Kuiper v. District Court of the Eighth Judicial District

No. 81-147 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 DENNIS KUIPER, Relator and Appellant, VS. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA et al., Respondent. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: For Appellant: Conner, Baiz and Olson, Great Falls, Montana Dennis Conner argued, Great Falls, Montana Niewald, Risjord and Waldeck, Kansas City, Missouri For Respondent: Church, Harris, Johnson and Williams, Great Falls, Montana Cresap McCracken argued, Great Falls, Montana Dzivi, Conklin & Nybo, Great Falls, Montana William Conklin argued, Great Falls, Montana Stinson, Mag and Frizzell, Kansas City, Missouri Submitted: June 10, 1981 Decided: August 12, 1981 Filed: August 12, 1981 Mr. J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Kuiper ( r e l a t o r ) , s e r v e d r e q u e s t s f o r Plaintiff, ~ e n n i s a d m i s s i o n a s k i n g Goodyear t o a d m i t t h e g e n u i n e n e s s of documents i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n of b o t h d e f e n d a n t and r e l a t o r and s o u g h t by d e p o s i t i o n t o o r a l l y examine t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s e x e c u t i v e s . Defendant, Goodyear T i r e and Rubber Company (Goodyear), f i l e d a motion s e e k i n g a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r . The D i s t r i c t Court granted t h e p r o t e c t i v e order, thereby preventing t h e r e l a t o r from d i s c o v e r i n g t h e documents and c o m p e l l i n g t h e answers. The r e l a t o r p e t i t i o n e d f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l . On A p r i l 1 6 , 1981, t h i s C o u r t e n t e r e d a n o r d e r a c c e p t i n g t h e application. T h i s c a s e r e s u l t s from i n j u r i e s r e c e i v e d by t h e r e l a t o r , on August 1 3 , 1979. The r e l a t o r was h a n d l i n g a t r u c k t i r e i n f l a t e d on a Goodyear K-type m u l t i - p i e c e truck r i m . The complaint a l l e g e s t h a t a side-ring explosively separated from t h e r i m b a s e , f r a c t u r i n g r e l a t o r ' s s k u l l . The c o m p l a i n t sets f o r t h a c l a i m i.n s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y r e q u i r i n g proof t h a t : (1) The p r o d u c t was i n a d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n and u n r e a s o n a b l y dangerous t o t h e u s e r . ( 2 ) The d e f e c t c a u s e d t h e a c c i d e n t and i n j u r i e s complained of h e r e i n . ( 3 ) The d e f e c t i s t r a c e - a b l e t o t h e defendant. On November 7 , 1980, t h e r e l a t o r f i l e d a r e q u e s t f o r a d m i s s i o n of g e n u i n e n e s s of documents. The c o n t e s t e d docu- ments came i n t o t h e p o s s e s s i o n of r e l a t o r ' s a t t o r n e y a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e documents o r i g i n a l l y b e i n g o r d e r e d produced i n a similar b u t unrelated case. Messick v . Goodyear T i r e & Rubber Co. (No. 74CV756-W-2 D. Mo. ) . I n t h a t case, the p l a i n t i f f had f i l e d a r e q u e s t f o r p r o d u c t i o n of documents, and a f t e r viewing t h e documents - camera, t h e f e d e r a l in d i s t r i c t judge h e l d t h a t t h e documents w e r e t o b e produced. A f t e r production, t h a t c a s e was s e t t l e d and d i s m i s s e d . T h e r e a f t e r , t h e documents w e r e w i d e l y d i s s e m i n a t e d . The relator, and many o t h e r s , have s e e n t h e documents since t h a t t i m e . The r e l a t o r , i n t h i s c a s e , h a s s o u g h t t o d e p o s e c e r t a i n of d e f e n d a n t ' s executives. The q u e s t i o n s t o which t h e d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t e d , p e r t a i n e d t o t h e s u b j e c t documents and t o a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e d e f e n d a n t by t h e N a t i o n a l Highway T r a f f i c S a f e t y A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (NHTSA). That i n v e s t i g a t i o n was commenced i n 1970 f o r t h e p u r p o s e of d e t e r m i n i n g why K- t y p e t r u c k r i m s seemed t o c a u s e numerous a c c i d e n t s . The r e l a t o r s e e k s t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t Goodyear a t t e m p t e d , t h r o u g h government i n f l u e n c e , t o t e r m i n a t e t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The r e l a t o r a l l e g e s t h a t Goodyear " c o v e r e d up" t h e d e f e c t i n a p r o d u c t , which Goodyear knew t o b e u n s a f e , and t h a t t h e r e l a t o r i s e n t i t l e d t o prove such f a c t s t o e s t a b l i s h a b a s i s f o r p u n i t i v e damages. The r e l a t o r f i l e d a m o t i o n u n d e r R u l e 3 7 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., s e e k i n g t o compel a n s w e r s t o d e p o s i t i o n q u e s t i o n s by r e q u i r i n g a t t e n d a n c e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s employees a t t r i a l t o t e s t i f y about the disputed matters. The r e l a t o r ' s m o t i o n was d e n i e d , and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h a s r u l e d t h a t t h e r e l a t o r c a n n o t i n q u i r e e i t h e r a b o u t t h e documents o r t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s a r e now b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t : (1) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e c o n t e s t e d documents f e l l w i t h i n t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e and t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e , t h e r e b y f o r e - c l o s i n g t h e u s e o f t h o s e documents i n t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . ( 2 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n p r e c l u d i n g re- l a t o r from u s i n g m a t e r i a l , a l r e a d y i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n , f o r any p u r p o s e . ( 3 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o a l l o w t h e r e l a t o r t o q u e s t i o n Goodyear e x e c u t i v e s r e g a r d i n g t h e documents and f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . With r e s p e c t t o t h e d i s p u t e d documents, i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h between two s e p a r a t e i s s u e s . R e l a t o r ' s re- q u e s t f o r a d m i s s i o n of g e n u i n e n e s s of documents was f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o Rule 3 6 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., a l l o w i n g a p a r t y t o make r e q u e s t s f o r a d m i s s i o n of g e n u i n e n e s s of documents c o v e r i n g t h e t r u t h of any m a t t e r s w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of Rule 2 6 ( b ) , M.R. Civ.P. T h e r e f o r e , p u r s u a n t t o Rule 2 6 ( b ) , a p a r t y must o n l y a d m i t t h e g e n u i n e n e s s of documents which a r e n o t p r i v i l e g e d and are d i s c o v e r a b l e under t h a t r u l e . A r e s o l u t i o n of this i s s u e i n v o l v e s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e a s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 26-1-803, MCA, and t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e governed by Rule 26 ( b ) ( 3 ) , M.R.Civ.P. A s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t i s s u e r e l a t e s t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r f o r b i d d i n g u s e of t h e documents. The c o u r t o r d e r p r e v e n t s t h e u s e of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , i n p o s s e s s i o n of r e l a t o r , f o r any purpose whatsoever. R e s o l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e i n v o l v e s d i s c u s s i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n of r i g h t s of f r e e s p e e c h , under a r t i c l e 11, S7, of t h e Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n , and t h e F i r s t Amendment of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . With r e g a r d t o d e p o s i t i o n q u e s t i o n s propounded by r e l a t o r t o Goodyear e x e c u t i v e s , r e l a t o r s e e k s t o compel t h e a t t e n d a n c e of t h o s e w i t n e s s e s a t t r i a l . Though t h e r e l i e f s o u g h t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e , we w i l l t r e a t r e l a t o r ' s motion a s o n e t o compel answers under Rule 3 7 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., and d e c i d e whether r e l a t o r i s e n t i t l e d t o have Goodyear's w i t - n e s s e s answer t h e q u e s t i o n s . W e resolve the constitutional issue f i r s t . The o r d e r of t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r e v e n t s r e l a t o r from u s i n g t h e documents i n r e l a t o r ' s possession, f o r e x t r a j u d i c i a l purposes, a s w e l l a s i n the case a t bar. Such an o r d e r h a s a c h i l l i n g e f f e c t upon F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s and must be s u b j e c t e d t o c l o s e scrutiny. I n r e Halkin, (D.C. Cir. 1 9 7 9 ) , 598 F.2d 176. I n H a l k i n , t h e p l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e d t h a t c e r t a i n government a g e n c i e s conducted u n l a w f u l s u r v e i l l a n c e of c i t i z e n s who opposed t h e war i n V i e t Nam. P l a i n t i f f s s o u g h t damages and e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f f o r v i o l a t i o n of t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rights. During t h e pendency of t h e c a s e , p l a i n t i f f s , t h r o u g h d i s c o v e r y , o b t a i n e d c e r t a i n documents which t h e government contended would i m p a i r U n i t e d S t a t e s d i p l o m a t i c and f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s , r e v e a l C I A i n t e l l i g e n c e s o u r c e s , and i m p l i c a t e t h e p r i v a c y i n t e r e s t s of t h i r d p e r s o n s . Plaintiffs they a d v i s e d t h e government t h a t / i n t e n d e d t o r e l e a s e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t o t h e news media and, t h e r e a f t e r , d e f e n d a n t moved f o r a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r p u r s u a n t t o Rule 2 6 ( c ) . Defendant a r g u e d t h a t p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e of t h e documents would be " p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' r i g h t t o a d j u d i c a t i o n of t h e i s s u e s " i n a n u n b i a s e d c l i m a t e and would deny t h e d e f e n d a n t a fair trial. P l a i n t i £ f s responded by c o n t e n d i n g t h a t t h e p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r would v i o l a t e t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' F i r s t Amendment right. The U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t s i g n e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r and t h e p l a i n t i f f s p e t i t i o n e d t h e c o u r t of a p p e a l s f o r a w r i t of mandamus, s e e k i n g t o v a c a t e t h e D i s t r i c t Court order. Judge Bazelon, w r i t i n g f o r t h e c o u r t acknowledged t h a t a t t o r n e y s have h i s t o r i c a l l y been o f f i c e r s of t h e c o u r t s and t h a t t h e y have a l e g a l and e t h i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o s a f e - guard t h e r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . However, Judge Bazelon s a i d : ". . . But l a w y e r s ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t t h e f a i r n e s s of t h e j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s d o e s n o t mean t h a t l a w y e r s and l i t i g a n t s s u r r e n d e r t h e i r F i r s t Amend- ment r i g h t s a t t h e c o u r t h o u s e d o o r . Even p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s who h a v e s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o t h e c o u r t d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y have a 'more s e v e r e l y c u r - t a i l e d ' r i g h t t o freedom of e x p r e s s i o n t h a n ' t h e a v e r a g e c i ti zen ' ". I n Halkin, J u d g e B a z e l o n c i t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l , Chase v . Robson ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 7 0 ) , 435 F.2d 1059, w h e r e i n t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t a n o r d e r b a r r i n g c o u n s e l and p a r t i e s from making p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t h e merits o f t h e case, was u n c o n s t i - tutional. The Robson c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e o r d e r c o n s ti t u t e d ". . . a p r i o r r e s t r a i n t on p r o t e c t e d F i r s t Amendment c o n d u c t " . The c o u r t i n H a l k i n acknowledged t h a t a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r may n o t c o n s t i t u t e a p r i o r r e s t r a i n t , b u t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e i s s u e o f " p r i o r r e s t r a i n t " was n o t d e t e r m i n a t i v e . The c o u r t s a i d : "We d o n o t b e l i e v e , however, t h a t t h e p r o p e r r e s o l u - t i o n o f t h i s case i n t h e end t u r n s on w h e t h e r t h i s o r d e r c a n b e termed a p r i o r r e s t r a i n t . W e observe t h e admonition of J u s t i c e F r a n k f u r t e r t h a t t h e t e r m ' p r i o r r e s t r a i n t ' should n o t be used a s ' a t a l i s m a n i c t e s t , ' K i n g s l e y Books, I n c . v . Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 4 4 1 , 77 S . C t . 1325 ( 1 9 5 7 ) , and d o n o t b e g i n o u r ex- amination w i t h an almost insurmountable presumption a g a i n s t t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h i s o r d e r . However, t h e f a c t t h a t t h e o r d e r p o s e s many o f t h e d a n g e r s o f a prior restraint i s sufficient t o require close s c r u t i n y o f i t s i m p a c t o n p r o t e c t e d F i r s t Amendment expression." 598 F.2d a t 1 8 6 . N o t i n g t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t had s t r e s s e d t h a t l i t i g a t i o n may b e "a v e h i c l e f o r e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n and a s s o c i a t i o n , a s w e l l a s a means of communicating u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n t o t h e p u b l i c " , I n r e P r i m u s ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 436 U.S. 412, 431, 98 S . C t . 1893, 1904, 56 L.Ed.2d 417, t h e c o u r t stated that ". . . [ l l i t i g a t i o n i t s e l f i s a form of e x p r e s s i o n p r o t e c t e d by t h e F i r s t Amendment". 598 F.2d a t 1 8 7 . The c o u r t i n H a l k i n , c o n c l u d e d t h a t a F i r s t Amendment r i g h t extends t o use of discovery m a t e r i a l s . 598 F . 2d a t 187. Before a t r i a l c o u r t can e n t e r a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r r e s t r a i n i n g f r e e e x p r e s s i o n , t h e c o u r t must f i n d t h a t t h r e e criteria exist: (1) The harm posed by d i s s e m i n a t i o n m u s t b e s u b s t a n t i a l and s e r i o u s . ( 2 ) The r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r must b e n a r r o w l y drawn and be p r e c i s e . ( 3 ) There must be no a l t e r n a - t i v e means of p r o t e c t i n g t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t which i n t r u d e s less d i r e c t l y on e x p r e s s i o n . Nebraska P r e s s A s s ' n v . S t u a r t ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 427 U . S . 539, 96 S . C t . 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683; I n re Halkin, supra. I n a s s e s s i n g t h e p r o p r i e t y of a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r i n e a c h c a s e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t must c o n s i d e r and make n e c e s s a r y f i n d i n g s on each e l e m e n t of t h e s t a n d a r d . I n t h i s c a s e no f i n d i n g s have been made which j u s t i f y t h e c o u r t o r d e r t h a t " c o u n s e l f o r p l a i n t i f f a r e hereby p r o h i b i t e d from making any f u r t h e r u s e whatsoever of such p r i v i l e g e d documents and exhibits i n t h i s action." T h i s p o r t i o n of t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o s c r i b e s p l a i n t i f f ' s freedom of e x p r e s s i o n and must b e r e v e r s e d . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e c o n t e s t e d documents, e x h i b i t s A-E, and G-M were e n t i t l e d t o p r o t e c t i o n under a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e and work p r o d u c t . The e f f e c t of t h i s r u l i n g i s t o f o r e c l o s e u s e of t h e documents when t h i s m a t t e r comes t o t r i a l . S e c t i o n 26-1-803, MCA, provides: "An a t t o r n e y c a n n o t , w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t of h i s c l i e n t , b e examined a s t o any communication made by t h e c l i e n t t o him o r h i s a d v i c e g i v e n t h e r e o n i n t h e c o u r s e o f p r o f e s s i o n a l employment." Work p r o d u c t i s governed by Rule 26 ( b ) ( 3 ) , M.R.Civ.P., which p r o v i d e s : " S u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s u b d i v i s i o n ( b ) ( 4 ) o f t h i s r u l e , a p a r t y may o b t a i n d i s c o v e r y of documents and t a n g i b l e t h i n g s o t h e r w i s e d i s c o v e r - a b l e under s u b d i v i s i o n ( b ) (1) of t h i s r u l e and p r e - p a r e d i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of l i t i g a t i o n o r f o r t r i a l by o r f o r a n o t h e r p a r t y o r by o r f o r t h a t other party ' s representative (including h i s attorney, consultant, s u r e t y , indemnitor, in- s u r e r o r a g e n t ) o n l y upon a showing t h a t t h e p a r t y s e e k i n g d i s c o v e r y h a s s u b s t a n t i a l need of t h e m a t e r i a l s i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of h i s c a s e and t h a t h e i s u n a b l e w i t h o u t undue h a r d s h i p t o o b t a i n t h e s u b s t a n t i a l e q u i v a l e n t of t h e mater- i a l s by o t h e r means. I n o r d e r i n g d i s c o v e r y of such m a t e r i a l s when t h e r e q u i r e d showing h a s been made, t h e c o u r t s h a l l p r o t e c t a g a i n s t d i s c l o s u r e of t h e m e n t a l i m p r e s s i o n s , conclu- s i o n s , o p i n i o n s , o r l e g a l t h e o r i e s of a n a t t o r n e y o r o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a p a r t y c o n c e r n i n g t h e litigation. " B e f o r e d i s c u s s i n g a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e and t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e , w e must r e s o l v e t h e q u e s t i o n of w a i v e r . R e l a t o r c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e documents h e r e i n q u e s t i o n have been w i d e l y d i s s e m i n a t e d w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n from Goodyear. On t h e o t h e r hand, Goodyear c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e documents were i n v o l u n t a r i l y produced p u r s u a n t t o c o u r t o r d e r and t h a t under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a w a i v e r d i d n o t o c c u r . Waiver i s t h e v o l u n t a r y r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of a known right. M a s s e t t v . Anaconda ( 1 9 8 1 ) , -Mont. -1 - . 2d -, P 38 St.Rep. 961. Goodyear's r e s p o n s e t o c o u r t p r o c e s s d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e such a w a i v e r . S t a t e e x r e l . Union O i l Co. of C a l . v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 229, 503 P.2d 1008. However, t h e waiver c o u l d s u b s e q u e n t l y be found s h o u l d t h e e v i d e n c e show t h a t , t h e r e a f t e r , Goodyear v o l u n t a r i l y d i s s e m i n a t e d t h e documents i n q u e s t i o n . A waiver c o u l d a l s o be found i f d i s s e m i n a t i o n was made by p e r s o n s n o t c o n n e c t e d w i t h Goodyear. I f a s u f f i c i e n t l y wide d i s s e m i n a t i o n of t h e m a t e r i a l s was found t o have o c c u r r e d , and Goodyear, knowing of t h i s , took no l e g a l a c t i o n t o p r o t e c t a g a i n s t d i s s e m i n a t i o n , t h e n t h e v o l u n t a r y r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of a r i g h t c o u l d be found. The r e c o r d b e f o r e u s i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o make t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Upon remand of t h i s m a t t e r , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s d i r e c t e d t o hold a h e a r i n g w i t h r e s p e c t t o e v i d e n c e b e a r i n g upon t h e w a i v e r q u e s t i o n and t o make f i n d i n g s a c c o r d i n g l y . The b a l a n c e of o u r d i s c u s s i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e and t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e , w i l l apply should t h e t r i a l c o u r t f i n d t h a t a waiver has not occurred. I f a w a i v e r i s found, t h e n t h e e x i s t e n c e of p r i v i l e g e i s r e n d e r e d moot. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r d a t e d March 1 3 , 1981, g r a n t i n g a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r t o Goodyear, c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e s e x h i b i t A a s c o n s i s t i n g of r e p o r t s c o n c e r n i n g c l o s e d p r o d u c t l i a b i l i t y l i t i g a t i o n p r e p a r e d by Goodyear's in-house c o u n s e l . However, t h e o r d e r ' s r e f e r e n c e t o e x h i b i t B a s b e i n g a communication between house c o u n s e l R i g r i s h and o t h e r Goodyear p e r s o n n e l i s inaccurate. E x h i b i t B i s a b r i e f n o t e from a Goodyear employee denominated "Gerb" f o r w a r d i n g e x c e r p t s from a d e p o s i t i o n t a k e n i n a n o t h e r "rim" c a s e . E x h i b i t s D and E a r e c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d as communications between house c o u n s e l R i g r i s h and o t h e r Goodyear p e r s o n n e l . The o r d e r m i s t a k e n l y i d e n t i f i e s e x h i b i t J a s b e i n g a communication between in-house lawyer R i g r i s h and Goodyear's l i a b i l i t y c a r r i e r ; e x h i b i t J i s a memorandum from one employee of a l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e company t o a n o t h e r employee w i t h i n t h e same company. Exhibit M i s mistakenly i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e o r d e r a s a communication between lawyer R i g r i s h and Goodyear's l i a b i l i t y c a r r i e r ; e x h i b i t M i s a l e t t e r w r i t t e n by a r e p r e s e n t - a t i v e of t h e Aetna I n s u r a n c e Company a d d r e s s e d t o R i g r i s h of Goodyear. E x h i b i t s C , H I I , K and L a r e c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e o r d e r a s b e i n g communications from R i g r i s h t o l i a b i l i t y insurance c a r r i e r s . Exhibit G i s correctly identified a s a communication from R i g r i s h t o r e t a i n e d c o u n s e l r e p r e s e n t i n g Goodyear i n s i m i l a r b u t u n r e l a t e d l i t i g a t i o n . The s u b j e c t m a t t e r and a u t h o r of e a c h e x h i b i t i s c r i t i c a l t o d e t e r m i n i n g whether a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e i s a p p l i c a b l e . T h a t p r i v i l e g e o n l y a p p l i e s s t a t u t o r i l y i n Montana t o communi- c a t i o n s made by a c l i e n t t o h i s a t t o r n e y and l e g a l a d v i c e g i v e n i n r e s p o n s e t h e r e t o , d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of p r o f e s s i o n a l employment. S e c t i o n 26-1-803, MCA. ~ x h i b i A i s a c o m p i l a t i o n of c a s e h i s t o r i e s p r e p a r e d t by ~ i g r i s h o r h i s s u p e r i o r a t Goodyear. f Attorney-client p r i v i l e g e d o e s r e l a t e t o l e g a l a d v i c e g i v e n by house c o u n s e l t o t h e c o r p o r a t e employer. S t a t e e x r e l . Union O i l Co. of C a l . v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t , s u p r a . A c a r e f u l s t u d y of e a c h of the case h i s t o r i e s contained i n e x h i b i t A shows t h a t t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e document c a n n o t be a c c u r a t e l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s " l e g a l a d v i c e " . R i g r i s h ana- l y z e d c l o s e d p r o d u c t l i a b i l i t y f i l e s and r e p o r t e d t o h i s s u p e r i o r t h e r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d i n e a c h of t h o s e f i l e s . The f i l e s w e r e c l o s e d a t t h e t i m e t h e document was p r e p a r e d . The r e p o r t was a p p a r e n t l y made by R i g r i s h f o r t h e purpose of a l l o w i n g h i s s u p e r i o r t o e v a l u a t e h i s work and f o r t h e p u r p o s e of k e e p i n g c o r p o r a t e management a d v i s e d a b o u t t h e h i s t o r y of p r o d u c t l i a b i l i t y l i t i g a t i o n . I t i s important t o n o t e t h a t no l e g a l a d v i c e i s b e i n g g i v e n by R i g r i s h t o h i s s u p e r i o r o r c o r p o r a t e management w i t h r e s p e c t t o pending litigation files. Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e a s s t a t u t o r i l y d e f i n e d i n Montana, d o e s n o t a p p l y t o e x h i b i t A. E x h i b i t B i s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e from Goodyear p e r s o n n e l t o R i g r i s h and, though t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e n o t e a r e r a t h e r ambiguous, i t would seem t o be c o v e r e d by a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t privilege. However, t h e e n c l o s u r e a p p e a r s t o be d e p o s i t i o n e x c e r p t s which would be p a r t of t h e p u b l i c r e c o r d . E x h i b i t s D and E a r e l e t t e r s from R i g r i s h t o o t h e r Good- year personnel. They a p p e a r t o c o v e r m a t t e r s c o n t e m p l a t e d by t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e . E x h i b i t s C , HI I, K and L a r e communications between R i g r i s h and p e r s o n n e l employed by Goodyear's l i a b i l i t y carriers. R i g r i s h i s n o t a lawyer f o r t h o s e l i a b i l i t y carriers. There i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e r e c i p i e n t s of t h e communications a r e a t t o r n e y s f o r R i g r i s h . Therefore, the a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e d o e s n o t a p p l y t o t h e s e documents. E x h i b i t G i s a communication from Goodyear t o r e t a i n e d counsel. E x h i b i t G i s c l e a r l y p r o t e c t e d by t h e p r i v i l e g e . E x h i b i t J i s a document p r e p a r e d by a n employee of t h e l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e company and forwarded t o o t h e r p e r s o n n e l w i t h i n t h e same i n s u r a n c e company. I f any p r i v i l e g e e x i s t s , i t e x i s t s f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h a t l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e company and would have t o be claimed by t h a t company. E x h i b i t M i s a communication from Aetna I n s u r a n c e Company t o R i g r i s h . R i g r i s h i s n o t a n a t t o r n e y f o r Aetna I n s u r a n c e Company and a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e i s , t h e r e f o r e , inapplicable. E x h i b i t s A, C , H , I, J, K, L and M a r e n o t covered by attorney-client privilege. E x h i b i t s B , D, E and G may be protected . The work p r o d u c t r u l e i s b r o a d e r i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n than t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e , b u t it i s n o t an a b s o l u t e privilege. By i t s t e r m s t h e r u l e g o v e r n s n o t o n l y t h e a t t o r n e y and h i s c l i e n t , b u t a l s o a p a r t y ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , including h i s consultant, surety, indemnitor, i n s u r e r o r agent. The r u l e p r o t e c t s m a t e r i a l s p r e p a r e d d u r i n g liti- g a t i o n o r i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of l i t i g a t i o n and p r o v i d e s f o r t h e d i s c l o s u r e of such m a t e r i a l o n l y upon a showing t h a t t h e p a r t y s e e k i n g d i s c o v e r y h a s a s u b s t a n t i a l need f o r t h e m a t e r i a l i n p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e c a s e and i s u n a b l e , without undue h a r d s h i p , t o o b t a i n t h e m a t e r i a l s t h r o u g h o t h e r means. The r u l e f u r t h e r d i r e c t s t h a t t h e c o u r t p r o t e c t a g a i n s t t h e d i s c l o s u r e of t h e m e n t a l i m p r e s s i o n s , c o n c l u s i o n s , o p i n i o n s , o r l e g a l t h e o r i e s of a n a t t o r n e y o r o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a p a r t y concerning t h e l i t i g a t i o n . Rule 2 6 ( b ) ( 3 ) , M . R . c ~ v . P . , may a f f o r d p r o t e c t i o n t o much of t h e documentary e v i d e n c e here i n dispute. I n a p p l y i n g t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e , w e must make t h e f o l l o w i n g d e t e r m i n a t i o n s : (1) Does t h e r u l e a p p l y where m a t e r i a l h a s been d i s c o v e r e d and i s i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n of opposing c o u n s e l ? ( 2 ) Does t h e r u l e a p p l y t o t e r m i n a t e d litigation? ( 3 ) Does t h e r u l e a p p l y where t h e r e i s a c l a i m b u t t h e r e a l i t y of l i t i g a t i o n may be v e r y s p e c u l a t i v e ? A l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Rule 2 6 ( b ) ( 3 1 , M.R.Civ.P., would c o n f i n e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e r u l e t o t h o s e i n s t a n c e s where d i s c o v e r y i s s o u g h t . R e l a t o r does n o t h e r e s e e k discovery. R e l a t o r h a s p o s s e s s i o n of t h e s u b j e c t documents and s e e k s o n l y t o l a y f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h o s e documents. We f e e l t h a t t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e must be g i v e n a l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n o r d e r t o e f f e c t u a t e i t s purpose. The r i g h t g r a n t e d under t h e r u l e can be waived and such a w a i v e r w i l l be t h e s u b j e c t of t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g h e r e i n b e f o r e ordered. However, w e h e r e h o l d t h a t t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e l e g i t i m a t e l y c a n form t h e b a s i s of a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r even though t h e "work p r o d u c t " i s i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e a d v e r s e party . The q u e s t i o n of whether " t e r m i n a t e d l i t i g a t i o n " i s con- t e m p l a t e d by t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e , was d e t e r m i n e d i n I n re Murphy ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , 560 F. 2d 326. I n t h a t c a s e Chief Judge Gibson, w r i t i n g f o r t h e c o u r t , s a i d : " I n view of t h e Hickman r a t i o n a l e and t h e p o l i c i e s of Rule 26 ( b ) ( 3 ) , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e work p r o d u c t p r i v i l e g e a p p l i e s t o documents p r e p a r e d i n a n t i c i - p a t i o n of t e r m i n a t e d l i t i g a t i o n . The p r i m a r y pur- p o s e of t h e work p r o d u c t p r i v i l e g e i s t o a s s u r e t h a t an a t t o r n e y i s n o t i n h i b i t e d i n h i s represent- a t i o n of h i s c l i e n t by t h e f e a r t h a t h i s f i l e s w i l l be open t o s c r u t i n y upon demand of a n opposing p a r t y . Counsel s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o amass d a t a and commit h i s o p i n i o n s and t h o u g h t p r o c e s s e s t o w r i t i n g f r e e of t h e concern t h a t , a t some l a t e r d a t e , a n opposing p a r t y may be e n t i t l e d t o s e c u r e any r e l e v a n t work p r o d u c t documents merely on r e q u e s t and u s e them a g a i n s t h i s c l i e n t . The work p r o d u c t p r i v i l e g e would be a t t e n u a t e d i f i t were l i m i t e d t o documents t h a t were p r e p a r e d i n t h e c a s e f o r which d i s c o v e r y i s s o u g h t . What i s needed, i f w e a r e t o remain f a i t h f u l t o t h e a r t i c u l a t e d p o l i c i e s of Hickman, i s a p e r p e t - u a l p r o t e c t i o n f o r work p r o d u c t , one t h a t e x t e n d s beyond t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e l i t i g a t i o n f o r which t h e documents were p r e p a r e d . Any less p r o t e c t i o n would g e n e r a t e t h e v e r y e v i l s t h a t t h e C o u r t i n Hickman attempted t o avoid." 560 F.2d a t 326. There i s a d i v i s i o n of a u t h o r i t y on t h i s q u e s t i o n . Cases s u p p o r t i n g t h e o p p o s i t e view a r e U n i t e d S t a t e s v. I n t e r n a t i o n a l B u s i n e s s Machines Corp., (S.D. N . Y . 1 9 7 4 ) , 66 F . R . D . 154, 178, and Honeywell, I n c . v . P i p e r A i r c r a f t Corp., (M.D. Pa. 1 9 7 0 ) , 50 F . R . D . 117, 119. W e f e e l t h a t t h e b e t t e r reasoned r u l e s u p p o r t s a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e t o t e r m i n a t e d litigation. Rule 26 ( b ) p r o v i d e s t h a t m a t e r i a l s p r e p a r e d - a n t i c i p a t i o n in of l i t i g a t i o n c a n o n l y be produced upon a showing of s u b s t a n t i a l need and i n a b i l i t y t o o b t a i n t h e m a t e r i a l s e l s e w h e r e . However, t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e r u l e which p r o t e c t s t h e m e n t a l i m p r e s s i o n s and l e g a l t h e o r i e s of a n a t t o r n e y o n l y r e f e r s specifically t o "the litigation". S u b s e c t i o n 3 of Rule 26 ( b ) , i n i t s l a s t s e n t e n c e , s t a t e s : " I n ordering discovery of such m a t e r i a l s when t h e r e q u i r e d showing h a s been made, t h e c o u r t s h a l l p r o t e c t a g a i n s t d i s c l o s u r e of t h e m e n t a l i m p r e s s i o n s , c o n c l u s i o n s , o p i n i o n s , o r l e g a l t h e o r i e s of a n a t t o r n e y o r o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a p a r t y c o n c e r n i n g t h e litigation. " W e must d e t e r m i n e whether t o a p p l y t h e p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d m e n t a l i m p r e s s i o n s of a n a t t o r n e y t o t h o s e impres- s i o n s r e n d e r e d d u r i n g t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of a c l a i m where no l i t i g a t i o n i s i n progress. I n I n r e Murphy, s u p r a , t h e government f i l e d motions s e e k i n g t o d i s c o v e r l e g a l documents and i n t e r n a l memoranda t h a t were p r e p a r e d by law f i r m s r e p r e s e n t i n g s e v e r a l l a r g e corporate clients. The law f i r m s ' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e s e c l i e n t s had e x i s t e d f o r many y e a r s . The documents c o n s i s t e d of i n t e r n a l memoranda, n o t e s , summaries, o u t l i n e s and chrono- l o g i e s p r e p a r e d f o r u s e i n t h e n c u r r e n t and a n t i c i p a t e d litigation. The documents were c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o u n s e l a s p r i v a t e working p a p e r s of t r i a l l a w y e r s t h a t i n c l u d e d a t y p e of " d e v i l ' s advocacy" made i n an e f f o r t t o o u t l i n e t h e i n f e r e n c e s t h a t m i g h t be drawn by a " s k i l l e d and i m a g i n a t i v e " adversary. These documents w e r e n o t s e n t t o o r shown t o t h e clients. The 8 t h C i r c u i t C o u r t of Appeals h e l d t h a t s u c h documents were p r o t e c t e d by t h e "mental i m p r e s s i o n s " p r o v i s i o n of t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e even though some documents r e l a t e d t o anticipated litigation. W a g r e e t h a t such p r o t e c t i o n e s h o u l d be a f f o r d e d even though l i t i g a t i o n i s n o t i n p r o g r e s s . When a c l a i m f i l e i s opened, t h e r e i s always some p r o s p e c t of l i t i g a t i o n and a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n must be conducted g e a r e d t o t h e u l t i m a t e e v e n t u a l i t y of l i t i g a t i o n . Theref o r e , we f e e l t h a t work p r o d u c t p r o t e c t i o n must be a f f o r d e d from t h e t i m e t h e c l a i m f i l e i s opened. E x h i b i t A was n o t p r e p a r e d i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of l i t i g a t i o n and o n l y r e l a t e s t o an a n a l y s i s of c l o s e d f i l e s . It clearly i s n o t covered by t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e . The b a l a n c e of t h e e x h i b i t s i n q u e s t i o n a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n s of Rule 2 6 ( b ) ( 3 ) , M.R.Civ.P., b u t such protection i s not absolute. The m a t e r i a l s may n o t be t h e p r o p e r s u b j e c t of a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r i f r e l a t o r i s a b l e t o make a showing t h a t he " h a s s u b s t a n t i a l need of t h e m a t e r i a l s i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of h i s c a s e and t h a t he i s u n a b l e w i t h o u t undue h a r d s h i p t o o b t a i n t h e s u b s t a n t i a l e q u i v a l e n t of t h e m a t e r i a l s by o t h e r means." However, t h o s e p o r t i o n s of t h e documents which r e l a t e t o t h e m e n t a l i m p r e s s i o n s of t h e a u t h o r of t h e document, r e c e i v e a g r e a t e r p r o t e c t i o n . We a g r e e w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g r a t i o n a l e from I n r e Murphy, s u p r a , wherein t h e c o u r t s a i d : " I t i s c l e a r t h a t o p i n i o n work p r o d u c t i s e n t i t l e d t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y g r e a t e r p r o t e c t i o n than ordinary work p r o d u c t . T h e r e f o r e , u n l i k e o r d i n a r y work p r o d u c t , o p i n i o n work p r o d u c t c a n n o t be d i s c o v e r e d upon a showing of s u b s t a n t i a l need and a n i n a b i l i t y t o s e c u r e t h e s u b s t a n t i a l e q u i v a l e n t of t h e mater- i a l s by a l t e r n a t e means w i t h o u t undue h a r d s h i p . See Fed.R.Civ.P. 2 6 ( b ) ( 3 ) . I n o u r view, o p i n i o n work p r o d u c t e n j o y s a n e a r l y a b s o l u t e immunity and c a n be d i s c o v e r e d o n l y i n v e r y r a r e and e x t r a o r d i n a r y circum- stances. See Hickman v . T a y l o r , s u p r a . Our u n w i l l - i n g n e s s t o r e c o g n i z e a n a b s o l u t e immunity f o r o p i n i o n work p r o d u c t s t e m s from t h e c o n c e r n t h a t t h e r e may be r a r e s i t u a t i o n s , y e t unencountered by t h i s c o u r t , where weighty c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p u b l i c p o l i c y and a p r o p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e would m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t t h e n o n d i s c o v e r y of a n a t t o r n e y ' s m e n t a l i m p r e s s i o n . Absent such c o m p e l l i n g showing, t h e a t t o r n e y ' s o p i n i o n work p r o d u c t s h o u l d remain i m - mune from d i s c o v e r y . I' ( F o o t n o t e s o m i t t e d . ) 560 F. 2d a t 337. Upon remand, t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i l l have t h e burden of a p p l y i n g t h i s law t o e a c h of t h e documents i n v o l v e d i n t h e case. I f t h e t r i a l c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e r e was a w a i v e r , t h e n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s r u l e becomes moot. I n i t s o r d e r , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r e c l o s e d r e l a t o r from d e p o s i n g Goodyear e x e c u t i v e s r e g a r d i n g f a c t s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e d i s p u t e d documents and a l s o from i n t e r r o g a t i n g t h o s e w i t n e s s e s a b o u t t h e N a t i o n a l Highway T r a f f i c S a f e t y A d m i n i s t r a - tion investigation. The c o u r t based i t s p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r upon " r e l e v a n c y " and " p u b l i c p o l i c y " . The b a s i s f o r a w i t n e s s ' s r e f u s a l t o t e s t i f y i s s e t f o r t h i n Rule 2 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., which p r o v i d e s : "Upon motion by a p a r t y o r by t h e p e r s o n from whom d i s c o v e r y i s s o u g h t , and f o r good c a u s e shown, t h e c o u r t i n which t h e a c t i o n i s pending o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y , on m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g t o a d e p o s i t i o n , t h e c o u r t i n t h e d i s t r i c t where t h e d e p o s i t i o n i s t o be t a k e n may make any o r d e r which j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s t o pro- t e c t a p a r t y o r p e r s o n from annoyance, embarrassment, o p p r e s s i o n , o r undue burden o r expense . . ." The r u l e d o e s n o t p r o v i d e f o r r e f u s a l on " p u b l i c p o l i c y " grounds. Were t h i s C o u r t t o expand t h e r u l e and a l l o w f o r a "public policy" b a s i s f o r r e f u s a l t o t e s t i f y , then, given t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , such a b a s i s would n o t f o r e c l o s e i n q u i r y . T h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y found s t r o n g p u b l i c p o l i c y r e a s o n s f o r imposing s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t . I n Branden- b u r g e r v. Toyota Motor S a l e s ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268, we s a i d : "The e s s e n t i a l r a t i o n a l e f o r imposing t h e d o c t r i n e of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t i s t h a t such i m p o s i t i o n a f f o r d s t h e consuming p u b l i c t h e maximum p r o t e c t i o n from dangerous d e f e c t s i n manufactured p r o d u c t s by r e q u i r i n g t h e m a n u f a c t u r e r t o b e a r t h e burden of i n j u r i e s and l o s s e s enhanced by such d e f e c t s i n i t s products. . ." The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r s t a t e s t h a t " d i s c l o s u r e i n t h i s a c t i o n of t h e m a t e r i a l and i n f o r m a t i o n Goodyear was compelled t o submit t o t h e N a t i o n a l Highway T r a f f i c S a f e t y A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n v e s t i g a t i o n would c l e a r l y d i s c o u r a g e f r a n k and open communications w i t h t h e government c o n t r a r y t o t h e s t r o n g p u b l i c p o l i c y i n t e r e s t s i n such ,an i n v e s t i g a t i o n . " I t s h o u l d h e r e be n o t e d t h a t Goodyear d o e s n o t have t h e o p t i o n of d i s c l o s i n g t o t h e f e d e r a l government. Such d i s c l o s u r e i s mandated by l a w . I n B a r r y v. Manglass ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 877, t h e c o u r t s a i d : "As a n a d d i t i o n a l answer t o General Motors' p u b l i c p o l i c y argument ( t h a t t h e a d m i s s i o n of such r e c a l l l e t t e r s would d i s c o u r a g e m a n u f a c t u r e r s from an- nouncing a p o s s i b l e d e f e c t ) , i t i s m e r e l y n e c e s s a r y t o p o i n t o u t t h a t such announcement was n o t a v o l - u n t a r y a c t , b u t one mandated by F e d e r a l s t a t u t e ( s e e Motor V e h i c l e S a f e t y Act of 1966, s u p r a ) ." This Court has recognized a strong p u b l i c p o l i c y i n p r o t e c t i n g members of t h e p u b l i c from i n j u r y by d e f e c t i v e products. I n Brown v . North American Manufacturing Co. (1977), 176 Mont. 98, 516 P.2d 711, J u s t i c e H a r r i s o n , w r i t i n g f o r t h e majority, said: "We r e j e c t any r u l e which would o p e r a t e t o encourage m i s d e s i g n . " W h o l d t h a t p u b l i c p o l i c y m i l i t a t e s i n f a v o r of p e r m i t t - e i n g d i s c o v e r y o f f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e " r e c a l l campaign" and t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n by t h e N a t i o n a l Highway T r a f f i c S a f e t y Administration. A complete p u b l i c awareness of i n v e s t i g a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g d e f e c t i v e p r o d u c t s i s i n t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and s h o u l d be f a c i l i t a t e d . W f i n d t h i s l i t i g a t i o n t o be a e p r o p e r forum f o r such d i s c l o s u r e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r g r a n t i n g p r o t e c t i o n t o Goodyear's w i t n e s s e s , f u r t h e r j u s t i f i e d i t s h o l d i n g on t h e b a s i s of "relevancy". R e l a t o r h e r e s e e k s p u n i t i v e damages and by way of d i s c o v e r y s e e k s t o d e v e l o p e v i d e n c e f o r t h e p u r p o s e of proving malice. R e l a t o r ' s d e p o s i t i o n q u e s t i o n s a r e designed t o prove Goodyear knew i t had a d e f e c t i v e p r o d u c t and a t t e m p t e d t o p r e v e n t p u b l i c knowledge of t h a t d e f e c t . Such f a c t s would t e n d t o p r o v e m a l i c e and a r e r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e s p l e a d e d . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r p r e c l u d i n g r e l a t o r from d e p o s i n g Goodyear w i t n e s s e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e N a t i o n a l Highway T r a f f i c S a f e t y A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n v e s t i g a t i o n and t h e " r e c a l l campaign" i s r e v e r s e d . T h a t p o r t i o n of t h e o r d e r which p r e v e n t s r e l a t o r from i n q u i r i n g a b o u t t h e d i s p u t e d documents i s governed by t h e law e n u n c i a t e d i n t h i s o p i n i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h o s e documents. I f a p a r t i c u l a r document i s n o t p r o t e c t e d by e i t h e r t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e o r t h e work p r o d u c t r u l e , t h e n i n q u i r y may be made a b o u t t h a t docu- ment d u r i n g t h e t a k i n g of d e p o s i t i o n s from Goodyear e x e c u t i v e s . I f a document i s p r i v i l e g e d , such i n q u i r y may n o t be made. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h i s m a t t e r i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r proceedings i n conformity with t h i s opinion. /1 I W concur: e 1 Chief J u s t i c e A ,,<' N' Justices