No. 13253
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN
1977
THE STATE OF MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
BERNARD JAMES FITZPATRICK,
GARY R A D I , TRAVIS HOLLIDAY,
PAUL BAD HORSE, J R . , and
EDWIN R . BUSHMAN,
D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t s .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l
District,
Honorable Nat A l l e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellants:
J o h n L. Adams, Jr. a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana
R o b e r t L. S t e p h e n s , J r . a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana
Reno and Dove, B i l l i n g s , Montana
James Reno a r g u e d , ~ i l l i n g s ,Montana
C h r i s J. N e l s o n a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana
C l a r e n c e T. B e l u e , H a r d i n , Montana
C a t e , Lynaugh, F i t z g e r a l d & Huss, B i l l i n g s , Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. M i c h a e l G r e e l y a r g u e d , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,
H e l e n a , Montana
James S e y k o r a a r g u e d , County A t t o r n e y , H a r d i n ,
Montana
James S i n c l a i r a r g u e d , S p e c i a l Deputy C o . A t t o r n e y ,
B i l l i n g s , Montana
Submitted: J a n u a r y 28, 1977
Decided: $ @= j9;47
! &ig
F i l e d : .jf)t-
-
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from t h e f i n a l judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t , Big Horn County, f o l l o w i n g a j u r y t r i a l . Defendants
F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi a p p e a l from judgments o f c o n v i c t i o n f o r
d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g and r o b b e r y . Defen-
d a n t s H o l l i d a y and Bad Horse a p p e a l from judgments o f c o n v i c t i o n
f o r robbery.
On May 20, 1975, t h e S t a t e o f Montana f i l e d a n Informa-
t i o n c h a r g i n g d e f e n d a n t s F i t z p a t r i c k , Radi, H o l l i d a y , Bad Horse
and Bushman w i t h d e l i b e r a t e homicide, i n v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n
94-5-102 (1) a ) ( b ) , R.C .M.
( 1947; a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g i n v i o l a -
t i o n o f s e c t i o n s 94-5-303 (1)( b ) ( c ) , 94-5-303 ( 2 ) and 94-5-304,
R.C.M. 1947; and robbery, i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-5-401 (1) b ) ,
(
R.C.M. 1947. The a f f i d a v i t o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e i n d i c a t e s t h e s e
c h a r g e s s t e m from t h e A p r i l 5, 1975 r o b b e r y o f t h e Safeway s t o r e
i n Hardin, Montana and t h e murder o f Monte Dyckman, a Safeway
s t o r e employee. Following d e f e n s e m o t i o n s f o r s e v e r a n c e o f t r i a l ,
change o f venue and d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f j u d g e s , t r i a l was h e l d
i n B i l l i n g s , Montana i n October 1975. Defendant Bushman t e s t i -
f i e d i n b e h a l f o f t h e s t a t e and was g r a n t e d immunity from p r o s e -
cution. A t t h e conclusion of t h e s t a t e ' s case-in-chief, all
defendants r e s t e d without o f f e r i n g evidence. Defendants F i t z p a t r i c k
and Radi were found g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a g g r a v a t e d
k i d n a p p i n g , and r o b b e r y . Defendants H o l l i d a y and Bad Horse w e r e
found g u i l t y o n l y o f r o b b e r y .
On October 29, 1975, d e f e n d a n t s F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi were
e a c h s e n t e n c e d t o 100 y e a r s imprisonment f o r t h e c r i m e o f d e l i b e r a t e
homicide; 100 y e a r s imprisonment f o r t h e c r i m e of r o b b e r y a s
p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 95-2206.5, R.C.M.
1947; and d e a t h by hanging f o r t h e c r i m e o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g .
Defendants H o l l i d a y and Bad Horse w e r e e a c h s e n t e n c e d t o 4 0
y e a r s imprisonment f o r t h e c r i m e o f r o b b e r y . Defendants Radi
and F i t z p a t r i c k ' s s e n t e n c e s o f d e a t h were s t a y e d by t h e d i s -
t r i c t c o u r t pending a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t .
A t t r i a l t h e s t a t e o f f e r e d e v i d e n c e t o p r o v e t h a t de-
f e n d a n t s m e t i n B i l l i n g s , Montana on A p r i l 5, 1975 and c o n s p i r e d
t o r o b t h e Safeway g r o c e r y s t o r e i n H a r d i n , a s m a l l community 50
miles south of B i l l i n g s . The s t a t e o f f e r e d d i r e c t and circum-
s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t e n d i n g t o p r o v e t h a t on t h e evening o f A p r i l
5 , 1975 d e f e n d a n t s F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi d r o v e t o Hardin i n R a d i ' s
a u t o m o b i l e , w h i l e ~ o l l j . d a y , ~ aHorse and Bushman t o g e t h e r d r o v e
d
t o ~ a r d i n n another automobile.
i Defendants parked i n f r o n t of
t h e Safeway s t o r e and w a i t e d u n t i l c l o s i n g t i m e when E v e r e t t
S t o l t z , t h e s t o r e manager, and Monte Dyckman, a s t o r e employee
locked t h e s t o r e d o o r s and d r o v e away i n d i f f e r e n t a u t o m o b i l e s .
F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi f o l l o w e d t h e s t o r e manager. The r e m a i n i n g
d e f e n d a n t s p u r p o r t e d l y f o l l o w e d Monte Dyckman b u t l o s t s i g h t o f
him when he s t o p p e d a t t h e p o s t o f f i c e t o d e p o s i t m a i l . When
t h e s t o r e manager d r o v e t o h i s home, Radi and F i t z p a t r i c k
r e a l i z e d t h e s t o r e r e c e i p t s were c a r r i e d by Dyckman and t h e y
proceeded t o t h e bank where t h e d e p o s i t w a s t o be dropped. It i s
a l l e g e d F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi a b d u c t e d Monte Dyckman a t t h e bank,
p r i o r t o h i s d e p o s i t i n g t h e s t o r e ' s r e c e i p t s , robbed him, and
t h e n k i l l e d him i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f t h e Toluca I n t e r c h a n g e , 1 2
m i l e s w e s t o f H a r d i n , w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f Big Horn County.
Defendants r a i s e numerous i s s u e s on a p p e a l . W e hold t h e
judgments o f c o n v i c t i o n must be r e v e r s e d and t h e c a u s e s remanded
f o r new t r i a l s . Therefore, we d i s c u s s only t h e following i s s u e s
t o i n s u r e t h a t we d o n o t comment on m a t t e r s t o come b e f o r e t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n a new t r i a l :
I. Whether t h e Montana s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s f o r j u r y
s e l e c t i o n a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a l i d and, i f s o , whether t h e j u r y
i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e was s e l e c t e d and drawn i n s u b s t a n t i a l
compliance w i t h t h e law?
11. Whether t h e d e f e n d a n t s were p r e j u d i c e d by t h e
j o i n d e r of t h e i r t r i a l s ?
111. Whether t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f de-
f e n d a n t Bushman's t e s t i m o n y ?
IV. Whether t h e c o n v i c t i o n s of d e f e n d a n t s H o l l i d a y and
Bad Horse s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d and t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t them d i s -
missed on t h e grounds t h e j u r y was i n a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d on
t h e a p p l i c a b l e law and r e t u r n e d i n c o n s i s t e n t v e r d i c t s ?
Issue I. Defendants i n i t i a l l y contend t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n s
should be r e v e r s e d and t h e c a u s e s remanded on t h e grounds t h e
Montana s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n f o r s e l e c t i n g j u r o r s i s u n c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l a n d , even i f t h e s t a t u t e i s found t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,
t h a t t h e j u r y p a n e l s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e w e r e s e l e c t e d and
drawn i n t o t a l d i s r e g a r d of t h e a p p l i c a b l e Montana l a w . Section
95-1908, R.C.M. 1947, sets f o r t h t h e p r o c e d u r e i n c h a l l e n g i n g
t h e s e l e c t i o n of a j u r y p a n e l :
"Motion t o d i s c h a r g e j u r y p a n e l . ( a ) Any o b j e c t i o n
t o t h e manner i n which a j u r y p a n e l h a s been
s e l e c t e d o r drawn s h a l l be r a i s e d by a motion t o
discharge t h e jury panel. The motion s h a l l be
made a t l e a s t f i v e ( 5 ) d a y s p r i o r t o t h e t e r m f o r
which t h e j u r y i s drawn. For good c a u s e shown, t h e
c o u r t may e n t e r t a i n t h e motion a t any t i m e t h e r e a f t e r .
" ( b ) The motion s h a l l be i n w r i t i n g s u p p o r t e d by
a f f i d a v i t and s h a l l s t a t e f a c t s which show t h a t t h e
j u r y p a n e l was i m p r o p e r l y s e l e c t e d o r drawn.
" ( c ) I f t h e motion s t a t e s f a c t s which show t h a t t h e
j u r y p a n e l h a s been i m p r o p e r l y s e l e c t e d o r drawn,
it s h a l l be t h e d u t y o f t h e c o u r t t o c o n d u c t a h e a r -
ing. The burden of proof s h a l l be on t h e movant.
"(d) I f the court finds t h a t t h e j u r y p a n e l was
i m p r o p e r l y s e l e c t e d o r drawn, the court s h a l l order
t h e j u r y p a n e l d i s c h a r g e d and the selection o r
drawing o f a new p a n e l i n t h e manner p r o v i d e d by
law. I'
A t t h e o u t s e t w e n o t e d e f e n d a n t s have f a i l e d t o comply
w i t h s e c t i o n 95-1908. Defendants r a i s e d t h e i s s u e of improper
j u r y s e l e c t i o n and d r a w i n g i n a t i m e l y and s p e c i f i c manner,
b u t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t record f a i l s t o d i s c l o s e t h e submission
o f any a f f i d a v i t i n s u p p o r t o f t h e a l l e g a t i o n . Defense c o u n s e l
c o n t e n d , on o r a l a r g u m e n t b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t , t h a t t h e t i m e l y
s u b m i s s i o n o f a s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t , r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 95-1908,
was p r o h i b i t i v e s i n c e c o u n s e l l a c k e d t h e means o f d e t e r m i n i n g
t h e manner i n which t h e j u r y p a n e l was s e l e c t e d and drawn. Absent
s u c h knowledge, d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c o n c l u d e t h e f i l i n g o f a f f i d a v i t s
b e f o r e t h i s Court a t t h e t i m e of appeal i s s u f f i c i e n t . W disagree.
e
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e c l e a r l y r e v e a l s t h a t a t l e a s t o n e
d e f e n s e c o u n s e l was c o g n i z a n t o f t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 95-
1908. The m o t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t Bad H o r s e t o d i s c h a r g e t h e j u r y
panel s t a t e s :
"COMES NOW t h e D e f e n d a n t , PAUL BAD HORSE, J R . ,
and moves t h e C o u r t t o D i s c h a r g e t h e J u r y P a n e l
h e r e i n p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 95-1908, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 .
" S a i d m o t i o n w i l l b e s u p p o r t e d by a f f i d a v i t when
t h e j u r y p a n e l i s s e l e c t e d and made known t o t h i s
defendant.
"Dated t h i s 2 9 t h d a y o f A u g u s t , 1 9 7 5 . "
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e i s d e p l e t e o f any a f f i d a v i t
supporting t h i s motion t o d i s c h a r g e t h e j u r y panel. Absent such
a showing o f good c a u s e t o s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e i r m o t i o n , d e f e n d a n t s
c a n n o t c h a l l e n g e t h e j u r y p a n e l f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e o n a p p e a l on
t h e ground t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f a i l e d t o s e l e c t and draw j u r y
p a n e l s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a p p l i c a b l e Montana law. Ledger v .
McKenzie, 107 Mont. 335, 85 P.2d 352; S t a t e v . C o r l i s s , 150 Mont.
4 0 , 430 P.2d 632. The means o f e s t a b l i s h i n g good c a u s e , s p e c i f i -
c a l l y t h e sworn a f f i d a v i t s o f t h e c h i e f d e p u t y c l e r k o f t h e d i s -
t r i c t c o u r t o f Y e l l o w s t o n e County and t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e c o u n t y
r e g i s t r a r o f v o t e r s , were a s a c c e s s i b l e a t t h e t i m e o f t r i a l a s
a t t h e t i m e of appeal.
Yet, d e f e n d a n t s ' f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h s e c t i o n 95-1908,
w i l l n o t f o r e c l o s e our c o n s i d e r a t i o n of whether t h e j u r y panel
was p r o p e r l y s e l e c t e d and drawn where t h e fundamental c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of t h e d e f e n d a n t s a r e a t s t a k e . S t a t e v. P o r t e r ,
125 Mont. 503, 242 P.2d 984; S t a t e e x r e l . Henningsen v . ~ i s t r i c t
C o u r t , 136 Mont. 354, 348 P.2d 143; S t a t e v . Chapman, 139 Mont.
98, 360 P.2d 703. Thus w e c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e
s e l e c t i o n o f j u r o r s and drawing o f j u r y p a n e l s i n t h e i n s t a n t
c a s e i n f r i n g e d on d e f e n d a n t s ' fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s ?
T h i s Court h a s l o n g h e l d t h e a c c u s e d i n a c r i m i n a l p r o s e -
c u t i o n i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y g u a r a n t e e d a t r i a l by a n i m p a r t i a l
j u r y s e l e c t e d and drawn i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e law. S t a t e ex
r e l . Henningson v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , s u p r a ; S t a t e v . Hay, 120 Mont.
573, 194 P.2d 232; Dupont v. McAdow, 6 Mont. 226, 9 P. 925. Any
m a t e r i a l d e v i a t i o n o r d e p a r t u r e i n p r o c u r i n g a j u r y h a s been
h e l d t o c o n s t i t u t e a d e n i a l o f fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s .
S t a t e v . P o r t e r , s u p r a ; S t a t e v . Groom, 49 Mont. 354, 1 4 1 P. 858;
S t a t e v . Tighe, 27 Mont. 327, 7 1 P. 3; r e v e r s e d on o t h e r grounds
3 5 M o n t . 512, 90 P. 981.
The Revised Codes o f Montana a r e e x p l i c i t l y c l e a r i n
d e f i n i n g t h e p r o c e d u r e t o be f o l l o w e d i n s e l e c t i n g j u r o r s and
drawing j u r y p a n e l s . S e c t i o n 93-1301, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s
t h a t r e g i s t e r e d e l e c t o r s whose names a p p e a r on t h e most r e c e n t
l i s t of a l l r e g i s t e r e d e l e c t o r s , a s p r e p a r e d by t h e c o u n t y r e g i s -
t r a r , a r e competent t o s e r v e a s j u r o r s . S e c t i o n 93-1401, R.C.M.
1947, p r o v i d e s t h a t a l i s t of p e r s o n s t o s e r v e a s j u r o r s must be
p r e p a r e d by t h e chairman o f t h e c o u n t y commissioners, o r i n h i s
a b s e n c e , any member of t h e board o f c o u n t y commissioners, t h e
c o u n t y t r e a s u r e r and t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r o r any two cf such
officers. Once t h e j u r y l i s t i s composed, s e c t i o n 93-1402,
R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e s t h a t e a c h name on t h e l i s t be a s s i g n e d a
number and t h e l i s t of t h e names of t h e p e r s o n s be d e l i v e r e d by
those o f f i c e r s t o t h e c l e r k of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t pursuant t o
section 93-1403, R.C.M. 1947. Section 93-1404, R.C.M. 1947,
mandates that the clerk of court place the individual pieces of
paper, embossed with the number assigned each juror, in a box
and from this box the numbers are to be drawn by the district
judge in the presence of the clerk of court pursuant to section
93-1502, R.C.M. 1947. Section 93-1512, R.C.M. 1947, provides
that in the event additional jurors are needed, their numbers
must also be drawn by the district judge.
Defendants contend section 93-1301, regarding the com-
petency of jurors, is unconstitutional in that voter registra-
tion lists fail to provide a true cross-section of the community
in violation of equal protection requirements of the state and
federal constitutions. It is argued the voter registration
system excludes residents who are qualified for jury service, but
are not qualified to vote or do not choose to vote. The issue of
whether voter registration lists are a proper instrument for
selecting jurors was recently discussed in United States v. Ramos
Colon, 415 F.Supp. 459, 464:
"From a constitutional standpoint it is well
settled that voting lists may be used as a basis
for jury selection unless it appears that in the
comm;nity there is systematic, intentional and
deliberate exclusion from those lists of a partic-
ular economic, social, religious, racial, geograph-
ical or political group. [Citing cases.]
From Colon and Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, we glean
the prima facie case for establishing a statutory challenge
to a jury selection system on the ground of jury composition:
1) Proof that the jury selection system is disadvantageous to a
cognizable class, and 2) proof that the disadvantage is occasioned
by discrimination in the selection process.
Defendants bear the burden of establishing the cognizable
class which is discriminated against by the jury selection process.
Purposeful discrimination may not be assumed or merely asserted.
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L ed 2d 759;
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L ed 84. De-
fendants' only allegation of discrimination was that the jury
panel was composed of all whites, with the exception of two
Indians, and that the convicting jury was exclusively white in
composition. Such allegation falls short of establishing a
prima facie case challenging the jury selection system on the
ground of racial composition. Petition of Boe, 156 Mont. 303,
481 P.2d 45; State v. Johnson, 149 Mont. 173, 424 P.2d 728. It
is a well accepted proposition of law that the voter registration
list, from which the jurors are selected, and the jury panel
need not perfectly mirror the racial composition of the community.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 6 9 2 4 2 L ed 2d 690;
Foster v. Sparks, supra; State v. Taylor, 168 Mont. 142, 542 P.2d
100, 32 St.Rep. 993.
Defendants further contend the jury panels in the instant
case were selected and drawn in total disregard of the applicable
Montana law. We find merit in defendants' claim that the manner
in which jurors were selected and drawn substantially deviated
from the procedures mandated in Title 93, Revised Codes of
Montana, 1947. Specifically, all duties delegated to the jury
commission and district court judge were performed by the clerk
of court without any apparent overseeing. While we have no cause
to question the good faith of the public officers involved, it
is obvious the statutory scheme for selecting and drawing a jury
was completely circumvented. The rule in Montana is that juries
must be selected and drawn in substantial compliance with the
law. Where the disregard for legislative mandates amounts to
more than technical irregularity substantial compliance has not
been achieved. State ex rel. Henningsen v. District Court,
supra; State v. Porter, supra. We stated initially that this
m a t t e r was n o t p r o p e r l y r a i s e d on a p p e a l , b u t it i s o f s u f -
f i c i e n t import t o warrant a f u l l d i s c u s s i o n f o r f u t u r e
guidance.
I s s u e 11. Defendants contend t h a t t h e j o i n d e r of
t h e i r t r i a l s , a f t e r t i m e l y and s p e c i f i c f i l i n g o f m o t i o n s f o r
severance, brought about t h e s e e r r o r s :
1. The j u r y was a l l o w e d t o c o n s i d e r h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e
which was i n a d m i s s i b l e a g a i n s t c e r t a i n d e f e n d a n t s , y e t a d m i s s i b l e
against others.
2. The a d m i s s i o n o f h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e d e n i e d i n d i v i d u a l
d e f e n d a n t s t h e i r fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o confronta-
t i o n u n d e r t h e S i x t h Amendment of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n .
3. The j o i n d e r o f d e f e n d a n t s ' t r i a l s d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t s
t h e i r r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel.
The o n l y s p e c i f i c example o f t h e a d m i s s i o n o f e x t r a j u d i -
c i a 1 h e a r s a y c i t e d t o u s i s Bushman's t e s t i m o n y of s t a t e m e n t s
a l l e g e d l y made by d e f e n d a n t Radi. Bushman t e s t i f i e d t h e s e s t a t e -
ments w e r e made a t R a d i ' s home i n B i l l i n g s on A p r i l 6, 1 9 7 5 ,
a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2:30 a . m . , s e v e r a l h o u r s a f t e r t h e commission
of t h e a l l e g e d crimes. A l l of defendants, w i t h t h e exception
o f F i t z p a t r i c k , w e r e p r e s e n t when t h e s t a t e m e n t s w e r e made.
Bushman t e s t i f i e d Radi s t a t e d :
"A. ' F i t z d i d n ' t have t o s h o o t t h e k i d . '
I ! * * *
"A. And h e s a i d , ' F i t z s h o t h i m . ' He said,
'Boom, boom, h e blew h i s head o f f . '
"A. * * * he s a i d , ' F i t z p a t r i c k i s p r e t t y p i s s e d
off.' h e s a i d , ' H e i s uptown g e t t i n g d r u n k be-
c a u s e him h a v i n g t o s h o o t t h e k i d f o r n o t h i n g
b e c a u s e tlere w a s no money i n t h e bag."'
The c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1, s t a t e d :
"You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t where o n e d e f e n d a n t
testifies about what was said by a second de-
fendant, it is ordinarily not admissible as
evidence against any other defendant if that
other defendant was not present at the time and
place where it was said.
"However, what is said is admissible against the
defendants that are present when it is said.
"In your deliberation, you are not to consider
what was said against any defendant who was not
present at the time and place where it was said.
"You may consider what was said as evidence against
those defendants present at the time and place it
was said.
"The reason for this is that a defendant who is
not present when something was said about him,
cannot, of course, deny that it was said because
it is quite obvious he was not there to know the
facts. Therefore, you will not use it as evidence
against him."
Defendants contend the instruction of the district court
was insufficient and failed to erase from the minds of the jurors
the crucial and devastating prejudice naturally flowing from the
testimony.
In support of their argument defendants cite Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L ed 2d 476. In
Bruton the codefendants Bruton and Evans were tried jointly and
convicted of armed postal robbery. During the trial a postal
inspector testified Evans confessed that Bruton and Evans com-
mitted the robbery. Evans' conviction was later reversed be-
cause the oral admission had been elicited by police officers
in disregard of Evans' Miranda rights. Bruton's conviction was
upheld on the theory the trial court sufficiently instructed
the jurors not to consider Evans' confession as evidence against
Bruton. The United States Supreme Court disagreed and reversed
Bruton's conviction stating:
" * * * because of the substantial risk that the
jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked
to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in
determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evans'
confession in this joint trial violated petitioner's
r i g h t of c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n s e c u r e d by t h e Con-
f r o n t a t i o n C l a u s e o f t h e S i x t h Amendment."
391 U . S . 126.
I n a f o o t n o t e t h e Court s a i d :
"We emphasize t h a t t h e h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t i n c u l -
p a t i n g p e t i t i o n e r was c l e a r l y i n a d m i s s i b l e a g a i n s t
him under t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e s o f e v i d e n c e * * * t h e
problem a r i s i n g o n l y b e c a u s e t h e s t a t e m e n t was * * *
a d m i s s i b l e a g a i n s t t h e d e c l a r a n t Evans. * * * T h e r e
i s n o t b e f o r e u s , t h e r e f o r e , any r e c o g n i z e d excep-
t i o n t o t h e hearsay r u l e i n s o f a r a s p e t i t i o n e r i s
concerned and we i n t i m a t e no view whatever t h a t such
e x c e p t i o n s n e c e s s a r i l y r a i s e q u e s t i o n s under t h e
Confrontation Clause." 391 U . S . 128.
The s t a t e a r g u e s Bruton i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e i n -
s t a n t c a s e s i n c e t h e h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t s t e s t i f i e d t o by Bushman
w e r e a d m i s s i b l e under t h e coconspirator exception t o t h e hearsay
rule. S e c t i o n 93-401-27, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s i n p a r t :
" F a c t s which may be proved on t r i a l . I n conformity
w i t h t h e p r e c e d i n g p r o v i s i o n s , e v i d e n c e may be g i v e n
upon a t r i a l o f t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t s :
"6. A f t e r proof o f a c o n s p i r a c y , t h e a c t o r d e c l a r a -
t i o n o f a c o n s p i r a t o r a g a i n s t h i s c o c o n s p i r a t o r , and
r e l a t i n g t o t h e conspiracy."
The s t a t e f u r t h e r a r g u e s even i f R a d i ' s d e c l a r a t i o n s w e r e
n o t a d m i s s i b l e under t h e c o c o n s p i r a t o r e x c e p t i o n t o t h e h e a r s a y
r u l e , t h e y were a d m i s s i b l e under s e c t i o n 93-401-7, R.C.M. 1947,
which p r o v i d e s :
" D e c l a r a t i o n s which a r e a p a r t of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n .
Where, a l s o , t h e d e c l a r a t i o n , a c t , o r o m i s s i o n
forms p a r t o f a t r a n s a c t i o n , which i s i t s e l f t h e
f a c t i n d i s p u t e , o r e v i d e n c e of t h a t f a c t , such
d e c l a r a t i o n , a c t , o r omission i s evidence, a s p a r t
of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n . "
The s t a t e c o n t e n d s t h e c o c o n s p i r a t o r e x c e p t i o n t o t h e
hearsay r u l e i s a v a i l a b l e i n t h i s c a s e , s i n c e t h e s t a t e prose-
c u t e d t h e c a s e on t h e t h e o r y t h e r e was a c o n s p i r a c y t o commit
robbery. I t i s argued t h a t , even though t h e c r i m e o f c o n s p i r a c y
was n o t c h a r g e d a s a s e p a r a t e o f f e n s e i n t h e I n f o r m a t i o n , t h e
s t a t e c o u l d p r o p e r l y p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e t o show t h e r e w a s a con-
spiracy. Defendants u r g e t h e s t a t e i s b a r r e d from u t i l i z i n g
t h e coconspirator exception t o t h e hearsay r u l e s i n c e t h e
s t a t e d i d n o t c h a r g e d e f e n d a n t s w i t h t h e c r i m e of c o n s p i r a c y ;
t h a t t h e s t a t e ' s e v i d e n c e was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o prove a c o n s p i r a c y ;
and, t h a t t h e h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t s t e s t i f i e d t o by Bushman were
made a f t e r t h e c o n s p i r a c y ended, i f t h e r e was one, and w e r e n o t
made i n f u r t h e r a n c e of a c o n s p i r a c y . W e d i s a g r e e with defen-
d a n t s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e c o c o n s p i r a t o r e x c e p t i o n t o t h e
hearsay r u l e .
The s t a t e may p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h i n g a c o n s p i r -
a c y even though t h e crime of c o n s p i r a c y was n o t c h a r g e d a s a
separate offense i n t h e Information. S t a t e v. Dennison, 94 Mont.
159, 2 1 P.2d 63. Whether o r n o t a c o n s p i r a c y was proved f o r t h e
purpose o f p e r m i t t i n g a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e c o c o n s p i r a t o r e x c e p t i o n
was a
t o t h e h e a r s a y r u l e j q u e s t i o n t o be d e c i d e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t .
The e x i s t e n c e of a c o n s p i r a c y can be shown by c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i -
dence. To e s t a b l i s h a c o n s p i r a c y it i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v e
by d i r e c t e v i d e n c e a n agreement t o commit a c r i m e . S t a t e v.
A l t o n , 139 Mont. 479, 365 P.2d 527; S t a t e v. C o l l i n s , 88 Mont.
514, 294 P. 957; S t a t e v . Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504, 219 P. 1106.
A e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t
n
c o u r t made a f i n d i n g , w i t h o u t a d i s c l o s u r e of i t s g r o u n d s , con-
c e r n i n g t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of e x t r a j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s made by
a d e f e n d a n t a g a i n s t a n o n p r e s e n t c o d e f e n d a n t , by a n o t h e r co-
defendant. The c o u r t a d m i t t e d t h e t e s t i m o n y , t h e n admonished
t h e j u r y by i t s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 ( h e r e t o f o r e c i t e d i n f u l l )
t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t c o u l d n o t be used a g a i n s t a c o d e f e n d a n t n o t
p r e s e n t when t h e s t a t e m e n t was made. T h i s p r o c e d u r e was approved
by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n P a o l i v . United S t a t e s ,
352 U.S. 232, 77 S . C t . 294, 1 L ed 2d 278. I n Paoli a confession
o f o n e d e f e n d a n t was a d m i t t e d i n c u l p a t i n g t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t s .
A five-four Court approved t h e g i v i n g o f a c a u t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n ,
i f s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r , and r e a s o n e d t h a t it c o u l d be assumed
t h e j u r y would f o l l o w t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n .
Yet, t h i s s t a r t e d a series of c a s e s based on t h e S i x t h
Amendment command t h a t a l l d e f e n d a n t s i n a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n
s h a l l e n j o y t h e r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t t h e w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t them. In
1 9 6 8 , Bruton p r e s e n t e d a f a c t s i t u a t i o n where Bruton was j o i n t l y
t r i e d w i t h a c o d e f e n d a n t named Evans and c o n v i c t e d of r o b b e r y .
A p o s t a l i n s p e c t o r t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t Evans had o r a l l y
c o n f e s s e d t o him and a l s o i m p l i c a t e d Bruton. The U n i t e d S t a t e s
Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h i s added s u b s t a n t i a l w e i g h t t o t h e c a s e i n
a form n o t s u b j e c t t o c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , s i n c e Evans d i d n o t
take t h e stand. The Court of Appeals, E i g h t h C i r c u i t , 375 F.2d
355, s e t a s i d e t h e Evans c o n v i c t i o n f o r a "Miranda" v i o l a t i o n
b u t a f f i r m e d t h e c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e n o n c o n f e s s o r Bruton. The
c o u r t r e l i e d on P a o l i b e c a u s e t h e j u r y w a s i n s t r u c t e d n o t t o con-
s i d e r Evans1 c o n f e s s i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g B r u t o n 1 s i n n o c e n c e o r
guilt.
The Supreme Court i n Bruton s p e c i f i c a l l y o v e r r u l e d P a o l i
and c h a l l e n g e d t h e n a i v e assumption t h e p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t of
s u c h t e s t i m o n y c o u l d be overcome by j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s . The C o u r t
h e l d t h a t s i n c e s u b s t a n t i a l w e i g h t was added t o t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s
c a s e by t h e t e s t i m o n y i n a form n o t s u b j e c t t o c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n ,
B r u t o n ' s S i x t h Amendment r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t him
was v i o l a t e d , and t h e v i o l a t i o n was n o t c u r e d by t h e c o u r t ' s i n -
s t r u c t i o n t o d i s r e g a r d t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e p o s t a l i n s p e c t o r
c o n c e r n i n g Evans1 c o n f e s s i o n i n c u l p a t i n g Bruton. For a c a s e by
c a s e e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e "Bruton r u l e " see
H a r r i n g t o n v . C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395 U . S . 250, 89 S.Ct. 1 7 2 6 ,
2 3 L ed 2d 2 8 4 . I n H a r r i n g t o n t h e r e a r e d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of con-
s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s of t h e "Bruton r u l e " , i n Bruton t y p e
s i t u a t i o n s where it i s n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W do n o t f i n d
e
these exceptions present i n t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n i n t h e i n s t a n t
case.
- 13 -
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the
right of the defendant to confront his witnesses at the time of
trial. In Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242, 243, 15
S.Ct. 337, 39 L ed 409, 411, the Court said:
"The primary object of the constitutional provision
in question was to prevent depositions or ex
parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted
in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in
lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination
of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity,
not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him
to stand face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon
the stand and the manner in which he gives his testi-
mony whether he is worthy of belief. * * *"
The United States Court of Appeals in United States v.
Adams, 446 F.2d 681, 683, cert. den. 404 U.S. 943, found the
relevant factual inquiry in determining whether the Confronta-
tion Clause is violated to be:
" * * * whether under the circumstances, the un-
availability of the declarant for cross-examina-
tion deprived the jury of a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth of the extrajudicial
declaration."
The criteria to be considered in making this factual
inquiry are: (1) the declarant's knowledge of the identities
and roles of the other coconspirators; (2) the possibility that
declarant was relying on faulty recollection; (3) the circumstances
under which the statements were made, indicating declarant might
be lying about the codefendant's involvement in the crime; (4)
the possibility defendants could have shown by cross-examination
the declarant's statements were unreliable; and (5) whether the
testimony is so "crucial" to the prosecution or "devastating"
to the defense as to require reversal of the conviction. United
States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730; United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d
150, cert. den. 416 U.S. 940. Whether a defendant was denied
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses must be resolved
case-by-case, based on an examination of all the circumstances
and e v i d e n c e . A r i a s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 388 F.Supp. 736.
T h e r e i s l i t t l e d o u b t t h a t d e c l a r a n t Radi c l e a r l y knew
F i t z p a t r i c k ' s r o l e i n t h e a l l e g e d crime and t h e i d e n t i t i e s and
r o l e s of t h e o t h e r conspirators. The e v e n t s w e r e f r e s h i n h i s
mind. Y e t , w i t h o u t d i s c u s s i n g t h e t r u t h and v e r a c i t y o f t h e
d e c l a r a n t , w e r e c o g n i z e t h a t Radi had good r e a s o n t o l i e a b o u t
who s h o t t h e v i c t i m . W i t h o u t F i t z p a t r i c k p r e s e n t , Radi m i g h t
e a s i l y persuade h i s coconspirators t h a t a l l f a t a l s h o t s w e r e
f i r e d by F i t z p a t r i c k and t h u s a v o i d some c o n c e i v e d c r i m i n a l
culpability. I n any e v e n t , w e recognize t h e d e v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t
t h i s t e s t i m o n y would have upon a j u r y and h o l d , a t l e a s t a s t o
F i t z p a t r i c k , t h e r e was a d e n i a l o f t h e r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t t h e
d e c l a r a n t on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n b e f o r e t h e t r i e r o f f a c t . The
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n admonishing t h e j u r y was i n s u f f i -
c i e n t a s f a r a s o f f s e t t i n g a n y p r e j u d i c e which r e s u l t e d from
t h e admission of t h e e x t r a j u d i c i a l statements. Bruton v. United
S t a t e s , s u p r a ; R o b e r t s v . R u s s e l l , 392 U.S. 293, 88 S . C t . 1921,
W e acknowledge t h e i n h e r e n t d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t i n determining whether d e f e n d a n t s j o i n t l y charged w i t h
p u b l i c o f f e n s e s a r e t o be provided s e p a r a t e t r i a l s o r t r i e d
jointly. However, w e r e c o g n i z e a need f o r j u d i c i a l g u i d e l i n e s
i n t h e i n s t a n c e where t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n t e n d s t o i n t r o d u c e i n t o
evidence t h e e x t r a j u d i c i a l statement of one defendant t h a t im-
p l i c a t e s a codefendant. T h i s i s s u e was d i s c u s s e d i n P e o p l e v .
Aranda, 63 C.2d 518, 47 C a l . R p t r . 353, 4 0 7 P.2d 265, 272:
"When t h e p r o s e c u t i o n p r o p o s e s t o i n t r o d u c e
i n t o evidence an e x t r a j u d i c i a l statement of
one defendant t h a t i m p l i c a t e s a codefendant,
t h e t r i a l c o u r t must a d o p t o n e o f t h e f o l l o w i n g
procedures: (1) I t c a n p e r m i t a j o i n t t r i a l i f
a l l p a r t s of t h e e x t r a j u d i c i a l statements im-
p l i c a t i n g a n y c o d e f e n d a n t s c a n b e and a r e
e f f e c t i v e l y deleted without prejudice t o t h e
d e c l a r a n t . By e f f e c t i v e d e l e t i o n s , w e mean
n o t o n l y d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s
o f c o d e f e n d a n t s b u t any s t a t e m e n t s t h a t c o u l d
be employed a g a i n s t n o n d e c l a r a n t c o d e f e n d a n t s
once t h e i r i d e n t i t y i s o t h e r w i s e e s t a b l i s h e d .
( 2 ) I t c a n g r a n t a s e v e r a n c e of t r i a l s i f t h e
p r o s e c u t i o n i n s i s t s t h a t it must u s e t h e e x t r a -
j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s and it a p p e a r s t h a t e f f e c -
t i v e d e l e t i o n s c a n n o t be made. (3) I f the
p r o s e c u t i o n h a s s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s i s t e d a motion
f o r s e v e r a n c e and t h e r e a f t e r o f f e r s a n e x t r a -
j u d i c i a l statement implicating a codefendant,
t h e t r i a l c o u r t must e x c l u d e i t i f e f f e c t i v e
deletions a r e not possible. Similar rules
c o n c e r n i n g j o i n t t r i a l have been a d o p t e d i n
o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s and have been found work-
able. [ C i t i n g c a s e s . ] " 407 P.2d 272.
W a r e i n agreement w i t h t h e e f f e c t of t h e s e j u d i c i a l g u i d e l i n e s .
e
Our f i n a l i n q u i r y i n t h i s a r e a of j o i n d e r c o n c e r n s de-
f e n d a n t s ' c o n t e n t i o n t h e j o i n d e r of t h e i r t r i a l s d e n i e d them t h e
e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . Defendants c l a i m : (1) The
number o f d e f e n d a n t s and i n d e p e n d e n t c o u n s e l m81.de it i m p o s s i b l e
t o employ e f f e c t i v e t r i a l t a c t i c s ; ( 2 ) one d e f e n d a n t o r a n o t h e r
d i s q u a l i f i e d a d i s t r i c t judge o r c h a l l e n g e d a j u r o r t h a t a n o t h e r
d e f e n d a n t would have a l l o w e d t o remain i n t h e c a s e ; (3) certain
c o u n s e l d e l v e d i n t o a r e a s on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n t h a t m e r e l y re-
p e a t e d t h e s t a t e ' s c a s e a g a i n s t p a r t i c u l a r d e f e n d a n t s ; and ( 4 )
a l l d e f e n d a n t s , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of Radi, e l e c t e d t o rest
t h e i r cases f o l l o w i n g t h e s t a t e ' s c a s e - i n - c h i e f , t h u s compelling
Radi t o r e s t . W n o t e t h a t most of t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s a r e o f a
e
g e n e r a l n a t u r e and c o u l d be r a i s e d i n a l m o s t any m u l t i p l e de-
fendant-counsel proceeding. I t would be most u n u s u a l , i n our
opinion, i f four defense counsel representing individual c l i e n t s
d i d a g r e e on e v e r y q u e s t i o n of t r i a l t a c t i c s . F u r t h e r , a de-
f e n d a n t h a s no r i g h t t o have h i s c a s e t r i e d by a s p e c i f i c judge
o r have a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s i t on h i s j u r y . S t a t e v . Moran,
1 4 2 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777.
I n c o n c l u d i n g d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i s s u e of j o i n d e r , w e
r e i t e r a t e our position. Defendants i n c u r r e d s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u -
d i c e t h r o u g h t h e j o i n d e r of t h e i r t r i a l s b e c a u s e of a f a i l u r e
to protect individual defendant's right to confrontation. We
fully realize the benefits of joint trials, specifically, the
conservation of state funds, diminished inconvenience to witnesses
and public authorities, and the avoidance of delay in bringing
those accused of crime to trial. Yet, where we obtain speed,
economy and convenience in the administration of the law at the
cost of fundamental constitutional rights, that price is too
high. Trial courts must examine joinder of defendants' trials
more closely, particularly where separate counsel is required
because of potential conflicts of interest between the defendants.
Issue 111. This issue attacks the sufficiency of evi-
dence which the state presented to corroborate Bushman's testi-
mony. Section 95-3012, R.C.M. 1947, provides:
"Testimony of person legally accountable. A con-
viction cannot be had on the testimony of one
responsible or legally accountable £0; the same
offense, as defined in section 94-2-106, unless
he is corroborated by other evidence, which in it-
self, and without the aid of the testimony of
the one responsible or legally accountable for the
same offense, tends to connect the defendant with
the commission of the offense; and the corroboration
is not sufficient, it merely shows the commission
of the offense, or the circumstances thereof."
In State v. Orsborn, Mont . , 555 P.2d 509, 514,
33 St.Rep. 935, 940, this Court said:
"State v. Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 92, 245 P.2d 265, has
been cited many times as to the general guidelines
for determining the sufficiency of evidence corrob-
orating the testimony of one legally accountable.
Though Cobb was decided under section 11988, R.C.M.
1921, since repealed, the language of the old
statute is nearly identical to that of section 95-
3012, R.C.M. 1947, in pertinent part. * * *"
State v. Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 92, 245 P. 265, set out
these general rules:
"(a) The corroborating evidence may be supplied
by the defendant or his witnesses.
"(b) It need not be direct evidence--it may be
circumstantial.
"(c) It need not extend to every fact to which
t h e accomplice t e s t i f i e s .
" ( d ) I t need p o t b e s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a con-
v i c t i o n o r t o e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e c a s e o f
guilt.
" ( e ) I t need n o t b e s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n n e c t t h e
d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e commission of t h e c r i m e ; i t
i s s u f f i c i e n t i f it t e n d s t o do s o .
" ( f ) Whether t h e c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e t e n d s t o
c o n n e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e commission o f t h e
o f f e n s e i s a q u e s t i o n of l a w , b u t t h e weight o f
t h e evidence--its e f f i c a c y t o f o r t i f y t h e testi-
mony o f t h e accomplice and r e n d e r h i s s t o r y t r u s t -
worthy--is a m a t t e r f o r t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e
j u r y . ''
A t t r i a l t h e s t a t e p r e s e n t e d two minor g i r l s who t e s t i -
f i e d t h e y were w i t h a l l f i v e d e f e n d a n t s on t h e day of t h e
r o b b e r y and murder. The g i r l s t e s t i f i e d a l l f i v e d e f e n d a n t s
planned t o go t o Hardin and t h e g i r l s t h e m s e l v e s accompanied
Bushman, Bad Horse and H o l l i d a y on t h e t r i p t o Hardin and t h e
r e t u r n t r i p t o B i l l i n g s , a t a b o u t m i d n i g h t on A p r i l 5 , 1975;
t h a t F i t z p a t r i c k and Radi were i n R a d i l s a u t o m o b i l e a t a s e r v i c e
s t a t i o n i n B i l l i n g s j u s t b e f o r e Bushman, H o l l i d a y , Bad Horse
and t h e two g i r l s l e f t f o r Hardin; t h a t R a d i l s a u t o m o b i l e p a s s e d
them on t h e highway t o Hardin; and t h a t two men, who t h e g i r l s
presumed t o be Radi and F i t z p a t r i c k , g o t o u t o f R a d i l s a u t o m o b i l e
i n Hardin. Both g i r l s t e s t i f i e d t h e y o b s e r v e d a h o l e i n t h e
w i n d s h i e l d o f R a d i ' s a u t o m o b i l e on t h e morning f o l l o w i n g t h e
crimes.
C a r o l Broach t e s t i f i e d Bushman, Bad Horse and H o l l i d a y
were i n Hardin from a p p r o x i m a t e l y 10:45 p.m. t o m i d n i g h t on
A p r i l 5 , 1975; t h a t s h e r e t u r n e d t o B i l l i n g s w i t h t h e s e t h r e e
d e f e n d a n t s and t h e two minor g i r l s ; a n d , t h a t t h i s g r o u p a r r i v e d
a t R a d i ' s house a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2:00 a . m . on ~ p r i l , 1975.
6
R a l e i g h K r a f t , Jr. t e s t i f i e d he had d i s c u s s e d w i t h
Bushman and Bad Horse t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r o b b i n g t h e Safeway
store.
- 18 -
Ronald Potts and Lyle Doane testified they were custo-
mers at the Safeway store on the evening of April 5, 1975,
and observed an automobile, blue or green in color,parked in
front of the Safeway store, with two male occupants approxi-
mately the same ages as Radi and Fitzpatrick. Radi's automo-
bile was metallic blue in color.
Agent Dieckman of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
testified Fitzpatrick was arrested in Spokane, Washington on
June 3, 1975, and Fitzpatrick told him he had been drinking
with Radi in Billings on the evening of April 5. The witness
established that Fitzpatrick used a fictitious name while in
Spokane and possessed a newspaper clipping stating Fitzpatrick
was wanted by the police for the crimes committed in Hardin on
April 5, 1975.
Robert Balko, employed by Nyquist Financial Services
in Billings, testified Radi indicated in a conversation with
him that someone had shot a hole through his windshield. The
testimony of Mary Jenkins and Helen Jones established that Radi
had changed his Montana automobile license plates for Nevada
license plates shortly after the crimes.
Roger Asbury of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
testified the bullet found in Radi's automobile was fired from
the same gun as the slug found in the victim's automobile and
the slug which killed the victim.
This evidence sufficiently corroborates Bushman's test-
imony.
Issue IV. The final issue we will consider is whether
the convictions of defendants Holliday and Bad Horse should be
reversed on the ground the jury was inadequately instructed on
the applicable law and returned inconsistent verdicts. Holliday
and Bad Horse contend that since the state prosecuted its case
on the theory of conspiracy it is logically inconsistent to find
them guilty of robbery, but not guilty of deliberate homicide
and aggravated kidnapping. In support of this contention de-
fendants direct our attention to the court's Instruction No. 28,
an instruction on the felony-murder doctrine, which provided:
"You are instructed that when two or more
persons agree to commit a crime under such cir-
cumstances as may * * * result in the taking of
human life, either in the furtherance of, or
the resistance to their unlawful agreement, then
each party * * * will be held responsible for
the consequences which might reasonably be ex-
pected to flow * * * from carrying into effect
their unlawful agreement * * *.
"The law is that, if two or more persons agree
to commit a felony and death happens in the fur-
therance of the common object, all are alike
guilty of the homicide. The act of one of them
done in the furtherance of the original design,
in the contemplation of the law, is the act of
all. And if such an agreement is to do or per-
form an unlawful act constituting a felony, and
in the prosecution of such unlawful act constitut-
ing a felony, an individual is killed, such killing
is deliberate homicide."
A general principle of law is that consistency in crim-
inal verdicts is unnecessary. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S.
390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L ed 356. Where two or more defendants
are tried together in a criminal case the verdicts need not
demonstrate rational consistency. United States v. Anderson,
509 F.2d 312, cert. den. 420 U.S. 991. The United States Supreme
Court explained the rationale for the Dunn holding when it said:
"That the verdict may have been the result
of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of
the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot
be upset by speculation or inquiry into such
matters." 284 U.S. 394.
Defendants Holliday and Bad Horse distinguish Dunn from
the instant case. They contend the jury in Dunn correctly
followed the instructions of law given to it in reaching that
verdict, but the jury here when finding Holliday and Bad Horse
not guilty on two counts and guilty on the other count, completely
disregarded Instruction No. 28 and relied on Instruction No.
36 which provided the jury might "find any one of the follow-
ing verdicts" as to each defendant:
"1. Guilty of Count One, deliberate homicide;
"2. Not guilty of Count One, deliberate homicide;
"3. Guilty of Count Two, aggravated kidnapping;
"4. Not guilty of Count Two, aggravated kidnapping;
"5. Guilty of Count Three, robbery;
"6. Not guilty of Count Three, robbery."
The jury verdicts returned in this case can be distinguished
from the inconsistent verdicts which were the subject of the
general rule announced in Dunn. These verdicts are not merely
inconsistent, they are legally unsupportable. his case was
prosecuted on a conspiracy to commit robbery theory and each de-
fendant prosecuted under the felony murder rule or doctrine which
contemplates, as set forth in the trial court's Instruction No.
28, that each defendant is guilty of deliberate homicide or must
be acquitted.
This jury was improperly and inadequately instructed on
that point of law and could not reach a proper verdict. State
v. Bean, 135 Mont. 135, 337 P.2d 930; State v. Jackson, 88 Mont.
420, 293 P. 309.
The inconsistency between the court's Instruction No.
28 and Instruction No. 36 is apparent and the resulting confusion
in the minds of the jury is evidenced by its request for clar-
ification of Instruction No. 28:
"Question on Instruction #28
"If we find one defendant guilty of robbery
does Inst. No. 28 require guilty verdict on
two remaining counts."
The district court responded:
"Instruction number 36 answers this question."
No further clarification was provided, the jury completed
d e l i b e r a t i o n and r e a c h e d i t s v e r d i c t .
T h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t t h e need f o r g i v i n g a d d i -
t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e jury i s a m a t t e r of d i s t r i c t
court discretion. S t a t e v . Hawkins, 165 Mont. 4 5 6 , 529 P.2d
1377. However, h e r e t h e j u r y was d i r e c t e d t o examine I n s t r u c -
t i o n No. 36, which i s a n improper i n s t r u c t i o n c o n t r a r y t o t h e
l a w of t h e case. The c o u r t s h o u l d have f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t e d
t h e j u r y i n a manner t h a t would s u f f i c i e n t l y and c l e a r l y
p r e s e n t t h e a p p l i c a b l e law. Such f a i l u r e i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r .
The judgments o f c o n v i c t i o n o f a l l d e f e n d a n t s a r e r e v e r s e d .
The c a u s e s a r e remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r new t r i a l s .
Justice
( Chief J u s t i c e A
Justices 0
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g
in part:
I concur w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y ' s o p i n i o n a s t o a l l d e f e n d a n t s
except Radi whose c o n v i c t i o n I would a f f i r m . By h i s own s t a t e -
ments he was one of two men who kidnapped a young man (who u n l i k e
any of t h e d e f e n d a n t s worked f o r a l i v i n g ) , took him o u t s i d e h i s
hometown robbed and r u t h l e s s l y murdered him. I n ~ a d i ' s a s e it
c
makes l i t t l e o r no d i f f e r e n c e who f i r e d t h e s h o t s , f o r h i s v e r y
a c t s i n p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e kidnapping and robbery make him a
p r i n c i p a l t o t h e murder.
A s t o Fitzpatri'ck, who was n o t p r e s e n t a t t h e time of R a d i ' s
s t a t e m e n t on who f i r e d t h e s h o t s , t h i s Court i s compelled t o
f o l l o w t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Bruton
v . United S t a t e s , s u p r a , and i t s progeny. To do o t h e r w i s e would
be t o d e l a y t h e u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n on r e t r i a l . Bruton i s based
upon t h e r i g h t of defendant F i t z p a t r i c k , guaranteed by t h e S i x t h
and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments, t o cross-examine w i t n e s s e s . Bruton t h u s
h e l d t h a t , i n a j o i n t t r i a l where one defendant d i d n o t t a k e t h e
s t a n d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of h i s e x t r a j u d i c i a l c o n f e s s i o n which
i n c r i m i n a t e d t h e second d e f e n d a n t , v i o l a t e d t h e second d e f e n d a n t ' s
Sdxth and F o u r t e e n t h Amendment r i g h t s even though t h e j u r y was
i n s t r u c t e d t h e c o n f e s s i o n was n o t t o be c o n s i d e r e d a g a i n s t him.
Subsequent c a s e s i l l u s t r a t e Bruton does n o t i n v a l i d a t e
use of codefendant s t a t e m e n t s i n a l l j o i n t t r i a l s i t u a t i o n s .
When, f o r example, t h e d e c l a r a n t codefender t a k e s t h e s t a n d and
s u b j e c t s himself t o cross-examination, t h e r e i s no i n f r i n g e m e n t
of any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o cross-examine. Nelson v . O'Meil,
402 U.S. 622, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L ed 2d 222. The Bruton r u l e cannot
be invoked b y a defendant who i n s i s t s u p o i ~a join^ trial,
knowing t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n t e n d s t o use codefendants' i n c u l p a t o r y
scatements. United S t a t e s v. S u l l i v a n , 435 F.2d 650, c e r t . denied
+ d 2 U.S. 912, 9 1 S.Ct. 1392, 28 L ed 2d 654. See a l s o Anno. 29
I f t h e inculpatory codefendant's confession i s admissible
u n d e ~an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e hearsay r u l e , a s f o r example an admis-
s i o n of a c o c o n s p i r a t o r , t h e Bruton r u l e w i l l n o t be invoked.
: ~ n i t e d t a t e s v . K e l l e y , 526 F.2d 615,620.
S Also where e x t r a -
j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s of both d e f e n d a n t s i n t e r l o c k , and do n o t
c o n f l i c t on v i t a l p o i n t s , c o u r t s have h e l d t h a t no r e v e r s a l i s
required. United S t a t e s e x r e l . S t a n b r i d g e v . Z e l k e r , 514 F.2d 45.
For t h e above reasons I would confirm a s t o defendant Radi.