No. 80-265
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTNAA
1981
LOIS JEFFERSON BIG MAN, Personally and
as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Daniel Big Man, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
VS.
THE STATE OF MONTANA, and
EUNICE IRENE CASE,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Big Horn.
Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Holmstrom, Dunaway & West, Billings, Montana
Jock B.West argued, Billings, Montana
For Respondents :
Moulton, Bellingham, Longo and Mather, Billings, Montana
Corinne Courtney argued, Billings, Montana
Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings,
Montana
Cynthia Ford argued, Billings, Montana
Submitted: January 15, 1981
Decided: MAR I 0 1
s
Filed: MAR 1 0 198%
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l f r o m a summary j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d a g a i n s t
t h e p l a i n t i f f i n f a v o r o f b o t h d e f e n d a n t s by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
o f t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e County of B i g
Horn.
D a n i e l B i g Man, a f i v e - y e a r - o l d p e d e s t r i a n , was s t r u c k by
a car d r i v e n by E u n i c e Case. The a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d o n o r n e a r
t h e s o u t h end of a b r i d g e t h a t c r o s s e s t h e L i t t l e B i g H o r n R i v e r ,
1 8 m i l e s s o u t h of H a r d i n , Montana, o n I n t e r s t a t e 90 ( 1 - 9 0 ) . The
s i t e o f t h e a c c i d e n t a b u t s a "swimming h o l e " f r e q u e n t l y used by
c h i l d r e n i n t h e area. The c h i l d r e n had a c c e s s t o t h e swimming
h o l e t h r o u g h a n o p e n i n g i n a f e n c e which r u n s from t h e i n t e r s t a t e
b o u n d a r y f e n c e t o a c o n c r e t e a b u t m e n t l o c a t e d a t t h e s o u t h end of
t h e bridge. D a n i e l d i e d as a r e s u l t o f t h e i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d i n
the accident.
P l a i n t i f f b r o u g h t s u i t a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e of Montana f o r
n e g l i g e n c e i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n and m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e highway
f e n c e and a g a i n s t E u n i c e Case f o r n e g l i g e n c e i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of
her vehicle. Defendants contend t h a t D a n i e l d a r t e d from behind
t h e b r i d g e a b u t m e n t s o q u i c k l y t h a t Case c o u l d n o t a v o i d h i t t i n g
him.
A f t e r some d i s c o v e r y was p u r s u e d , d e f e n d a n t s m v e d f o r
summary j u d g m e n t . The c o u r t g r a n t e d j u d g m e n t i n t h e i r f a v o r .
P l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t s the following i s s u e s t o t h i s Court f o r
review:
1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n f i n d i n g n o g e n u i n e i s s u e
a s t o a n y m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h e r e b y e r r i n g r a n t i n g t h e summary
j udgment?
2. Did t h e s t a t e h a v e a l e g a l d u t y t o erect and m a i n t a i n
t h e f e n c e a l o n g t h e i n t e r s t a t e w h e r e t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d so a s
t o p r e v e n t access by p e d e s t r i a n s ?
A p a r t y moving f o r summary j u d g m e n t h a s t h e b u r d e n of
s h o w i n g t h e c o m p l e t e a b s e n c e o f a n y g e n u i n e i s s u e as t o a l l f a c t s
w h i c h are deemed m a t e r i a l i n l i g h t o f t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s which
e n t i t l e him t o a j u d g m e n t as a matter o f l a w . R e a v e s v. R e i n b o l d
(1980 I Mont . , 615 P.2d 8 9 6 , 37 S t . R e p . 1 5 0 0 ; H a r l a n d v.
A n d e r s o n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 447, 548 P.2d 613.
A s to defendant Case, t h e p l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s t h e r e are
i s s u e s o f f a c t y e t t o be r e s o l v e d . Case concedes t h a t t h e sub-
m i t t e d r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t t h e r e are g e n u i n e i s s u e s of f a c t b u t
c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e y a r e n o t material i n l i g h t o f t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s
w h i c h e n t i t l e h e r t o a j u d g m e n t a s a m a t t e r o f law.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o u l d p r o p e r l y g r a n t summary j u d g m e n t
t o Case o n l y o n a f i n d i n g t h a t , o n t h e s u b m i t t e d r e c o r d , s h e
e x e r c i s e d p r o p e r d u e care i n p r o c e e d i n g down t h e highway and was
unable t o avoid the c o l l i s i o n with the decedent.
I n s u p p o r t o f t h i s f i n d i n g , C a s e p r e s e n t e d h e r own a f f i d a -
v i t and t h e a f f i d a v i t o f h e r h u s b a n d , C l a r e n c e Case, who was a
p a s s e n g e r i n t h e car a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . These a f f i d a -
v i t s established the following facts:
1. The a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d a t 2: 30 p.m. i n t h e southbound
l a n e o f a l i m i t e d access f o u r - l a n e i n t e r s t a t e highway. The s p e e d
l i m i t w a s 55 m i l e s p e r hour.
2. E u n i c e Case was d r i v i n g a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 40 m i l e s per
hour.
3. The d e c e d e n t was f i r s t s e e n by C l a r e n c e Case, a
p a s s e n g e r i n d e f e n d a n t ' s c a r , a s t h e y a p p r o a c h e d t h e s o u t h end of
the bridge.
4. The d e c e d e n t d a r t e d from b e h i n d a t h r e e - f o o t - h i g h
b r i d g e a b u t m e n t o n t h e r i g h t h a n d s i d e o f t h e roadway d i r e c t l y
i n t o t h e highway.
5. The d e c e d e n t a p p e a r e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e f e e t from
t h e b r i d g e abutment.
6. The d e c e d e n t t r i e d t o s t o p , b u t r a n i n t o t h e r i g h t
f r o n t f e n d e r of t h e v e h i c l e .
7. The d e c e d e n t a p p e a r e d and r a n i n t o t h e s i d e o f t h e c a r
w i t h o u t w a r n i n g and w i t h o u t time f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t t o t a k e any
a c t i o n to a v o i d t h e c o l l i s i o n .
8. The d e c e d e n t was t h e o n l y c h i l d who r a n o u t f r o m
b e h i n d t h e b r i d g e a b u t m e n t a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t .
I n response t o Case's a l l e g a t i o n s , p l a i n t i f f presented
a f f i d a v i t s which e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t ,
t h e r e were o t h e r c h i l d r e n on t h e b r i d g e o r s t a n d i n g o n t h e
i n t e r s t a t e r o a d b e d n e a r t h e highway. The a f f i d a v i t s a l s o i n d i -
c a t e d t h a t t h e p o i n t o f i m p a c t a p p e a r e d t o be 2 1 . 1 f e e t from t h e
end of t h e b r i d g e abutment.
I s s u e s of f a c t i n d i s p u t e i n c l u d e w h e t h e r t h e r e were o t h e r
c h i l d r e n on t h e b r i d g e or roadway a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t ;
w h e t h e r t h e p o i n t o f i m p a c t was 3 f e e t o r 2 1 f e e t f r o m t h e end of
t h e b r i d g e a b u t m e n t and w h e t h e r Case's v e h i c l e was t r a v e l i n g a t a
r e a s o n a b l e rate of speed. These f a c t s being i n d i s p u t e , t h e
i s s u e becomes w h e t h e r t h e y are m a t e r i a l t o a f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n
i n t h i s matter a n d , t h u s , p r e c l u d e a n y summary j u d g m e n t .
S e c t i o n 61-8-504, MCA, provides:
" ... e v e r y d r i v e r s h a l l e x e r c i s e d u e care t o
a v o i d c o l l i d i n g w i t h a n y p e d e s t r i a n upon a n y
r o a d w a y and s h a l l g i v e w a r n i n g by s o u n d i n g t h e
h o r n when n e c e s s a r y and s h a l l e x e r c i s e p r o p e r
p r e c a u t i o n upon o b s e r v i n g a n y c h i l d
roadway. "
... upon a
I f c h i l d r e n were p r e s e n t on t h e b r i d g e o r s t a n d i n g o n t h e
r o a d b e d and r e a d i l y v i s i b l e t o C a s e , s h e was u n d e r a d u t y to
e x e r c i s e p r e c a u t i o n t o a v o i d a n y c o l l i s i o n and t o sound h e r h o r n
when s u c h a c t i o n became n e c e s s a r y .
Case f a i l e d t o make u s e of h e r h o r n a s s h e a p p r o a c h e d t h e
b r i d g e b u t s t i l l c o n t e n d s s h e e x e r c i s e d d u e care i n d r i v i n g h e r
car. Case t h e n c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t c h i l d r e n may h a v e
b e e n on t h e b r i d g e o r roadbed a d j a c e n t t o t h e i n t e r s t a t e is of no
c o n c e r n f o r t h e c o l l i s i o n w i t h t h e d e c e d e n t s t i l remained
unavoidable.
I n s u p p o r t of t h i s p o s i t i o n , d e f e n d a n t c i t e s A u t i o v.
M i l l e r ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 92 Mont. 1 5 0 , 11 P.2d 1039, f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g
proposition :
"While t h e d r i v e r of an a u t o m o b i l e i s r e q u i r e d
t o be v i g i l a n t , he is n o t bound t o a n t i c i p a t e
t h a t a c h i l d w i l l s u d d e n l y d a r t from t h e s i d e o f
t h e s t r e e t o r s u d d e n l y r u n across t h e s t r e e t , i n
f r o n t o f h i s car." 1 P.2d a t 1 0 4 2 .
1
S e e also Annot., 6 5 A.L.R. 192 ( 1 9 3 0 ) ; Annot., 1 1 3 A.L.R. 528
( 1 9 3 8 ) ; 60A C.J.S. Motor V e h i c l e s , 5 3 9 6 ( 2 ) a t 777.
I t s h o u l d be n o t e d , however, t h a t t h e c o u r t i n A u t i o also
s t a t e d t h a t i f t h e d r i v e r of a n a u t o m o b i l e "is n o t v i g i l a n t , if
h e d o e s n o t k e e p a l o o k o u t , t h e j u r y may s a y h e was n e g l i g e n t . "
I n p r o v i d i n g a lookout, t h e c o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e " d r i v e r must
l o o k ' n o t o n l y s t r a i g h t ahead, b u t l a t e r a l l y ahead "I and t h a t a
" p e r s o n is p r e s u m e d t o see t h a t which h e c o u l d s e e by l o o k i n g . "
I n v i e w i n g t h e p r e s e n t e d a f f i d a v i t s and t h e i n f e r e n c e s
a r i s i n g therefrom, i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e p a r t y
o p p o s i n g t h e m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t , t h i s Court must
a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t c h i l d r e n w e r e p r e s e n t o n t h e b r i d g e o r roadway
a n d r e a d i l y v i e w a b l e by t h e d e f e n d a n t . C h i l d r e n being p r e s e n t ,
C a s e was u n d e r a d u t y t o e x e r c i s e a l l p r o p e r p r e c a u t i o n t o a v o i d
any c o l l i s i o n .
A d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f n e g l i g e n c e is a l w a y s d e p e n d e n t upon a n
examination of t h e surrounding circumstances. McCusker v.
R o b e r t s ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 2 Mont. 513, 452 P.2d 408; J a c k s o n v. W i l l i a m
Dingwall Co. ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 4 5 Mont. 1 2 7 , 399 P.2d 236. The s u b m i t t e d
r e c o r d f a i l s t o f u l l y d e s c r i b e t h e l o c a t i o n and a c t i o n s of t h e
children but af fording the p l a i n t i f f a l l reasonable inferences
w h i c h may be drawn f r o m t h e o f f e r e d p r o o f , it c o u l d be f o u n d upon
f u r t h e r e x a m i n a t i o n a t t r i a l t h a t a f a i l u r e t o sound t h e c a r h o r n
and/or r e d u c e t h e c a r ' s s p e e d t o l e s s t h a n 40 m i l e s p e r h o u r was
i n v i o l a t i o n o f a d u t y o f r e a s o n a b l e care and p r e c a u t i o n . This
b e i n g t h e case, t h e t r i a l c o u r t i m p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d Case a summary
j udgmen t .
A s to t h e disputed f a c t of w h e t h e r t h e c o l l i s i o n o c c u r r e d 3
o r 21 f e e t from t h e b r i d g e abutment, t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y b e a r s on
t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r Case had time t o a v o i d t h e d e c e d e n t as h e
r a n o n t o t h e highway. P l a i n t i f f submits t h a t , i f the decedent
was 2 1 . 1 f e e t down t h e r o a d from t h e b r i d g e , Case i n t h e e x e r -
c i s e o f d u e c a r e would h a v e b e e n a b l e t o see him p r i o r to i m p a c t
and t h e r e b y avoid t h e a c c i d e n t .
T h e r e a p p e a r s t o be no d i s p u t e t h a t t h e d e c e d e n t d a r t e d
s u d d e n l y o u t i n t o t h e roadway from u n d e r n e a t h t h e b r i d g e and from
behind a b r i d g e abutment. The d i s p u t e is w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t
was 3 . 0 f e e t or 2 1 . 1 f e e t f r o m t h e b r i d g e when h e a p p e a r e d i n t h e
view of defendant.
The d i s c r e p a n c y i n t h i s i n s t a n c e is 1 8 . 1 f e e t , b u t t h e
d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s it is o f l i t t l e s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h a t when t r a -
v e l i n g a t a s p e e d o f 40 m i l e s p e r h o u r , t h i s d i s t a n c e is c o v e r e d
i n less t h a n a second. What d e f e n d a n t f a i l s t o a c k n o w l e d g e ,
h o w e v e r , is t h a t u n d e r t h e g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 40 m i l e s p e r h o u r
may h a v e b e e n e x c e s s i v e and had s h e b e e n d r i v i n g a t a more r e a s o -
n a b l e speed t h e d i s t a n c e c o u l d have allowed a d e q u a t e t i m e t o
avoid the collision.
I n v i e w i n g t h e e v i d e n c e and i n £ e r e n c e s a r i s i n g t h e r e f r o m
i n a l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f , w e a r e n o t able to
c o n c l u d e , as a matter o f l a w , t h a t d e f e n d a n t p r o p e r l y e x e r c i s e d
h e r duty. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e summary j u d g m e n t was i m p r o p e r l y
granted.
This determination agrees with t h i s Court's holding t h a t
o r d i n a r i l y i s s u e s of negligence a r e not s u s c e p t i b l e o f summary
adjudication. Hogen v. Great N o r t h e r n R a i l w a y C o . (1969), 153
Mont. 3 0 9 , 456 P.2d 51. I t is f e l t t h a t t h e C o u r t s h o u l d be
e x t r e m e l y c a u t i o u s i n r e v i e w i n g g r a n t s of summary j u d g m e n t i n
t h i s area f o r t h e i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of n e g l i -
g e n c e are b e t t e r r e s o l v e d a t t r i a l . McAlpine v. Dahl ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,
Mont . , 5 8 5 P.2d 1 3 0 7 , 3 5 S t . R e p . 1 5 6 1 ; see a l s o L y n d e s v.
Scofield (1979), Mont . , 589 P.2d 1000, 36 St.Rep. 185;
S l a g s v o l d v. J o h n s o n ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 490, 5 4 4 P.2d 4 4 2 ; Dean v.
F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank o f G r e a t F a l l s ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 2 Mont. 474, 4 5 2
P.2d 402.
I n r e g a r d t o t h e s e c o n d i s s u e o n a p p e a l t h e p l a i n t i f f con-
t e n d s t h a t a n i s s u e o f f a c t y e t t o be r e s o l v e d is w h e t h e r t h e
- 6 -
S t a t e of Montana as a d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d to p r o p e r l y u p k e e p t h e
f e n c e e x t e n d i n g from t h e i n t e r s t a t e boundary f e n c e t o t h e b r i g e
abutment. The S t a t e s u b m i t s t h a t t h e f a c t t h e f e n c e may h a v e
b e e n i n d i s r e p a i r is o f no c o n c e r n i n t h i s matter f o r t h e S t a t e
i s u n d e r no l e g a l d u t y t o erect o r m a i n t a i n t h e f e n c e .
To s u p p o r t h e r a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e S t a t e h a s a d u t y of
m a i n t e n a n c e , p l a i n t i f f c i t e s s e c t i o n 60-5-105, MCA. This section
reads:
"Each highway a u t h o r i t y may so d e s i g n a n y
c o n t r o l l e d access f a c i l i t y and so r e g u l a t e ,
r e s t r i c t , o r p r o h i b i t access as t o b e s t s e r v e
t h e t r a f f i c f o r which t h e f a c i l i t y is i n t e n d e d .
I n d o i n g so, it may d i v i d e and s e p a r a t e a n y
c o n t r o l l e d access f a c i l i t y i n t o s e p a r a t e r o a d -
ways by t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of r a i s e d c u r b i n g s ,
c e n t r a l d i v i d i n g s e c t i o n s , or o t h e r p h y s i c a l
s e p a r a t i o n s o r by d e s i g n a t i n g a s e p a r a t e roadway
b y s i g n s , m a r k e r s , s t r i p e s and o t h e r d e v i c e s . "
Upon r e a d i n g t h i s s e c t i o n i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t
C o u r t o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 6 3 ,
572 P.2d 201, p l a i n t i f f c o n c l u d e s t h a t o n c e t h e S t a t e h a s c h o s e n
a method o f r e g u l a t i n g , r e s t r i c t i n g and p r o h i b i t i n g access t o a
h i g h w a y ( i . e . , by means of a f e n c e ) i t is l i a b l e f o r a n y n e g l i -
g e n t maintenance of such d e v i c e .
W e f a i l t o f i n d any requirement contained i n s e c t i o n
60-5-105, MCA, t h a t t h e S t a t e h a s a l e g a l d u t y t o erect a f e n c e
t o p r e v e n t access by p e d e s t r i a n s to a c o n t r o l l e d access highway.
The s t a t u t e s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e highway a u t h o r i t y may
( n o t s h a l l ) r e s t r i c t o r p r o h i b i t access.
F u r t h e r m o r e , w e f a i l t o see t h a t t h e S t a t e of Montana c a n
b e h e l d l i a b l e f o r t h e n e g l i g e n t m a i n t e n a n c e of a f e n c e i t had n o
d u t y t o e r e c t b a s e d upon t h e d e c i s i o n r e n d e r e d i n S t a t e v .
D i s t r i c t Court, supra. I n t h a t c a s e , t w o i s s u e s were p r e s e n t e d
f o r review:
" ( 1 )May t h e S t a t e m a i n t a i n a d e f e n s e of
s o v e r e i g n immunity a g a i n s t claims a r i s i n g from
death?
" ( 2 ) May t h e S t a t e m a i n t a i n a d e f e n s e o f
f i n a n c i a l f e a s i b i l i t y o r d i s c r e t i o n ' i n a high-
way i n j u r y o r d e a t h c a s e ? " 572 P.2d a t 202.
N e i t h e r o f t h e s e i s s u e s a r e i n c o n t r o v e r s y i n t h e case a t h a n d .
T h i s Court i n S t a t e , i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e second i s s u e on
r e v i e w , d i d i n d i c a t e t h a t " w h e n e v e r and w h e r e v e r it [ t h e S t a t e ]
c h o o s e s t o b u i l d h i g h w a y s it a s s u m e s t h e d u t y of m a i n t a i n i n g them
s a f e l y and is a n s w e r a b l e i f it f a i l s t o d o so." This statement,
h o w e v e r , w a s d i r e c t e d a t a d u t y owed t o a m o t o r i s t , n o t a
p e d e s t r i a n , and was made s o l e l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a f i n d i n g
t h a t t h e S t a t e c a n n o t a v o i d a c l a i m o f n e g l i g e n c e o n a d e f e n s e of
f i n a n c i a l f e a s i b i l i t y or d i s c r e t i o n - - m a t t e r s not i n issue i n t h i s
proceeding. S e e S t a t e , 572 P.2d a t 203. S t a t e s h o u l d n o t be
deemed c o n t r o l l i n g i n t h i s p r o c e e d i n g . ( T h e same a n a l y s i s is
t r u e f o r M o d r e l l v. S t a t e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . , 587 P.2d 405, 3 5
St.Rep. 1 8 1 1 , c i t e d by p l a i n t i f f . )
P l a i n t i f f a l s o a r g u e s t h a t s i n c e t h e S t a t e of Montana
knew, o r s h o u l d h a v e known, t h a t c h i l d r e n i n t h e a r e a s w a m i n t h e
r i v e r d i r e c t l y below t h e b r i d g e where t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d , t h e
S t a t e was u n d e r a d u t y t o e r e c t and m a i n t a i n a f e n c e to p r e v e n t
t h o s e c h i l d r e n f r o m g a i n i n g access t o t h e highway.
I n making t h i s a r g u m e n t p l a i n t i f f f i r s t r e l i e s upon a
p o l i c y d e c l a r a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e l e g i s l a t u r e 's p u r p o s e i n
c o n t r o l l i n g access o n c e r t a i n d e s i g n a t e d h i g h w a y s . See sect i o n
60-5-101, MCA. The p o l i c y of t h e S t a t e i n t h i s r e g a r d is t o
f a c i l i t a t e t h e f l o w o f t r a f f i c and t h e p r o m o t i o n of p u b l i c
safety.
T h i s Court acknowledges t h e p o l i c y s t a t e m e n t b u t d i s a g r e e s
w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f f e r e d by p l a i n t i f f . The i n i t i a l p u r p o s e of
t h e s t a t u t e is t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e f l o w o f t r a f f i c on h i g h w a y s
w h i c h h a v e b e e n d e s i g n a t e d f o r u s e s o l e l y by t h r o u g h t r a f f i c .
( S e e s e c t i o n 60-5-102 ( 2 ) , MCA, f o r t h e d e f i n i t i o n of c o n t r o l l e d -
access highway. ) I t is e v i d e n t t h a t t h e f l o w of traffic in this
r e g a r d r e f e r s s o l e l y t o motor v e h i c l e and n o t p e d e s t r i a n t r a f f i c
a s s u b m i t t e d by p l a i n t i f f .
The a d d i t i o n a l p u r p o s e o f t h e l e g i s l a t i o n is t o p r o m o t e
p u b l i c s a f e t y and a r g u a b l y t h i s i n c l u d e s t h e p r o m o t i o n of
pedestrial safety. W a r e , however, u n w i l l i n g to f i n d t h a t t h i s
e
- 8 -
p r o m o t i o n a l s o i n c l u d e s a s t a t u t o r y d u t y , o n t h e p a r t of t h e
S t a t e , t o p r o t e c t p e d e s t r i a n s by p r e v e n t i n g access to a
c o n t r o l l e d - a c c e s s h i g h w a y by e r e c t i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g a f e n c e .
I t s h o u l d n o t be s a i d t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , i n declaring a policy
f o r c o n t r o l l i n g access t o d e s i g n a t e d h i g h w a y s , intended t h a t the
S t a t e be r e q u i r e d t o a s s u r e p e d e s t r i a n s a f e t y by e n c l o s i n g o u r
h i g h w a y s w i t h a p h y s i c a l o b s t r u c t i o n so as to p r e v e n t a
p e d e s t r i a n ' s i n t e n t i o n a l e n t r a n c e upon t h e roadway. Such a
c o n c l u s i o n is u n t e n a b l e .
I n f i n a l s u p p o r t of t h e c o n t e n t i o n f o r imposing l i a b i l i t y
o n t h e S t a t e f o r f a i l i n g t o m a i n t a i n a f e n c e i n a n a r e a known t o
b e f r e q u e n t e d by c h i l d r e n , p l a i n t i f f a s s e r t s t h e d o c t r i n e of
a t t r a c t i v e nuisance. S e e G a g n i e r V. Curran Construction Co.
( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 4 6 8 , 4 4 3 P.2d 8 9 4 ; Molohon v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( D .
Mont. 1 9 6 2 ) , 206 F.Supp. 3 8 8 ; J o h n s o n v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 9 t h C i r .
1 9 5 9 ) , 270 F.2d 4 8 8 , c e r t . d e n i e d , 362 U.S. 924, 80 S.Ct. 677, 4
L.Ed.2d 7 4 2 ; D r i s c o l l v. C l a r k ( 1 9 0 5 ) , 3 2 Mont. 1 7 2 , 8 0 P. 1.
T h i s C o u r t h a s n o t d e c i d e d , h o w e v e r , w h e t h e r a h i g h w a y , as
a n a r t i f i c i a l c o n d i t i o n , i s s u c h t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e is deemed
a p p l i c a b l e when a c h i l d is k i l l e d o r i n j u r e d t h e r e o n . N o r have
w e b e e n a b l e t o f i n d a case d e a l i n g w i t h s u c h a n a p p l i c a t i o n i n
other jurisdictions.
The e l e m e n t s needed t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of l i a b i l i t y
u n d e r a t h e o r y of a t t r a c t i v e n u i s a n c e i n c l u d e : (1) a n a r t i f i c i a l
c o n d i t i o n m a i n t a i n e d by t h e p o s s e s s o r o f l a n d i n a p l a c e which
t h e p o s s e s s o r knows or s h o u l d know t h a t c h i l d r e n are l i k e l y t o
trespass; ( 2 ) t h e c o n d i t i o n i n v o l v e s a n u n r e a s o n a b l e r i s k of
d e a t h or s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm; ( 3 ) c h i l d r e n b e c a u s e of t h e i r y o u t h
w i l l be u n a b l e t o d i s c o v e r t h e c o n d i t i o n or r e a l i z e t h e d a n g e r ;
( 4 ) t h e u t i l i t y of m a i n t a i n i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n is s l i g h t compared t o
t h e r i s k it p r e s e n t s t o young c h i l d r e n ; ( 5 ) t h e possessor f a i l s
t o e x e r c i s e r e a s o n a b l e care t o e l i m i n a t e t h e d a n g e r o r o t h e r w i s e
protect the children. S e e R e s t a t e m e n t o f T o r t s 2 d , S 339;
Gagnier, supra.
- 9 -
An i n t e r s t a t e highway m o s t c e r t a i n l y c o n s t i t u t e s a n a r t i -
f i c i a l c o n d i t i o n , b u t w e a r e unable to f i n d a n y t h i n g i n t h e
record t h a t a five-year-old c h i l d would n o t be a b l e t o d i s c o v e r
i t n o r be a b l e t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e d a n g e r s i n v o l v e d when w a l k i n g
thereon. I n a s o c i e t y w h e r e c a r s , s t r e e t s and highways a r e
commonplace, a c h i l d from t h e m i n u t e h e is a b l e t o w a l k i s
c o n s t a n t l y r e m i n d e d t h a t o n e s h o u l d be e x t r e m e l y c a r e f u l of
roadways. C o n s e q u e n t l y , b y t h e t i m e a c h i l d is f i v e y e a r s of
a g e , it may be he h a s grown t o a p p r e c i a t e and f e a r t h e r i s k s a
highway p r e s e n t s t o a p e d e s t r i a n .
P l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h a l e g a l d u t y on t h e S t a t e
t o erect or m a i n t a i n t h e f e n c e a t i s s u e . W e a f f i r m t h e summary
j u d g m e n t g r a n t e d i n f a v o r of t h e S t a t e of Montana. Since
m a t e r i a l i s s u e s of f a c t h a v e y e t t o be r e s o l v e d c o n c e r n i n g t h e
p r o p r i e t y of d e f e n d a n t C a s e ' s d r i v i n g b e h a v i o r and t h e d i s t a n c e
f r o m t h e b r i d g e a b u t m e n t of t h e i m p a c t , t h e summary j u d g m e n t i n
d e f e n d a n t C a s e ' s f a v o r is
f u r t h e r proceedings.
Justice d
W e concur:
~ u s t i c e rank I . H a s w e l l .
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea concurring:
I agree with the decision of this Court affirming the
grant of summary judgment to the defendant State of
Montana, but reversing the grant of summary judgment to the
defendant, Eunice Irene Case. Nonetheless, I must express
my disapproval of the way the trial court handled and granted
both motions for summary judgment. There is absolutely no
way from the record that we can tell why the trial court
ruled in the way it did. We should be able to tell from the
trial court order or accompanying memorandum precisely why
the trial court considered there to be no genuine issue of
fact. It has always seemed to be that if parties are to be
thrown out of court they are entitled to know why.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics require that trial
judges, in disposing of controverted cases, set out the
reasons for their decisions. The first paragraph of Canon
19 (144 Mont. at xxvi-xxvii) states in unequivocal language:
"In disposing of controverted cases, a judge
should indicate the reasons for his action in
an opinion showing that he has not disregad-ed
or overlooked serious arguments of counsel. He
thus shows his full understanding of the case,
avoids the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion,
promotes confidence in his intellectual integrity
and may contribute useful precedent to the
growth of the law."
The order of the trial judge granting summary judgment
to both defendants fails to measure up to this mandate. The
order states in pertinent part:
"WHEREAS, the Court having received written
memorandums on behalf of the Plaintiff and
the respective Defendants, and the Court
having duly considered the same,
"NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Motion
for Summary Judgment of Defendant State of
Montana is hereby GRANTED,
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Motion for Summary
Judgment of Defendant Emice Irene Case is hereby
GRANTED. "
That is it--abs~lutelyno analysis of why there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Nor is there an accompanying
memorandum setting out an analysis.
In Ballantyne v. Anaconda Co. (1978), 175 Mont. 406,
574 P.2d 582, this Court quoted froin The State Trial Judge's
Book published by the West Publishing Company. 175 Mont.
at 409, 574 P.2d at 584. This language sets out in no
uncertain terms why trial judges should explain the reasons
for their decisions.
One paragraph of -- Trial Judge's Book, quoted
The State
in Ballantyne, is particularly apt here:
"'The function of an opinion is to state the
reason which led the court to decide the
case the way it did. Moreover, since in
the process of preparing an opinion the judae
must discipline his thinking, he is more apt
to reach a just decision in a complex case if
he reduces his reasoning to writing. Referring
to the fruitful effect of the process, Chief
Jfistice Hughes once commented, "The importance
of written opinions as a protection against
judicial carelessness is very great."'" 175
Mont. at 409, 574 P.2d at 584.
If the trial court would have mulled the case over and
entered a written decision explaining why it granted summary
judgment, it might, in the process of reaching that decision,
have recognized the basic error in granting summary judgment.
Obviously, the existence or nonexistence of children on the
bridge would markedly change the duty of the defendant-
driver to slow down as she was approaching the bridge. That
basic fact is in dispute.
A jury issue is manifestly involved here. On trial,
had the jury believed there were children on the bridge,
it might well conclude that the defendant-driver did not
exercise reasonable care in approaching the bridge and that
this lack of care caused the death of the child. On the
other hand, if the jury concluded there were no children on
the bridge, it could conclude that the driver exercised
reasonable care in approaching the bridge.
A careful analysis of the case would suggest a strong
likelihood that the trial court would realize the error in
granting summary judgment to the defendant-driver. The dis-
puted facts were clearly pointed out to the trial court in
the plaintiff's memorandum opposing the grant of summary
judgment. That brief, after pointing out that the affidavits
of defendant's witnesses that there were no children on the
bridge, were flatly contradicted by affidavits of plaintiff's
witnesses that there were children on the bridge, stated:
"If the facts are as stated in the Affidavit
submitted by the plaintiff, the question of
fact which must be resolved is whether or not
the defendant Eunice Irene Case exercised due
care in proceeding down the highway knowing
children were on or near the highway and
whether or not she was negligent in not seeing
the decedent although he was 20 feet down the
road from the bridge abutment:' (Plaintiff's
Memorandum to the Trial Court at page 2.)
The trial court therefore, cannot claim that the
existence of such genuine issues of material fact were not
pointed out to the court by plaintiff's counsel. If the
trial court found that the existence or nonexistence of
children on the highway was not a material fact, the duty
would then be imposed on the trial court to explain why the
presence or absence of children on the bridge would not
alter the right of the defendant-driver to summary judgment
on the liability issue.
I would urge the trial courts to heed the mandate of
Canon 19. But even were the Canon not there, the reasons,
as pointed out in Ballantyne, supra, are just as compelling
for a requirement that the trial courts spread upon the
record the reasons for their
I concur with the foregoing concurring
Justice