No. 80-194
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
JAMES P. CAVANAUGH AND
JAMES I. MESLER,
Petitioners,
-vs-
ROGER W. CRIST, Warden, Montana
State Prison,
Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:
Counsel of Record:
For Petitioners:
James P. Cavanaugh, Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana
James I. Mesler, Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana
For Respondents:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Donald White, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana
J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted: July 29, 1980
Decided : AUG 14 1980
BUG 14 1986
Filed:
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.
T h i s i s a n o r i g i n a l a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of h a b e a s
c o r p u s i n which p e t i t i o n e r s James Cavanaugh and James Mesler
j o i n t l y c h a l l e n g e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 46-18-
202 ( 2 ) , MCA. T h a t s e c t i o n p e r m i t s d i s t r i c t judges t o sen-
t e n c e p e r s o n s c o n v i c t e d of f e l o n i e s t o imprisonment w i t h no
p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e p r i s o n e r
f u r l o u g h program.
James Cavanaugh r e c e i v e d c o n c u r r e n t s e n t e n c e s of one
hundred y e a r s and twenty y e a r s f o r a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g and
aggravated a s s a u l t . James Mesler was s e n t e n c e d t o t e n y e a r s
. f o r robbery. The d i s t r i c t judges imposed t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s
o f s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 ) , MCA, on b o t h p e t i t i o n e r s . Both
pleaded g u i l t y t o t h e o f f e n s e s charged.
The a p p l i c a t i o n f o r habeas c o r p u s r e l i e f a l l e g e s t h a t
s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), MCA, i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on e q u a l
p r o t e c t i o n , due p r o c e s s and vagueness grounds and a s a n
u n l a w f u l d e l e g a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y . Among t h e
numerous c o n t e n t i o n s r a i s e d by p e t i t i o n e r s i s t h a t t h e i r
c o n v i c t i o n s and s e n t e n c e s a r e i n v a l i d . However, t h e con-
s t i t u t i o n a l a t t a c k on t h e s t a t u t e i s n o t a n a t t a c k on t h e
underlying convictions. The d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s d e c i s i o n
whether t o impose t h e f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n s of s e c t i o n 46-18-
2 0 2 ( 2 ) o c c u r s s u b s e q u e n t t o and d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e under-
lying conviction. T h e r e f o r e , t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i s one of
a sentencing s t a t u t e . I f i t were t o b e found u n c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l , t h e o n l y a p p r o p r i a t e remedy would b e t o remand f o r
r e s e n t e n c i n g and n o t o v e r t u r n t h e c o n v i c t i o n s .
T h i s C o u r t w i l l a d d r e s s o n l y t h e i s s u e of whether t h e
r e s t r i c t i o n s on p e t i t i o n e r s ' p a r o l e and p r i s o n e r f u r l o u g h
e l i g i b i l i t y imposed p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), MCA,
are constitutional.
I n 1977, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e amended s e c t i o n 95-2206,
R.C.M. 1947, which s e t o u t t h e s e n t e n c i n g o p t i o n s a v a i l a b l e
t o a d i s t r i c t judge by a d d i n g s u b d i v i s i o n ( 3 ) (b) . See
C h a p t e r 580, Laws of 1977. T h a t p r o v i s i o n , now s e c t i o n 46-
18-202 ( 2 ) , MCA, states:
"Whenever t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t imposes a s e n t e n c e
of imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r a t e r m
e x c e e d i n g 1 y e a r , t h e c o u r t may a l s o impose t h e
r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t t h e defendant be i n e l i g i b l e
f o r p a r o l e and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e p r i s o n e r
f u r l o u g h program w h i l e s e r v i n g h i s t e r m . If
s u c h a r e s t r i c t i o n i s t o be imposed, t h e c o u r t
s h a l l s t a t e t h e reasons f o r it i n writing. If
t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e r e s t r i c t i o n i s neces-
s a r y f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y , i t s h a l l
impose t h e r e s t r i c t i o n - - r t of t h e s e n t e n c e
as pa --
and t h e judgment s h a l l c o n t a i n a s t a t e m e n t of
t h e reasons f o r t h e r e s t r i c t i o n . " (Emphasis
added. )
The c l e a r e f f e c t of s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) i s t o permit a
d i s t r i c t judge t o c l o s e one avenue f o r e s c a p i n g t h e f u l l
f o r c e of a s e n t e n c e . T h i s complete r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e
and f u r l o u g h program e l i g i b i l i t y i s d i s t i n c t from t h e p a r -
t i a l r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t f o l l o w s a d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e D i s -
t r i c t Court t h a t a defendant i s i n e l i g i b l e f o r designation
a s a nondangerous o f f e n d e r . See s e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA. In
t h e l a t t e r c a s e , a d e f e n d a n t must s e r v e a t l e a s t one-half of
h i s f u l l term, l e s s good t i m e , t o b e e l i g i b l e f o r p a r o l e . A
d e f e n d a n t who i s d e s i g n a t e d a nondangerous o f f e n d e r becomes
e l i g i b l e f o r p a r o l e a f t e r s e r v i n g o n e - q u a r t e r of h i s f u l l
term, l e s s good t i m e . S e c t i o n 46-23-201, MCA. Unless he i s
s e n t e n c e d under s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), MCA, a d e f e n d a n t may
a p p l y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e f u r l o u g h program a f t e r s e r v i n g
a t l e a s t one-half of t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d t o b e c o n s i d e r e d f o r
parole. S e c t i o n 46-23-411, MCA.
P e t i t i o n e r s c o n t e n d t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 ) f a i l s t o
i n c l u d e p r o c e d u r a l e l e m e n t s which t h e y a l l e g e a r e r e q u i r e d
t o m e e t due p r o c e s s s t a n d a r d s . The e l e m e n t s p r e s e n t e d a r e :
(1) n o t i c e t h a t a c o m p l e t e r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and f u r -
l o u g h program e l i g i b i l i t y may be imposed a s a p a r t of t h e
sentence; (2) a jury t r i a l s p e c i f i c a l l y addressing t h i s
m a t t e r ; and ( 3 ) p r o o f beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e
r e s t r i c t i o n i s required.
P e t i t i o n e r s r e l y on d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v i n g s e n t e n c e en-
hancement s t a t u t e s and c i t e S p e c h t v . P a t t e r s o n ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 386
U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 1 8 L.Ed.2d 326, a s c o n t r o l l i n g . In
S p e c h t t h e d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d of " i n d e c e n t l i b e r t i e s "
under a Colorado s t a t u t e which c a r r i e d a t e n - y e a r maximum
sentence. The d e f e n d a n t , however, was s e n t e n c e d under t h e
s t a t e ' s Sex O f f e n d e r A c t which p e r m i t t e d a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e
t e r m of from one day t o l i f e . H i s sentencing followed a
s e p a r a t e commitment p r o c e e d i n g conducted p u r s u a n t t o t h e
a c t , t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n s t i t u t e s a
t h r e a t of b o d i l y harm t o members of t h e p u b l i c , o r i s a n
h a b i t u a l o f f e n d e r and m e n t a l l y ill. The d e f e n d a n t was n o t
given n o t i c e o r an opportunity t o be heard a s t o t h a t d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n and argued t h a t t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e was, t h e r e -
fore, violated. The Supreme C o u r t a g r e e d .
The C o u r t found i n S p e c h t t h a t t h e Colorado a c t re-
quired t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o determine a f a c t t h a t w a s n o t an
i n g r e d i e n t of t h e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e and compared t h e a c t ' s
p r o c e e d i n g s t o " t h o s e under r e c i d i v i s t s t a t u t e s where a n
habitual criminal issue i s a ' d i s t i n c t issue' . . . on which
a d e f e n d a n t 'must r e c e i v e r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e and a n oppor-
t u n i t y t o be h e a r d . ' " S p e c h t v. P a t t e r s o n , 386 U.S. a t 610.
The C o u r t r u l e d where s u c h commitment p r o c e e d i n g s a r e i n v o l v e d ,
due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s t h e d e f e n d a n t t o be p r e s e n t w i t h
c o u n s e l , t o have a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o be h e a r d , t o c o n f r o n t
w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s t him, and t o p r e s e n t w i t n e s s e s o f h i s own.
Due p r o c e s s s t a n d a r d s a r e r e q u i r e d where a s e n t e n c e i s
t o be enhanced on t h e b a s i s of a p s y c h i a t r i c e v a l u a t i o n and
p a s t b e h a v i o r and p u r s u a n t t o a s e p a r a t e a c t ( a s i n S p e c h t ) .
I t i s n o t r e q u i r e d f o r s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), MCA. This
s t a t u t e i s n o t a s e n t e n c e enhancement s t a t u t e . The s t a t u t e
d o e s n o t p e r m i t d i s t r i c t judges t o add any t i m e beyond t h e
s t a t u t o r y maximum f o r t h e u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e . In this
r e s p e c t , s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) i s fundamentally d i f f e r e n t
from t h e k i n d s of s t a t u t e s examined i n t h e c a s e s p e t i t i o n e r s
cite. I n Specht, f o r i n s t a n c e , while t h e underlying o f f e n s e
c a r r i e d a t e n - y e a r maximum s e n t e n c e , t h e Sex O f f e n d e r A c t
p e r m i t t e d a s e n t e n c e o f from one day t o l i f e .
The Montana s t a t u t e d o e s n o t p e r m i t enhancement. It
i n s u r e s t h a t t h e l e n g t h o f t h e p e n a l t y e n a c t e d by t h e l e g i s -
l a t u r e and imposed by t h e c o u r t i s c a r r i e d o u t . The r e s t r i c -
t i o n on p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h e l i g i b i l i t y p e r m i t t e d by s e c t i o n
46-18-202(2) h a s no e x i s t e n c e beyond t h e t e r m of t h e sen-
t e n c e imposed f o r t h e u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e . The S p e c h t - t y p e
s t a t u t e e n t a i l s a p r o c e e d i n g which i s s e p a r a t e from t h e
ordinary sentencing proceeding. A s t h e Supreme C o u r t empha-
s i z e d i n S p e c h t , t h e Colorado Sex O f f e n d e r Act "makes one
c o n v i c t i o n t h e b a s i s f o r commencing a n o t h e r p r o c e e d i n g under
another A c t . . ." 386 U.S. a t 608.
S e c t i o n 46-18-202(2), on t h e o t h e r hand, h a s no s u c h
effect. The r e s t r i c t i o n of p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h Program
e l i g i b i l i t y i s " a p a r t o f t h e s e n t e n c e " by t h e e x p r e s s t e r m s
of t h e s t a t u t e and d o e s n o t i n v o l v e any p r o c e e d i n g e x c e p t
t h e o r d i n a r y sentencing proceeding. I t r e p r e s e n t s one
o p t i o n , among o t h e r s , t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s made a v a i l -
a b l e t o d i s t r i c t judges i n t h e c o u r s e of o r d i n a r y s e n t e n c i n g .
The f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h e l i g i b i l i t y
p e r m i t t e d by s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) h a s no e x i s t e n c e a p a r t
from t h e s e n t e n c e imposed f o r t h e u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e .
P e t i t i o n e r s f u r t h e r contend t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 )
i s s i m i l a r t o t h e Specht-type s t a t u t e i n t h a t t h e f u l l
r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h program e l i g i b i l i t y must
b e n e c e s s a r y f o r " t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y . " They a r g u e
t h i s i s a f a c t determination t h a t r e q u i r e s a jury.
D i s t r i c t C o u r t s a r e r e q u i r e d t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e
f u l l r e s t r i c t i o n on p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h e l i g i b i l i t y i s
n e c e s s a r y f o r " t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y " when a p e r s o n i s
sentenced a f t e r conviction. This matter i s n o t an element
of d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e was committed.
A f t e r c o n v i c t i o n , such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as t o " p r o t e c t s o c i e t y
from t h e a c t i o n s of t h e g u i l t y " i s a m a t t e r of t h e o r d i n a r y
c o u r s e of s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e e d i n g s .
The s o u r c e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e s a n c t i o n i n g
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r e l a x a t i o n of t r i a l s t a n d a r d s i s W i l l i a m s v.
N e w York ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 337 U.S. 2 4 1 , 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337.
I n W i l l i a m s t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s c o n v i c t e d of murder and t h e n
s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h , r a t h e r t h a n l i f e imprisonment, l a r g e l y
on t h e b a s i s of background i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n a p r e -
s e n t e n c e r e p o r t p r e p a r e d by p r o b a t i o n a u t h o r i t i e s . H e c h a l -
l e n g e d t h e s e n t e n c e b e c a u s e h e had been g i v e n no o p p o r t u n i t y
t o c o n f r o n t and cross-examine t h e w i t n e s s e s who s u p p l i e d t h e
information i n t h e report. The Supreme C o u r t upheld t h e
s e n t e n c e and approved t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s u s e of s u c h u n c h a l -
lenged evidence. I t r e l i e d on a n o n a d v e r s a r i a l t h e o r y of
penology i n which punishment i s i n d i v i d u a l i z e d t o f i t t h e
offender and not merely the crime. The sentencing judge
should be concerned with obtaining as much information about
the defendant as possible, the Court asserted, and most
information that courts relied upon in the "intelligent
imposition of sentences" would become unavailable if it
could be obtained only in open court and subject to cross-
examination. Williams, 337 U.S. at 250.
The Supreme Court allowed very broad judicial discre-
tion, based on the principle that courts should not be
encumbered by the procedural formality required at trial.
This remains the rule. The Specht court classified Williams
as "a case where at the end of the trial and in the same
proceeding the fixing of the penalty for first degree murder
was involved." Specht, 386 U.S. at 606-607. Here is a case
where the admissions of guilt and the fixing of the penal-
ties for the crimes admitted were conducted in the same
proceeding. The judge in Williams, in sentencing the defen-
dant to death rather than life imprisonment, relied on the
information in the presentence report. Since the Court in
Specht specifically announced it would adhere to Williams,
which permitted the judge to make such a finding on the
basis of hearsay, then Williams is controlling in these
facts. While the trial judge in Williams examined past
events, he was doing so only to predict the defendant's
future behavior rather than impose a separate punishment for
past actions. The same is true here.
Federal courts have consistently declined to extend
full procedural due process protections to defendants whose
sentences were enhanced by federal statute. In United
States v. Bowdach (5th Cir. 1977), 561 F.2d 1160, the court
rejected the argument that such proceedings must include an
o p p o r t u n i t y t o have a j u r y d e t e r m i n e t h e r e q u i s i t e f a c t s .
See a l s o United S t a t e s v. S t e w a r t ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) , 531 F.2d
326, c e r t . d e n i e d , 426 U.S. 922, 96 S.Ct. 2629, 49 L.Ed.2d
376; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. H o l t (D. Tex. 1 9 7 5 ) , 397 F.Supp. 1397,
a f f i r m e d i n p a r t and v a c a t e d i n p a r t , ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 5 ) , 537
F.2d 845, cert. d e n i e d , 429 U.S. 1051, 97 S.Ct. 764, 50
L.Ed.2d 767; United S t a t e s v. Neary ( 7 t h C ; i x . 1977) , 552 F.2d
1184, c e r t . d e n i e d , 434 U.S. 864, 98 S.Ct. 197, 54 L.Ed.2d
139.
I n H o l l i s v . Smith (2nd C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 571 F.2d 685, 693,
t h e court said:
"There i s no a u t h o r i t y . . . which h o l d s t h a t
t h e procedure i n proceedings r e l a t i n g s o l e l y t o
punishment, even when a n a d d i t i o n a l f a c t h a s t o
b e e s t a b l i s h e d , must conform p r e c i s e l y t o t h o s e
i n p r o c e e d i n g s r e l a t i n g t o g u i l t , and w e s e e no
b a s i s i n p r i n c i p l e f o r so holding. . ."
While t h e r e i s no r i g h t t o a j u r y t r i a l on s e n t e n c i n g
o r compelled a t t e n d a n c e of p e r s o n s s u p p l y i n g h e a r s a y informa-
t i o n , W i l l i a m s v . N e w York, s u p r a , c e r t a i n p r o t e c t i o n s a r e
necessary i n ordinary sentencing. A defendant has t h e r i g h t
t o c o u n s e l a t s e n t e n c i n g , Mempa v . Rhay ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 389 U.S.
1 2 8 , 88 S.Ct. 254, 1 9 L.Ed.2d 336, and t o have h i s s e n t e n c e
based on a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n , Townsend v. Burke (1948) , 334
U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690. And, a s t h i s C o u r t
h e l d i n S t a t e v . S t e w a r t ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175 Mont. 286, 573 P.2d
1138, 1139, a d e f e n d a n t h a s t h e r i g h t t o b e f r e e from a
d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s a b u s e of s e n t e n c i n g d i s c r e t i o n . I n addi-
t i o n , a d i s t r i c t judge must now s t a t e r e a s o n s for t h e sen-
t e n c e h e imposed i n t h e r e c o r d i n e v e r y c a s e . S t a t e v.
Stumpf (1980) , Mont. -, 609 P.2d 298, 37 St.Rep. 673.
Cavanaugh's s e n t e n c e and judgment shows t h a t he a p p e a r e d
f o r s e n t e n c i n g , w i t h c o u n s e l , a p p r o x i m a t e l y one month a f t e r
e n t e r i n g p l e a s of g u i l t y t o t h e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e s . Cavanaugh
was g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e i n m i t i g a t i o n
of s e n t e n c e a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , b u t i n f a c t , p r e -
s e n t e d no e v i d e n c e . Cavanaugh was g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o
a d d r e s s t h e c o u r t b e f o r e s e n t e n c e was imposed. H e declined
t o do s o . Material appearing i n t h e presentence r e p o r t ,
i n c l u d i n g h i s p a s t f e l o n y r e c o r d , w a s summarized by t h e
court, Cavanaugh was a s k e d i f t h e r e w a s any l e g a l c a u s e why
s e n t e n c i n g s h o u l d n o t b e imposed. H e o f f e r e d nothing.
Mesler's record indicates likewise. Mesler, w i t h t h e
c o n c u r r e n c e of c o u n s e l , waived a p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t . He
t e s t i f i e d a t t h e sentencing proceeding. Both p e t i t i o n e r s
were a c c o r d e d a l l t h e p r o c e d u r a l p r o t e c t i o n s r e q u i r e d by t h e
court.
P e t i t i o n e r s c o n t e n d t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 ) , MCA,
d e n i e s equal p r o t e c t i o n because it provides d i f f e r e n t punish-
ments, o r d i f f e r e n t d e g r e e s o f punishment, f o r d i f f e r e n t
p e r s o n s f o r t h e same a c t . This Court recognizes t h a t v i r -
t u a l l y every sentencing provision has t h i s e f f e c t . A s the
Supreme C o u r t n o t e d i n W i l l i a m s , t h e " p r e v a l e n t modern
p h i l o s o p h y of penology [ i s ] t h a t t h e punishment s h o u l d f i t
t h e o f f e n d e r and n o t m e r e l y t h e c r i m e . " Furthermore, " [ t l h e
b e l i e f no l o n g e r p r e v a i l s t h a t e v e r y o f f e n s e i n l i k e l e g a l
c a t e g o r y c a l l s f o r a n i d e n t i c a l punishment w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o
p a s t l i f e and h a b i t s of a p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n d e r . " 337 U.S. at
247.
P a r o l e and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e f u r l o u g h program, b o t h
o f which r e l a t e t o punishment, a r e p r i v i l e g e s - - m a t t e r s of
grace, not rights. Lopez v . C r i s t ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont. ,
578 P.2d 312, 314, 35 St.Rep. 622; P e t i t i o n of H a r t (19651,
145 Mont. 203, 206, 399 P.2d 984. The d i s t r i c t judges d i d
n o t d e p r i v e p e t i t i o n e r s of a r i g h t when t h e y d e c i d e d t h a t
p e t i t i o n e r s s h o u l d b e imprisoned w i t h no p o s s i b i l i t y of
p a r o l e o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e f u r l o u g h program. The d i s -
t r i c t judges w i t h h e l d g r a c e . S e c t i o n 46-28-202(2), MCA,
which a l l o w s a d i s t r i c t judge t o r e s t r i c t c o n d i t i o n a l re-
l e a s e , does n o t s i n g l e o u t a c l a s s without r a t i o n a l i t y .
I n d i v i d u a l i z e d s e n t e n c i n g g o a l s must be m e t . Any k i n d of
conditional r e l e a s e necessarily involves the r i s k t h a t
p a r o l e e s " w i l l n o t b e a b l e t o l i v e i n s o c i e t y w i t h o u t com-
mitting additional anti-social acts." Morrissey v. B r e w e r
( 1 9 7 2 ) , 408 U.S. 471, 483, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484.
P e t i t i o n e r s a l s o c l a i m t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) must
f a l l b e c a u s e i t i s t o o vague i n d e f i n i n g t h e supposed " o f -
f e n s e " c i t i n g L a n z e t t a v. New J e r s e y ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 306 U.S. 451,
5 9 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888. P e t i t i o n e r s a r e misled. Sec-
t i o n 46-18-202(2) does n o t d e f i n e an offense. I t i s invoked
n o t s o much on t h e b a s i s of p a s t a c t s a s on t h e b a s i s of a
p r e d i c t i o n of f u t u r e b e h a v i o r . I t f o c u s e s on t h e o f f e n d e r ,
n o t on a p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n s e . I t d o e s n o t c r e a t e a new
o f f e n s e ; n o r d o e s i t f o r b i d o r r e q u i r e t h e d o i n g of a n a c t .
I t s s o l e p u r p o s e i s t o p e r m i t a d i s t r i c t judge, i n t h e
c o u r s e of o r d i n a r y s e n t e n c i n g , t o d e t e r m i n e t h a t a d e f e n d a n t
s h o u l d s e r v e h i s f u l l s e n t e n c e f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s o c i e t y .
F i n a l l y , p e t i t i o n e r s c o n t e n d t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2)
unlawfully delegates l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y t o the j u d i c i a l
and e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h e s of government. The r e a l t h r u s t of
t h i s argument a p p e a r s t o be t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-202(2) vests
t o o much d i s c r e t i o n i n d i s t r i c t judges and p r o s e c u t i n g
attorneys. Petitioners allude t o prosecutorial vindictive-
n e s s i n t h e u s e of t h i s s t a t u t e a s a d e v i c e t o p u n i s h de-
f e n d a n t s who choose t o go t o t r i a l r a t h e r t h a n p l e a d g u i l t y .
The f a c t t h a t b o t h p e t i t i o n e r s h e r e d i d p l e a d g u i l t y and
were s u b s e q u e n t l y s e n t e n c e d w i t h o u t p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e o r
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e f u r l o u g h program i s c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e
t o the contrary.
~ i s t r i c j u d g e s , n o t county p r o s e c u t o r s , d e t e r m i n e t h e
t
punishment t h a t i s imposed f o l l o w i n g c o n v i c t i o n . Petitioners'
a l l e g a t i o n t h a t p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y s somehow i n d u c e d i s t r i c t
judges i n t o r e s t r i c t i n g p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h program e l i g i -
b i l i t y i g n o r e s t h e p l a i n language of t h e s t a t u t e ( " . .. the
c o u r t may a l s o impose t h e r e s t r i c t i o n .. ."). While a
recommendation m i g h t b e made i n a g i v e n c a s e t h a t t h e f u l l
r e s t r i c t i o n p e r m i t t e d by s e c t i o n 46-18-202 ( 2 ) s h o u l d b e
imposed, t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n whether t o do s o i s m a n i f e s t l y
t h e d i s t r i c t judge's alone.
This Court f i n d s t h e contention t h a t excessive j u d i c i a l
d i s c r e t i o n e x i s t s i n p e r m i t t i n g d i s t r i c t judges t o c h o o s e t o
f u l l y r e s t r i c t p a r o l e and f u r l o u g h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s w i t h o u t
merit. A d i s t r i c t judge i s p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l p o s i t i o n e d t o
p r e d i c t whether t h e r e s t r i c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e p r o t e c -
t i o n of s o c i e t y i n l i g h t of t h e o f f e n d e r ' s p e r s o n a l and
c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y , a p p a r e n t w i l l i n g n e s s t o conform h i s be-
h a v i o r t o s o c i e t y ' s r u l e s , and o t h e r f a c t s t h a t a r e commonly
weighed i n s e n t e n c i n g .
For t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h p e t i t i o n e r s ' application f o r
a w r i t of habeas c o r p u s i s d e n i e d .
We concur:
ii ustices
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea will file a special concurring
opinion later.