No. 12314
I N THE SUPKEME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A
OR F F OTN
NORA MAKLE I~CCLUSKEY, I n d i v i d u a l l y
and a s A d m i n i s t r a t r i x of t h e E s t a t e
of JOHN M. McCLOSKEY, Deceased,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
DENISE GROSS PORTER,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable J a c k L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For Appellant :
Boone, Karlberg and Haddon, Missoula, Montana.
Sam E. Haddon argued, Missoula, Montana.
For ~ e s p o n d e n:
t
Worden, Thane, Haines and Williams, Missoula, Montana.
Shelton C. Williams argued, Missoula, Montana.
Submitted: November 3 0 , 1972
Decided :
, ttdj ~5
JAN 3 O 1973
Filed: , ! I-.
Xr. J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court.
This i s an a p p e a l from a judgment e n t e r e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t
of t h e f o u r t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of Missoula. Plaintiff,
Nora Marie McCloskey, brought t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t defendant Denise
Gross P o r t e r , i n d i v i d u a l l y and a s a d m i n i s t r a t r i x of t h e e s t a t e
of h e r deceased husband, John M. McCloskey, f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s
s u s t a i n e d by each of them i n an automobile a c c i d e n t which occurred
i n Missoula on May 14, 1970. T r i a l b e f o r e a j u r y began on A p r i l
1 9 , 1972. During t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e , t h e t r i a l
judge g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t a f t e r
denying p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r of proof r e g a r d i n g a l l e g e d a m b i g a i t y ' i n
c e r t a i n agreements. From t h e judgment e n t e r e d pursuant t o t h e d i -
rected v e r d i c t , p l a i n t i f f appeals.
The a c c i d e n t occurred a s a r e s u l t of d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o
s t o p h e r v e h i c l e a t a s t o p s i g n , thereby c o l l i d i n g i n t o t h e s i d e
of t h e ~ c C l o s k e y s 'pickup t r u c k . Defendant's f a i l u r e t o s t o p i s
n o t denied. The pickup t r u c k was turned on i t s s i d e , b u t p l a i n t i f f
and h e r husband d i d n o t f e e l i t n e c e s s a r y t o c a l l an ambulance.
Some f r i e n d s l a t e r took them t o S t . P a t r i c k ' s H o s p i t a l i n Missoula,
where both were t r e a t e d and r e l e a s e d , I n June 1970, John McCloskey
was h o s p i t a l i z e d f o r a few days w i t h neck problems which had ap-
p a r e n t l y responded t o treatment by t h e time of h i s d e a t h . Over a
c o u r s e of s e v e r a l months, p l a i n t i f f was t r e a t e d f o r broken o r
s p r a i n e d r i b s and o t h e r i n j u r i e s .
I n December 1970, t h e McCloskeys were involved i n a s e p a r a t e
a c c i d e n t wherein John McCloskey r e c e i v e d i n j u r i e s r e s u l t i n g i n
his d e a t h . Neither t h a t a c c i d e n t n o r t h e i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d t h e r e i n
a r e a p a r t of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n .
S h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t i n q u e s t i o n , John McCloskey c o n t a c t e d
t h e a d j u s t e r f o r Safeco I n s u r a n c e Company, d e f e n d a n t ' s i n s u r e r .
A s a r e s u l t of s e v e r a l meetings between t h e a d j u s t e r and t h e Mc-
Closkeys, t h e p a r t i e s e n t e r e d i n t o two agreements. These agreements
were e n t i t l e d "Agreement and Release", one was signed by p l a i n t i f f
and t h e o t h e r by h e r husband. The agreements, i d e n t i c a l p r i n t e d
forms, r e c i t e d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s "* ** i n t e n d t h a t t h i s agreement
s t a t e a l l terms of t h e i r mutual s e t t l e m e n t of demands made a g a i n s t
John Gross", t h e f a t h e r o f defendant. A t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t ,
defendant was a minor. She was i n s u r e d under h e r f a t h e r ' s automobile
i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y w i t h Safeco Insurance Company,
These agreements were executed on May 28, 1970, f o u r t e e n
days a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t occurred, I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , both agree-
ments s t a t e :
"(4) Claimant and Claimant's Spouse a g r e e a s
follows :
" ( a ) Those named i n Paragraph 1 [John Gross]
a r e r e l e a s e d from a l l l i a b i l i t y r e s u l t i n g because
of t h e a c c i d e n t . This r e l e a s e i s intended t o a p p l y
t o l i a b i l i t y f o r o r because of p r o p e r t y damage,
d e a t h , b o d i l y i n j u r i e s which a r e known t o Claimant
and b o d i l y i n j u r i e s of which Claimant i s n o t y e t
aware. " (Emphasis added) .
Under t h e s e agreements McCloskeys were paid a t o t a l of
$4,200 on t h e day t h e agreements were executed, p l u s medical ex-
penses f o r a d e f i n i t e p e r i o d following t h e a c c i d e n t , n o t t o exceed
certain dollar l i m i t s . I n a d d i t i o n , they were i s s u e d checks
t o t a l i n g $674.60 f o r medical expenses i n c u r r e d a f t e r t h e agree-
ments were signed. However, of t h a t amount a check f o r $406.90
was n o t n e g o t i a t e d , on a d v i c e of c o u n s e l .
P l a i n t i f f maintained t h a t a p o r t i o n of t h e compensation
r e c e i v e d was f o r p r o p e r t y damage only; t h a t i s , s i n c e two of t h e
d r a f t s equaled t h e e x a c t amount h e r husband had paid f o r t h e t r u c k ,
chose d r a f t s were intended t o compensate t h e l o s s of t h e t r u c k only.
Defendant, on t h e o t h e r hand, noted t h a t t h e agreements i n no way
l i m i t t h e amount s t a t e d a s b e i n g o n l y f o r p r o p e r t y damage. Rather,
t h e agreements s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r t o " a l l l i a b i l i t y r e s u l t i n g be-
cause of t h e accident.!' p l a i n t i f f s main c o n t e n t i o n was t h a t t h e
agreements do n o t p r o t e c t defendant, w h i l e d e f e n d a n t ' s main defense
was t h e agreements.
Numerous i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d on appeal but t h e determinative
i s s u e s a r e these: (1) whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n d i r e c t i n g
a v e r d i c t f o r defendant, and (2) whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y
denied p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r of proof. Before d i s c u s s i n g t h e s e i s s u e s ,
we must f i r s t determine t h e e f f e c t of t h e agreements signed by
p l a i n t i f f and h e r husband when only t h e defendant's f a t h e r ' s name
appears on t h e f a c e of each agreement.
Section 31-131(b), R,C.M, 1947, provides t h a t t h e negligence
of a minor s h a l l be imputed t o t h e person signing t h e a p p l i c a t i o n
f o r a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e , making t h a t person j o i n t l y and s e v e r a l l y
l i a b l e f o r any damages caused by t h e minor. John Gross had signed
defendant's a p p l i c a t i o n , and, by s t a t u t e , would b e l i a b l e f o r
damages caused by h i s daughter's negligence. P l a i n t i f f argues t h a t
negligence, being a l e g a l word of a r t , cannot e x i s t u n t i l i t i s
determined by a t r i e r of t h e f a c t s ; t h a t i s , s i n c e defendant had
n o t been adjudged n e g l i g e n t by a judge o r j u r y , she cannot t a k e
advantage of t h e s t a t u t e , P l a i n t i f f ' s argument i s c i r c u l a r ; i f
a j u r y was t o determine t h a t defendant was indeed n e g l i g e n t , t h e
s t a t u t e would absolve h e r through h e r f a t h e r ' s r e l e a s e , t h e r e s u l t
of which i s discussed l a t e r i n t h i s opinion. On t h e o t h e r hand,
i f a juryd&rmined she was not n e g l i g e n t , t h e r e s u l t would be the
same. Moore v , Jacobsen, 127 Mont. 341, 263 P,2d 713.
The t h r u s t of p l a i n t i f f ' s argument i s t h a t s i n c e John
Gross could not be j o i n t l y and s e v e r a l l y l i a b l e f o r t h e damages
caused by t h e negligence of defendant u n t i l a f t e r h e r negligence
was j u d i c i a l l y determined, t h e r e l e a s e of John Gross does not
r e l e a s e defendant. I n o t h e r words, Gross and defendant were n o t
j o i n t t o r t f e a s o r s a t t h e time t h e r e l e a s e s were signed. That
view misses t h e p o i n t . I f , i n f a c t , a j u r y d i d f i n d defendant
n e g l i g e n t , she would n o t be n e g l i g e n t from t h e d a t e of t h e j u d i -
c i a l determination, b u t r a t h e r from t h e d a t e of t h e t o r t . Sleeper
v. Woodmansee, 1 C.A.2d 595, 54 P.2d 519, 521,
1 Any r e l e a s e of
defendant o r h e r f a t h e r would d a t e back t o t h e a c c i d e n t , n o t t o t h e
d a t e t h e j u r y found h e r n e g l i g e n t .
Having found t h a t John Gross was j o i n t l y l i a b l e w i t h de-
f e n d a n t , we proceed t o t h e e f f e c t of t h e r e l e a s e s . Does a r e l e a s e
of Gross, r e l e a s e t h e defendant? Yes, i t does. I n Montana, t h e
r u l e h a s long been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e r e l e a s e of one j o i n t t o r t -
feasor releases the others, unless there a r e c l e a r provisions i n
the release t o the contrary. Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 266,
292 P. 577; L i s o s k i v. Anderson, 112 Mont. 112, 117,118, 112 P.2d
1055; Beedle v. Carolan, 115 Mont. 587, 590, 148 P.2d 559.
L i s o s k i was an automobile p e r s o n a l i n j u r y c a s e , There
p l a i n t i f f was a passenger i n a t a x i c a b owned by t h e defendant.
The t a x i c a b was involved i n an i n t e r s e c t i o n c o l l i s i o n w i t h a n o t h e r
c a r belonging t o Glasgow Motors. P l a i n t i f f signed an instrument
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l e a s i n g Glasgow Motors and " a l l o t h e r persons ***
from a l l claims". P l a i n t i f f urged she be allowed t o show t h a t t h e
r e l e a s e was n o t intended t o cover t h e defendant. Answering t h a t
argument, t h i s Court s a i d :
II
The language could n o t be more p l a i n t o show
t h e i n t e n t i o n t o make t h e r e l e a s e o p e r a t e a s t o
a l l h e r claims a g a i n s t a l l persons which would
i n c l u d e t h e s e defendants. 11
W b e l i e v e t h e language of Clause (4) of t h e two "Agreement
e
and el ease" documents i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t o be no l e s s p l a i n q
6 B l a s h f i e l d , Automobile Law and P r a c t i c e , 3rd Ed, 5257.52,states
t h e r u l e i n t h i s manner:
"The g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t , i n t h e absence of s t a t u t e ,
t h e r e l e a s e of one t o r t - f e a s o r e x t i n g u i s h e s and
d i s c h a r g e s t h e l i a b i l i t y of o t h e r t o r t - f e a s o r s
a p p l i e s where a motor v e h i c l e s a c c i d e n t occasions
an i n j u r y . It h a s been h e l d t h a t t h e amount p a i d f o r
t h e r e l e a s e i s n o t m a t e r i a l o r open f o r q u e s t i o n
provided i t h a s been accepted i n f u l l s a t i s f a c t i o n
and d i s c h a r g e of t h e claim. The r u l e t h a t a r e l e a s e
of one o p e r a t e s a s a d i s c h a r g e of a l l l i a b l e f o r t h e
i n j u r y i s based on t h e view t h a t a r e l e a s e and d i s -
charge c o n s t i t u t e a s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e claim, 1:
Mere, t h e r e i s no mention i n t h e r e l e a s e agreements of any
r e s e r v a t i o n r e g a r d i n g p o s s i b l e f u t u r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t defendant, a s
opposed t o an a c t i o n a g a i n s t h e r f a t h e r . C e r t a i n l y , i t cannot be
a s s e r t e d h e r e t h a t Clause ( 4 ) , h e r e t o f o r e quoted, should be given
any meaning d i f f e r e n t from t h e p l a i n import of t h o s e words. In
L i s o s k i , t h i s Court s a i d :
"* + * t h e r u l e i s t h a t t o s a v e t h e r i g h t
:
of r e c o u r s e a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r f e a s o r s , t h e
r e l e a s e must b e i n t h e n a t u r e of a covenant
n o t t o sue o r t h e r e must be words i n t h e
r e l e a s e which show t h a t i t i s n o t i n f u l l
s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c l a i m and t h a t he [ c l a i m a n t ]
does n o t thereby d i s c h a r g e t h e o t h e r s from
liability."
Here, w e do n o t f i n d t h e r e l e a s e agreements contained any such
covenants, Furthermore, t h e d r a f t s by which p l a i n t i f f and h e r
husband were paid a l l r e c i t e on t h e back of each t h e s e words:
II
By endorsement h e r e o f payee hereby r e l e a s e s
a l l claims a r i s i n g o u t of t h e occurrence r e -
f e r r e d t o on t h e f a c e hereof a g a i n s t
1I
Safeco Insurance Company of America
"and, where a p p l i c a b l e , i t s i n s u r e d . "
Tn and of i t s e l f , such a statement on t h e r e v e r s e of a check
would be s u s p e c t . But,when coupled w i t h t h e c l e a r and unambiguous
language of t h e r e l e a s e agreements, t h e i n t e n t i s obvious. We
f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o a l l o w p l a i n t i f f t o endorse f i v e d r a f t s
b e f o r e r a i s i n g q u e s t i o n s concerning t h e e f f e c t of t h e language
appearing on them.
T h i s Court h a s considered such r e l e a s e s and t h e i r e f f e c t
many times. Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 292 P. 577, p r e s e n t s
a l e a r n e d and a u t h o r i t a t i v e account of t h e law concerning r e l e a s e s .
The v a l i d i t y of t h e r u l e s s t a t e d i n Black h a s r e p e a t e d l y been
affirmed. I n Chisholm v. Vocational School, 103 Mont. 503, 511,
64 P.2d 838, we s a i d :
h he v o l u n t a r y payment of a d e b t by one n o t
l e g a l l y l i a b l e t o do so n e v e r t h e l e s s e x t i n g u i s h e s
the debt a s t o the c r e d i t o r 9 ; ** and t h e r e s u l t
i s t h e same where one of two j o i n t t o r t - f e a s o r s
pays t h e damages claimed. ** JC
"1n a c a s e such a s t h i s , i f t h e two p a r t i e s t o
whom t h e i n j u r e d person looks f o r compensation
a r e j o i n t t o r t - f e a s o r s , where t h e i n j u r e d person
a c c e p t s f u l l s a t i s f a c t i o n o r what t h e law con-
s i d e r s such *** i t i s a b a r t o an a c t i o n a g a i n s t
the other ** * *".
W b e l i e v e t h a t r u l e t o be c o r r e c t l y s t a t e d .
e See a l s o : Tanner
v. Bowen, 34 Mont. 121, 124, 85 P. 876.
A s t o t h e determinative i s s u e s : P l a i n t i f f , i n h e r o f f e r of
proof, contended she should n o t be bound by t h e r e l e a s e s , She
o f f e r e d t o show, by o r a l testimony, a s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r e n t than
t h a t appearing on t h e f a c e of t h e "Agreement and ele ease" forms,
She argues f u r t h e r t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e agreements was i n
dispute. P l a i n t i f f r e l i e s upon s e c t i o n 93-401-13, R.C.M, 1947,
regarding when evidence o t h e r than t h e c o n t e n t s of a w r i t t e n
agreement may be introduced; and, s e c t i o n 93-401-17, R.C.M. 1947,
n o t i n g t h a t surrounding circumstances should be considered, At
t h e same time, p l a i n t i f f contends t h a t one of t h e agreements was
t o cover t h e damage t o t h e t r u c k , and t h e o t h e r medical expenses
and h e r " d i f f i c u l t y " up t o t h a t time. That argument, however,
goes merely t o t h e scope of the agreements, n o t t h e i r v a l i d i t y .
P l a i n t i f f a l s o claims t h e i s s u e of fraud was r a i s e d i n t h e o f f e r
of proof. W do not f i n d t h a t i s s u e r a i s e d , nor can i t now be
e
r a i s e d on appeal.
W note t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r of proof came a t t h e end
e
of t h e c a s e , and a f t e r defendant had made a motion f o r a d i r e c t e d
verdict. The o f f e r of proof purported t o show p l a i n t i f f was
not bound by h e r r e l e a s e because: (1) she d i d not i n t e n d t o
r e l e a s e Denise Gross; (2) t h e r e l e a s e was intended t o cover j u s t
property damage, medical b i l l s , and pain and s u f f e r i n g t o t h e
d a t e of t h e r e l e a s e ; (3) she was a l l e g e d l y t o l d t h a t even i f she
signed a r e l e a s e she would be a b l e t o b r i n g a lawsuit w i t h i n
t h r e e y e a r s ; (4) Safeco f a i l e d t o pay a l l t h e b i l l s i t was r e -
quired t o pay under t h e terms of t h e r e l e a s e .
W f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of t h e o f f e r
e
of proof. Here, a p r e t r i a l order was prepared and executed by
counsel; p l a i n t i f f made no contentions a t t h e p r e t r i a l s t a g e a s
t o h e r competency, a s t o fraud o r mistake o r lack of c o n s i d e r a t i o n
for the release. These a r e a l l a f f i r m a t i v e matters which should have
been r a i s e d a s contentions a t p r e t r i a l and t o r a i s e them when she
d i d , was too l a t e .
P l a i n t i f f r e l i e s upon t h e r e c e n t c a s e of L i t t s v . P i e r c e
County, 5 Wash.App. 531, 488 P.2d 785, 790, and a s k s t h i s Court
t o adopt t h e r u l e s e t down i n t h a t c a s e . W d e c l i n e t o c o n s i d e r
e
t h i s authority f o r f a c t u a l l y i t i s not applicable. In Litts,
t h e p l a i n t i f f was i n j u r e d i n a two c a r a c c i d e n t a t an i n t e r s e c t i o n
of two r o a d s maintained by t h e county. S u i t a g a i n s t t h e adverse
d r i v e r was s e t t l e d and s u i t was then i n s t i t u t e d a g a i n s t t h e
county, a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e i n j u r i e s r e s u l t e d from t h e n e g l i g e n t
a c t s and omissions o f t h e county. The c o u r t r u l e d :
It* ** we adopt t h e r u l e t h a t a r e l e a s e by an
i n j u r e d p a r t y of one of s e v e r a l c o n c u r r e n t t o r t -
f e a s o r s , whose o b l i g a t i o n i s s o l i d a r y , does n o t
r e l e a s e the other concurrent t o r t - f e a s o r s unless
i t can be e s t a b l i s h e d a s a f a c t e i t h e r (1) t h a t
t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y intended t o r e l e a s e a l l t o r t -
f e a s o r s o r (2) t h a t t h e r e l e a s e c o n s t i t u e d s a t i s -
f a c t i o n of t h e o b l i g a t i o n . l I
Here, t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i s t i n g u i s h e d L i t t s , where t h e r e
were s e p a r a t e independent a c t s of negligence by two s e p a r a t e
a c t o r s producing t h e i n j u r y , and t h e i n s t a n t case. Even i f
w e were t o adopt t h i s r u l e , t h e h o l d i n g would b e t h e same f o r
only one a c t , n o t two independent a c t s of n e g l i g e n c e , produced
the injury. F u r t h e r , t h a t r u l e i s n o t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Montana
T h i s Court i n Webber v. K i l l o r n , 66 Mont. 130, 132, 212
P. 852, s a i d i t i s elementary:
"* * fc t h a t when a c o n t r a c t h a s been reduced t o
w r i t i n g t h e c o n t e n t s of such w r i t i n g cannot be
added t o , c o n t r a d i c t e d , a l t e r e d , o r v a r i e d by
par01 o r e x t r i n s i c evidence, and t h a t such w r i t i n g
supersedes a l l o r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s concerning i t s
m a t t e r which preceded, accompanied, o r l e d up t o
i t s execution. I I
See a l s o : West River Equip. Co, v . Holzworth, 134 Mont. 582, 588,
335 P.2d 298; United S t a t e s v. W i l l a r d E , F r a s e r Co., 308 F.Supp.
557, a f f ' d 459 F.2d 483.
There must be some p o i n t a t which a p r o p e r l y executed
r e l e a s e , accompanied by adequate c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i s immutable.
The s i t u a t i o n h e r e seems t o i n d i c a t e t h a t p l a i n t i f f became d i s -
s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e "Agreement and Release" forms a f t e r t h e y were
executed. But t h e f a c t remains t h a t t h e instruments were signed
and l a t e n t d i s c o n t e n t cannot be grounds f o r a l t e r a t i o n of t h e i r
e x p r e s s terms.
Therefore, we f i n d t h e r e l e a s e s were v a l i d and e f f e c t i v e
w i t h r e g a r d t o defendant and c o n s t i t u t e d complete s a t i s f a c t i o n
o f p l a i n t i f f ' s claim. P l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r of proof a t t e m p t i n g t o
v a r y t h e express terms of t h e w r i t t e n r e l e a s e agreements was
properly r e j e c t e d .
F i n a l l y , we hold t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n d i r e c t i n g
a v e r d i c t f o r defendant.
The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s affirmed.
i
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A sociate Justic
................................
Associate J u s t i c e s ,
Mr, J u s t i c e Haswell and M r , J u s t i c e Daly s p e c i a l l y c o n c u r r i n g :
W concur i n t h e r e s u l t b u t n o t i n t h e r a t i o n a l e of t h e
e
m a j o r i t y opinion.
I n our view, t h e r e l e a s e agreements h e r e b a r p l a i n t i f f ' s
a c t i o n on two grounds: (1) t h e l i a b i l i t y of f a t h e r and daughter
i s i n s e p a r a b l e and i d e n t i c a l , both i n kind and i n amount, so t h a t
s e t t l e m e n t and r e l e a s e of one must n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s t i t u t e s e t t l e -
ment and r e l e a s e of t h e o t h e r , and (2) r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e r e l e a s e
agreements.
The r e l e a s e s h e r e b a r p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n , n o t because
Denise and h e r f a t h e r a r e j o i n t t o r t f e a s o r s which they a r e n o t ,
b u t because t h e l i a b i l i t y of each i s i d e n t i c a l , i n d i v i s i b l e , and
inseparable. L i a b i l i t y of t h e f a t h e r i s imputed by s t a t u t e ,
wholly d e r i v a t i v e , and i n l i k e amount t o t h a t of t h e daughter.
Accordingly, s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e one c l a i m must n e c e s s a r i l y i n c l u d e
settlement of the other.
A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e acceptance of pa.yment and t h e conduct
of t h e p a r t i e s c o n s t i t u t e s r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e r e l e a s e s under
s e c t i o n 13-325, R,C,M. 1947, which provides:
II
A v o l u n t a r y acceptance of t h e b e n e f i t of a t r a n s -
a c t i o n i s e q u i v a l e n t t o a consent t o a l l t h e o b l i g a -
t i o n s a r i s i n g from i t , so f a r a s t h e f a c t s a r e known,
o r ought t o b e known, t o t h e person a c c e p t i n g . 1 1
/ Associate J u s t i c e s . f