State v. Gopher

No. 80-485 IN THE SUPRENE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . MICHAEL GOPHER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade. Honorable John McCarvel, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: John C. Koch argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mark Murphy argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Randall Snyder argued,Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: June 11, 1981 ~ecidedJUL : 9 - 1981 ."..u- - Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of the Court. D e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h f e l o n y b u r g l a r y and f e l o n y theft. A f t e r a h e a r i n g on May 9 , 1 9 8 0 , d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n t o suppress i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d e v i d e n c e was d e n i e d . A jury trial was held on August 18, 1980, and defendant was convicted on both counts. Defendant appeals, submitting t h a t t h e C a s c a d e County D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d e n y i n g h i s motion t o s u p p r e s s . A t about 5:00 a.m. on March 15, 1980, a silent burglar a l a r m went o f f a t t h e Warehouse Pawn Shop i n G r e a t F a l l s , Montana. Officer Stan Johnston arrived a t the scene about a minute l a t e r . His i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e v e a l e d a broken window, two large rocks on the floor, a number of empty spaces in a r i f l e rack, and a f r e s h s e t o f t i r e tracks in the parking l o t . While i n v e s t i g a t i n g he n o t i c e d a s i n g u l a r v e h i c l e d r i v i n g s l o w l y p a s t t h e s c e n e and o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e o c c u p a n t s e x h i b i t e d an un u s u a l c u r i o s i t y i n t h e c r i m e s i t e . J o h n s t o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e knew from p a s t e x p e r i e n c e t h a t i t was n o t uncommon f o r b u r g l a r s t o r e t u r n t o t h e s c e n e of the crime after simply breeking a window. If the break-in was u n d i s c o v e r e d , t h e y would then enter and take t h e goods. On t h e b a s i s o f t h e s e f a c t s , J o h n s t o n c a l l e d an assisting officer (Sharpe) and requested him to stop the vehicle. O f f i c e r S h a r p e s t o p p e d and a p p r o a c h e d t h e v e h i c l e shining h i s f l a s h 1i g h t i n t o t h e passenger compartment. He noticed s e v e r a l r i f l e s on t h e f l o o r . While examining t h e l i c e n s e of t h e d r i v e r , d e f e n d a n t Michael Gopher, t h e o f f i c e r noticed the passenger's arm d r o p p i n g t o w a r d t h e g u n s . When t h e o f f i c e r drew h i s weapon and o r d e r e d t h e o c c u p a n t s o f t h e car t o g e t o u t of the vehicle, t h e d r i v e r a c c e l e r a t e d and headed north. A subsequent pursuit by police terminated w i t h t h e a r r e s t of b o t h p e r s o n s i n t h e c a r . The s o l e i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t i s w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l court erred when it refused defendant Gopher's motion to s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e h e a l l e g e s was i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d . The g i s t o f d e f e n d a n t ' s a r g u m e n t i s t h a t t h e o f f i c e r who i n i t i a l l y " s t o p p e d " h i s c a r d i d n o t h a v e p r o b a b l e c a u s e to do so. He maintains that the authorities must have probable c a u s e t o b e l i e v e h e had committed a c r i m i n a l act and s u f f i c i e n t c a u s e t o a r r e s t him t o j u s t i f y the search. See s e c t i o n 4 6 - 5 - 1 0 1 ( 1 ) , MCA. Without probable c a u s e , t h e r e c a n be no l a w f u l a r r e s t , and w i t h o u t t h e l a w f u l a r r e s t , a search cannot be properly made as being incident to the arrest. See section 46-6-401(4), MCA. Officer Sharpe, defendant maintains, must h a v e had knowledge o f sufficient facts to believe d e f e n d a n t had c o m m i t t e d the burglary and that he must be immediately arrested. Gopher emphasizes that the facts sufficient to properly arrest a defendant must be known a t t h e moment o f t h e a r r e s t and n o t d i s c o v e r e d during or after the arrest. S t a t e v. Rader ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 252, 5 8 1 P.2d 4 3 7 . C i t i n g Rader, defendant concludes that t h i s Court h a s made a clear statement to the effect t h a t s t o p and f r i s k p r i n c i p l e s do n o t a p p l y t o a d e f e n d a n t in a vehicle. 581 P.2d a t 440. A t t h e o u t s e t we r e c o g n i z e t h e Rader rule regarding s t o p and f r i s k . A l t h o u g h d i c t u m , s u c h a c l e a r e x p r e s s i o n by t h i s Court p r o h i b i t i n g a p p l i c a t i o n of s t o p and f r i s k r u l e s t o a u t o m o b i l e s c a n n o t be i g n o r e d . We also recognize that the facts known to Officer Johnston at the time he directed Officer Sharpe to stop defendant's automobile fall short of probable cause. We, therefore, must determine whether Rader should continue to be the law in this State and, if not, what standard should be applied in circumstances such as exist before us here. The State maintains that the "stop and frisk" doc- trine should apply to vehicular stops, citing Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. In 'Terry, the Supreme Court ruled that it can be constitu- tionally permissible for an officer to stop and search a. person, even in the absence of probable cause. 392 U.S. at 15. This type of encounter must be reviewed as to its "reasonableness," and take into account the police interest involved and existence of specific and articulable facts. The most recent post-Terry decision regarding stop and frisk is United States v. Cortez (1981), - U.S. I 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621. In Cortez, the Supreme Court ruled that objective facts and circumstantial evidence suggesting that a particular automobile is involved in some sort of criminal activity is sufficient to warrant a limited investigatory stop. Chief Justice Burger writes: "The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements, each of which must be present before a stop is permissible. First, the assessment must be based upon all the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions--inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person. "The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articu- l a t e d a s such, p r a c t i c a l people formulated c e r t a i n common s e n s e c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t human behavior; jurors a s f a c t f i n d e r s a r e permitted t o do t h e same--and s o a r e law e n f o r c e m e n t officers. Finally, the evidence thus col- l e c t e d m u s t b e s e e n and weighed n o t i n t e r m s o f l i b r a r y a n a l y s i s by s c h o l a r s , b u t a s u n d e r s t o o d by t h o s e v e r s e d i n t h e f i e l d o f law e n fo rc e m e n t . " 101 S.Ct. a t 6 9 5 , 66 L.Ed.2d a t 629. I t s h o u l d be n o t e d h e r e t h a t O f f i c e r J o h n s t o n is an experienced and knowledgeable member of the Great Falls police department, having been with the force for over twelve years. This is a n i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f the Cortez a n a l y s i s , which e m p h a s i z e s t h a t e x p e r i e n c e d l a w e n f o r c e m e n t authorities are allowed t o draw c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s which laymen c o u l d n o t p r o p e r l y d r a w i n d e t e r m i n i n g i f a s p e c i f i c vehicular stop is legally valid. The -o r t e z C-- court concludes: ". . . Thus, t h e t e s t is n o t whether o f f i c e r s Gray and Evans had p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e v e h i c l e t h e y s t o p p e d would c o n t a i n 'Chevron' and a g r o u p o f i l l e g a l a l i e n s . R a t h e r t h e q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r , b a s e d upon t h e whole p i c t u r e , t h e y , a s e x p e r i e n c e d Border Patrol agents, could reasonably surmise t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r vehicle they s t o p p e d was engaged i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . On t h i s record, they could s o conclude." 101 S . C t . a t 6 9 7 , 66 L.Ed.2d a t 6 3 1 . This Court is convinced that the facts at the officer's disposal in this case are sufficient to affirm under C o r t e z . F u r t h e r , our review of c a s e s from n e i g h b o r i n g jurisdictions r e v e a l s t h a t t h e g r e a t t r e n d of a u t h o r i t y is in accord. Citing State v. Ruiz ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 9 Ariz.App. 84, 504 P.2d 1 3 0 7 , t h e c o u r t i n S t a t e v . Dean ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 112 A r i z . 437, 543 P.2d 425, held t h a t "I . . . [ a ] founded s u s p i c i o n is a l l t h a t is n e c e s s a r y , some b a s i s from which t h e c o u r t can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing. '" 543 P.2d 425, 427 ( q u o t i n g Wilson v. Porter ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 6 6 ) , 361 F.2d 4 1 2 , 4 1 5 ) . In People v. Waits ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 196 Colo. 35, 580 P.2d 391, the Colorado Supreme C o u r t applied the standards of Stone v. People (1971), 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495, stating: " ' I n order l a w f u l l y t o d e t a i n an i n d i v i d u a l f o r q u e s t i o n i n g , ( 1 ) t h e o f f i c e r m u s t have a reasonable suspicion t h a t the individual has c o m m i t t e d , o r i s a b o u t t o commit, a c r i m e ; ( 2 ) t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e d e t e n t i o n must be r e a s o n a b l e ; and ( 3 ) t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e d e t e n t i o n m u s t be r e a s o n a b l e when c o n s i d e r e d i n l i g h t of t h e purpose.' 174 Colo. a t 509, 485 P . 2 d a t 497. "We have p r e v i o u s l y a p p l i e d t h e s e s t a n d a r d s t o investigatory s t o p s involving automobiles. People v. Mangum, Colo., 539 P . 2 d 120 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . " 580 P.2d a t 393. See a l s o S t a t e v. Bartosz ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 34 0 r . A p p . 1 2 3 , 578 P.2d 426; W a s h i n g t o n v . S t a t e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 94 Nev. 1 8 1 , 576 P.2d 1 1 2 6 . Primarily applying the rules of Cortez, the State submits t h a t s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i c u l a r i z e d suspicion existed t o j u s t i f y t h e s t o p of d e f e n d a n t ' s c a r . The S t a t e ' s b u r d e n h a s two e l e m e n t s : ( 1 ) o b j e c t i v e d a t a f r o m which a n e x p e r i e n c e d officer c a n make certain inferences; and (2) a resulting s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e occupant of a c e r t a i n v e h i c l e is o r has been engaged in wrongdoing or was a witness to criminal activity. The f u n d a m e n t a l f a c t s p e r s u a d e u s t h a t t h e b u r d e n was met i n t h i s c a s e . The o f f i c e r s knew t h a t a c r i m e had b e e n committed-- probably theft, but certainly criminal mischief. They b e l i e v e d s e v e r a l g u n s had b e e n t a k e n . They knew a v e h i c l e was p r o b a b l y involved. They o b s e r v e d o n e v e h i c l e d r i v i n g very slowly p a s t t h e crime scene. Although h i s p o l i c e c a r was n o t on t h e f r o n t s t r e e t and d i d n o t h a v e i t s f l a s h i n g lights on, the occupants of the vehicle expressed an inordinate amount of interest in the scene. These known f a c t s , combined w i t h t h e d e d u c t i o n s made i n l i g h t o f t w e l v e years' experience in crime investigation, led Officer Johnston to s u s p e c t d e f e n d a n t was involved in, or witness t o , t h e crime. W reaffirm the traditional e r u l e of t h i s Court tha.t dictum is not binding as controlling precedent, S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 139 Mont. 453, 471, 365 P.2d 512, 521, and feel compelled t o abandon the language of Rader which a p p e a r s t o p r e c l u d e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e T e r r y s t o p and f r i s k r u l e s t o v e h i c u l a r s t o p s . I n l i g h t of t h e C o r t e z decision, and o t h e r p e r s u a s i v e a u t h o r i t y , we now h o l d t h a t when a t r a i n e d p o l i c e o f f i c e r h a s a p a r t i c u l a r i z e d s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e o c c u p a n t of a vehicle is or has been engaged in criminal activity, or witness thereto, a limited and r e a s o n a b l e i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t o p and s e a r c h i s j u s t i f i e d . The d e n i a l o f d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s and h i s subsequent conviction a r e affirmed. W concur: e 4 2-/+J<%ed Chief J u s t i c e w/ 1