No. 80-288
I N THE SUPREME COURT O T E STATE O M N A A
F H F OTN
1981
THE STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
VS.
OWEN A A RUMLEY, J R . ,
S
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f F l a t h e a d .
Honorable James M. S a l a n s k y , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
K. M. B r i d e n s t i n e , P o l s o n , Montana
F o r Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana
Ted 0 . Lympus, County A t t o r n e y , K a l i s p e l l , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : May 28, 1981
Filed :
0 7 p R ,%?a.-Q
-< 4# I
v Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t .
The d e f e n d a n t , Owen Asa Rumley, Jr ., was c h a r g e d on
June 7, 1979, w i t h n e g l i g e n t homicide under s e c t i o n 45-5-
104, MCA, by an information filed in Flathead County
D i s t r i c t Court. S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e information charged t h a t
the defendant's negligent operation of his motor vehicle
caused the death of Margaret Beebe on May 12, 1979.
Defendant pleaded n o t g u i l t y and asserted the affirmative
d e f e n s e of mechanical d e f e c t . Defendant a l s o f i l e d a motion
to suppress e v i d e n c e of a blood alcohol test. After an
e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g , t h e m o t i o n was d e n i e d .
D e f e n d a n t was f o u n d g u i l t y of n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e and
s e n t e n c e d t o f i v e y e a r s i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n . The
s e n t e n c e was s u s p e n d e d on t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t
s e r v e s i x t y d a y s i n t h e F l a t h e a d County j a i l , perform p u b l i c
service at the county nursing home for ten weeks, and
u n d e r g o a n e v a l u a t i o n a t t h e C h e m i c a l Dependency C e n t e r in
Kalispell. Defendant a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n .
On the afternoon of May 12, 1979, defendant was
driving north on Highway 93 several miles south of
K a l i s p e l l , Montana. H e had j u s t l e f t a b a r where h e c l a i m e d
h e d r a n k o n l y two b o u r b o n d i t c h e s .
According t o t h e testimony of a n o t h e r d r i v e r on t h e
road a t t h e t i m e , d e f e n d a n t ' s yellow pickup truck suddenly
appeared in his rear view mirror. He testified that
d e f e n d a n t blew h i s h o r n , and t h e n p a s s e d h i s v e h i c l e a s w e l l
a s t h e v e h i c l e a h e a d o f him, coming s o c l o s e t h a t h e had t o
swerve t o avoid being h i t by t h e d e f e n d a n t . A few m i l e s
down t h e r o a d , t h e d r i v e r and h i s w i f e came upon t h e s c e n e
o f t h e c o l l i s i o n which g a v e r i s e t o t h i s a c t i o n .
An off-duty highway patrolman witnessed the collision
as he was driving south on Highway 93. As the patrolman
crossed the center line to see whether he could pass the
vehicle ahead of him, he saw the defendant's pickup swerve
across the center line and collide with a Buick sedan driven
by Margaret Scherf Beebe. Margaret Beebe died as a result
of the injuries she received in the accident.
Defendant testified that he was driving between 50
and 55 miles per hour when he saw a southbound vehicle pull
into his lane in an attempt to pass another car. When he
saw the other car, defendant slammed on his brakes leaving
skid marks for 134 feet in the northbound lane. The marks
indicate that defendant's pickup swerved into the southbound
lane, and just before the collision, the marks indicate that
the pickup swerved back toward the northbound lane. The
highway patrolman who investigated the scene testified that
in his opinion the defendant's pickup was traveling between
65 and 70 miles per hour at the time of the collision.
Numerous witnesses, including several highway
patrolmen, an ambulance driver, and a nurse at the hospital
where defendant was taken, testified that after the
collision defendant smelled of alcohol and was confused and
disoriented. Defendant was either unresponsive or
incoherent when he did try to respond to questions. Even
when others tried to explain to defendant what had occurred,
he kept repeating, "What did I do?" or "What happened?"
At the hospital in Kalispell a blood sample was drawn
from the defendant and sent to the criminal investigation
lab in Missoula. The crime 1 a ~ ' s analysis showed that
defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.25 grams percent by
welgnt e t h y l alcohol.
D e f e n d a n t p r e s e n t s t o r r e v i e w f o u r specifications o i
error:
1. D e n l a l oZ t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t l o n t o s u p p r e s s ;
2. A d m i s s i o n of t h e b l o o d a n a l y s i s a t t h e t r i a l ;
3. Denial of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s or
d l r e c t a v e r d i c t of a c q u i t t a l ; and
4. Limitation of t h e f i n a l a r g u m e n t t o f o r t y - f i v e
mlnutes.
Defendant a r g u e s t h a t h i s motlon t o s u p p r e s s should
h a v e been g r a n t e d b e c a u s e he had n o t e x p r e s s l y c o n s e n t e d t o
t h e t a k i n g o f h i s b l o o d and was n o t i n f o r m e d o f the reason
for its extraction. F u r t h e r , c i e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t h e was
not arrested prior t o t h e time t h e blood s a m p l e was t a k e n
and, therefore, the taking of the blood was an improper
search. T h e s e a r g u m e n t s a r e a p p a r e n t l y made t o show t h a t
the State failed t o comply w i t h subsection (1) o f section
61-8-402, MCA.
S e c t i o n 61-8-402, MCA, is Montana's implied consent
statute, and subsection ( 1 ) of that section does require
t h a t a f o r m a l a r r e s t be made p r i o r t o t h e t a k i n g of a b l o o d
sample. A s t h i s C o u r t f o u n d i n S t a t e v . Mangels ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 6
Mont. 1 9 0 , 5 3 1 P.2d 1 3 1 3 , h o w e v e r , s u b s e c t i o n ( 2 ) o f s e c t i o n
61-8-402, MCA, d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h a t a f o r m a l a r r e s t be made
~f a person is " u n c o n s c i o u s " o r "otherwise i n a condition
rendering him incapable of refusal." See section 61-8-
4 L ) 2 ( 2 ) , MCA. Here, t h e D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t at the
tlme the blood s a m p l e was taken, t h e d e f e n d a n t was "in a
condition rendering him incapable of refusal" of a blood
test. A f o r m a l a r r e s t was t h e r e f o r e n o t n e c e s s a r y , n o r was
it p o s s i b l e a t t h a t time t o obtain the express consent o i
the defendant.
D e f e n d a n t ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t he was n o t a r r e s t e d f a i l s
also for the simple reason that the record supports a
f i n d i n g t h a t an a r r e s t was made. The i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r
a t t h e s c e n e of t h e c o l l i s i o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t he p l a c e d t h e
d e f e n d a n t under arrest for driving under the i n f l u e n c e of
alcohol. Similarly, t h e o f f i c e r who met d e f e n d a n t a t t h e
h o s p i t a l when t h e ambulance a r r i v e d testified that he too
had p l a c e d t h e d e f e n d a n t under a r r e s t .
The t e s t for determining whether a person is " i n a
c o n d i t i o n r e n d e r i n g him i n c a p a b l e of r e f u s a l " was f i r s t s e t
down i n Mangels and r e c e n t l y a f f i r m e d i n S t a t e v . Campbell
(1980 1 , Mont. , 615 P.2d 1 9 0 , 37 S t . R e p . 1337. The
C o u r t i n Manqels s t a t e d : "Here, we o n l y r e q u i r e that the
i n c a p a c i t y be d e t e r m i n e d on t h e b a s i s of the best evidence
which i s r e a s o n a b l y a v a i l a b l e t o t h e o f f i c e r . " 166 Mont. a t
1 9 4 , 531 P.2d a t 1 3 1 5 .
In - g e-
Man ls the results of a blood test were
suppressed because the officers only had evidence of
c o n f u s i o n on t h e p a r t of the defendant, t h e d e f e n d a n t had
minor injuries, and b e c a u s e t h e o f f i c e r s d i d n o t a t t e m p t t o
t r y t o question the defendant. I n Campbell t h e blood test
was admitted into evidence because the o f f i c e r s could see
t h a t Campbell was s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d and i n g r e a t p a i n , w e r e
a d v i s e d by a n u r s e that i t would be b e t t e r not t o t r y to
talk t o him, and could n o t g e t him to respond coherently
when t h e y d i d t r y t o t a l k t o him.
Here, t h e o f f i c e r who i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e s c e n e of the
collision, the ambulance driver, the officer at the
hospital, and a n u r s e i n t h e emergency room where d e f e n d a n t
was t a k e n a f t e r t h e c o l l i s i o n , a l l t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t
was c o n f u s e d and d i s o r i e n t e d , t h a t defendant kept repeating
"What h a p p e n e d ? " e v e n a f t e r h e was t o l d w h a t had h a p p e n e d ,
a n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t c o h e r e n t i n h i s responses even
when h e r e a l i z e d h e was b e i n g a s k e d a q u e s t i o n . As a result
of the collision, d e f e n d a n t had a fractured jaw, a broken
f o o t , a c o n t u s i o n on h i s c h e s t t h a t l e d t o a c o l l a p s e d l u n g ,
and m u l t i p l e lacerations. In light of this evidence of
i n c a p a c i t y , t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y denied t h e motion t o
s u p p r e s s , and t h e o f f i c e r a t t h e K a l i s p e l l h o s p i t a l , unable
t o r e c e i v e a c o h e r e n t r e s p o n s e from t h e d e f e n d a n t , p r o p e r l y
r e q u e s t e d t h a t a b l o o d s a m p l e be t a k e n .
Defendant's second contention is t h a t the District
C o u r t e r r e d by a d m i t t i n g t h e b l o o d a n a l y s i s i n t o e v i d e n c e a t
trial. Defendant claims t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h
an adequate foundation for introduction of the blood
a n a l y s i s due t o an a s s e r t e d break i n t h e c h a i n of p o s s e s s i o n
of t h e sample t a k e n from d e f e n d a n t . D e f e n d a n t c l a i m s more
specifically that the c h a i n of c u s t o d y was b r o k e n b e c a u s e
tne officer i n charge of taking the blood sample d i d n o t
a c t u a l l y see t h e b l o o d drawn from d e f e n d a n t .
The officer, standing in the doorway of the room
where t h e b l o o d was b e i n g drawn f r o m d e f e n d a n t , saw a d o c t o r
and two nurses standing around the table where defendant
lay. He d i d n o t see t h e a c t u a l d r a w i n g of blood. Never-
t h e l e s s , one o f t h e n u r s e s who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e drawing
of blood from d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t she helped t o draw
t h e b l o o d s a m p l e i n t o a v i a l t h e o f f i c e r had g i v e n h e r and
gave that same vial to the officer. In light of this
nurse's testimony, t h e s e c o n d c l a i m of d e i e n d a n t l a c k s any
merit.
I n S t a t e v. Nelson ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 280, 583 P.2d
435, q u o t i n g S t a t e v . Wong Fong ( 1 9 2 5 ) , 75 Mont. 8 1 , 8 7 , 241
P. 1072, 1074, t h i s Court described t h e S t a t e ' s burden in
e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e c h a i n of c u s t o d y o f c e r t a i n e v i d e n c e :
'"It was n o t i n c u m b e n t upon t h e s t a t e t o
prove t h a t i t c o u l d n o t have been tampered
with. I t was n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t a l l p o s -
s i b i l i t y of its having been tampered w i t h
s h o u l d be e x c l u d e d by a f f i r m a t i v e t e s t i m o n y .
[Citation omitted.] I t was o n l y n e c e s s a r y t o
i d e n t i f y t h e p a c k a g e , and t o make a p r i m a
f a c i e showing t h a t t h e r e h a s been no s u b s t a n -
t i a l change i n it t o w a r r a n t i t s i n t r o d u c t i o n
into evidence. ' " N e l s o n , 1 7 8 Mont. a t 2 8 8 ,
583 P . 2 d a t 4 3 9 .
I n N e l s o n t h e C o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e p r e s e n c e of an unbroken
s e a l and s e a l number saved t h e e v i d e n c e from e x c l u s i o n , in
spite of an earlier misidentification of a misread seal
number.
Here, t h e n u r s e who h e l p e d draw t h e b l o o d from t h e
defendant placed t h e blood i n t h e g l a s s v i a l g i v e n h e r by
t h e o f f i c e r ; t h e o f f i c e r s e a l e d t h e v i a l and s e c u r e d i t i n
the s e a l e d crime lab container. The s e a l on t h e v i a l and
t h e c o n t a i n e r w e r e i n t a c t when opened by t h e c h e m i s t a t t h e
ivlissoula c r i m e l a b . The i n t a c t s e a l and t h e t e s t i m o n y o f
t h e n u r s e who h e l p e d t o draw t h e b l o o d show t h a t t h e r e was
n o t a s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n g e i n t h e b l o o d from t h e t i m e i t was
drawn from d e f e n d a n t t o t h e t i m e i t was a n a l y z e d . The c h a i n
of c u s t o d y was n o t b r o k e n .
Defendant's third contention is that the District
Court erred by denying his motion to dismiss or for a
d l r e c t e d v e r d i c t of acquittal. Defendant claims that the
evidence presented at t r i a l was insufficient t o support a
guilty veraict. More specifically, defendant claims that
proximate cause was not sufficiently shown. Defendant
c l a i m s t h a t t h e r e remains t h e q u e s t i o n of whether he s t e e r e d
h i s pickup i n t o t h e oncoming l a n e o r whether a mechanical
d e f e c t b r o u g h t him i n t o t h e oncoming l a n e .
The o f f i c e r who i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e c o l l i s i o n g a v e h i s
opinion that defendant had steered his truck into the
oncoming lane. Defendant presented t e s t i m o n y of a person
t r a i n e d a s a m e t a l l u r g i s t and a n a c c i d e n t i n v e s t i g a t o r , who
gave the opinion that the pickup veered as a result of
damage t o a s p r i n g i n t h e f r o n t e n d o f t h e p i c k u p .
It is the prerogative of the jury to decide the
facts, and t h i s C o u r t must u p h o l d s u c h f i n d i n g s when t h e y
are supported by substantial evidence. As we stated in
S t a t e v. Kirkaldie ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 179 k o n t . 283, 587 P.2d 1298,
1 3 0 5 , 35 S t . R e p . 1532, 1539, " [ t l h e j u r y is t h e f a c t - f i n d i n g
body and i t s d e c i s i o n i s c o n t r o l l i n g . .. Given t h e r e q u i r e d
legal minimum of evidence, we will not substitute our
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the facts for that of the jury. . . If
substantial evidence is found to support the verdict, it
w i l l stand. . ." (Citations omitted.)
C o n t r a r y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m s , t h e r e c o r d is r e p l e t e
with evidence sufficient to support a conviction of
n e g l i g e n t homicide. E v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l showed t h a t
t h e d e f e n d a n t was e x t r e m e l y i n t o x i c a t e d , driving carelessly
just moments prior to the collision, and driving at an
excessive speed. Such evidence is clearly sufficient to
support the jury's f i n d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s b e h a v i o r was a
g r o s s d e v i a t i o n from t h e s t a n d a r d of reasonable care. See
s e c t i o n s 45-2-101(31) and 45-5-104, MCA.
Defendant contends finally that the District Court
e r r e d by l i m i t i n g c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t t o a p e r i o d o f f o r t y - f i v e
minutes per side. Although the r e c o r d d o e s show t h a t t h e
c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t was l i m i t e d t o f o r t y - f i v e m i n u t e s , t h e r e i s
no i n d i c a t i o n on t h e r e c o r d t h a t a n o b j e c t i o n was made by
defense counsel a t t h a t time. Further, s i n c e t h e r e i s no
record of either the State's or the defendant's closing
argument, we cannot determine whether defendant's rights
w e r e a b r i d g e d by t h e t i m e l i m i t a t i o n .
A s s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Musgrove ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. 1 6 2 ,
582 P.2d 1 2 4 6 , t h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t c o n s i d e r i s s u e s which a r e
not based upon a record t o which the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t can
look. A similar h o l d i n g was made i n S t a t e e x r e l . Woodahl
v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 7 Mont. 5 1 4 , 5 1 8 , 540 P.2d 3 1 2 ,
3 1 4 , where t h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n e d no i n d i c a t i o n o f a m o t i o n t o
substitute a judge. The Court in S t a t e e x r e l . Woodahl
decided: "We w i l l n o t c o n s i d e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of parties
after the fact or representations dehors the records."
Regardless of the possible merits of defendant's final
contention, the District Court's time limitation must be
upheld since we have no basis on which to review the
a l l e g a t i o n of e r r o r .
Af f i r m e d .
we c o n c u r :