No. 14239
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1979
ROSEMARY F. CATTEYSON,
Claimant and Respondent,
-vs-
FALLS MOBILE HOME CENTER, INC., Employer,
and
GLACIER GENERAL ASSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court
Hon. William E. Hunt, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver, Great Falls,
Montana
For Respondent:
Barry Olson, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on briefs: April 12, 1979
Decided : AU G - 9 1979
Mr. ~ustice
Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t .
F a l l s Mobile Home C e n t e r , I n c . , and G l a c i e r G e n e r a l
A s s u r a n c e Company, d e f e n d a n t s , a p p e a l from t h e m o d i f i e d
c o n c l u s i o n s o f law and judgment d a t e d F e b r u a r y 27, 1 9 7 8 ,
e n t e r e d by t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t . Respondent
c l a i m a n t was a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t employed
by F a l l s Mobile Home C e n t e r , I n c . G l a c i e r General Assurance
Company was e m p l o y e r ' s i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t i n s u r e r .
The Workers' Compensation C o u r t by i t s judgment d e c i d e d
t h a t c l a i m a n t w a s e n t i t l e d t o temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y
payments u n d e r s e c t i o n 39-71-701 MCA, from November 20,
1 9 7 4 , t o O c t o b e r 27, 1 9 7 6 , and t e m p o r a r y t o t a l payments from
O c t o b e r 28, 1976, t o March 3 , 1977, f o r t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e
c a r r i e r t o n o t i f y t h e Workers' Compensation D i v i s i o n o f i t s
intention t o u n i l a t e r a l l y terminate benefits. S e c t i o n 39-
71-609 MCA. The c o u r t f u r t h e r h e l d t h a t c l a i m a n t s u f f e r e d
1 0 p e r c e n t permanent p a r t i a l i n j u r y u n d e r s e c t i o n 39-71-
1 1 6 ( 1 2 ) MCA, e n t i t l i n g h e r t o b e n e f i t s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n
39-71-703 MCA. F i n a l l y , t h e c o u r t awarded c l a i m a n t a t t o r n e y
f e e s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 39-71-612 MCA, i n t h e amount o f
$1500.
S h o r t l y b e f o r e 4:00 p.m. on November 20, 1974, c l a i m a n t
was i n j u r e d i n a n a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t a s s h e w a s h e a d i n g
n o r t h on 1 3 t h S t r e e t N o r t h i n G r e a t F a l l s , Montana. A t the
t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t , c l a i m a n t had two jobs--one a s a handy
p e r s o n f o r F a l l s Mobile Home and o n e a s a d i s p a t c h e r f o r
B l a c k and White Cab. T h e r e w a s some d i s p u t e a s t o w h a t
c l a i m a n t was d o i n g a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . The c a r r i e r
c o n t e n d e d s h e was on h e r way t o h e r j o b a t B l a c k and w h i t e
Cab; c l a i m a n t c o n t e n d e d , and t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t
f o u n d , t h a t s h e had been r u n n i n g a n e r r a n d f o r F a l l s ~ o b i l e
Home.
On December 5, 1974, claimant filed for benefits and
the compensation carrier for Falls Mobile Home began paying
her benefits. Later, and while compensation benefits were
being paid, the carrier notified claimant by letter that
compensation would be discontinued when her doctor released
her to work.
Temporary total benefits were paid until June 25, 1976,
when claimant was released for work. The payments were then
discontinued and a "Compensation Advice Form" was sent to
claimant on July 22, 1975, and forwarded to the Workers'
Compensation Division.
Thereafter, the parties corresponded for a period of
ten months in an effort to determine whether claimant had
suffered any permanent disability. Later claimant filed a
petition with the Workers' Compensation Court for a hearing.
Prior to the hearing, the carrier discovered that claimant
may have been on her way to her second job at the time of
the accident. It therefore withdrew its settlement offers
and chose to defend on the ground that claimant had not
suffered a compensable injury.
The Workers' Compensation Court found in favor of
claimant, and the carrier appeals.
Initially we are asked to determine whether the evi-
dence supports the Workers' Compensation Court's conclusion
that the employee was injured in an industrial accident and,
as a result, was permanently or partially disabled. We find
that it does.
While there was disputed evidence as to what claimant
was actually doing at the time of the accident, the workers'
Compensation Court found that she was running an errand for
Falls Mobile Home. There is sufficient evidence in the
record to support this finding:
"Whether t h i s C o u r t a g r e e s i s o f no moment.
S i n c e c r e d i b l e and s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ap-
p e a r s i n t h e r e c o r d i n s u p p o r t o f t h e Workers'
Compensation C o u r t , w e a r e bound by i t s d e c i -
s i o n on t h e f a c t s . " McGee v . B e c h t e l C o r ~ .
(1979) Mont. , 595 P . 2d 1156, i 1 5 8 -
59, 36 St.Rep. 220, 224.
There i s a l s o s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t c l a i m a n t w a s permanently p a r t i a l l y d i s a b l e d
and e n t i t l e d t o b e n e f i t s u n d e r s e c t i o n 39-71-703 MCA.
Next w e a r e a s k e d t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e Workers' Com-
p e n s a t i o n C o u r t e r r e d i n h o l d i n g t h a t t h e c a r r i e r had u n i -
l a t e r a l l y t e r m i n a t e d c l a i m a n t ' s b e n e f i t s and t h a t t e r m i n a t i o n
was i m p r o p e r .
I n s u p p o r t o f i t s c o n c l u s i o n s o f law, t h e c o u r t c i t e d
C l a r k v . H e n s e l P h e l p s C o n s t r u c t i o n Company ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,
Mont. , 560 P.2d 515, 34 St.Rep. 61. I n Clark, t h e
i s s u e p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t was t h e n e c e s s i t y o f g i v i n g
c l a i m a n t w r i t t e n n o t i c e and a c q u i r i n g a p p r o v a l of t h e D i v i -
s i o n o f Workers' Compensation p r i o r t o t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of
benefits. The C o u r t found t h e c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e t o b e
s e c t i o n 92-615, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 39-71-609 MCA,
which o r i g i n a l l y r e a d :
". . . I f t h e i n s u r e r determines t o i n i t i a l l y
deny t h e c l a i m , o r a f t e r a c l a i m h a s been ac-
c e p t e d , t e r m i n a t e s b i w e e k l y c o m p e n s a t i o n bene-
f i t s , i t may d o s o o n l y a £ t e r £ i f t e e n ( 1 5 ) d a y s
w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o t h e c l a i m a n t and t h e d i v i s i o n
and a f t e r w r i t t e n a p p r o v a l o f t h e d i v i s i o n . "
T h i s s e c t i o n h a s s i n c e been amended and no l o n g e r
r e q u i r e s w r i t t e n approval of t h e Division. S e c t i o n 39-71-
6 0 9 MCA. T h i s amendment, however, h a s no e f f e c t on t h e
Clark r u l e . The i s s u e i n C l a r k was o n e o f f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n
i n this state. I n r e a c h i n g o u r d e c i s i o n w e l o o k e d t o Xhode
I s l a n d which had i n t e r p r e t e d a s t a t u t e s i m i l a r t o o u r p r e s e n t
d a y s e c t i o n 39-71-609 MCA, and h e l d :
". . . i f t h e employer d o e s a t t e m p t t o u n i l a t e r -
a l l y t e r m i n a t e t h e payment of b e n e f i t s such a t -
tempted t e r m i n a t i o n i s i n e f f e c t i v e . The employer
remains l i a b l e f o r t h e payment of b e n e f i t s u n t i l
t h e t e r m i n a t i o n i s accomplished by f o l l o w i n g t h e
s t a t u t o r y notice provision." C l a r k , 560 P.2d a t
517.
Here, t h e c a r r i e r a d v i s e d t h e employer and t h e D i v i s i o n
some 27 d a y s a f t e r t e r m i n a t i o n and n o t 1 5 d a y s b e f o r e a s i s
r e q u i r e d by law. The Workers' Compensation C o u r t was c o r -
r e c t i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Clark r u l e i n t h i s case.
Once i t h a s been d e t e r m i n e d t h a t s e c t i o n 39-71-609 MCA
and C l a r k have been v i o l a t e d , t h e c a r r i e r " r e m a i n s l i a b l e
f o r t h e payment of b e n e f i t s u n t i l t h e t e r m i n a t i o n i s accom-
p l i s h e d by f o l l o w i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y n o t i c e p r o v i s i o n . "
C l a r k , 560 P.2d a t 517. The Workers' Compensation C o u r t
c o r r e c t l y found t h a t c l a i m a n t was e n t i t l e d t o temporary
t o t a l b e n e f i t s from t h e d a t e of t h e improper t e r m i n a t i o n t o
t h e d a t e of i t s o r d e r f o r t h e f a i l u r e of t h e c a r r i e r t o
comply w i t h s e c t i o n 39-71-609 MCA.
The c a r r i e r c o n t e n d s t h a t even i f t h e n o t i c e of t e r m i -
n a t i o n was improper, t h a t c l a i m a n t had waived h e r r i g h t t o
notice. This contention i s without m e r i t . "No agreement by
[ c l a i m a n t ] t o waive any r i g h t s under t h i s c h a p t e r f o r a n
i n j u r y t o be r e c e i v e d s h a l l b e v a l i d . " S e c t i o n 39-71-409
MCA .
Furthermore, n o t i c e i s a l s o r e q u i r e d t o be given t o t h e
d i v i s i o n under s e c t i o n 39-71-609 MCA. There i s no e v i d e n c e
b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e D i v i s i o n waived i t s
r i g h t t o notice.
The c a r r i e r q u e s t i o n s whether t h e Workers1 Compensation
C o u r t c a n a g g r e g a t e e a r n i n g s from two s e p a r a t e and u n r e l a t e d
employments f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f d e t e r m i n i n g b e n e f i t s p a y a b l e .
T h i s C o u r t h a s r e c e n t l y approved t h e a g g r e g a t i o n o f wages
from s e p a r a t e and u n r e l a t e d employments. Walker v . H. F.
Johnson, I n c . (19781, Mont. , 591 P.2d 1 8 1 , 35
F i n a l l y , t h e c a r r i e r o b j e c t s t o a n award of a t t o r n e y
fees. S e c t i o n 39-71-612 MCA p r o v i d e s t h a t i f :
". . . c o n t r o v e r s y r e l a t e s t o t h e amount o f
c o m p e n s a t i o n d u e and t h e s e t t l e m e n t o r award
i s g r e a t e r t h a n t h e amount p a i d o r t e n d e r e d
by t h e employer o r i n s u r e r , a r e a s o n a b l e a t -
t o r n e y ' s f e e a s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e d i v i s i o n
o r t h e w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n judge i f t h e
c a s e h a s gone t o a h e a r i n g , b a s e d s o l e l y upon
t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e amount s e t t l e d f o r
o r awarded a n d t h e amount t e n d e r e d o r p a i d ,
may b e awarded i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e amount o f
compensation. "
Further, " [ t l h e finding t h a t claimant is e n t i t l e d t o
s e c t i o n 92-703.1 [now s e c t i o n 39-71-703 MCA] b e n e f i t s t r i g -
g e r s s e c t i o n 92-618 [now s e c t i o n 39-71-612 MCA] e n t i t l i n g
claimant t o '. . . a reasonable attorney's f e e a s estab-
l i s h e d by t h e d i v i s i o n o r workmen's c o m p e n s a t i o n judge
. . . 1 11
Walker, 591 P . 2d a t 185.
C l a i m a n t c l e a r l y f i t s i n t o b o t h o f t h e above s i t u a -
tions. T h e r e i s a l s o n o t h i n g t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e compensa-
t i o n judge d e v i a t e d from t h e f o r m u l a s e t o u t i n s e c t i o n 39-
71-613 MCA.
The judgment o f t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t i s
a £f i r m e d .
t
Justice
/'
We concur:
7Adb4 w a d q
Chief Justice
\.-:)i,.- tt
Justices
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