No. 13523
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F
1977
STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
-vs-
WILLIAM CHRISTOPHER SATHER,
D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: District Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
P a u l B. S m i t h a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
W i l l i a m Boggs a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
F o r Respondent :
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
R o b e r t Deschamps 111, County A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a ,
Montana
Ed McLean, Deputy County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a ,
Montana
-
-
Submitted: A p r i l 1 5 , 1977
Decided:
JUN -2 1977
Mr. J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t .
Defendant William C h r i s t o p h e r S a t h e r was c o n v i c t e d o f
t h e c r i m e o f a t t e m p t e d b u r g l a r y by j u r y v e r d i c t i n t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t o f Missoula County. H e was s e n t e n c e d t o a t e r m o f 50
years i n t h e s t a t e prison a s a p e r s i s t e n t felony offender. De-
f e n d a n t a p p e a l s from t h e s e n t e n c e imposed.
his c a s e comes t o u s on t h e b a s i s of a n a g r e e d s t a t e -
ment o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e , and a c e r t i -
f i e d copy o f t h e d o c k e t e n t r i e s i n l i e u o f a t r a n s c r i p t and ex-
h i b i t s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 95-2408, R.C.M. 1947.
Defendant S a t h e r and Claude S y l v e s t e r McIntosh w e r e
a r r e s t e d on September 30, 1975. They w e r e i n c a r c e r a t e d i n t h e
Missoula County j a i l . On October 1 5 t h e y w e r e j o i n t l y c h a r g e d
by d i r e c t i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h e c r i m e s o f a t t e m p t e d b u r g l a r y and
theft. Each e n t e r e d a p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y t o e a c h c h a r g e .
On October 31 a w r i t t e n p l e a b a r g a i n p r o p o s a l and a g r e e -
ment s i g n e d by t h e d e p u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y and McIntosh w a s f i l e d
with t h e d i s t r i c t court. The S t a t e , i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a p l e a
o f g u i l t y t o t h e two c h a r g e s , a g r e e d t o recommend a s e n t e n c e o f
10 y e a r s on t h e c h a r g e o f a t t e m p t e d b u r g l a r y and 5 y e a r s on t h e
c h a r g e o f t h e f t t o be s e r v e d c o n c u r r e n t l y and a n o t h e r 1 0 y e a r s
and 5 y e a r s on c h a r g e s i n a n o t h e r c a s e t o be s e r v e d c o n c u r r e n t l y
i n t h a t case b u t c o n s e c u t i v e l y w i t h t h e s e n t e n c e imposed f o r t h e
attempted burglary.
On November 4 McIntosh a p p e a r e d i n c o u r t w i t h c o u n s e l ,
withdrew h i s p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y t o t h e c h a r g e s o f a t t e m p t e d
b u r g l a r y and t h e f t and e n t e r e d a p l e a o f g u i l t y t o e a c h c h a r g e .
A p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n w a s o r d e r e d and s e n t e n c i n g s e t f o r
November 20.
On November 2 0 McIntosh r e c e i v e d a s e n t e n c e i n c o n f o r m i t y
w i t h t h e p l e a b a r g a i n p r o p o s a l and agreement. McIntosh had p r e -
v i o u s l y been c o n v i c t e d of t h r e e f e l o n i e s , two o f them w i t h i n t h e
previous f i v e years.
I n t h e meantime d u r i n g t h e week of November 7 t o Nov-
ember 1 4 a p a r o l e r e v o c a t i o n h e a r i n g w a s h e l d i n t h e Missoula
County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e on d e f e n d a n t S a t h e r ' s p a r o l e . Defen-
d a n t S a t h e r r e q u e s t e d c o u n s e l b u t was n o t r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l
a t t h e parole revocation hearing. On November 1 4 d e f e n d a n t
S a t h e r w a s t r a n s p o r t e d t o t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n i n Deer Lodge.
On December 29 t h e P a r o l e Board a t Montana S t a t e P r i s o n revoked
d e f e n d a n t S a t h e r ' s p a r o l e c o n t i n g e n t on h i s c a s e b e i n g recon-
s i d e r e d a f t e r d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e pending c h a r g e s .
The c h a r g e s o f a t t e m p t e d b u r g l a r y and t h e f t a g a i n s t
d e f e n d a n t S a t h e r w e r e s e t f o r t r i a l i n t h e A p r i l , 1976 j u r y t e r m .
Names o f p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s w e r e drawn on F e b r u a r y 20. On March
16 t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r y p a n e l was f i n a l i z e d and s e n t q u e s t i o n n a i r e s
by t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t . On March 18 t h e c a s e w a s s e t f o r t r i a l on
A p r i l 5 as t h e 9 t h c a s e . On March 22 t h e c a s e was reset f o r t r i a l
from t h e 9 t h c a s e t o t h e 1 9 t h c a s e on A p r i l 5. Subsequently t h e
c a s e was reset f o r A p r i l 1 2 and f i n a l l y f o r A p r i l 8.
On A p r i l 7 d e f e n d a n t S a t h e r w a s t r a n s p o r t e d from t h e
s t a t e p r i s o n t o t h e Missoula County j a i l . O t h a t d a t e t h e dep-
n
u t y c o u n t y a t t o r n e y f i l e d and s e r v e d upon d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l a
n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o s e e k i n c r e a s e d punishment p u r s u a n t t o s e c -
t i o n s 95-1506 and 95-1507, R.C.M. 1947, by r e a s o n o f d e f e n d a n t ' s
p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n of k i d n a p p i n g . A t t h a t t i m e t h e deputy county
a t t o r n e y s t a t e d t h a t he would withdraw t h i s n o t i c e i f d e f e n d a n t
p l e a d g u i l t y b e f o r e t h e c a s e went t o t r i a l and would t h e r e u p o n
recommend a s e n t e n c e o f 10 y e a r s .
The t r i a l s t a r t e d on A p r i l 8 . A t t h e conclusion of t h e
s t a t e ' s case-in-chief, t h e p r e s i d i n g judge d i s m i s s e d t h e c h a r g e
o f t h e f t on motion of t h e S t a t e . On A p r i l 1 2 , t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d
a v e r d i c t o f g u i l t y on t h e c h a r g e o f a t t e m p t e d b u r g l a r y . On
A p r i l 19 d e f e n d a n t S a t h e r was s e n t e n c e d t o 50 y e a r s imprisonment
in the state prison and given credit for 45 days served in the
Missoula County jail. No presentence report was made by the
State Board of Pardons.
On more than one occasion between defendant Sather's
arrest and trial the deputy county attorney and defendant's
counsel discussed the matter of defendant's plea. The deputy
county attorney offered to recommend to the sentencing judge
that defendant receive a sentence of 10 years in the state
prison if he agreed to plead guilty.
At the start of trial and again on the day of sentenc-
ing, counsel for defendant objected to the filing of notice to
seek increased punishment less than 24 hours before trial con-
tending that the filing of such notice under the circumstances
was unlawful and unfair. The district court overruled defendant's
objection.
We were advised upon oral argument that during the pen-
dency of this appeal, defendant Sather applied to the Sentence
Review Board for reduction of his sentence which was denied.
Defendant has appealed from the final judgment. All
specifications of error are directed at the sentence imposed.
None are directed at his conviction of attempted burglary.
Defendant raises three specifications of error:
(1) That Montana's statute of increased punishment for
prior offenders as applied in this case denies defendant due
process of law as required by federal and state constitutional
provisions.
(2) That the notice of intention to seek increased punish-
ment was not timely served.
(3) That defendant was not given proper credit for time
served prior to conviction against the sentence imposed.
Defendant's first specification of error carries us into
deep constitutional waters. He claims that realistically he was
s e n t e n c e d t o 10 y e a r s f o r a t t e m p t e d b u r g l a r y and 40 y e a r s f o r
r e f u s i n g t o p l e a d g u i l t y and i n s i s t i n g upon a j u r y t r i a l . The
c o r e o f h i s argument i s s i m p l y t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r used p l e a
b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e d u r e s and invoked t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e
f o r a n improper p u r p o s e and when t h a t d i d n o t work, t h e judge
punished him w i t h a n e x c e s s i v e s e n t e n c e f o r r e f u s i n g t o p l e a d
guilty. Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t t h e t o t a l i t y o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e t r u t h o f h i s c o n t e n t i o n s and s p e c i f i c a l l y p o i n t s
t o these:
(1) Knowledge by t h e p r o s e c u t o r o f d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i o r
c o n v i c t i o n long b e f o r e invoking t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e on
t h e eve of t r i a l , ( 2 ) a p p a r e n t d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e p r o s e c u t o r
t h a t t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t r e q u i r e d no g r e a t e r s e n t e n c e t h a n 1 0 y e a r s
a s e v i d e n c e d by t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s o f f e r t o recommend a 10 y e a r sen-
t e n c e i f d e f e n d a n t would p l e a d g u i l t y , ( 3 ) a f t e r invoking t h e
h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e l e s s t h a n 24 h o u r s b e f o r e t r i a l , t h e
p r o s e c u t o r ' s o f f e r t o withdraw it and recommend a 1 0 y e a r s e n t e n c e
i f d e f e n d a n t would p l e a d g u i l t y b e f o r e t h e t r i a l s t a r t e d , (4) the
f a i l u r e o f t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge t o s e c u r e and u t i l i z e a p r e s e n t e n c e
i n v e s t i g a t i o n and r e p o r t from t h e S t a t e Board o f Pardons i n sen-
t e n c i n g d e f e n d a n t , and ( 5 ) t h e d i s p a r i t y o f s e n t e n c e imposed upon
h i s c o d e f e n d a n t who p l e a d g u i l t y a s compared t o t h e s e n t e n c e he
received. Because o f t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s he
was d e n i e d due p r o c e s s i n v i o l a t i o n o f f e d e r a l and s t a t e c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l requirements.
The S t a t e , on t h e o t h e r hand, d e n i e s any a b u s e o f d i s -
c r e t i o n o r misconduct on t h e p a r t o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r o r s e n t e n c i n g
judge. The S t a t e p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g
between t h e p r o s e c u t o r and d e f e n d a n t wherein t h e p r o s e c u t o r o f f e r s
t o recommend a l i g h t e r s e n t e n c e i n exchange f o r a g u i l t y p l e a i s
n e i t h e r coercive i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l sense nor otherwise constitu-
t i o n a l l y infirm. The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t where, a s h e r e , t h e r e i s
no evidence of bad faith, discrimination or arbitrary use of
plea bargaining, it is unobjectionable. The State emphasizes
that both the prosecutor and judge acted within the limits of
their statutory authority in sentencing defendant under Montana's
habitual criminal statute. The State denies any abuse of dis-
cretion on the part of the prosecutor or judge. In short, the
State denies any "due process" violation under the facts of this
case.
It is important to note that defendant does not attack
plea bargaining per se nor contend that Montana's habitual crim-
inal statute is unconstitutional on its face. Defendant's con-
stitutional attack is bottomed on the proposition that these
procedures were unconstitutionally applied in his case to deny
him due process of law.
The broad dimensions of the pertinent constitutional re-
quirements are quite clear. A person cannot be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law. Fourteenth Amendment, United
States Constitution; Art. 11, Section 17, 1972 Montana Constitu-
tion. A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right
to a jury trial, Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution;
Art. 11, Section 26, 1972 Montana Constitution. He also has the
right or privilege against self-incrimination. Fifth Amendment,
United States Constitution; Art. 11, Section 25, 1972 Montana
Constitution. He waives these rights by entering a plea of guilty,
but such waiver must be voluntary. Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L Ed 2d 747, and cases cited therein.
A coerced plea of guilty violates constitutional due process
requirements. Rohrer v. Montana, 237 F.Supp. 747 (1965). Imper-
missible coercion may exist in a variety of forms arising out of
the conduct of the prosecutor or judge acting within statutory
authority. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 8 4 S.Ct. 2072,
23 L Ed 2d 656; Hayes v. Cowen, United States Court of Appeals,
6 t h C i r c u i t (No. 76-1409), December 30, 1976. V i n d i c t i v e , re-
t a l i a t o r y o r p u n i t i v e u s e of o t h e r w i s e u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e p r o c e d u r e s
o f f e n d s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s . Blackledge v.
P e r r y , 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 4 0 L Ed 2d 628; North C a r o l i n a
v . P e a r c e , s u p r a ; Hayes v . Cowen, s u p r a .
The r e c o r d i n t h i s c a s e s t r o n g l y s u g g e s t s a c o n s t i t u t i o n -
a l l y i m p e r m i s s i b l e u s e o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g and t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m -
i n a l s t a t u t e by t h e p r o s e c u t o r . Long a f t e r d e f e n d a n t ' s background
and p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n w e r e known t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r and a f t e r p l e a
b a r g a i n i n g had f a i l e d , t h e p r o s e c u t o r invoked t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m -
i n a l s t a t u t e t o s u b j e c t defendant t o a p o t e n t i a l sentence of 1 0 0
y e a r s a s opposed t o t h e s t a t u t o r y maximum of 1 0 y e a r s f o r a t t e m p t e d
burglary. See s e c t i o n 95-1507, R.C.M. 1947; s e c t i o n 94-4-103,
R.C.M. 1947; s e c t i o n 94-6-204, R.C.M. 1947. A f t e r invoking t h e
h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e t h e day b e f o r e t r i a l , t h e p r o s e c u t o r
o f f e r e d t o withdraw t h i s a c t i o n and recommend a s e n t e n c e of 10
y e a r s i f d e f e n d a n t would p l e a d g u i l t y b e f o r e t h e t r i a l s t a r t e d .
The r e c o r d i s b a r r e n o f any e v e n t o r c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t would j u s -
t i f y such a c t i o n by t h e p r o s e c u t o r w i t h i n t h e l e g i t i m a t e o b j e c t -
ives of the habitual criminal s t a t u t e o r t h e criminal j u s t i c e
system. Although t h e u s e o f t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e i s
d i s c r e t i o n a r y w i t h t h e p r o s e c u t o r , t h a t d i s c r e t i o n i s n o t un-
l i m i t e d and c a n n o t be used f o r improper p u r p o s e s . H e r e t h e prose-
c u t o r knew o f d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i o r c r i m i n a l r e c o r d and had t h e p a r o l e
b o a r d ' s e v a l u a t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t b e f o r e him and had completed h i s
information g a t h e r i n g long before invoking t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l
statute. When t h e s e f u n c t i o n s w e r e completed, t h e p r o s e c u t o r was
i n a p o s i t i o n t o e v a l u a t e whether t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e
s h o u l d be invoked i n t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t o r n o t . The p r o s e c u t o r
d i d n o t do s o a t t h a t t i m e b u t w a i t e d u n t i l p l e a b a r g a i n i n g had
broken down and t r i a l was o n l y 24 h o u r s away and even t h e n o f f e r e d
t o withdraw h i s a c t i o n under t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e and
recommend a 10 y e a r s e n t e n c e i f d e f e n d a n t would p l e a d g u i l t y .
This a c t i o n i s not c o n s i s t e n t with a determination t h a t t h e
p u b l i c i n t e r e s t r e q u i r e d i n c r e a s e d punishment o f d e f e n d a n t u n d e r
the habitual criminal statute. The o n l y s u p p o r t a b l e i n f e r e n c e
i s t h a t such c o n d u c t was u s e d i n a n a t t e m p t t o c o e r c e d e f e n d a n t
i n t o waiving h i s r i g h t t o a j u r y t r i a l . Subsequent e v e n t s ,
while n o t conclusive, lend support t o t h i s inference.
R e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r f o r t h e
e x e r c i s e o f p r o c e d u r a l r i g h t s by a n a c c u s e d h a s been h e l d t o v i o -
l a t e c o n s i t u t i o n a l due process requirements. Blackledge v. Perry,
supra. T h e r e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t where
d e f e n d a n t had a p p e a l e d h i s c o n v i c t i o n o f misdemeanor a s s a u l t i n
a lower c o u r t and was e n t i t l e d t o a t r i a l d e novo i n s u p e r i o r
c o u r t u n d e r s t a t e law, t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s s u b s e q u e n t a c t i o n i n ob-
t a i n i n g a n i n d i c t m e n t f o r f e l o n y a s s a u l t c o v e r i n g t h e same con-
d u c t c o n t r a v e n e d t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amend-
ment. The b a s i s f o r t h e r u l i n g was t h a t a d e f e n d a n t p u r s u i n g
h i s p r o c e d u r a l r i g h t s under s t a t e law i s e n t i t l e d t o pursue t h o s e
r i g h t s w i t h o u t a p p r e h e n s i o n t h a t t h e S t a t e w i l l r e t a l i a t e by
s u b s t i t u t i n g a more s e r i o u s c h a r g e f o r t h e o r i g i n a l o n e and t h u s
s u b j e c t him t o a s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e d p o t e n t i a l p e r i o d o f i n -
carceration.
S i m i l a r h o l d i n g s have been handed down by o t h e r f e d e r a l
courts. The f e d e r a l c o u r t o f a p p e a l s f o r t h e D i s t r i c t o f Columbia
r e v e r s e d a c o n v i c t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t d e g r e e murder f o l l o w i n g t h e
d e f e n d a n t s s e c u r i n g o f a m i s t r i a l on a p r i o r c h a r g e o f second
d e g r e e murder. U n i t e d S t a t e s v . J a m i s o n , 5 0 5 F.2d 407 ( 1 9 7 4 ) .
The U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n C a l i f o r n i a r e f u s e d t o a l l o w
p r o s e c u t i o n o f a n i n d i c t m e n t on more s e r i o u s c h a r g e s a f t e r de-
f e n d a n t had a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t t o a change o f venue on a n i n d i c t -
ment c h a r g i n g l e s s s e r i o u s o f f e n s e s . U n i t e d S t a t e s v. DeMarco,
401 F.Supp. 505 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . And i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Ruesga-Martinez,
534 F.2d 1367 ( 9 t h C i r . 1976) t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t of a p p e a l s f o r
t h e 9 t h C i r c u i t h e l d t h a t a d e f e n d a n t c a n n o t be t r i e d o n a f e l o n y
i n d i c t m e n t a f t e r h e h a s r e f u s e d t o p l e a d g u i l t y t o a misdemeanor,
i f no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e i n c r e a s e i n s e v e r i t y o f t h e c h a r g e s
is offered. W e p e r c e i v e no d i f f e r e n c e i n p r i n c i p l e between t h e s e
c a s e s and t h e i n s t a n t c a s e where t h e c h a r g e r e m a i n s unchanged
b u t a s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n c r e a s e d p e n a l t y i s s o u g h t by i n v o k i n g t h e
habitual criminal statute.
The f e d e r a l c o u r t o f a p p e a l s f o r t h e 6 t h C i r c u i t h a s
recently held t h a t the prosecutor's t a c t i c s i n a case involving
>
p l e a b a r g a i n i n g and a h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e , p l a c e d t h e de-
f e n d a n t i n f e a r o f r e t a l i a t o r y a c t i o n f o r i n s i s t i n g upon h i s
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o s t a n d t r i a l and t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d u e
p r o c e s s was v i o l a t e d . Hayes v . Cowan, s u p r a . c his c a s e i s s i m i -
l a r , a l t h o u g h n o t i d e n t i c a l , t o t h e i n s t a n t case o n t h e f a c t s .
I n Hayes t h e d e f e n d a n t was i n d i c t e d f o r f o r g e r y . After arraign-
ment, a p r e t r i a l c o n f e r e n c e was h e l d w i t h t h e p r o s e c u t o r who
o f f e r e d t o recommend a 5 y e a r s e n t e n c e i f d e f e n d a n t would p l e a d
guilty. Defendant w a s warned t h a t i f he d i d n o t p l e a d g u i l t y
he would be c h a r g e d u n d e r t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e . Defen-
d a n t r e f u s e d t o p l e a d g u i l t y , b u t i n s i s t e d on r e c e i v i n g a f u l l
trial. The p r o s e c u t o r t h e n o b t a i n e d a new i n d i c t m e n t from t h e
grand j u r y charging defendant under t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e
b a s e d upon t h e f o r g e r y a s a t h i r d o f f e n s e . Defendant was con-
v i c t e d by a j u r y , and o n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e judge, t h e man-
d a t o r y l i f e s e n t e n c e f o r a t h i r d o f f e n s e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l was
imposed. I n v a c a t i n g t h e s e n t e n c e , t h e c o u r t i n Hayes v . Cowan, s u p r a ,
set f o r t h i t s reasoning:
"The Commonwealth u r g e s t h a t t h e e n t i r e c o n c e p t
of p l e a bargaining w i l l be destroyed i f prose-
c u t o r s a r e n o t a l l o w e d t o s e e k c o n v i c t i o n s on
more s e r i o u s c h a r g e s i f d e f e n d a n t s r e f u s e t o
p l e a d g u i l t y . W e d o n o t a g r e e . Although a
p r o s e c u t o r may i n t h e c o u r s e o f p l e a n e g o t i a t i o n
o f f e r a defendant concessions r e l a t i n g t o
p o s e u c t i o n under a n e x i s t i n g i n d i c t m e n t ,
[ C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ] he may n o t t h r e a t e n a
d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e consequence t h a t more s e v e r e
c h a r g e s may be b r o u g h t i f he i n s i s t s on g o i n g t o
t r i a l . When a p r o s e c u t o r o b t a i n s a n i n d i c t m e n t
l e s s s e v e r e t h a n t h e f a c t s known t o him a t t h e
t i m e might p e r m i t , h e makes a d i s c r e t i o n a r y
determination t h a t t h e interests of t h e s t a t e
a r e s e r v e d by n o t s e e k i n g more s e r i o u s c h a r g e s .
[Citations omitted.] Accordingly, i f a f t e r p l e a
n e g o t i a t i o n s f a i l , he t h e n p r o c u r e s a n i n d i c t m e n t
c h a r g i n g a more s e r i o u s c r i m e , a s t r o n g i n f e r e n c e
i s c r e a t e d t h a t t h e o n l y r e a s o n f o r t h e more
s e r i o u s charge i s vindictiveness. Under t h e s e
circumstances, t h e prosecutor should be r e q u i r e d
t o justify h i s action. In t h i s case, a vindic-
t i v e m o t i v e need n o t be i n f e r r e d . The p r o s e c u t o r
has admitted i t . "
The o n l y m a t e r i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between Hayes and t h e c a s e on a p p e a l
is t h a t t h e r e t h e prosecutor expressly threatened t h e defendant
w i t h mandatory i n c r e a s e d punishment under t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l
s t a t u t e i f he d i d n o t p l e a d g u i l t y , w h i l e h e r e t h e p r o s e c u t o r ex-
p r e s s e d no t h r e a t b u t s i m p l y invoked a d i s c r e t i o n a r y and p o t e n t i a l l y
g r e a t e r p e n a l t y a f t e r p l e a b a r g a i n i n g had broken down. In our
view, t h e c o e r c i v e e f f e c t i s a s s u r e l y p r e s e n t i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e
a s i n Hayes, d i f f e r i n g o n l y i n d e g r e e .
For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s and based o n t h e c i t e d a u t h o r i t y ,
w e h o l d t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s d e n i e d due p r o c e s s under f e d e r a l and
s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s a s a p p l i e d t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s
case. W e do n o t h o l d t h a t t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s i n i t s e l f
i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n f i r m n o r t h a t Montana's h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l
s t a t u t e i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on i t s f a c e .
D e f e n d a n t ' s second s p e c i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r r e l a t i n g t o t h e
t i m e l i n e s s of invoking t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e i s i n s e p a r a b l e
from t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e . A s t h e timing of i t s i n j e c t i o n
i n t o t h e c a s e h a s been d i s c u s s e d p r e v i o u s l y and forms a b a s i s f o r
o u r r u l i n g on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e r a i s e d i n d e f e n d a n t ' s f i r s t
s p e c i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r , f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n a p p e a r s u n n e c e s s a r y .
I n i t s b r i e f t h e S t a t e concedes d e f e n d a n t ' s t h i r d s p e c -
i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r . The S t a t e a d m i t s t h a t d e f e n d a n t i s e n t i t l e d
t o c r e d i t of 6 months and 2 2 d a y s a g a i n s t h i s s e n t e n c e . This
r e p r e s e n t s t h e t i m e a c t u a l l y s e r v e d by d e f e n d a n t between t h e
d a t e o f h i s a r r e s t and t h e d a t e of s e n t e n c e .
The 5 0 y e a r s e n t e n c e imposed i s v a c a t e d . The S t a t e ' s
n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o s e e k i n c r e a s e d punishment under t h e h a b i t u a l
criminal s t a t u t e i s ordered stricken. The c a u s e i s remanded t o
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t with d i r e c t i o n s t o resentence t h e defendant
f o r t h e c r i m e of a t t e m p t e d b u r g l a r y w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e c r e d i t f o r
t i m e a c t u a l l y s e r v e d a c c o r d i n g t o law.
Justice
Chief J u s t i c e
(Specially concurring)
I concur i n t h e r e s u l t o f
t h e f o r e g o i n g d e c i s i o n but
not i n t h e e n t i r e r a t i o n a l e
of t h e majority opinion.