Rose v. District Court of the Eighth Judicial District

No. 81-90 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 RONALD E. ROSE, Petitioner and Appellant, VS. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, Cascade County, H. William Coder, Judge, Respondents. ORIGIPJAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Lawrence A. Anderson argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mark Murphy, argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Barbara Bell argued, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Mike Garrity argued, Dept. of Revenue, Helena, Montana Robert F. James, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: April 24,1981 Decided: -MAY 281a ? Filed: Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t . This is an application for a writ of certiorari s e e k i n g a r e v i e w o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s by which Ronald Rose was adjudged g u i l t y of contempt of c o u r t . The record discloses that on o r about January 15, 1 9 8 0 , t h e S t a t e o f Montana, t h e Department of Revenue, t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s , D i a n a L . Ruff and L i s a M. R u f f f i l e d a p e t i t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, to establish paternity and p r o v i d e s u p p o r t f o r a minor child b o r n on S e p t e m b e r 2 1 , 1 9 7 9 . The p e t i t i o n a l l e g e d t h a t t h e State, t h e m o t h e r and t h e d a u g h t e r ". . . a r e i n f o r m e d and b e l i e v e t h a t Respondent [Rose] is t h e f a t h e r of the child based upon the following: Diana L. Ruff has named the Respondent, Ronald E. Rose, as the father of the minor child, Lisa M. Ruff." Attendant to the petition was a m o t i o n t o r e q u i r e Rose t o s u b m i t t o b l o o d t e s t s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 40-6-112, MCA. An ex p a r t e o r d e r was i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e q u i r i n g Rose t o show c a u s e why h e s h o u l d not submit to a blood test. On F e b r u a r y 28, 1 9 8 0 , Rose f i l e d an a n s w e r . On March 11, 1 9 8 0 , Rose f i l e d a m o t i o n t o q u a s h t h e o r d e r t o show c a u s e . The b a s i s f o r R o s e ' s m o t i o n was t h a t submission to a blood test would violate various constitutional rights including his right of privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. In o p p o s i t i o n t h e p e t i t i o n e r s argued t h a t t h e reasonableness of t h e i n t r u s i o n , coupled with t h e compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t t o determine parentage, authorizes the minimal invasion of p r i v a c y involved i n o b t a i n i n g a blood sample. On A u g u s t 21, 1980, the D i s t r i c t Court entered its order vacating the pretrial hearing originally set for A u g u s t 20, 1 9 8 0 , and r e s e t i t f o r December 15, 1980. The D i s t r i c t Court a d d i t i o n a l l y ordered t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s motion compelling discovery be heard on September 19, 1980. Subsequently, on O c t o b e r 9 , 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court issued a n e x p a r t e o r d e r f o r b l o o d t e s t s , whereby Rose was o r d e r e d to appear a t Columbus H o s p i t a l , Great Falls, Montana, on October 21, 1980, t o submit t o a blood t e s t . After formally asserting his right to refuse the test, Rose failed to appear f o r t h e court-ordered blood t e s t . On November 5 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d Rose t o show c a u s e why he s h o u l d n o t be h e l d i n c o n t e m p t o f c o u r t f o r f a i l i n g t o t a k e t h e blood test. On November 28, 1980, the District Court found Rose in contempt of court and issued the following decree: "1. T h a t R e s p o n d e n t , R o s e , be c o n f i n e d i n t h e C a s c a d e County J a i l f o r a p e r i o d o f f i v e days ; "2. T h a t t h e e x e c u t i o n o f s a i d judgment o f c o n t e m p t and o r d e r o f c o n f i n e m e n t i n t h e Cascade County J a i l b e , and h e r e b y i s , stayed ; " 3 . T h a t R e s p o n d e n t , R o s e , may p u r g e h i m s e l f of s a i d contempt by complying w i t h t h e Court's Order of October 9, 1980, by s u b m i t t i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d blood t e s t w i t h i n f o u r t e e n d a y s from t h e d a t e h e r e o f ; "4. That t h e Clerk of t h i s Court is d i r e c t e d t o p r o v i d e n o t i c e of t h i s O r d e r by m a i l i n g a t r u e copy t h e r e o f t o t h e R e s p o n d e n t , Rose." On December 11, 1 9 8 0 , Rose f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t in the United States District Court alleging civil rights v i o l a t i o n s under 42 U.S.C. 1983, i n t h a t s e c t i o n 40-6-112, MCA, violated his constitutional rights. Rose p r a y e d that the court grant injunctive relief barring the State District Court from ordering blood tests under section 40-6-112, MCA. On J a n u a r y 6 , 1 9 8 1 , t h e S t a t e f i l e d a m o t i o n t o dismiss with supporting briefs. The F e d e r a l District Court has not issued a temporary restraining order or g r a n t e d any i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f at this time, and t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s is p r e s e n t l y under advisement. On o r a b o u t March 3 , 1 9 8 1 , Rose f i l e d w i t h t h i s C o u r t an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i o r o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e r e l i e f t o determine t h e m a t t e r s s e t f o r t h above. On J u n e 27, 1 9 8 0 , p r i o r t o b e i n g h e l d i n c o n t e m p t by the D i s t r i c t Court, p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of supervisory control with t h i s Court. The p e t i t i o n was denied on the ground that he had an adequate remedy by appeal. This ruling contemplated that petitioner would submit to the blood test and, in the assertion of constitutional rights, e i t h e r move t o s u p p r e s s t h e r e s u l t s prior t o an a d j u d i c a t i o n of p a t e r n i t y o r a p p e a l t h e f i n a l judgment on the merits. This procedure would answer petitioner's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t submission t o a blood t e s t is an irretrievable forfeiture of constitutional rights; however, it does not prevent a possible constitutional violation i n the f i r s t instance. Herzog v. R e i n h a r d t ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 2 A r i z . A p p . 1 0 3 , 406 P.2d 738, holds that citizens are protected from a r b i t r a r y a c t i o n s of the t r i a l court. If fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rights are violated i n t h e contempt p r o c e s s , t h e contempt o r d e r c a n be a t t a c k e d c o l l a t e r a l l y a s v o i d , upon c e r t i o r a r i . Also, in precluding an appeal from an adjudication of contempt, section 3-1-523, MCA, provides that the only method of review is a writ of certiorari. A writ of certiorari w i l l i s s u e o n l y when a t r i a l c o u r t h a s e x c e e d e d its jurisdiction. State v. District Court of Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ( 1 9 0 0 ) , 24 Mont. 4 9 4 , 62 P. 820; M a t t e r o f Gr a v e l e y Mont . The statute in question is section 40-6-112, MCA, which is attacked in isolation from the balance of the Uniform A c t and p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s : " ( 1 ) The c o u r t may, and upon r e q u e s t o f a a r t y s h a l l , r e q u i r e t h e c h i l d , mother o r i l l e q e d f a t h e r t o submit t o blood t e s t s . The tests s h a l l be p e r f o r m e d by a n e x p e r t q u a l i f i e d a s an examiner of blood t y p e s , a p p o i n t e d by t h e c o u r t . " ( 2 ) The c o u r t , upon r e a s o n a b l e r e q u e s t b y a p a r t y , s h a l l o r d e r t h a t independent tests be performed by o t h e r e x p e r t s q u a l i f i e d a s examiners of blood t y p e s . " ( 3 ) In a l l cases the court s h a l l determine the number and qualifications of the experts." (Emphasis added.) I n Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., OSHA ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305, the United States Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e p r o v i s i o n o f the F o u r t h Amendment applicable to civil as well as criminal investigations. The Court also held in Schmerber v. C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 384 U.S. 757, 86 S . C t . 1 8 2 6 , 1 6 L.Ed.2d "Cour t - o r d e r e d b l o o d t e s t s a r e u n d o u b t e d l y 'searches' within the meaning of the constitution. The Fourth Amendment p r o s c r i p t i o n , h o w e v e r , is d i r e c t e d o n l y t o t h o s e s e a r c h e s which a r e u n r e a s o n a b l e . An u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h i s o n e u n j u s t i f i e d by t h e circumstances o r c a r r i e d o u t i n an improper m a n n e.r . -" . 3 8 4 U.S. a t 757. (Emphasis - supplied ) . I n S t a t e v . Meacham ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 93 Wash.2d 738, 612 P.2d 795, precisely the same p o i n t s came b e f o r e t h e Washington court as are presented in the case before us today. In that case, which involved two separate cases consolidated for appeal, the putative fathers were ordered to submit to the withdrawal of a small amount of their blood for testing. Each objected on constitutional grounds: (1) invasion of the right of privacy; (2) the unlawful search and seizure; and (3) interference with their freedom of religion. With respect to privacy the Washington court said: "The right to privacy, to be let alone, while fundamental and personal in nature, is not absolute. The State may reasonably regulate this right to safeguard society or where it otherwise has a compelling interest. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). "Here, the State has a compelling interest in fixing the parentage of a minor child. The test specified to be used is highly reliable. No other evidence that is at all comparable in effectiveness is available to the State. The pain inflicted when blood is withdrawn by an experienced technician is inconsequential. And, any hazard to health is virtually nonexistent." 612 P.2d 797. With respect to the argument that the blood test was an unreasonable search and seizure, the Washington court said: "In addition to the issue of privacy, appellants challenge the order to submit to blood withdrawal on grounds that it constitutes an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. We reject that contention out of hand. "'Court-ordered blood tests are undoubtedly "searches" within the meaning of the constitution. The Fourth Amendment proscription, however, is direct* only to those searches which are unreasonable. A n unreasonable search is one unjustified by t G circumstances or carried out i n a n improper manner. ' Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. "For example, in Schmerber, a blood sample was taken over the objections of a criminal defendant. An informed, deliberate decision was made t o o r d e r t h e t e s t . Because of t h e S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t i n d e t e r r i n g driving while under t h e i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l and t h e r e l a t i v e l y inoffensive nature of a properly conducted blood t e s t , t h e t a k i n g of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s b l o o d i n t h e h o s p i t a l s e t t i n g was n o t deemed t o be a n u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h . " Meacham, 612 P.2d a t 798. However, the blood tests in Meacham were ordered a f t e r a f u l l adversary hearing before the t r i a l court where i t was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a p r i m a f a c i e showing had b e e n made to justify the order for blood tests. Here, attempts a t d i s c o v e r y from p e t i t i o n e r h a v e b e e n met w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l objections a s t o h i s testimony. A d e p o s i t i o n of t h e mother was taken before the second order which indicated sexual a c t i v i t y with p e t i t i o n e r . The Montana statute on blood tests in paternity proceedings is found i n a s e c t i o n o f t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e Act, T i t l e 40, Montana Code A n n o t a t e d . The Act h a s been a d o p t e d now i n most o f the states. The A c t a r i s e s b e c a u s e o f t h e e f f o r t s of t h e f e d e r a l government t o r e c o v e r monies paid for the support of dependent children where the children are born out of wedlock or, as here, an absent p a r e n t is n o t s u p p o r t i n g h i s c h i l d . There is a s t r o n g s o c i e t a l r e a s o n f o r upholding such a c t s which r i s e f r o m d e c i s i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n t h e 1970s t h a t i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n were e n t i t l e d to the same constitutional benefits and protections as legitimate children. Out of this concept, only lately developed, h a s come t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t a m o t h e r , e v e n t h o u g h n o t wed, o r l i v i n g a p a r t from t h e f a t h e r , n e v e r t h e l e s s h a s a r i g h t t o h a v e t h e b u r d e n o f s u p p o r t s h a r e d by t h e f a t h e r o f the child. The C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t i n S a l a s v . C o r t e z , ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 154 C a l . R p t r . 529, 593 P.2d 226, d e f i n e s t h e S t a t e i n t e r e s t i n these cases as follows: "The state's interest in determining p a r e n t a g e h a s t r a d i t i o n a l l y been l i m i t e d t o p r e v e n t i n g c h i l d r e n born o u t of wedlock from becoming p u b l i c c h a r g e s ( s e e a n A c t f o r S e t t i n g t h e Poor on Work ( 1 5 7 6 ) , 1 8 E l i z . 1, Ch. 3 , S 2 , q u o t e d i n K r a u s e , s u p r a , a t p p . 105-106). The amendments t o f e d e r a l l a w which g a v e r i s e t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e s w e r e b r o u g h t a b o u t by c o n c e r n s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e t h a t i n s p i r e d t h e E l i z a b e t h a n Poor Laws--the i n c r e a s i n g a p p e a r a n c e on t h e w e l f a r e r o l l s o f c h i l d r e n born o u t of wedlock. ( S e e , Note ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 52 Wash.L.Rev. 1 6 9 , 1 7 0 . ) In recent y e a r s n e a r l y h a l f of t h e f a m i l i e s r e c e i v i n g AFDC h a v e had a t l e a s t o n e c h i l d b o r n o u t o f wedlock. ( I d . a t 1 7 7 . ) Were t h e s t a t e a b l e t o r e c o v e r from a b s e n t p a r e n t s e v e n a p o r t i o n o f t h e f u n d s e x p e n d e d t h r o u g h t h e AFDC p r o g r a m , t h e s a v i n g s would be s u b s t a n t i a l . (See, Id. a t 172.) " I t i s c l e a r l y w i t h i n t h e power o f t h e s t a t e t o provide f o r t h e enforcement of t h e parental duty t o support one's children. The s t a t e may f u r t h e r l e g i t i m a t e l y p r o v i d e f o r t h e e x p e n d i t u r e of p u b l i c f u n d s t o a s s i s t custodial parents i n enforcing the support o b l i g a t i o n s of a b s e n t p a r e n t s , whether o r n o t the custodial parent is receiving public assistance. Such e f f o r t s a r e a l a u d a b l e attempt t o prevent custodial parents, the overwhelming m a j o r i t y o f w h i c h a r e women, from h a v i n g t o b e a r a l o n e t h e b u r d e n o f a mutual d e c i s i o n t o engage i n s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s . . ." 593 P.2d a t 233. In Salas, the court held that an indigent putative f a t h e r was e n t i t l e d t o c o u n s e l , s u p p l i e d a t t h e expense of the state. Although a number of c a s e s a r e now arising on the problem of b l o o d t e s t s u n d e r t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e A c t , no court has set aside the statute requiring blood tests as unconstitutional per se. The l e g a l significance of blood tests is not that the results may possibly include the a c c u s e d a s t h e f a t h e r , b u t t h a t s u c h r e s u l t s may p o s i t i v e l y e x c l u d e him a s t h e f a t h e r . Thus, i t h a s been h e l d i n any number of cases that a father has an absolute right to demand a b l o o d t e s t o f t h e m o t h e r and c h i l d , e v e n t o g e t a continuance if the child has not yet been born for the reason that such test may positively exclude him as the father. See People v. S t o e c k l (Mich. 1 9 5 6 ) , 78 N.W.2d 640. Thus, the rights of the parties are reciprocal, and a constitutional elimination of the statute would severely l i m i t t h e r i g h t s of t h e p u t a t i v e f a t h e r . To u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r o c e d u r e i n t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e Act, particularly with relation to blood tests, it is necessary to realize the advances t h a t have b e e n made in c o n n e c t i o n with blood t e s t s . For t h i s p u r p o s e , a r e a d i n g o f Current S t a t u s of P a t e r n i t y Testinq, by Dr. Chang L i n g Lee, 9 F a m i l y Law Q u a r t e r l y 615 (1975), is instructive. The a r t i c l e explains t h e v a r i o u s means o f testing for genetic markers. Under s e c t i o n 40-6-114(4), MCA, it is p r o v i d e d t h a t if the scientific evidence resulting from a blood test conclusively shows the defendant could not have been the father, t h e a c t i o n s h a l l be d i s m i s s e d . I f , however, there is a s t a t i s t i c a l chance t h a t he is t h e f a t h e r , the blood tests, weighed in accordance with the evidence, are admissible r e l a t i v e t o the paternity. S e c t i o n 40-6-113(3), MCA . I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e i t is a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e h a s n o t been followed. What s h o u l d o c c u r under t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e Act i s t h a t a f t e r t h e a c t i o n h a s b e e n brought t o d e c l a r e t h e p a t e r n i t y of t h e c h i l d , an i n f o r m a l hearing by way of pretrial proceedings should occur. Section 40-6-111, MCA. A t the pretrial hearing, if any p a r t y t o t h e a c t i o n r e f u s e s t o t e s t i f y under o a t h , t h e c o u r t may order him to testify. If he refuses to testify, the court has the power to grant him immunity from all criminal liability on account of the testimony he is required to produce (except for perjury). Section 40-6-111(2), MCA. It is at the pretrial proceeding that the court may order the blood tests. Section 40-6-112, MCA. At that point, therefore, it is assured from the statutory scheme that a prima facie case (the equivalent of probable cause in a criminal proceeding) is established for the ordering of the blood test. It is at the pretrial proceedings that the evidence relating to paternity, including the blood tests, are considered. Section 40-6-114, MCA. Thereafter, there are pretrial recommendations to be made as set forth in section 40-6-114(1), MCA. At that point, the court considers whether or not the case should go on. The statute says : "On the basis of the information produced at the pretrial hearing, the judge or referee conducting the hearing shall evaluate the probability of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship in a trial and whether a judicial declaration of the relationship would be in the best interest of the child. On the basis of the evaluation, an appropriate recommendation for settlement shall be made to the parties, which may include any of the following: [options omitted]." Section 40-6-114, MCA. As our discussion has revealed, the mere conclusory allegations by the movant in the petition are insufficient to satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 11, Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution. Reasonableness can only be established by an affirmative showing by the movant that there exists a prima facie case against the putative father. After t h i s , a b l o o d t e s t may be t a k e n . Therefore, t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e A c t , as it r e l a t e s t o t h i s s u b j e c t , m u s t be c o n s t r u e d a s a w h o l e , and we w i l l not consider an attack upon an isolated section, i.e., section 40-6-112, MCA, t o determine its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . However, w e do c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o f o l l o w the s t a t u t o r y procedures t o e s t a b l i s h reasonableness p r i o r t o t h e o r d e r i n g of t h e "search" r e n d e r s t h e ordered s e a r c h a violation of the accused's F o u r t h Amendment rights to be s e c u r e from " u n r e a s o n a b l e " s e a r c h and a l s o v i o l a t e s A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 11, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . The w r i t , a s p r a y e d f o r , s h a l l i s s u e : 1. The c o n t e m p t o r d e r of November 2 8 , 1 9 8 0 , by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s h e r e b y v a c a t e d and s e t a s i d e . 2. The c a s e i s r e t u r n e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i t h instructions to follow the procedure set forth in the Uniform P a r e n t a g e A c t a s d i s c u s s e d h e r e i n . A s provided in section 40-6-111, MCA, this will require an informal p r e t r i a l proceeding before t h e c o u r t . I n t h e event a prima f a c i e case i s made showing t h e d e f e n d a n t t o be a p o s s i b l e father, then an o r d e r p r o p e r l y may be made requiring the defendant to submit to the blood test. In the event defendant refuses to testify, the court may grant him immunity from a l l c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y and t h e r e a f t e r r e q u i r e t h a t he t a k e t h e b l o o d t e s t . 3. A copy of t h i s o p i n i o n , when s e r v e d by t h e C l e r k of t h i s C o u r t , s h a l l p e rf o r m t h e o f f i c e of a formal w r i t . d& #/ . d Justice W e concur: 2A& J, p g ,4 Chief J u s t i c e ILrrniblsL ~ o n d r a b l eJames B. W h e e l i s . i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n of Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C .