a rebuttable presumption of
mental retardation arises. A.R.S. § 13-703.02(G). If the court
does not find mental retardation, the defense may still argue
the issue to the jury as a mitigating factor. A.R.S. § 13-
703.02(H).
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higher than a preponderance of the evidence. Rejecting Grell’s
claim, the trial court required Grell to prove mental
retardation by clear and convincing evidence.
¶18 During preparations for the hearing on remand, a new
defense expert, Dr. Denis W. Keyes, interviewed Grell. The
State requested that Grell also submit to examination by its new
expert, Dr. Dan Martel. Before Dr. Keyes completed his report
and before meeting with Dr. Martel, Grell told his attorneys he
was “not willing to cooperate any further with any of our
experts or investigators.” Shortly thereafter, Dr. Keyes
completed his report, which concludes that Grell has mental
retardation.
¶19 After receiving Grell’s written refusal to be
examined, the State moved to “Preclude Defendant’s Additional
Mental Health Professional.” The defense, which did not yet
have Dr. Keyes’ report, did not respond to the motion. As a
result of these circumstances, the trial court granted the
State’s motion to preclude Dr. Keyes from testifying. After
receiving Dr. Keyes’ report, the defense filed a Motion to
Reconsider, which was denied.
¶20 Following the motion and Grell’s refusal to cooperate,
each side determined that it had no additional evidence to
present and would rely on the evidence presented at the June
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2001 hearing. The court held oral argument on December 7, 2004,
at which each side argued from the same documents and the same
testimony to the same judge as in the first hearing. Quoting
extensively from the record and noting that it had previously
found the State’s experts more persuasive, the trial court found
nothing “to change its mind” and concluded that Grell had failed
to satisfy his burden of proving mental retardation by clear and
convincing evidence.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Burden of Proof and Standard for Proving Mental
Retardation
¶21 Grell’s major argument on this appeal is that the
trial court used a flawed process in finding that he does not
have mental retardation. He raises three challenges to the
process: First, the State should bear the burden of proving
lack of retardation to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, if the defendant must bear the burden of proof, the
standard should be no higher than a preponderance of the
evidence; the statutory requirement of clear and convincing
evidence is unconstitutionally high. Third, the process should
be bifurcated, with both a pretrial hearing before a judge to
determine, under Atkins, whether mental retardation should bar
the defendant’s execution and, should the judge not find mental
retardation, a jury component in which the jury must find,
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beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant does not have
mental retardation.6
¶22 Grell’s challenges raise issues of constitutional law
and statutory construction, which we review de novo. State v.
Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 445, ¶ 62, 94 P.3d 1119, 1140 (2004). In
analyzing statutes, however, we begin by assuming the statute is
constitutional. State v. Casey, 205 Ariz. 359, 362, ¶ 11, 71
P.3d 351, 354 (2003).
1. Imposing burden on defendant to prove mental
retardation
¶23 For the hearing to determine whether Grell has mental
retardation, this court instructed the trial court to apply the
procedures in A.R.S. § 13-703.02 “insofar as is practical in the
post-trial posture of this case.” Grell I, 205 Ariz. at 64,
¶ 42, 66 P.3d at 1241. The statute places on “the
defendant . . . the burden of proving mental retardation by
clear and convincing evidence” in the pretrial hearing. A.R.S.
§ 13-703.02(G). If the defendant’s IQ is 65 or lower, a
rebuttable presumption of mental retardation arises. Id.
Because the parties here stipulated that Grell’s IQ falls
between 65 and 70, the trial court accordingly placed the burden
6
The statute currently provides for a bifurcated process,
see supra note 5, but the jury hears the mental retardation
evidence only as a mitigating factor. See A.R.S. § 13-
703.02(H).
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on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that mental
retardation renders him ineligible for execution. Grell argues
that if the defendant must bear the burden at all, the standard
should be to prove retardation by no more than a preponderance
of the evidence.
¶24 This issue reaches our court because in Atkins, the
Supreme Court declined to specify the procedures that states
should use to identify mentally retarded individuals, deferring
to the states to develop appropriate procedures. Atkins, 536
U.S. at 317. The Court did so in part in acknowledgement of the
lack of consensus regarding which defendants have mental
retardation:
To the extent there is serious disagreement about the
execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in
determining which offenders are in fact
retarded. . . . Not all people who claim to be
mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall
within the range of mentally retarded offenders about
whom there is a national consensus. As was our
approach in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106
S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), with regard to
insanity, “we leave to the State[s] the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of
sentences.” Id. at 405, 416-417, 106 S.Ct. 2595.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. Although left to the states, the
procedures developed must comport with the Constitution.
¶25 The Supreme Court has confirmed that states may
“‘regulate the procedures under which [their] laws are carried
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out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden
of persuasion,’ and [their] decision[s] in this regard [are] not
subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless
‘[they] offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
fundamental.’” Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02
(1977) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 353 U.S. 513, 523 (1958));
see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (calling
Patterson the “proper analytical approach” in evaluating burdens
of proof). Grell claims that imposing the burden on a defendant
to prove mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence
does offend deeply rooted principles.
¶26 Grell initially argues that the burden on the issue of
mental retardation should not fall on the defendant at all, but
rather should be borne by the State. We disagree that the
Constitution requires the prosecution to bear this burden. The
Supreme Court has held that a state may require that the
defendant prove affirmative defenses. E.g., Patterson, 432 U.S.
at 206 (requiring the defendant to prove extreme emotional
disturbance); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987)
(requiring the defendant to prove self defense). Proof of
mental retardation is like proof of an affirmative defense in
that it serves to relieve or mitigate a defendant’s criminal
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responsibility, and as with affirmative defenses, the evidence
of retardation will lie largely within the possession and
control of the defendant.
¶27 Because the defendant has superior access to the
evidence to prove his mental condition, it is not inappropriate
to place the burden on him to do so. See Medina, 505 U.S. at
455 (O’Connor, J., concurring); cf. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 206
(to same effect). A critical component of proof of mental
retardation is onset before age eighteen. The defendant has
better information regarding his condition and superior access
to friends and family who knew him before he turned eighteen.
Moreover, a defendant has significant motivation to attempt to
score poorly on an IQ test, a low score on which triggers a
claim of mental retardation. See A.R.S. § 13-703.02(B). Such
evidence lies within the defendant’s control and may prove
difficult for the state to rebut.
¶28 New Jersey is the only state, as of this writing, to
place the burden of disproving mental retardation on the state.
State v. Jimenez, 880 A.2d 468, 484 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2005). It did so because state law developed under the
Ring/Apprendi line of cases treats certain statutory “capital
triggers” like aggravating factors that the state must prove to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 482-84 (discussing the
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implications of Ring II, 536 U.S. at 584, and Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). The court in Jimenez held that
mental retardation was essentially such a “capital trigger,”
which under New Jersey law the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt. 880 A.2d at 484. Because, however, the
absence of mental retardation is neither an aggravating factor
nor an element of the capital offense under Arizona law, the
rationale supporting the result in Jimenez does not apply here.
¶29 We find no constitutional bar to imposing the burden
of proving mental retardation on the defendant.
2. Imposition of the “clear and convincing evidence”
standard
¶30 Citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), Grell
asserts the unconstitutionality of requiring him to prove mental
retardation by clear and convincing evidence. In Cooper, the
Court, having already declared that the defendant must bear the
burden of proving competency to stand trial, id. at 355, held
that the defendant may not be forced to prove his competency by
clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 369. The Court evaluated
the right not to be tried while incompetent and weighed the
impact of its loss on the defendant to determine the appropriate
standard of proof. Id. at 354, 364. The Court observed that
the right not to be tried if incompetent is a fundamental
“principle of justice [so] rooted in the traditions and
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conscience of our people” that its violation “threatens . . .
the basic fairness of the trial itself.” Id. at 364.
¶31 Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the heightened
standard of proof affected only those defendants who could prove
they were incompetent, but could not do so by clear and
convincing evidence. Id. at 366-67. The higher standard
affected those defendants’ only opportunity to contest
competency, creating a grave risk of violating their right not
to be tried while incompetent. Id. The Court concluded that
the defendants’ interest outweighed the government’s lesser
interest in trying a probably incompetent defendant. Id. The
Court also noted that forty-six other state jurisdictions used a
lower standard of proof, showing consensus that Oklahoma’s
higher standard was unnecessary to serve the state’s needs and
inappropriate in light of the importance of the right. Id. at
361-62. The Court therefore held that due process limits the
burden on the defendant to prove competency to stand trial by a
standard no higher than preponderance of the evidence. Id. at
368-69.
¶32 As was the Court in Cooper, we have been asked to
assess the statutory imposition of a clear and convincing
evidence standard in a situation in which a preponderance
standard would be permissible. Although the right not to be
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executed if mentally retarded is of recent vintage, it — like
the right not to stand trial if incompetent — is a
constitutional right based on modern consensus and historical
views regarding the propriety of executing those who may be
“less morally culpable” because of their reduced mental
capacity. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21. We also note that,
following Atkins, all but one jurisdiction that has chosen a
burden has chosen preponderance of the evidence.7 We might have
done so as well, were there no Arizona statute already in place.
The question before us, however, is whether the standard chosen
by the legislature to protect admittedly important state
interests can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
7
The following statutes, passed in 2003 after Atkins, impose
a preponderance standard: Cal. Penal Code § 1369 (West, Westlaw
through 2006 Sess.); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2515A (Westlaw through
2005 Sess.); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/114-15 (West, Westlaw
through 2005 Sess.); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 174.098 (West,
Westlaw through 2005 Sess.); Utah Code Ann. § 77-15a-104 (West,
Westlaw through 2005 2d Sess.); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1.1
(West, Westlaw through 2005 Sess.). The following cases, from
jurisdictions in which no statute sets a burden, set
preponderance as the appropriate standard: State v. Williams,
831 So. 2d 835, 860 (La. 2002); Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95,
148 (Miss. 2003); State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio
2002); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 839 A.2d 202, 211 n.8 (Pa.
2003); Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606 (S.C. 2003); Ex
parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Delaware, which passed its statute within a month of
Atkins, is the lone exception. Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, § 4209
(West, Westlaw through 2005 Sess.) (imposing a clear and
convincing burden). Of the eighteen states that had statutes in
place before Atkins, thirteen states use the preponderance
standard. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15 & nn.12-15.
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¶33 The statutory scheme enacted by the Arizona
legislature does not merely prohibit execution of the mentally
retarded. It provides a detailed, bifurcated process that
requires a pretrial hearing at which a defendant may attempt to
show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he has mental
retardation; if he fails to make that showing, the defendant may
still present mental retardation evidence to the jury in
mitigation of his sentence. A.R.S. § 13-703.02. The statutory
process gives the defendant with an IQ of 75 or below the
opportunity to be examined by at least two psychological experts
to determine his IQ. A.R.S. § 13-703.02(B), (D). Those with at
least one full-scale IQ test result of 70 or below proceed for
further evaluation and an evidentiary hearing. A.R.S. § 13-
703.02(F), (G). Although the defendant bears the ultimate
burden to prove mental retardation, the statute creates a
rebuttable presumption of mental retardation if the defendant’s
IQ is 65 or below. A.R.S. § 13-703.02(G).8
¶34 The Arizona statute sets up a process similar to that
8
By selecting an IQ of 65 as the number that gives rise to
the presumption of retardation — which presumption assumes the
existence of “significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning,” concurrent “significant impairment in adaptive
behavior,” and onset before age eighteen, A.R.S. § 13-
703.02(K)(2) — the legislature has given added protection to
those defendants whom the DSM-IV would define as having “mild”
mental retardation. DSM-IV 42-43.
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used in Colorado and Indiana, and courts in both those states
have evaluated the constitutionality of requiring a defendant to
prove mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence.9
Compare People v. Vasquez, 84 P.3d 1019 (Colo. 2004) (approving
use of clear and convincing standard in a pretrial hearing),
with Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90 (Ind. 2005) (finding a clear
and convincing standard unconstitutional). Grell and our
dissenting colleague rely heavily on analysis from Cooper that
also formed the basis of the Pruitt opinion. They argue that
the definitive inquiry is the assessment of the relative risks
faced by the parties: the defendant’s risk of death compared to
the state’s minimal interest in executing a defendant who will
otherwise go to prison for life.
9
A Georgia statute requires the defendant to establish
mental retardation by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a burden
that the Georgia Supreme Court has twice upheld. See Head v.
Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 621 (Ga. 2003) (post-Atkins case analyzing
Georgia Code Annotated § 17-7-131 (West, Westlaw through 2005
Special Sess.)); Mosher v. State, 491 S.E.2d 348 (Ga. 1997)
(pre-Atkins case). Because the procedure under the Georgia
statute differs substantially from that under the Arizona
statute, however, we do not rely on the analysis in Head and
Mosher. In those cases, the Georgia Supreme Court found the
twin requirements that the defendant need only demonstrate
incompetence to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence
and may prove mental retardation to a jury by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt sufficient to safeguard mentally retarded
persons against the special risks of trial to which they are
subject. Head, 587 S.E.2d at 622. Arizona’s safeguards are, if
anything, more protective of the rights of the defendant than
are Georgia’s.
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¶35 With respect to statutes like those in Arizona,
Indiana, and Colorado, however, Grell overstates his case. As
the Colorado Supreme Court stressed in Vasquez, the defendant’s
risk at a pretrial hearing is not death, but a capital trial.10
84 P.3d at 1023. By creating a pretrial process, the
legislature provided a way for mentally retarded defendants to
avoid the burden of a capital trial and the risk of imposition
of the capital penalty. All defendants who do not prove mental
retardation at the pretrial hearing retain the ability to
present mental retardation evidence to the jury under a
preponderance standard in the penalty phase of the trial. That
opportunity reduces the ultimate risk they face from an adverse
determination in the pretrial mental retardation hearing.
¶36 The court in Pruitt acknowledged but rejected the
argument that the defendant’s ability to argue mental
retardation evidence in mitigation to the jury under a
preponderance of the evidence standard adequately safeguards the
defendant’s rights. It reasoned that “[m]entally retarded
defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful
execution.” 834 N.E.2d at 103 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at
10
Grell’s risk at this post-trial proceeding was of course
different, but the outcome is functionally the same because he
retains the right to present the evidence of mental retardation
to the jury in mitigation. See infra ¶¶ 64-67.
- 21 -
321). Although the acknowledged risk that the Pruitt court
identifies may justify barring the execution of the mentally
retarded, it does not suggest the need for any particular
procedure to ascertain mental retardation. Under Arizona’s
statutory procedure, these defendants about whom there is
consensus against execution will be screened out at the pretrial
stage. Given that fact, we cannot say that those unable to
establish retardation by clear and convincing evidence face such
a severe risk at sentencing that they may not constitutionally
be put through the capital trial process.
¶37 Although the Court in Atkins clearly announced that
states may not execute the mentally retarded, it recognized that
people may disagree over which individuals in fact have mental
retardation. 536 U.S. at 317. Before Atkins, states had
already begun to develop their own procedures, and had drawn in
different places the line for establishing the mental
retardation that would bar execution. Knowing this, the Court
explicitly left the procedure for determining mental retardation
to the states. Id. State procedures must ensure that those
about whom there is national consensus are protected from
execution, but left states otherwise free to craft their laws
for determining which defendants meet the consensus standard.
By providing differing procedures based on the defendant’s IQ,
- 22 -
Arizona law reflects this concept. Those with IQ scores of 65
or below face a comparatively lower bar, while those whose IQ
scores suggest greater intelligence must go to greater lengths
to prove their mental retardation. The legislature placed a
heavier burden on those who do not fall within the group about
whom there is national consensus regarding their right not to be
executed. The procedure occurs early in the capital process and
removes defendants found to have mental retardation from
exposure to a capital trial and hence to a sentence of death.
See A.R.S. § 13-703.02(C), (F), (G). The application of
Arizona’s tiered procedure does not deprive Grell of a right
rooted in fundamental justice.
¶38 Finally, in response to the reliance of the defendant
and our dissenting colleague on the analysis in Cooper, 517 U.S.
at 348, we note the significant differences between the right
not to be tried while incompetent and the right not to be
executed if mentally retarded. First, a defendant found
incompetent to stand trial is protected from having to submit to
trial on any charges unless he is restored to competency. See
id. A defendant deemed to have mental retardation, however, is
not shielded from trial. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. Despite
the risks that a mentally retarded defendant might not present
well to a jury, such a defendant can be tried, found guilty, and
- 23 -
sentenced to any statutory criminal penalty other than death.
This legal distinction suggests that mental retardation differs
constitutionally from incompetence to stand trial.
¶39 The second distinction relates to the risk of
malingering. A defendant who successfully feigns incompetence
to stand trial will not have to submit to trial at that time.
Generally, however, such a defendant is sent to a mental health
facility for treatment and further examination of his
competency. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.5(b)(2)(i). Most often,
the defendant is either restored to competency or discovered to
be malingering. In the event of either occurrence, the
defendant is subject to trial and punishment, including the
death penalty, if appropriate. On the other hand, once a court
determines that a defendant has mental retardation, that
defendant may never suffer the punishment of execution, even if
he is later discovered to have been malingering. These concerns
support the heightened standard that the legislature has imposed
to protect the interests of Arizona citizens.
¶40 A better comparison lies between claims of mental
retardation as a bar to execution and claims of mental
incompetence as a bar to execution. The defendant asserting the
latter claim is also subject to a clear and convincing evidence
burden of proof. See A.R.S. § 13-4022(F) (clear and convincing
- 24 -
burden of proof); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from
“inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is
insane”). We are aware of no case finding it violative of the
Constitution to require a defendant to prove incompetence to be
executed by clear and convincing evidence.
¶41 In sum, we conclude that requiring the defendant to
prove mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence in the
initial retardation hearing does not violate constitutional
standards.
3. Jury determination of mental retardation
¶42 Grell argues that, under Ring, the jury must find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant does not have
mental retardation before it may impose a sentence of death.
Furthermore, he argues, the process should be bifurcated: a
judge should make a preliminary finding on mental retardation,
and if the judge finds the defendant death-eligible, the state
still must prove a defendant’s lack of mental retardation beyond
a reasonable doubt to the jury.
¶43 Ring and Apprendi require that a jury find all
functional elements of a crime and all non-admitted facts except
prior convictions that increase the sentence above the
presumptive sentence. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489. Although
- 25 -
mental retardation does indeed involve fact-finding, it is not
the functional equivalent of an element of the crime. It has
nothing to do with the acts that make up the crime itself or the
defendant’s mental state while committing the crime, facts the
state traditionally must prove. As a result, Ring does not
require that a jury find the absence of mental retardation. See
Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 43 (Fla. 2005); Ex parte
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Winston v.
Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 21, 50 (Va. 2004).
¶44 Nor is the absence of retardation a fact that
increases the available penalty. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490
n.16; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244
(2005). The finding that a defendant does not have mental
retardation “neither expos[es] the defendant to a deprivation of
liberty greater than that authorized by the verdict according to
statute, nor . . . impos[es] upon the defendant a greater stigma
than that accompanying the jury verdict alone.” Bowling v.
Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 379 (Ky. 2005); see also Head v.
Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 619-20 (Ga. 2003); Russell v. State, 849
So. 2d 95, 147-48 (Miss. 2003); State v. Flores, 93 P.3d 1264,
1267 (N.M. 2004); State v. Laney, 627 S.E.2d 726, 731 (S.C.
2006); Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 467 (Tenn. 2004). Thus
nothing in the Apprendi line of cases requires that a jury find
- 26 -
the absence of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶45 The Supreme Court itself has signaled that a jury need
not decide the issue of mental retardation. When the Ninth
Circuit suspended federal habeas proceedings in Schriro v. Smith
and ordered a state jury trial on the issue of mental
retardation, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the decision,
implicitly rejecting the conclusion that Atkins requires a jury
trial. 126 S. Ct. 7, 9 (2005) (per curiam). The defendant in
Schriro had argued that he suffered from mental retardation and
could not be executed. Id. at 8. Observing that Arizona and
many states had adopted procedures for adjudicating the mental
retardation question, the Court said, “While those measures
might, in their application, be subject to constitutional
challenge, Arizona had not even had a chance to apply its chosen
procedures when the Ninth Circuit preemptively imposed its jury
trial condition.” Id. at 9. Although we hesitate to read too
much into the summary reversal, we draw from it a suggestion
that a jury trial is not required.
¶46 Grell also compares the mental retardation finding to
Enmund/Tison findings, arguing that both are findings of fact
that should be made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982). The analysis fails for two reasons. First,
- 27 -
the Supreme Court has held that Enmund/Tison findings, that a
defendant actually killed or intended to kill, need not be made
by a jury. See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385-86 (1986),
abrogated on other grounds by Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497,
503 n.7 (1987). The Court’s reasoning — that Enmund/Tison
findings serve to disqualify an otherwise seemingly death-
eligible defendant from death — suggests that that part of the
opinion will survive Apprendi, because the findings mitigate
rather than aggravate a potential sentence. Id.; see also Ring
III, 204 Ariz. at 564, ¶ 100, 65 P.3d at 945 (concluding that
Cabana survives Apprendi because it involves an Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis, traditionally done by a trial judge).
Similarly, mental retardation serves to exclude a defendant from
eligibility for the death penalty; its absence does not render
an otherwise ineligible defendant eligible for the death
penalty.
¶47 Second, Enmund/Tison findings lend themselves more
logically to proof beyond a reasonable doubt than does proof of
mental retardation. Enmund/Tison findings are based on evidence
of participation in the crime and intent. Mental retardation,
on the other hand, requires evaluation of the defendant’s past
and present mental functioning, using documentation and evidence
largely within the control of the defendant. Placing the burden
- 28 -
on the prosecution to prove lack of retardation beyond a
reasonable doubt would require it to prove a negative against a
party with a motive to misrepresent his mental health and his
past. The burden on the prosecution would be almost impossibly
high.
¶48 Grell argues not only that the jury should hear the
mental retardation evidence in mitigation, but also that it
should decide whether mental retardation should serve as a bar
to execution following an initial determination by the trial
judge on that issue. Because Atkins left the procedure for
determining mental retardation to the states, such a procedure
would not be prohibited; but neither is it required. Indeed,
the statute already requires that both the judge and jury
evaluate mental retardation before a sentence of death may be
imposed. The judge hears mental retardation evidence as a legal
bar to execution and the jury hears it for mitigation purposes.
¶49 Grell acknowledges that having the jury serve as the
only arbiter of mental retardation is not wise. The
difficulties a mentally retarded person may have in testifying,
communicating, and expressing remorse may negatively influence
the jury. That factor formed an explicit basis of the Supreme
Court’s prohibition on execution of the mentally retarded. See
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21. But because the statute requires an
- 29 -
initial judicial determination, Grell’s concern is ameliorated.
The trial court did not err in determining that a jury need not
determine mental retardation as a bar to execution.
B. Preclusion of Testimony from Defense Expert Dr. Keyes
¶50 Defense counsel protests the exclusion of his third
mental health expert as an unnecessarily harsh penalty for
Grell’s refusal to cooperate with the State’s third mental
health expert. “Whether to preclude . . . a witness’s testimony
lies within the discretion of the trial court.” Moody, 208
Ariz. at 457, ¶ 135, 94 P.3d at 1152. We will not reverse a
sanction unless the trial court has abused its discretion. Id.
¶51 The State moved to preclude Dr. Keyes from testifying
about Grell’s adaptive abilities after Grell refused to
cooperate with the State’s new mental health expert. Relying on
State v. Druke, 143 Ariz. 314, 693 P.2d 969 (App. 1984), and
State v. Schackart, 175 Ariz. 494, 858 P.2d 639 (1993), the
trial court granted the State’s unopposed motion. Concluding
that it would be unfair to the State to allow the new defense
expert when the State’s new expert could not examine Grell, the
court also denied the defense Motion to Reconsider, filed after
Dr. Keyes filed a report concluding that Grell has mental
retardation.
¶52 Defense counsel argues that Druke, Schackart, and
- 30 -
cases relating to insanity experts should not control Grell’s
case because mental retardation differs from insanity or
impulsive behavior. Mental retardation, by definition, must
exist before age eighteen. Grell argues that his current mental
condition is therefore of only limited relevance. The State’s
expert, Dr. Scialli, stated as much in his testimony. Grell
also emphasizes the difference between requiring the State to
face a defense expert with no expert of its own, and having it
face three defense experts with two experts of its own. The
latter situation, he argues, does not prejudice the State’s
case.
¶53 While it may be true that an expert could have
evaluated Grell’s adaptive skills without interviewing him, the
controlling statute defines mental retardation as including
current impairment in adaptive ability. See A.R.S. § 13-
703.02(K). Assessments based on recent interviews of the
defendant are thus persuasive. Accordingly, the trial judge has
discretion to preclude mental health experts as a sanction for
the defendant’s refusal to cooperate with interviews and
testing. Phillips v. Araneta, 208 Ariz. 280, 285, ¶ 15, 93 P.3d
480, 485 (2004). Although such a sanction weighs especially
heavily in a capital case, faced with the State’s reduced
ability to rebut Dr. Keyes’ assessment of Grell’s current
- 31 -
functioning, the judge did not abuse her discretion by
precluding Dr. Keyes’ testimony.
C. Denial of Motion to Strike Testimony of Dr. Scialli
¶54 The defense argues that Dr. Scialli is not a qualified
expert under A.R.S. § 13-703.02, the pretrial screening statute
the trial court was attempting to follow, and his testimony
should therefore have been precluded.
¶55 Whether a statute applies in a particular situation is
a question of law, which we review de novo. Schoneberger v.
Oelze, 208 Ariz. 591, 594, ¶ 12, 96 P.3d 1078, 1081 (App. 2004).
We review the decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of
discretion. State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 49, ¶ 29, 97 P.3d
865, 874 (2004).
¶56 Section 13-703.02(K)(3) defines a “psychological
expert” as “a psychologist licensed pursuant to title 32,
chapter 19.1 with at least two years’ experience in the testing,
evaluation and diagnosis of mental retardation.”11 Dr. Scialli
is a psychiatrist, not a psychologist. The record shows that he
11
Section 32-2071 requires a “doctoral degree” from an
accredited program in any of several areas of psychology. The
program must include hundreds of hours of supervised training.
A.R.S. § 32-2071(D). Among the required subjects of study are
“interviewing and the administration[,] scoring and
interpretation of psychological test batteries for the diagnosis
of cognitive abilities and personality functioning.” A.R.S.
§ 32-2071(A)(4)(g). Psychiatrists have medical training and
receive an M.D. rather than a Ph.D.
- 32 -
has had training in mental retardation for a child psychiatry
fellowship, has been a consultant with several government
agencies, has “evaluated and consulted on” children with mental
retardation for Child Protective Services, and has been the
acting medical director for the Division of Developmental
Disabilities, the agency responsible for the care of mentally
retarded children and adults.
¶57 This court in Grell I acknowledged that A.R.S. § 13-
703.02 should be applied to the hearing on remand only “insofar
as is practical.” The trial court reasonably concluded that it
was not practicable to apply the statute on this issue. The
State hired Dr. Scialli before it could possibly have known the
yet-unpassed statute’s requirements for qualifications of
experts. In addition, Dr. Scialli appears to be qualified to
diagnose and discuss retardation issues. Indeed, the defense
relies on his testimony to support its own points about the
diagnosis of retardation. And precluding Dr. Scialli’s
testimony would have left the State without an expert on mental
retardation. His qualifications in this instance bear on the
weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. The court did
not abuse its discretion by allowing Dr. Scialli to testify.
D. Error in Finding that Grell Did Not Prove Mental
Retardation
¶58 The defense asserts that the trial court erred in
- 33 -
concluding that Grell does not have mental retardation and
requests that we review that ruling. The decision was based
largely on expert testimony; the trial court determined that the
State’s expert was more credible. “The trial judge has broad
discretion in determining the weight and credibility given to
mental health evidence.” State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 69,
¶ 64, 969 P.2d 1168, 1181 (1998). “We defer to the trial
court’s factual findings that are supported by the record and
not clearly erroneous.” State v. Rosengren, 199 Ariz. 112, 116,
¶ 9, 14 P.3d 303, 307 (App. 2000).
¶59 Because the parties stipulated that Grell had a low IQ
before age eighteen, the only issue in the hearing on remand was
his adaptive functioning. Under Arizona law, the adaptive
functioning component of a mental retardation diagnosis requires
“significant impairment” in “the effectiveness or degree to
which the defendant meets the standards of personal independence
and social responsibility expected of the defendant’s age and
cultural group.” A.R.S. § 13-703.02(K)(1), (K)(2).
¶60 Defense counsel relied primarily on school and
juvenile detention records to highlight examples of poor
academic and social behavior. He argued that school and
detention workers did not diagnose students based on the DSM-
- 34 -
IV,12 and thus the fact that no one had diagnosed Grell as having
mental retardation did not establish the absence of that
condition. He urged the court to find deficits in the areas
listed in the DSM-IV.
¶61 The State countered with three main themes: no doctor
before defense expert Dr. Globus had ever diagnosed Grell as
having mental retardation; behaving badly does not necessarily
indicate adaptive deficits; and Grell can behave himself when he
wants to do so. The State relied on the Vineland Scale as the
only test administered to Grell as a youth that would reveal
retardation. The score on that scale was low-average, assessing
his intelligence as being only a year younger than his
chronological age at the time. After moving to Arizona, five
psychiatric reports all showed Grell to have a personality or
conduct disorder, but none indicated mental retardation.
Several school documents literally say that Grell demonstrated
“good adaptive skills.” The State also highlighted a ruse Grell
concocted about his life following an arrest for robbery in
1996. Although he was twenty at the time, Grell claimed to be a
juvenile named Michael Prentice and described a background
12
The DSM-IV instructs that poor adaptive skills exist when
there are deficits in at least two of the following areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal
skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional
academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.
- 35 -
different from his own in a number of respects. Grell
maintained the ruse for more than six months through repeated
contacts with the justice system.
¶62 The defense claims to have clearly shown that Grell
has deficits in two of the eleven areas listed in the DSM-IV and
therefore has mental retardation. The DSM-IV definition of
mental retardation, however, while similar in overall meaning,
is not the same as the statutory definition. See A.R.S. § 13-
703.02(K). The statute requires an overall assessment of the
defendant’s ability to meet society’s expectations of him. It
does not require a finding of mental retardation based solely on
proof of specific deficits or deficits in only two areas.
¶63 Reasonable minds may differ as to how to interpret the
evidence presented. The evidence does, however, support a
finding that Grell was able to function at a level higher than
that of “significant impairment.” The trial judge’s conclusion
was reasonably supported by evidence. The trial court did not
clearly err in finding that Grell failed to prove mental
retardation by clear and convincing evidence.
E. Entitlement to Jury Sentencing
¶64 Grell argues that he is entitled to jury sentencing by
the terms of his trial-by-submission agreement. He asserts that
he “agreed to a trial by submission in exchange for preserving
- 36 -
his claim that the United States Constitution entitled him to a
jury determination of aggravation or mitigation at the
sentencing phase.” The cover statement of the stipulation
states: “This stipulation shall in no way constitute a waiver
of any rights the defendant may have to have a jury empanelled
to determine the existence or absence of any aggravating and or
mitigating circumstances.”
¶65 The State acknowledges that Grell attempted to
preserve his right to a jury trial for sentencing. It argues,
however, that Grell preserved only any “right [he] may have” to
a jury sentencing, not an absolute right to such a proceeding.
Under Ring, the State thus maintains, Grell has a right to a
jury sentencing only if the judicial sentencing was not harmless
error.
¶66 While that may be one way to interpret the jury
sentencing provision, Grell clearly believed that the
stipulation would entitle him to a jury trial on aggravating
facts if the Ring challenge was successful. When the parties
signed the agreement in September 2000, Apprendi had just been
decided. Its reasoning suggested that Arizona’s judge-
sentencing system was unconstitutional. Grell’s stipulation was
thus not a meaningless reservation of a pipe-dream right.
Moreover, because Grell admitted the act of killing his
- 37 -
daughter, the sentencing hearing held increased significance as
his only chance to avoid a sentence of death. He waived his
right to a jury trial on the guilt-phase issues at least in part
based on assurances that he would retain his right to be
sentenced by a jury.
¶67 We find that the agreement entitles Grell to a jury
sentencing. We therefore vacate the sentence of death and
remand for a sentencing proceeding in accordance with A.R.S. §§
13-703 and 13-703.01 (Supp. 2002).
F. Other Issues
¶68 Grell raised several other issues, all of which are
rendered moot by the remand for resentencing. We therefore
decline to address them.
III. CONCLUSION
¶69 We affirm the trial court’s determination that Grell
does not have mental retardation. Because we conclude that the
State is bound by its agreement to afford a jury trial on
sentencing, we vacate Grell’s death sentence and remand the case
for resentencing in accordance with A.R.S. §§ 13-703 and 13-
703.01.
_______________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice
- 38 -
CONCURRING:
_______________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice
_______________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice
_______________________________________
Sheldon H. Weisberg, Judge*
*Pursuant to Article 6, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution,
the Honorable Sheldon H. Weisberg, Chief Judge of the Arizona
Court of Appeals, Division One, was designated to sit in this
matter.
B A L E S, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part
¶70 Based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Atkins and
Cooper, I do not believe that the federal constitution allows
states to execute defendants who are more likely than not
mentally retarded but who cannot prove their retardation by the
higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly,
I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ decision to uphold
the clear and convincing standard contained in A.R.S. § 13-
703.02(G).
¶71 “[D]eath is not a suitable punishment for a mentally
retarded criminal.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. Although Atkins
- 39 -
allows states to develop appropriate ways to enforce this
constitutional restriction, id. at 317, the procedures adopted
must themselves pass constitutional muster. Cooper outlines the
proper framework for determining if a statutorily-assigned
standard of proof on the issue of mental retardation comports
with due process.
¶72 The majority recognizes that, while the right not to
be executed if mentally retarded is of “recent vintage,” both
this right (Atkins) and the right not to stand trial if
incompetent (Cooper) are “constitutional right[s] based on
modern consensus and historical views” of the issues. Op. ¶ 32;
accord Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 100-03 (Ind. 2005)
(noting that the Supreme Court has identified the right of
mentally retarded defendants not to be executed as grounded in a
fundamental principle of justice). I agree with the majority
that, just as states may place on defendants the burden of
proving competency, states may place on defendants the burden of
proving mental retardation. Op. ¶ 29.
¶73 My disagreement with the majority concerns the
standard, rather than the burden, of proof. In arguing for a
clear and convincing standard, the majority notes that there are
“significant differences” between the right of the incompetent
not to be tried and the right of the retarded not to be
- 40 -
executed. Id. ¶ 38. Noting differences in these constitutional
rights does not itself justify requiring defendants to prove
retardation by the higher standard of proof; nor does it
substitute for actually applying the Cooper analysis. Moreover,
the difference between a defendant who might be executed if a
court incorrectly rejects a claim of mental retardation and an
incompetent defendant who might erroneously be subjected to a
trial does not support imposing a higher standard on the former
as compared to the latter.
¶74 Nor can the majority justify a higher standard of
proof by comparing the rights of the retarded and the mentally
insane. Id. ¶ 40. The standard of proof arguably should be
higher for eve-of-execution claims of insanity by defendants who
were competent to be tried and sentenced to death as compared to
defendants who claim to be mentally retarded, a permanent
condition which must be established by evidence of onset before
age eighteen. Cf. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 426 (1986)
(Powell, J., concurring) (noting state may presume defendant
remains sane and require defendant to make substantial threshold
showing to obtain hearing on post-sentencing claim of insanity).
Moreover, since Cooper, neither the Supreme Court nor this court
has addressed whether a state can, consistent with the
constitution, execute a person who is more likely than not
- 41 -
insane. Thus, the fact that Arizona statutes require defendants
to establish mental incompetence (i.e., insanity) by clear and
convincing evidence as a bar to execution, see A.R.S. § 13-
4022(F), does not resolve whether the higher standard can
constitutionally apply to that issue or to the issue of mental
retardation.13
¶75 Our legislature enacted A.R.S. § 13-703.02 before
Atkins held that executing a mentally retarded defendant
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, 536 U.S. at 316, 321. Thus, A.R.S. § 13-
703.02 does not reflect a legislative effort to adopt a statute
in light of the constitutional prohibition. Since Atkins, as
the majority acknowledges, all but one of those states that have
13
The majority notes that the Georgia Supreme Court has
upheld a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for
defendants claiming to be mentally retarded. Op. ¶ 34 n.9. The
Georgia statutory scheme, which allows a verdict of “guilty but
mentally retarded” in felony cases, substantially differs from
Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme, as the majority
acknowledges. Id. Moreover, the Georgia decisions are not
persuasive on the issue presented here. In Head v. Hill, 587
S.E.2d 613, 621 (Ga. 2003), the court reasoned that if a
defendant may be required to prove insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt, see Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), then requiring
proof of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt is also
constitutional. This reasoning, however, fails to recognize
that, under Atkins, the mentally retarded have a constitutional
right not to be executed. Whether the State may assign to the
defendant a higher standard for proving non-constitutional
defenses at trial does not address whether the State can execute
defendants who prove they are more likely than not mentally
retarded.
- 42 -
set the standard of proof for proving mental retardation have
adopted a preponderance standard. Op. ¶ 32.
¶76 The majority, however, discounts the significance of
the standard of proof by arguing that, because Arizona’s
statutes provide for a pretrial determination of mental
retardation, “the defendant’s risk . . . is not death, but a
capital trial.” Id. ¶ 35. The majority further states that the
ability of defendants to present mental retardation evidence as
mitigation during the sentencing hearing reduces “the ultimate
risk they face from an adverse determination” under the clear
and convincing standard for the pretrial hearing. Id.
¶77 The flaw in this analysis is that the pretrial hearing
under A.R.S. § 13-703.02 is the defendant’s only opportunity to
secure his constitutional rights under Atkins. See id. ¶ 48
(“The judge hears mental retardation evidence as a legal bar to
execution and the jury hears it for mitigation purposes.”); cf.
id. ¶ 31 (recognizing that the competency hearing provides
“those defendants’ only opportunity to contest competency”).
Under our statutes, the jury does not decide the Atkins issue
when it makes its sentencing determination. See id. ¶ 48.
Instead, each juror makes his or her own decision whether the
defendant has proven any mitigating facts and how such facts
should be valued. A.R.S. § 13-703(C); State ex rel. Thomas v.
- 43 -
Granville, 211 Ariz. 468, ___ ¶ 12 n.3, 123 P.3d 662, 665 n.3
(2005).14
¶78 Mitigation does not go to the constitutional issue in
Atkins. Even before Atkins, a defendant could argue mental
retardation as relevant mitigation evidence. Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 319-20 (1989) (holding that, although the
constitution did not prohibit execution of mentally retarded
defendants, the defendant must be allowed to present mental
retardation as mitigation evidence); see also A.R.S. § 13-
703(G). Atkins, however, made clear that the ability to argue
mitigation is not sufficient to avoid the constitutional issue
as “[m]entally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a
special risk of wrongful execution.” 536 U.S. at 321
(abrogating Penry, 492 U.S. at 323-25).15
14
Cf. Johnson v. State, 102 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Mo. 2003)
(“[T]he jury was not faced with the Atkins pronouncement: ‘death
is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.’
Rather, the jury instructions treated mental retardation as a
mere mitigating circumstance—not the outright bar to punishment
dictated by Atkins.”); Kristen F. Grunewald, Case Notes, Atkins
v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 15 Cap. Def. J. 117, 125 (2002)
(“In Atkins, mental retardation acts as a bar to death. In
mitigation, mental retardation is a reason to show mercy.”).
15
This court recognized the substantial difference between
considering mental retardation as a possible mitigating factor
and treating it as an absolute bar to the death penalty when the
court remanded this case for reconsideration in light of Atkins
after the trial judge had rejected Grell’s claim of mental
retardation as a mitigating factor. See State v. Grell, 205
Ariz. 57, 63, ¶¶ 37-40, 66 P.3d 1234, 1240 (2003).
- 44 -
¶79 Although one or more jurors may find that the
defendant has proven mental retardation by a preponderance of
the evidence, the jurors remain free to decide that such
evidence is not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency
and to impose a death sentence. See A.R.S. § 13-703(C);
Granville, 211 Ariz. at ___ ¶ 12 n.3, 123 P.3d at 665 n.3.
Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted in Atkins, reliance on mental
retardation as a mitigating factor can be a “two-edged sword”
because the jury may consider the same evidence as supporting
the imposition of a death sentence. 536 U.S. at 321 (noting
that mental retardation may enhance likelihood of finding of
aggravating factor of future dangerousness). We cannot uphold a
clear and convincing standard by relying on the very process the
Atkins court determined was insufficient to protect the
constitutional rights of the mentally retarded.
¶80 In addition, the majority reasons that a clear and
convincing standard is constitutional because Atkins recognized
that, while there is national consensus against executing the
mentally retarded, “people may disagree over which individuals
in fact have mental retardation.” Op. ¶ 37. States must
protect those defendants who fall within the national consensus
on mental retardation, but “are otherwise free to craft their
laws for determining which defendants meet the consensus
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standard.” Id. But the fact that the Court has afforded states
some flexibility in substantively defining mental retardation in
no way answers whether states may constitutionally execute those
defendants who prove they are more likely than not retarded
under any applicable definition.
¶81 The majority attempts to argue that A.R.S. § 13-703.02
protects those defendants who fall within the national consensus
by providing them with “a comparatively lower bar” while
requiring defendants with higher IQ scores to “go to greater
lengths to prove their mental retardation.” Id. This argument
mistakenly assumes the “national consensus” embraces only
defendants whose IQs are 65 or below and it fails to recognize
how the statute actually works even as to those defendants.
Although A.R.S. § 13-703.02 creates a rebuttable presumption of
mental retardation for defendants whose IQ scores are 65 or
below, this presumption shifts only the burden of production,
not the burden of persuasion, to the State. State v. Arellano,
___ Ariz. ___, ___ ¶¶ 11-12, ___, P.3d ___, ___ (2006). Once
the State has come forth with any evidence to rebut the
presumption, the defendant still must prove mental retardation
by clear and convincing evidence, regardless of IQ scores.
¶82 Additionally, the majority dismisses the “special risk
of wrongful execution” faced by mentally retarded defendants by
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stating “it does not suggest the need for any particular
procedure to ascertain mental retardation.” Op. ¶ 36. The
majority asserts that the clear and convincing standard will
assure that “defendants about whom there is a consensus against
execution will be screened out at the pretrial stage”; other
defendants do not “face such a severe risk at sentencing that
they may not constitutionally be put through the capital trial
process.” Id.
¶83 The right of the mentally retarded not to be executed,
however, is not limited to those defendants who are severely
retarded or who otherwise can establish their condition by
especially compelling evidence.16 Under Atkins, the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of all mentally retarded
defendants. See id. ¶ 37 (“[T]he Court in Atkins clearly
announced that states may not execute the mentally
retarded . . . .”). Defendants who can prove their mental
retardation by only a preponderance will not be “screened out”;
as a result, they still face the same special risk that,
according to Atkins, cannot be remedied during mitigation. 536
16
Indeed, the defendant in Atkins claimed to be “mildly
mentally retarded,” 536 U.S. at 308, and our statute includes
mildly mentally retarded defendants, A.R.S. § 13-703.02(K)(4).
See also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (noting that “mild” mental
retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ
level of 50-55 to approximately 70) (citing Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 42-43 (4th ed. 2000)).
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U.S. at 320-21.
¶84 Thus, the real issue here, which the majority does not
directly confront, is whether the State can constitutionally
execute those defendants who prove they are more likely than not
mentally retarded but cannot meet the clear and convincing
standard under A.R.S. § 13-703.02(G).
¶85 The Supreme Court in Cooper applied due process
principles to assess a state’s imposing a clear and convincing
standard of proof on a criminal defendant. Although Cooper
dealt with the constitutional right not to stand trial if
incompetent, its framework applies in evaluating the standard of
proof on mental retardation. See Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 100-03
(applying Cooper to mental retardation issue); State v.
Williams, 831 So. 2d 835, 859-60 (La. 2002) (same); Howell v.
State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 463-65 (Tenn. 2004) (same); see also
Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 382 (Ky. 2005) (citing
Cooper and applying preponderance of the evidence standard as
“[w]e have applied . . . to a defendant’s burden to prove
incompetency to stand trial”).
¶86 In Cooper, the Court noted that historic and
contemporary standards support a fundamental right not to stand
trial if incompetent; in Atkins, the Court recognized a similar
right not to be executed if mentally retarded. Op. ¶ 32. The
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Cooper court also noted that most jurisdictions required a
preponderance of the evidence or less to show incompetency;
similarly, most jurisdictions require only a preponderance of
the evidence for a showing of mental retardation. Id. & n.7.
¶87 Given the constitutional right at issue, the Court in
Cooper weighed the respective interests of the state and the
defendant to assess the fundamental fairness of requiring the
defendant to prove incompetency by clear and convincing
evidence. 517 U.S. at 362-67. “The function of a standard of
proof . . . is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree
of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions . . . .” Id. at 362
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “The more stringent the
burden of proof a party must bear, the more that party bears the
risk of an erroneous decision.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
¶88 The Cooper court determined that the “consequences of
an erroneous determination of competence are dire” for the
defendant because he would not be able to communicate with his
attorney or exercise other fundamental rights involved in a fair
trial. Id. at 364. In contrast, the injury to the state from
an erroneous conclusion that a defendant is incompetent when he
in fact is malingering is “modest.” Id. at 365. The state may
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incur expense and delay, but such errors are subject to
correction in subsequent proceedings and the state may detain
the defendant for a reasonable time to determine if he might
later become competent. Id. Recognizing that there were
important state interests at stake, the Court concluded that,
where incompetence is shown by a preponderance of the evidence,
“the defendant’s fundamental right to be tried only while
competent outweighs the [s]tate’s interest in the efficient
operation of its criminal justice system.” Id. at 367.
¶89 Applying Cooper’s weighing of interests framework
here, the use of a clear and convincing evidence standard “would
significantly increase the risk of an erroneous determination”
of no mental retardation for defendants who can prove they are
more likely than not mentally retarded. Williams, 831 So. 2d at
860 (citing Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362-63). The imposition of the
death penalty is serious and permanent; any mistake cannot be
undone once the punishment is carried out. See Evans v. State,
886 A.2d 562, 584 (Md. 2005) (“Reflected throughout the Supreme
Court jurisprudence underlying the Eighth Amendment is the
principle that death is different.”).
¶90 The State’s interest, in contrast, is at best modest,
likely even less than the interest involved in Cooper. See
Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 465 (“[T]he risk to the petitioner of an
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erroneous outcome is dire, as he would face the death penalty,
while the risk to the State is comparatively modest.”) (citing
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 364-65). At oral argument, counsel for the
State candidly acknowledged that the State does not have any
“particular interest” in executing those defendants who can
establish their mental retardation by a preponderance but not by
clear and convincing evidence. To be sure, the State does have
an interest in preventing malingering defendants from obtaining
erroneous determinations of their mental retardation. But such
determinations do not, in contrast to the competency
determinations involved in Cooper, prevent the State from
concluding criminal proceedings against the defendant; they
instead limit the ultimate punishment the State can exact.
Additionally, the risks of malingering are reduced because the
statutory definition of mental retardation requires proof not
only of a low IQ but also significantly impaired adaptive
behavior and the onset of such conditions before the age of
eighteen. A.R.S. § 13-703.02(K)(2).
¶91 When the relative risks are death and a lesser
available punishment, “the defendant’s right not to be executed
if mentally retarded outweighs the state’s interest as a matter
of federal constitutional law.” Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 103;
accord Williams, 831 So. 2d at 860 (“Clearly, in the Atkins
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context, the State may bear the consequences of an erroneous
determination that the defendant is mentally retarded (life
imprisonment at hard labor) far more readily than the defendant
of an erroneous determination that he is not mentally
retarded.”); Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 465 (“The balance, under
these circumstances, weighs in favor of the petitioner and
justifies applying a preponderance of evidence standard at the
hearing.”).
¶92 In light of the interests involved, I would hold that
the clear and convincing standard of proof under A.R.S. § 13-
703.02(G) is unconstitutional because the State cannot,
consistent with due process, execute those defendants who show
they are more likely than not mentally retarded. Thus, on
remand, the trial court should consider whether Grell can
establish mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence
before the court conducts further sentencing proceedings before
a jury. I otherwise concur in the majority’s opinion.
_______________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice
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