No. 13860
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN
1978
THE STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
-VS-
LEONARD SMITH,
D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: District Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
H o n o r a b l e James M. S a l a n s k y , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
A s t l e a n d A s t l e , K a l i s p e l l , Montana
David A s t l e a r g u e d , K a l i s p e l l , Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
Brenda J. G i l m e r , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d ,
H e l e n a , Montana
P a t r i c k S p r i n g e r , County A t t o r n e y , K a l i s p e l l , Montana
S t e w a r t A. P e a r c e , I1 a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y ,
K a l i s p e l l , Mont
MAR 2 ? 1978
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court :
Defendant Leonard Smith was charged by Information w i t h
t h e o f f e n s e s of attempted sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent
upon a minor female, a f e l o n y , i n v i o l a t i o n of sectiors94-4-103
and 94-5-503(3), R.C.M. 1947, and sexual a s s a u l t upon a minor
female, a f e l o n y , i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-5-502(1), R.C.M.
1947. Defendant appeals from t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court,
Flathead County, e n t e r e d pursuant t o t h e v e r d i c t of t h e j u r y ,
c o n v i c t i n g him of both o f f e n s e s .
On J u l y 10, 1976, t h e p r o s e c u t r i x , a j u v e n i l e 15 y e a r s of
age, was asked by d e f e n d a n t ' s wife t o b a b y s i t a t d e f e n d a n t ' s
residence i n K a l i s p e l l , Montana. The p r o s e c u t r i x a r r i v e d a t
approximately 7:00 p.m., accompanied by an 1 year o l d g i r l
1
friend. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , defendant and a companion, Dennis
P r u t t i s , arrived a t the residence. Although defendant and P r u t t i s
i n i t i a l l y planned t o proceed t o t h e b a r where d e f e n d a n t ' s wife
was employed, they remained a t d e f e n d a n t ' s residence and drank
beer. The p r o s e c u t r i x a l s o admitted d r i n k i n g an amount of b e e r .
A t v a r i o u s times i n t h e evening, defendant and t h e p r o s e c u t r i x
danced w i t h and k i s s e d each o t h e r .
The p r o s e c u t r i x and P r u t t i s t e s t i f i e d t h a t , while dancing,
defendant forced t h e p r o s e c u t r i x t o t h e f l o o r , p u l l e d down h e r
pants and, while r e s t r a i n i n g h e r , unsuccessfully attempted s e x u a l
intercourse. Both witnesses t e s t i f i e d t h e a c t was f o r c e f u l , and
a g a i n s t t h e w i l l of t h e p r o s e c u t r i x .
Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h e sexual c o n t a c t was encouraged by
t h e d r e s s and behavior of t h e p r o s e c u t r i x and was, a t a l l times,
w i t h h e r consent. A t t r i a l , defendant r a i s e d t h e defense t h a t he
reasonably b e l i e v e d t h e p r o s e c u t r i x t o be above t h e age of 16,
a s a b a r t o s t a t u t o r y l i a b i l i t y under s e c t i o n 9 4 - 5 - 5 0 2 ~ ( ~ ) ,
R.C.M. 1947.
A t t h e c l o s e of testimony, the j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d defendant
was r e q u i r e d t o prove t h e defense of reasonable b e l i e f of age by
a preponderance of t h e evidence, and t h a t forced nonconsent was
only an i s s u e i f defendant s u s t a i n e d t h e advanced defense. The
j u r y found defendant d i d n o t reasonably b e l i e v e t h e p r o s e c u t r i x was
above t h e age of 16, and r e t u r n e d v e r d i c t s convicting defendant
of both o f f e n s e s .
The narrow i s s u e on appeal i s : Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r
i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y t h a t defendant had t h e burden of proving
t h e defense of reasonable b e l i e f of age by a preponderance of t h e
evidence?
Defendant contends t h e i n s t r u c t i o n given by t h e t r i a l c o u r t
concerning t h e defense of reasonable b e l i e f of age improperly
placed t h e burden of both a s s e r t i n g and proving t h e defense upon
defendant. Rather, i t i s maintained a defendant charged with t h e
crime of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e without consent upon a minor, need only
advance t h e defense, and r a i s e a reasonable doubt regarding t h e
i s s u e of reasonable b e l i e f of age. W d i s a g r e e with t h i s c o n t e n t i o n .
e
The d i s p u t e d i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t e s , i n p a r t :
It* ** you a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t under Montana law t h a t
i n t h i s case c r i m i n a l i t y being dependent on [ t h e prose-
c u t r i x ] having been l e s s than 16 y e a r s o l d on t h e 10th
day of J u l y , 1976, i t i s a defense f o r t h i s defendant
t o prove t h a t he reasonably believed [ t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ]
t o be above 16 y e a r s o l d a t t h e time of t h e commission
of t h e a l l e g e d o f f e n s e .
"This burden of proof r e s t s s o l e l y upon t h e defendant,
and must be proved by a preponderance of t h e evidence.
** *I'
P r i o r t o t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e Montana Criminal Code of 1973,
s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y was imposed upon a defendant upon proof of a
s e x crime committed by him upon a female under t h e age of 18.
I t was no defense f o r t h e defendant t o prove he believed t h e
g i r l t o be o l d e r , d e s p i t e t h e reasonableness of such b e l i e f .
S t a t e v. Reid, (1954), 127 Mont. 552, 267 P.2d 986; S e c t i o n s
94-4101, 94-4106, R.C.M. 1947 ( r e p e a l e d January 1, 1974).
A m a j o r i t y of s t a t e s do n o t recognize t h e defense of
reasonable b e l i e f of age. Anno. 8 ALR3d L100,1102. However
t h e Montana Criminal Code o f 1973 e x p r e s s l y recognizes such a
d e f e n s e , p a t t e r n e d a f t e r S e c t i o n 213.6 of t h e Model Penal Code.
S e c t i o n 94-5-506(1), R.C.M. 1947. The s t a t e s of Kentucky and
Washington have a l s o a m e l i o r a t e d t h e u s u a l o p e r a t i o n of t h e
s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y s t a t u t e s punishing s t a t u t o r y r a p e , through
enactment of t h e s t a t u t o r y defense. Ky. Rev.Stat.Ann. $ 5 500.070,
510.030; Wash.Rev.Code Ann. 59.79.160(2). The defense i s a v a i l a b l e
i n C a l i f o r n i a , n o t by s t a t u t e , b u t by j u d i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n .
People v . Hernandez, (1964), 39 Cal.Rptr.361, 393 P.2d 673.
The s t a t u t e recognizing t h e defense i n Montana, s e c t i o n
94-5-506(1), R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
" ( 1 ) When c r i m i n a l i t y depends on t h e v i c t i m being
l e s s t h a n s i x t e e n (16) y e a r s o l d , i t i s a defense
f o r t h e o f f e n d e r t o prove t h a t he reasonably be-
l i e v e d t h e c h i l d t o be above t h a t age. * * *"
The United S t a t e s Supreme Court, i n t h e 1977 c a s e of
P a t t e r s o n v . New York, 432 U.S. 197,209, 97 S.Ct. 2319,2326,
53 L ed 2d 281, recognizes t h e t r a d i t i o n a l power of t h e s t a t e s
t o d e f i n e c r i m i n a l conduct and recognize e x c u l p a t o r y circum-
s t a n c e s and, i n s o doing, t o r e q u i r e a defendant t o prove he
f a l l s w i t h i n t h e purview of such circumstances. Specificially
regarding a m e l i o r a t i v e o r e x c u l p a t o r y d e f e n s e s d e r i v e d from t h e
Model Penal Code, including t h e defense of reasonable b e l i e f
of age, t h e Court s t a t e d :
"* * * I f the S t a t e n e v e r t h e l e s s chooses t o recognize a
f a c t o r t h a t m i t i g a t e s t h e degree of c r i m i n a l i t y o r
punishment, w t h i n k t h e S t a t e may a s s u r e i t s e l f t h a t
e
t h e f a c t has been e s t a b l i s h e d with reasonable c e r t a i n t y .
To recognize a t a l l a m i t i g a t i n g circumstance does n o t
r e q u i r e t h e S t a t e t o prove i t s nonexistence i n each
case i n which t h e f a c t i s put i n i s s u e , i f i n i t s judg-
ment t h i s would be too cumbersome, t o o expensive, and
too inaccurate." 432 U.S. 209.
Here, t h e r e i s no question t h a t t h e s t a t e was required t o
and d i d i n f a c t prove every element of t h e offenses charged,
beyond a reasonable doubt. The s t a t e t h e r e f o r e s a t i s f i e d t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandate t h a t i t prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every f a c t necessary t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e crime with which defendant
was charged. I n r e Winship, (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068,
25 L ed 2d 368; Mullaney v. Wilbur, (1975), 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct.
1881, 44 L ed 2d 508.
The jury was duly i n s t r u c t e d i n accordance with t h e s t a t u t e
giving r i s e t o t h e exculpatory defense of reasonable b e l i e f of
age. The evidence c l e a r l y f a i l e d t o convince t h e jury defendant
had e s t a b l i s h e d t h e defense.
F u r t h e r , we f i n d t h e burden of proof of t h e defense placed
on defendant i n t h i s case , i . e . by a preponderance of the evidence,
t o be e n t i r e l y reasonable. The Montana l e g i s l a t u r e , i n r e v i s i n g
t h e c r i m i n a l code, provided t h e existence of the defense of
reasonable b e l i e f of age, a defense n o t previously recognized.
The s t a t e , i n such circumstances, r e t a i n s t h e power t o a s s u r e
t h a t the f a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e defense be e s t a b l i s h e d with a
reasonable degree of c e r t a i n t y . W f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e law a s
e
presented by t h e given i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h i s c a s e .
The judgment of the d i s t
W Concur:
e
Hon. L. Gulbrandson,
~istricf Court Judge, sitting.