No. 81-369
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982
AARON P. SMALL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
VS.
ROBERT J. McRAE,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone
Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Moses Law Firm, Billings, Montana
Charles F. Moses, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
John Bobinski argued, Helena, Montana
J. Michael Young, Helena, Montana
Submitted: May 12, 1982
Decided: October 4, 1982
Filed:
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
The a p p e l l a n t , P r o f e s s o r Aaron P . Small, filed a one count
l i b e l action against the respondent, Dean R o b e r t J . McRae, and
M c R a e moved f o r summary j u d g m e n t . S m a l l t h e n moved to amend h i s
complaint. The Thirteenth Judicial District, in and for
Yellowstone County, granted Dean McRae s motion for summary
judgment and d e n i e d S m a l l ' s m o t i o n to amend t h e c o m p l a i n t . The
third count of Small's proposed amended c o m p l a i n t was denied
without prejudice to his right to replead. Small a p p e a l s .
The a p p e l l a n t was t h e a p p o i n t e d and a c t i n g c h a i r m a n of the
E n g l i s h D e p a r t m e n t a t E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e . On O c t o b e r 1 0 ,
1980, t h e respondent, R o b e r t J . M c R a e , as Dean of t h e s c h o o l of
1i b e r a l a r t s , t e r m i n a t e d a p p e l l a n t 1 s c h a i r m a n s h i p and i n c o n n e c -
t i o n t h e r e w i t h a d d r e s s e d and d e l i v e r e d a memorandum t o him a s a
way of n o t i f y i n g him and t h e o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s of s u c h c h a n g e i n
chairmanship, as p r o v i d e d by s e c t i o n 9 . l o 0 ( F ) (1) c ) ( T r a n s f e r of
(
Titles) of the collective bargaining agreement in force at
E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e a t t h a t t i m e . The r e a s o n s c i t e d f o r t h e
change included inadequate leadership that failed to bring a
polarized department i n t o a smoother-functioning unit, increased
acrimony w i t h i n t h e department, f a i l u r e t o handle the administra-
t i v e f u n c t i o n s of t h e o f f i c e e f f e c t i v e l y and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y a n d ,
finally, c o n c e r n o v e r t h e p a s t and o n g o i n g c o o r d i n a t i o n o f the
newly-instituted mass p l a c e m e n t p r o c e s s f o r f r e s h m a n c o m p o s i t i o n .
The memorandum e n d s by s t a t i n g :
" T h a n k y o u , A l , f o r t h e e f f o r t s you h a v e
expended i n t h i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n i n
t h e p a s t seven months. I am s o r r y t h a t t h i s
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a p p o i n t m e n t h a s n o t worked o u t .
I w i s h you my s i n c e r e g o o d w i l l as you r e t u r n
t o f u l l - t i m e t e a c h i n g , which I know i s y o u r
f i r s t l o v e . M esteem f o r you a s a t e a c h e r of
y
y o u r d i s c i p l i n e is u n t a r n i s h e d . "
Termination of t h i s chairmanship carried with i t l o s s of a
stipend of $900 p e r a c a d e m i c y e a r and $ 1 5 0 p e r summer s e s s i o n ,
b u t d i d n o t a f f e c t a p p e l l a n t ' s academic rank, t e n u r e , base s a l a r y
or membership i n t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g u n i t . Although the
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement provided a grievance procedure
which a p p e l l a n t c o u l d have p u r s u e d , he e l e c t e d instead to file
t h i s l i b e l a c t i o n a g a i n s t Dean M c R a e . W e agree with the trial
judge's factual findings and adopt his memorandum.
Originally, t h i s was a n a c t i o n i n l i b e l and was s u b m i t t e d t o
the trial court on t w o motions. One by which the appellant
s o u g h t t o f i l e a n amended c o m p l a i n t a d d i n g f o u r new c o u n t s . The
o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t s o u g h t damages caused by t h e a l l e g e d libel.
The amended c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e d C o u n t I , t h e same as t h e o r i g i n a l
complaint; Count 11, appellant was deprived of due process
contrary to his rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the
U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e S t a t e of Montana; C o u n t 111, a p p e l l a n t was
denied freedom of expression and speech in violation of his
r i g h t s u n d e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and C o n s t i t u t i o n of
t h e S t a t e o f Montana; C o u n t I V , t h a t t h e l i b e l a l l e g e d i n C o u n t I
v i o l a t e s t h e p r i v i l e g e s and i m m u n i t i e s c l a u s e and t h e e q u a l p r o -
t e c t i o n c l a u s e of the United S t a t e s Constitution; Count V , that
a n y s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e g i v e n by l e g i s l a t u r e is c o n t r a t o Montana
and U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n s .
B e f o r e g e t t i n g i n t o a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t s of
a p p e l l a n t s proposed amended c o m p l a i n t , r e s p o n d e n t a s s e r t s as a
g e n e r a l matter t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s m o t i o n to amend s h o u l d be d e n i e d
on the ground that justice would not be served through the
granting of it. In support of this argument the respondent
points out that, as a member of the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining u n i t ,
the appellant agreed to exercise the grievance procedure to
settle all disputes alleging breach, misinterpretation or
improper application of the terms found in the collective
bargaining agreement.
The o f f i c i a l s t a t e p o l i c y , r e l a t i n g to c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g
agreements, is found in section 39-31-101, MCA: "it is the
p o l i c y o f t h e S t a t e of Montana t o e n c o u r a g e t h e p r a c t i c e and p r o -
c e d u r e of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g to a r r i v e a t f r i e n d l y adjustment
of a l l d i s p u t e s between p u b l i c employers and t h e i r employees. "
A s c o r r e c t l y p o i n t e d o u t by t h e r e s p o n d e n t , t h i s Court h a s looked
t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n p l a c e d on t h e N a t i o n a l L a b o r R e l a t i o n s A c t b y
the f e d e r a l c o u r t s as a n a i d to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e Montana
P u b l i c Employees Collective Bargaining A c t . See, f o r example,
S t a t e ex rel. Department of Highways v . P u b l i c Employees C r a f t
C o u n c i l ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 5 Mont. 3 4 9 , 529 P.2d 7 8 5 .
S e c t i o n 39-31-306(2), MCA, of t h e Montana P u b l i c Employees
C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining A c t , states t h a t a c o l l e c t i v e bargaining
a g r e e m e n t may contain: " a grievance procedure culminating in
final and binding arbitration of unresolved grievances and
disputed interpretations of agreements." The collective
b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t of E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e c o n t a i n e d s u c h a
provision in this case. See, section 12.100, et seq.
Finally, section 39-31-306 ( 3 ) 1 MCA, provides that:
" [a]n agreement be t w e e n the public
e m p l o y e r and a l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a l l be
v a l i d and e n f o r c e d u n d e r i t s terms when
entered i n t o i n accordance with the provisions
o f t h i s c h a p t e r and s i g n e d b y t h e c h i e f
e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r o f t h e s t a t e or p o l i t i c a l
s u b d i v i s i o n o r C o m m i s s i o n e r of h i g h e r e d u c a -
t i o n or h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ."
As correctly noted by the respondent, the federal courts,
c o n s t r u i n g t h e Federal N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s A c t , h a v e enun-
c i a t e d a s t r o n g p o l i c y f a v o r i n g a r b i t r a t i o n of l a b o r d i s p u t e s and
r e q u i r i n g c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s t o be e x h a u s t e d p r i o r to
t h e commencement o f a l a w s u i t . S e e , f o r example, Republic S t e e l
Corporation v. Maddox ( 1 9 6 5 ) r 379 U.S. 650, 652-653, 8 5 S.Ct.
614, 616-17, 13 L.Ed.2d 580, wherein Justice Harlan stated:
"As a g e n e r a l r u l e i n c a s e s t o which f e d e r a l
law applies, federal labor policy requires
t h a t i n d i v i d u a l employees wishing to a s s e r t
c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e s m u s t a t t e m p t u s e of t h e
c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e c r e e d upon b y
e m p l o y e r and u n i o n as t h e mode o f r e d r e s s . If
t h e u n i o n r e f u s e s t o p r e s s or o n l y p e r f u n c -
t o r i l y p r e s s e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l I s claim, d i f -
f e r e n c e s may a r i s e as to t h e f o r m s o f r e d r e s s
then available. ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d .) But
unless the contract provides otherwise, there
c a n be no d o u b t t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e m u s t af f o r d
t h e union t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to act on h i s
behalf . Congress has e x p r e s s l y approved
c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s as a p r e f e r r e d
method f o r s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s and s t a b i l i z i n g
t h e 'common lawt o f t h e p l a n t . (Citations
omitted. )
"Union interest in prosecuting employee
g r i e v a n c e s is c l e a r . Such a c t i v i t y c o m p l i -
ments the union's status as exclusive
b a r g a i n i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e by p e r m i t t i n g it to
p a r t i c i p a t e a c t i v e l y i n t h e c o n t i n u i n g admi-
n i s t r a t i o n of the c o n t r a c t . In addition,
c o n s c i e n t i o u s h a n d l i n g o f g r i e v a n c e claims
will enhance the union's prestige with
employees. Employer i n t e r e s t s , for their
p a r t , a r e s e r v e d by l i m i t i n g t h e c h o i c e of
remedies a v a i l a b l e to aggrieved employees.
And it cannot be said, in the normal
s i t u a t i o n , t h a t contract grievance procedures
-
.
a r e i n a d e q u a t e --o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s - - n
t - of a
a g g r i e v e d e m p l o y e e - t i l the- -o y e e -
u- n empl - has
a t t e m p t e d t o implement t h e p r o c e d u r e s - - and
them s .
f o u n d --- - o supplied. )
" A c o n t r a r y r u l e w h i c h would p e r m i t a n i n d i v i -
d u a l employee t o c o m p l e t e l y s i d e s t e p a v a i l a b l e
g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s i n f a v o r of a l a w s u i t h a s
l i t t l e t o commend i t . I n a d d i t i o n t o c u t t i n g
across t h e i n t e r e s t s a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d , i t
would d e p r i v e e m p l o y e r and u n i o n of t h e a b i -
l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h a u n i f o r m and e x c l u s i v e
method f o r o r d e r l y s e t t l e m e n t o f e m p l o y e e
grievances. I f a grievance procedure cannot
b e made e x c l u s i v e , i t l o s e s much o f its
d e s i r a b i l i t y as a method o f s e t t l e m e n t . A
r u l e c r e a t i n g such a s i t u a t i o n 'would i n e v i -
t a b l y e x e r t a d i s r u p t i v e i n f l u e n c e upon b o t h
t h e n e g o t i a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of c o l l e c -
t i v e agreements. t ( C i t a t i o n s omitted. ) "
O n l y i n t h o s e cases w h e r e it is c e r t a i n t h a t t h e a r b i t r a t i o n
clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement is not
s u s c e p t i b l e t o a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t c o v e r s t h e d i s p u t e is a n
employee e n t i t l e d to sidestep t h e p r o v i s i o n s of the collective
bargaining agreement. S e e , T o r r i n g t o n Company v . Metal P r o d u c t s
Workers Union Local 1645 (2nd C i r . 1 9 6 6 ) r 362 F.2d 677. The
r e s p o n d e n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and p o l i c i e s which
m a n d a t e t h e u s e o f t h e g r i e v a n c e and a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s u n d e r
t h e f e d e r a l a c t a p p l y e q u a l l y t o d i s p u t e s which a r i s e u n d e r t h e
S t a t e P u b l i c Employees C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g A c t .
All the allegations contained in the a p p e l l a n t ' s proposed
amended c o m p l a i n t r e v o l v e a r o u n d h i s r e m o v a l as c h a i r m a n of the
English Department at Eastern. The argument boils down to
whether proper procedures were used. Such a contention most
definitely falls within the collective bargaining agreement's
definition of " g r i e v a n c e ," as : "an allegation by a faculty
member ... t h a t t h e r e h a s b e e n a b r e a c h , m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or
improper application of the terms of this agreement by the
administration." To allow a member of the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining
u n i t t o completely s i d e s t e p a v a i l a b l e procedures would, j u s t as
under federal law, exert a disruptive i n f l u e n c e upon both the
negotiation and administration of collective bargaining
a g r e e m e n t s and e f f e c t i v e l y d e p r i v e e m p l o y e r s and u n i o n s of the
ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for the
o r d e r l y s e t t l e m e n t of employee g r i e v a n c e s .
The respondent c o n t e n d s t h a t b e c a u s e t h e a p p e l l a n t h a s had
the benefit of the collective bargaining agreement, and yet
chooses to ignore the contractual grievance procedure, justice
would n o t be s e r v e d b y c o n d o n i n g h i s v i o l a t i o n of the agreement
and a l l o w i n g him l e a v e o f c o u r t t o amend h i s c o m p l a i n t and s t a t e
a d d i t i o n a l g r i e v a n c e s a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t , McRae , and t h e p r o p o s e d
new d e f e n d a n t s .
I n answer to the respondent the appellant argues that the
grievance procedures contained in the collective bargaining
agreement need o n l y be followed i n contractual disputes. The
a p p e l l a n t u r g e s t h a t t h e i s s u e i n t h i s case d o e s n o t c e n t e r on a
contractual dispute but, rather, on a violation of a
constitutionally protected right. A p p e l l a n t p r o c e e d s to d e v e l o p
t h i s a r g u m e n t by f i r s t p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provi-
sions cannot be modified by statute. See, No11 v . City of
Bozeman (1975), 1 6 6 Mont. 504, 534 P.2d 880, and Madison v.
Yunker ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 8 0 Mont. 5 4 , 589 P.2d 126. Appellant concludes
b y s t a t i n g t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s c a n n o t be m o d i f i e d b y p r i -
vate contract. Such a contract would be unenforceable.
T h i s r e s u l t f i n d s s u p p o r t i n s e c t i o n 1-3-204, MCA: "Waiver
of b e n e f i t of a law. Anyone may w a i v e t h e a d v a n t a g e o f a law
intended solely for h i s benefit. But a l a w e s t a b l i s h e d for a
public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement."
The rule that a law established for a public purpose cannot
b e c o n t r a v e n e d by a p r i v a t e a g r e e m e n t is a l s o s u p p o r t e d i n the
case law. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , New S i l v e r B e l l Mining Company v .
County of L e w i s and C l a r k ( 1 9 5 5 ) , 1 2 9 Mont. 269, 284 P.2d 1012;
and State ex. rel. Neiss v. District Court (1973), 1 6 2 Mont.
3 2 4 , 5 1 1 P.2d 9 7 9 .
The appellant's point is that his right to litigate the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e p r o c e d u r e s used i n r e m o v a l o f h i s t i t l e
cannot be limited by c o n t r a c t u a l agreement. Although the law
c i t e d b y t h e a p p e l l a n t is c o r r e c t , t h e p r e m i s e s upon which it is
based is h e r e c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n .
The issue t o be determined is w h e t h e r t h i s is, in fact, a
violation of a constitutionally protected right, or merely a
contractual dispute. The a n s w e r t o t h a t q u e s t i o n f o l l o w s i n con-
n e c t i o n w i t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t s of t h e pro-
p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t .
With these introductory matters completed, attention is
directed to the individual counts which appellant sought to
incorporate into the act i o n via amendment of his complaint.
The p r o p o s e d C o u n t I1 a l l e g e s t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t w a s d e p r i v e d
o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d u e p r o c e s s i n t h a t t h e memorandum w h i c h l e d t o
his dismissal as chairman placed in issue his good name,
reputation, honor and integrity without giving him notice or
opportunity to be heard. In support of this allegation,
a p p e l l a n t r e l i e s o n Board o f R e g e n t s v. Roth, ( 1 9 7 2 ) r 408 U.S.
564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, and Perry v. Sindermann
(1972), 408 U.S. 593, 92 Sect. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570.
T h e s e a u t h o r i t i e s , and t h e numerous o t h e r s c i t e d b y a p p e l l a n t
i n t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e b r i e f i n g he h a s s u b m i t t e d , a r e s u b j e c t t o
the factual distinction that they involved summary d i s m i s s a l s
f r o m p u b l i c e m p l o y m e n t , or t h e e q u i v a l e n t t h e r e o f , which is n o t
t h e case h e r e . A l t h o u g h s u c h d i s t i n c t i o n may be o n e of degree
only, it is n e v e r t h e l e s s p e r t i n e n t in determining whether any
requirement of due process has been fulfilled.
" 'Due p r o c e s s , u n l i k e some l e g a l r u l e s , is n o t a t e c h n i c a l
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances. " Cafeteria and R e s t a u r a n t Workers v. McElroy
" [ D l u e p r o c e s s is f l e x i b l e and c a l l s f o r s u c h p r o c e d u r a l p r o t e c -
t i o n s as t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n demands." Morrissey v. B r e w e r
"The f u n d a m e n t a l r e q u i r e m e n t o f d u e p r o c e s s is t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to
be heard 'at a meaningful time and i n a meaningful manner.'"
Mathews v. E l d r i d g e ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902,
A d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether the procedures followed i n any
g i v e n case i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s u f f i c i e n t r e q u i r e s a n a n a l y s i s of
t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l and p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s t h a t are a f f e c t e d b y t h e
a c t i o n taken. As stated i n A r n e t t v. Kennedy ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 416 U.S.
1 3 4 , 1 6 7 , 1 6 8 , 94 S . C t . 1 6 3 3 , 1 6 5 1 , 4 0 L.Ed.2d 15; by t h e u n i t e d
S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t :
"Having d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
g u a r a n t e e of p r o c e d u r a l d u e p r o c e s s a p p l i e s to
a p p e l l e e ' s d i s c h a r g e from p u b l i c e m p l o y m e n t ,
t h e q u e s t i o n arises whether a n e v i d e n t i a r y
hearing, including the right to p r e s e n t
f a v o r a b l e w i t n e s s e s and t o c o n f r o n t and e x a -
mine a d v e r s e w i t n e s s e s , m u s t be a c c o r d e d
b e f o r e removal. The r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e
d e p e n d s on a b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s i n which t h e
G o v e r n m e n t 1s i n t e r e s t i n e x p e d i t i o u s r e m o v a l
of a n u n s a t i s f a c t o r y e m p l o y e e i s weighed
a g a i n s t t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e a f f e c t e d e m p l o y e e
i n c o n t i n u e d p u b l i c employment. (Citations
omitted.) A s the Court s t a t e d i n C a f e t e r i a
and R e s t a u r a n t W o r k e r s v . McElroy, [supra]
' c o n s i d e r a t i o n of what p r o c e d u r e s due p r o c e s s
may r e q u i r e u n d e r a n y g i v e n s e t of c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s m u s t b e g i n w i t h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e
p r e c i s e n a t u r e of t h e government f u n c t i o n
i n v o l v e d as w e l l as o f t h e p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t
that has been affected by governmental
a c t i o n . "I
I n s h o r t , d u e p r o c e s s is n o t a f i x e d c o n c e p t b u t , r a t h e r , is
o n e which m u s t be t a i l o r e d t o e a c h s i t u a t i o n i n s u c h a way t h a t
i t meets t h e n e e d s and p r o t e c t s t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e v a r i o u s p a r -
ties involved. The due process requirements applicable to
someone destined to suffer the grievous loss associated with
termination of employment are different from the due process
r e q u i r e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y to p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of a c o l l e g e p r o -
f e s s o r who s u f f e r s t h e l o s s o f h i s t i t l e as d e p a r t m e n t c h a i r m a n
and t h e n o m i n a l s t i p e n d w h i c h a c c o m p a n i e s i t .
It is concluded that the governmental interest in orderly
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t d i s r u p t i o n of t h e e d u c a t i o n a l
process is s u f f i c i e n t t o allow summary d i s m i s s a l o f department
c h a i r m e n when the r e q u i r e m e n t s of d u e p r o c e s s a r e accommodated
t h r o u g h t h e g r i e v a n c e and a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e d u r e o u t l i n e d i n sec-
tion 12.000, et seq. , of the collective bargaining agreement.
T h e s e p r o c e d u r e s g i v e a g g r i e v e d f a c u l t y members t h e o p p o r t u n i t y
t o c h a l l e n g e any a l l e g e d breach, misinterpretation or improper
a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e terms o f t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t .
A l t h o u g h t h e y were n o t e x e r c i s e d , t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s were a v a i l a b l e
to the appellant t o s e e k r e i n s t a t e m e n t as d e p a r t m e n t c h a i r m a n .
Such a g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e a f f o r d s t h e a p p e l l a n t a n o p p o r t u n i t y
t o be h e a r d a t a m e a n i n g f u l t i m e and i n a m e a n i n g f u l m a n n e r . The
r e q u i r e m e n t s of due p r o c e s s are t h e r e b y m e t . It follows t h a t
C o u n t I1 d o e s n o t s e t f o r t h a c o g n i z a b l e claim and p e r m i t t i n g i t s
i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o t h e a c t i o n by t h e r e q u e s t e d amendment would be
a f u t i l e act.
C o u n t I11 o f t h e p r o p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t is g r o u n d e d upon
the allegation, stated in general terms, that appellant was
terminated and d i s c h a r g e d as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of t h e e x e r c i s e of
h i s cons t i t u t i o n a l l y g u a r a n t e e d freedom of s p e e c h and e x p r e s s i o n
with respect to the conduct of the department and the
administration. I t a l s o a l l e g e s i n a r e v e r s e form t h a t t h e ter-
m i n a t i o n and d i s c h a r g e c o n c e r n e d p r o x i m a t e l y r e s u l t s i n a d e n i a l
o f h i s r i g h t t o f r e e d o m o f s p e e c h and e x p r e s s i o n .
I t is s e t t l e d t h a t a v a l u a b l e g o v e r n m e n t a l b e n e f i t , s u c h as a
j o b , may n o t be d e n i e d o n a b a s i s which i n f r i n g e s o n e s c o n s t i t u -
tionally-protected interests, especially ones interest in
freedom of speech. P e r r y v. Sindermann, supra, and 4 2 U.S.C.
s e c t i o n 1983 ( C i v i l R i g h t s S t a t u t e ) .
The problem w i t h Count I11 is, first, whether removal of
a p p e l l a n t f r o m h i s t i t l e and s t i p e n d as c h a i r m a n of the English
Department, b u t n o t from h i s job, c o n s t i t u t e s a v a l u a b l e govern-
m e n t a l b e n e f i t which f a l l s u n d e r t h e p r o t e c t i o n a c c o r d e d i n P e r r y
m i t t i n g i t s i n c o r p o r t i o n i n t o t h e a c t i o n by t h e r e q u e s t e d amend-
m e n t would be a f u t i l e a c t . However, t h i s d o e s n o t mean t h a t t h e
appellant is n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e p l e a d h i s p r o p o s e d C o u n t I11 i n
o r d e r t o meet t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of s p e c i f i c i t y i n its a l l e g a t i o n s
through the medium o f a p r o p e r motion and notice and hearing
thereon.
I n v i e w o f t h i s , t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r a c h a i r m a n s h i p t i t l e
does constitute a valuable governmental b e n e f i t is n o t r e a c h e d
or determined at this time. Likewise, the question of the
effect, if any, of the grievance procedure provided in the
c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t a s t h e same a p p l i e s to C o u n t I11
cannot be determined unless repleading is accomplished.
C o u n t s I V and V o f t h e p r o p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t a r e d i f -
f e r e n t h u e s o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e f o u n d e d upon t h e p r i v i -
l e g e s and i m m u n i t i e s c l a u s e s and e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e s of t h e
Montana and F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n s . I n substance, they comprise a
c h a l l e n g e t o t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e a c c o r d e d to
a p u b l i c a t i o n made i n t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e o f a p u b l i c d u t y . The
e f f i c a c y of this privilege is t h e b a s i s of the defense asserted
b y r e s p o n d e n t McRae a n d , a l s o , t h e b a s i s f o r h i s m o t i o n f o r sum-
mary judgment lodged a g a i n s t b o t h t h e a c t i o n s t a t e d i n t h e o r i g i -
nal complaint and Count I of the proposed amended complaint.
Consequently, t h e y w i l l a l l be t r e a t e d t o g e t h e r i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n
which f o l l o w s :
L i b e l is d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 27-1-802, MCA, as: " a f a l s e and
unprivileged publication . . . which exposes any person to
h a t r e d , c o n t e m p t , r i d i c u l e , o r o b l o g u y o r which c a u s e s him to be
s h u n n e d or a v o i d e d o r which h a s a t e n d e n c y to i n j u r e him i n h i s
occupation." S e c t i o n 27-1-804, MCA, i n t u r n , d e f i n e s what p u b l i -
c a t i o n s are p r i v i l e g e d : "A p r i v i l e g e d p u b l i c a t i o n is o n e made :
(I) In the proper discharge of an official duty . . ."
In the case of Storch v. Board of Directors of Eastern
Montana R e g i o n F i v e M e n t a l H e a l t h C e n t e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 176,
181-182, 5 4 5 P.2d 644, 647-648, t h i s C o u r t had t h e o c c a s i o n to
v. Sindermann, supra; and, second, whether the allegations of
C o u n t 111, a s p r e s e n t l y f r a m e d , s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of spe-
c i f i c i t y a p p l i c a b l e t o a c l a i m of a denial of f i r s t amendment
privileges.
The memorandum i s s u e d by Dean M c R a e , the alleged offensive
p o r t i o n o f w h i c h is i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o C o u n t I11 b y r e f e r e n c e from
C o u n t I o f t h e amended c o m p l a i n t , g a v e as r e a s o n s f o r a p p e l l a n t ' s
loss of t i t l e h i s inadequate leadership, h i s f a i l u r e to b r i n g a
p o l a r i z e d department i n t o a smoother f u n c t i o n i n g u n i t , the fact
t h a t a c r i m o n y had increased w i t h i n t h e English Department, his
f a i l u r e t o e f f e c t i v e l y and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y h a n d l e t h e a d m i n i s t r a -
t i v e d e t a i l a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e o f f i c e , and h i s f a i l u r e t o p r o -
p e r l y c o o r d i n a t e t h e n e w l y i n s t i t u t e d mass p l a c e m e n t p r o c e s s f o r
freshman composition.
A l t h o u g h t h e s e r e a s o n s are a l l e g e d t o be f a l s e , nowhere a r e
t h e y o f f s e t by a l l e g a t i o n s i n C o u n t 111, s p e c i f y i n g w h a t s p e e c h
o r e x p r e s s i o n was e x e r c i s e d b y t h e a p p e l l a n t which is e n t i t l e d
t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n as h a v i n g a p r o x i m a t e r e l e v a n c e t o
the loss of his title of c h a i r i n a n of the E n g l i s h Department.
A s s t a t e d i n R o t o l o v. Borough of C h a r l e r o i ( 3 r d C i r . 1 9 7 6 )
"The a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t s t r i k e u s as
v a g u e and c o n c l u s o r y . They f a i l to i n d i c a t e ,
when, w h e r e , and how R o t o l o had ' e x e r c i s e d h i s
f i r s t amendment p r i v i l e g e s , ' r e n d e r i n g it
impossible t o determine i f indeed h i s a c t i v i t y
was t h e s o r t a f f o r d e d p r o t e c t i o n u n d e r t h e
f i r s t amendment and w h e t h e r i t had a n y rele-
v a n c e t o t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f h i s employment.
The a l l e g a t i o n s s t a t e no f a c t s upon which to
w e i g h t h e s u b s t a n t i a l i t y o f t h e claim; t h e y d o
n o t a v e r t h e c o n t e n t of t h e a l l e g e d f i r s t
amendment e x e r c i s e . "
See, also, Kennedy v. H & M Landing, Inc. (9th Cir.
1976)r 529 F.2d 987; Kauffman v. Moss (3rd Cir. 197O), 420
F.2d 1270, cert. denied ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 400 U.S. 846; Negrich v. Hohn
(3rd Cir. 1967), 379 F.2d 213; and Valley v. Maule (~.Conn.
It i s c o n c l u d e d t h a t C o u n t I11 o f t h e amended c o m p l a i n t , as
p r e s e n t l y f r a m e d , d o e s n o t s e t f o r t h a c o g n i z a b l e claim and per-
c o n s i d e r t h i s code s e c t i o n and i t s t a t e d :
" A p r i v i l e g e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n is o n e w h i c h , ex-
c e p t f o r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r which it is
made, may be defamatory and actionable.
(Citation omitted. )
" W h i l e some o f t h e q u o t e d s u b s e c t i o n s d o men-
t i o n m a l i c e t h e p e r t i n e n t s u b s e c t i o n 1, s a y s
nothing about qualified privilege. R a t h e r it
c o n s t i t u t e s an absolute p r i v i l e g e with the
o n l y requirement being t h a t the i n t r a d e p a r t -
m e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n be o n e r e n d e r e d w h i l e
engaged i n an ' o f f i c i a l d u t y . ' T h e r e c a n be
n o d o u b t t h a t t h e h i r i n g and f i r i n g o f
e m p l o y e e s is p a r t o f t h e ' o f f i c i a l d u t y 1 o f
t h e Montana R e g i o n a l H e a l t h C e n t e r s .
" W h e t h e r s t a t e m e n t s made by s u c h p u b l i c o f f i-
c e r s i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e h i r i n g and f i r i n g o f
e m p l o y e e s may be s u b j e c t t o a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e
h a s b e e n a n s w e r e d i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e many
times. Under f a c t s s i m i l a r t o t h e i n s t a n t
c a s e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n B a r r
v . Matteo, 360 U.S. 5 6 4 , 5 7 1 , 79 S . C t . 1 3 3 5 , 3
L.Ed.2d 1 4 3 4 , 1 4 4 1 , s t a t e d t h a t i n s o f a r as a
p u b l i c o f f i c e r was a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of
h i s a u t h o r i t y h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n was a b s o l u t e l y
privileged. ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) The C o u r t
w e n t on t o s a y why a n a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e as
e s s e n t i a l i n such a circumstance, quoting
a p p r o v i n g l y from J u d g e L e a r n e d Hand ' s d e c i s i o n
i n G r e g o i r e v. B i d d l e , 2 C i r . , 1 7 7 F.2d
5 7 9 , 581:
" I . . . it is i m p o s s i b l e t o know w h e t h e r t h e
claim is w e l l f o u n d e d u n t i l t h e case h a s b e e n
t r i e d , and t h a t t o s u b m i t a l l o f f i c i a l s , t h e
i n n o c e n t a s w e l l a s t h e g u i l t y , to t h e b u r d e n
o f a t r i a l and t o t h e i n e v i t a b l e d a n g e r of i t s
o u t c o m e , would dampen t h e a r d o r of a l l b u t t h e
most r e s o l u t e , o r t h e m o s t i r r e s p o n s i b l e , i n
t h e u n f l i n c h i n g d i s c h a r g e of t h e i r d u t i e s
... 1
" S i n c e t h e i n t e r n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n was w i t h i n
t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of a n o f f i c i a l d u t y , it
e n j o y e d a n a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e and c o u l d t h e r e -
f o r e n o t be t h e s u b j e c t of l i b e l a c t i o n . "
To p u t t h e meaning o f -t o r c h i n p e r s p e c t i v e f o r a p p l i c a t i o n
S- -
to this case, certain provisions of the collective bargaining
a g r e e m e n t and a Montana code s e c t i o n s h o u l d be n o t e d .
The p r o v i s i o n in the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining a g r e e m e n t which
allows the dean t o remove d e p a r t m e n t chairmen, and implements
procedures for the s e l e c t i o n of a new c h a i r m a n , is a u t h o r i z e d
under section 20-25-301, MCA. S u b s e c t i o n 11 o f this statute
allows the regents to: " a p p o i n t a p r e s i d e n t and f a c u l t y f o r e a c h
of the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the system, a p p o i n t any o t h e r n e c e s s a r y
officers, agents, and employees, and fix their compensation ."
Subsection 15, i n t u r n , a l l o w s t h e r e g e n t s to: "confer, a t the
regents' discretion, upon t h e p r e s i d e n t and f a c u l t y of e a c h of
t h e u n i t s of t h e s y s t e m f o r t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e u n i t such
a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i n g t o t h e i m m e d i a t e c o n t r o l and management, o t h e r
than financial, and the s e l e c t i o n of teachers and employees."
The collective bargaining agreement provides in connection
w i t h t r a n s f e r of t i t l e , b e i n g s e c t i o n 9 . 1 0 0 ( F ) ( l ) ( c ) :
"1. The a p p r o p r i a t e Dean w i l l implement pro-
c e d u r e s f o r t h e s e l e c t i o n of a new a c a d e m i c
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t C h a i r p e r s o n when one of
t h e following conditions occurs :
" c . The Dean n o t i f i e s a l l members of t h e u n i t
and t h e C h a i r p e r s o n t h a t i n h i s or h e r
judgment a c h a n g e s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e ."
The c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t a l s o p r o v i d e s a g r i e v a n c e
procedure under section 12.100. This section defines
"grievance," as: "An allegation by a f a c u l t y member or the
A.A.U.P. that there has been a breach, misinterpretation or
improper application of the terms of this agreement by the
administration." This section also provides that: "A g r i e v a n c e
m u s t be f i l e d by a f a c u l t y member of t h e A.A.U.P. within thirty
( 3 0 ) d a y s from t h e d a t e t h e g r i e v a b l e e v e n t was d e t e r m i n e d . Any
grievance not processed i n accordance with t h e time l i m i t spe-
c i f i e d h e r e i n s h a l l f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of t h i s a g r e e m e n t be deemed
null and without further recourse." The collective bargaining
a g r e e m e n t t h e n d e t a i l s a p r o c e d u r e f o r t h e s e t t l e m e n t of g r i e v -
ances. In the event that the procedure is followed and the
g r i e v a n c e r e m a i n s u n s e t t l e d , b i n d i n g a r b i t r a t i o n is p r o v i d e d f o r
u n d e r s e c t i o n 12.200.
J u s t a s t h i s C o u r t i n - r c h found t h a t t h e h i r i n g and f i r i n g
Sto-
o f e m p l o y e e s was a n o f f i c i a l d u t y of t h e Montana R e g i o n a l H e a l t h
C e n t e r s , t h e r e seems to be l i t t l e q u e s t i o n i n t h i s case t h a t t h e
statutory authority conferred upon the board of regents under
section 20-25-301(15) MCA, as well as the enumerated duty
found in section 9 . 1 0 0 ( F ) ( l ) ( c ) of the collective bargaining
agreement giving the appropriate d e a n power to remove depart-
m e n t a l c h a i r p e r s o n s , makes t h e memorandum i n q u e s t i o n a n o f f i c i a l
duty subject to absolute privilege under the statute.
The -t o r c h d e c i s i o n a l s o p o i n t s o u t two i m p o r t a n t c o n c e p t s :
S-
F i r s t of a l l , o n c e a c o m m u n i c a t i o n is l a b e l e d a s p r i v i l e g e d , it
i s n o t d e f a m a t o r y and t h e r e f o r e n o t a c t i o n a b l e . Secondly, the
a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e a r i s e s when t h e i n t r a d e p a r t m e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n
i s r e n d e r e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of a n o f f i c i a l d u t y ,
The appellant raises a number of issues questioning the
p r o p r i e t y o f t h e d e f e n s e of a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e :
1. First of all, he asserts "a constitutional right to
employment." I n l i g h t of t h i s r i g h t t o employment, t h e a p p e l l a n t
a r g u e s t h a t d u e p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s a n o t i c e and o p p o r t u n i t y to be
heard before a n y o n e c a n be deprived of such a property right.
Appellant c o n c l u d e s by s t a t i n g t h a t any d i s m i s s a l w i t h o u t such
notice and opportunity to be heard would not be a proper
d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y , and t h e r e f o r e no s t a t u t o r y p r i v i -
l e g e would a r i s e .
The m e r i t s of t h e due p r o c e s s a s s e r t i o n have a l r e a d y been
discussed in connection w i t h Count I1 o f t h e proposed amended
c o m p l a i n t and w i l l n o t be r e p e a t e d h e r e . S u f f i c e it t o s a y t h a t
a p p e l l a n t ' s view d o e s n o t p r e v a i l .
2. The s e c o n d i s s u e r a i s e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t i n o p p o s i t i o n t o
t h e m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t is t h a t , i n o r d e r f o r t h e r e t o be
a p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of a n o f f i c i a l d u t y which g i v e s r i s e to t h e
statutory privilege, t h e r e m u s t be c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e r e q u i r e -
ments of the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement. Appellant r a i s e s
t h r e e a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s of the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement:
First, t h a t t h e r e was no n o t i f i c a t i o n t o a l l members of the
u n i t under s e c t i o n 9 . 1 0 0 ( F ) ( l ) ( c ) .
Secondly, appellant argues that this section of the col-
lective bargaining agreement requires only that the dean give
n o t i c e t h a t a change s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e . T h e r e is no r e q u i r e m e n t
t h a t t h e dean g i v e any r e a s o n n e c e s s i t a t i n g a change. To g i v e
s u c h a r e a s o n is beyond t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y .
Thirdly, the appellant argues t h a t the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining
agreement o n l y r e q u i r e s a notice from the dean that a change
should take place --- not a judgment that the r e m o v a l of the
department chairperson has taken place.
In support of the first of these contentions, appellant
states that evidence to be set forth in affidavit form w i l l
clearly show that the requirement of notification was not
followed by the dean until some Later period of time.
Appellant's a f f i d a v i t s f i l e d F e b r u a r y 1 3 and 2 4 , 1 9 8 1 , make no
m e n t i o n of c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t .
The r e s p o n d e n t n o t e s i n t h i s r e g a r d t h a t t h e a f f i d a v i t s f i l e d
by D r . L a r r y J o n e s and P r e s i d e n t Van de W e t e r i n g show t h a t t h e
r e s p o n d e n t was a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of h i s o f f i c i a l d u t i e s and
d i d d i s c h a r g e t h o s e d u t i e s i n a p r o p e r manner when he removed t h e
respondent's t i t l e of c h a i r m a n of t h e E n g l i s h Department. The
memorandum which is t h e b a s i s of t h i s lawsuit a l s o contained a
n o t a t i o n a t t h e b o t t o m t h a t p h o t o c o p i e s were s e n t to members of
t h e D e p a r t m e n t s of E n g l i s h , P h i l o s o p h y , H u m a n i t i e s and R e l i g i o u s
studies. Finally, in this regard, the collective bargaining
a g r e e m e n t o n l y r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e d e a n n o t i f y a l l members of the
u n i t and t h e c h a i r p e r s o n t h a t a c h a n g e s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e . There
i s no r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t s u c h n o t i c e t o t h e u n i t and t h e c h a i r p e r -
s o n be c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s . I t is e v i d e n t h e r e t h a t n o t i f i c a t i o n of
all u n i t members d i d take place and the o n l y evidence i n the
r e c o r d seems t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n was p r o x i m a t e to
t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n g i v e n to t h e a p p e l l a n t .
T u r n i n g t o a p p e l l a n t ' s second argument w e f i n d t h e c o n t e n t i o n
r a i s e d t h a t because t h e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement does not
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u i r e t h e d e a n t o g i v e r e a s o n s f o r t h e r e m o v a l of
a department chairman, t o g i v e s u c h r e a s o n s would v i o l a t e the
collective bargaining agreement and would not be a proper
d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y . Although the respondent does not
a d d r e s s t h i s i s s u e beyond r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a f f i d a v i t s which n o t e
t h a t t h e dean did p r o p e r l y d i s c h a r g e h i s d u t i e s under t h e c o l l e c -
t i v e bargaining agreement, a p p e l l a n t l s a r g u m e n t would a p p e a r to
be w i t h o u t merit. I t would seem t o be n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d i n a n y
r e q u i r e m e n t of n o t i f i c a t i o n b e f o r e removal t h a t t h e r e a s o n s s u p
p o r t i n g s u c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n be g i v e n t o t h e o u t g o i n g c h a i r m a n t o
p u t him o n n o t i c e o f why t h e c h a n g e is n e c e s s a r y .
The t h i r d , and f i n a l , a r g u m e n t which a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s i n sup-
p o r t of h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of the collective
b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t were n o t met is t h a t t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n o n l y
requires a judgment that the change s h o u l d take place, rather
than a judgment that the determination has taken place. Once
a g a i n , t h e r e s p o n d e n t d o e s n o t a d d r e s s t h i s a r g u m e n t beyond c i t a -
t i o n t o t h e two s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t s which n o t e t h a t t h e r e s p o n -
dent properly discharged his duties under the collective
bargaining agreement.
The appellant's argument here is based on a semantic
interpretation of the definition to be given to the word,
"should," as contained in the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement.
Appellant believes that "should," as used i n t h i s case, means
" s h a l l , " and is t h e r e f o r e n o t a f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n . A s used in
this case, however, "should" does appear to be a final
determination.
Once t h e d e a n n o t i f i e s t h e u n i t members and the department
c h a i r p e r s o n t h a t a change should t a k e place, t h e p r o c e d u r e s f o r
s e l e c t i o n o f a new d e p a r t m e n t c h a i r p e r s o n a r e i m p l e m e n t e d . These
p r o c e d u r e s are f o u n d a t s e c t i o n 9 . l o 0 ( F ) (1) a ) t h r o u g h ( f )
( . The
procedures f o r s e l e c t i o n of a new d e p a r t m e n t c h a i r p e r s o n d o n o t
c o n t e m p l a t e a n y c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e d e a n 1s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t a
c h a n g e i n t h e c h a i r m a n s h i p of the department should take p l a c e .
Such a d e t e r m i n a t i o n by the dean appears to be final and the
correct avenue of appeal from such a decision would be the
grievance and arbitration procedures spelled out at sect i o n
12.000 of the collective bargaining agreement. The procedures
followed by the d e a n do n o t appear to v i o l a t e the collective
bargaining agreement.
3. The t h i r d c o n t e n t i o n r a i s e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t i n o p p o s i -
t i o n t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t is t h a t l i b e l is
a v i o l a t i o n of t h e Montana c o d e , and t h e r e f o r e i t would n o t be a
proper discharge of an official duty to libel someone ---
therefore, no statutory privilege would arise. The circular
reasoning involved in this argument is a p p a r e n t . Once it is
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t was made i n t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e o f
a n o f f i c i a l d u t y , it is c o n s i d e r e d p r i v i l e g e d and n o l o n g e r f a l l s
w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of libel. Not f a l l i n g w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i -
t i o n o f l i b e l , s u c h a s t a t e m e n t would n o t be a n a c t i o n a b l e t o r t .
4. The f o u r t h a r g u m e n t which t h e a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s i n o p p o s i -
t i o n t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s mot i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t is t h a t r e l i a n c e
upon a n y s t a t u t e g r a n t i n g p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e and
t h e r e b y making them immune from p r o s e c u t i o n for libel arising
d u r i n g t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l duty c o n f l i c t s with
the governmental immunity statute, and is therefore uncon-
s i t u t i o n a l i n l i g h t of A r t . 11, S e c . 1 8 , 1972 Mont.Const. This
s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e r e s h a l l be no s o v e r e i g n immunity e x c e p t
as specifically provided by law and two-thirds vote of each
House.
S e c t i o n 2 - 9 - 0 1 1 ( d ) , MCA, a d d r e s s e s governmental immunity,
and states i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n a l s e c t i o n : " ' P e r s o n a l i n j u r y ' means
any i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from l i b e l , s l a n d e r , m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n ,
or f a l s e a r r e s t , any b o d i l y i n j u r y , sickness, disease, o r death
s u s t a i n e d by a n y p e r s o n and c a u s e d by a n o c c u r r a n c e f o r which t h e
S t a t e may be held liable." S e c t i o n s 2-9-111 t h r o u g h 2-9-114,
MCA, s p e l l o u t t h e immunity which t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s s e e n f i t to
g r a n t t o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e body, t h e members, o f f i c e r s and a g e n t s
of the judiciary, the governor's o f f ice and local government
o f f i c i a l s d i s c h a r g i n g o f f i c i a l d u t i e s a s s o c i a t e d with approving
- 17 -
o r vetoing ordinance, o r while involved i n l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i v i t y .
S e c t i o n 2-9-305, MCA, s p e l l s o u t when t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y is
t o be j o i n e d as a d e f e n d a n t and p r o v i d e s f o r t h e i m m u n i z a t i o n and
i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n of e m p l o y e e s whose negligence or w r o n g f u l a c t ,
e r r o r o r o m i s s i o n , or o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e c o n d u c t g a v e r i s e to t h e
claim --- u n l e s s the claim is b a s e d o n a n i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t or
f e l o n i o u s act of t h e employee.
The appellant argues that these code sections modify and
explain the provisions of the libel s t a t u t e and show t h a t t h e
immunity g r a n t e d i n l i b e l a c t i o n s is n o t a b s o l u t e because it d o e s
n o t c o v e r torts t h a t are i n t e n t i o n a l o r f e l o n i o u s . The r e s p o n -
dent counters this argument by pointing out that section
2-9-101(a), MCA, provides:
" ' C l a i m ' means a n y claim a g a i n s t a governmen-
t a l e n t i t y , f o r money damages o n l y , which a n y
p e r s o n i s l e g a l l y e n t i t l e d to r e c o v e r a s
d a m a g e s b e c a u s e of p e r s o n a l i n j u r y or p r o p e r t y
damage c a u s e d by a n e g l i g e n t o r w r o n g f u l a c t
o r o m i s s i o n c o m m i t t e d by a n y e m p l o y e e of t h e
governmental e n t i t y while a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e
s c o p e o f h i s employment, u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s
where t h e governmental e n t i t y i f a p r i v a t e
p e r s o n , would be l i a b l e t o t h e c l a i m a n t f o r
s u c h damages u n d e r t h e laws of t h e s t a t e . "
In the case of State ex rel. Byorth v. District Court
( 1 9 7 7 ) r 1 7 5 Mont. 6 3 , 6 7 , 572 P.2d 201, 203, t h i s Court s t a t e d :
" t h e T o r t C l a i m s A c t a t t a c h e s l i a b i l i t y to t h e S t a t e i n t h e same
m a n n e r and t o t h e same e x t e n t t h a t l i a b i l i t y a t t a c h e s t o a p r i -
v a t e person." T h e r e c a n be no l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t to r e c o v e r y f o r
l i a b i l i t y when t h e a c t i o n c o m p l a i n e d o f d o e s n o t f a l l w i t h i n t h e
definition of a tort. Before a writing is considered an
actionable libel, t h e Montana s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h a t it be u n p r i -
vileged. Once t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n is made t h a t t h e w r i t i n g is p r i -
vileged, no actionable tort exists and there is no legal
e n t i t l e m e n t to r e c o v e r y . The t w o code s e c t i o n s are complemen-
t a r y , and no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n e x i s t s .
5. The f i f t h a r g u m e n t which t h e a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s i n o p p o s i -
t i o n t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t is t h a t t h e
United States Supreme C o u r t , in the case of Butz v. Econmou
( 1 9 7 8 ) r 438 U.S. 478, 98 S . C t . 2894, 5 7 L.Ed.2d 895, impliedly
overruled its earlier decision in Barr v. Matteo, supra.
Appellant argues t h a t because t h i s Court i n - o r c h , s u p r a , r e l i e d
S-
t
o n Barr i n s u p p o r t o f i t s d e c i s i o n , S t o r c h is no l o n g e r good l a w .
The B u t z case arose u n d e r 42 U.S.C., s e c t i o n 1 9 8 3 , and c o n s i d e r e d
t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r a f e d e r a l o f f i c i a l is p e r s o n a l l y immune i f ,
in the course of enforcing a statute, he infringes someone's
constitutional rights. F e d e r a l o f f i c i a l s may n o t , w i t h i m p u n i t y ,
d i s c h a r g e t h e i r d u t i e s i n a way t h a t is known t o them to v i o l a t e
the constitution o r transgress a clearly established cons t i t u -
tional rule.
I n answer t o t h i s argument t h e r e s p o n d e n t f i r s t p o i n t s o u t
that this lawsuit arises under state law and, as such, this
C o u r t h a s t h e f i n a l s a y as t o t h e s t a t e l a w g o v e r n i n g t h e s u i t .
T h i s r u l e i s c l e a r l y i m p l i e d i n t h e h o l d i n g of Erie R a i l r o a d v.
Tompkins ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S . C t . 817, 822, 8 2 L.Ed.
1188:
" E x c e p t i n matters g o v e r n e d b y t h e F e d e r a l
C o n s t i t u t i o n or by A c t s o f C o n g r e s s , t h e l a w
t o be a p p l i e d i n a n y c a s e is t h e law of t h e
S t a t e . And w h e t h e r t h e l a w o f t h e S t a t e s h a l l
b e d e c l a r e d b y i t s L e g i s l a t u r e i n a s t a t u t e or
b y i t s h i g h e s t C o u r t i n a d e c i s i o n is n o t a
matter of f e d e r a l c o n c e r n . T h e r e is n o
f e d e r a l g e n e r a l common l a w . C o n g r e s s h a s no
p o w e r to d e c l a r e s u b s t a n t i v e r u l e s of common
l a w a p p l i c a b l e i n a S t a t e w h e t h e r t h e y be
local i n t h e i r n a t u r e o r ' g e n e r a l , be t h e y
c o m m e r c i a l l a w or a p a r t of t h e l a w o f t o r t s .
And n o c l a u s e i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n p u r p o r t s to
c o n f e r s u c h a power upon t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s . "
The S t o r c h d e c i s i o n b e i n g t h e l a t e s t p r o n o u n c e m e n t by t h i s C o u r t
on t h e i s s u e of statutory privilege in libel actions, the deci-
s i o n is s t i l l good law.
I n S t o r c h , t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t i n o r d e r t o t a k e advantage
of the absolute privilege provided under s e c t i o n 27-1-804 ( I ) ,
MCA:
" t h e only requirement [is] t h a t the intrade-
p a r t m e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n be o n e r e n d e r e d w h i l e
engaged i n an ' o f f i c i a l duty. ' " S t o r c h , 169
Mont. a t 1 8 1 , 5 4 5 P.2d a t 647.
If the respondent's actions f a l l within t h i s exception, then the
memorandum i n q u e s t i o n would be a b s o l u t e l y p r i v i l e g e d w i t h i n t h e
s t a t u t e and a n a b s o l u t e d e f e n s e t o t h e l i b e l a c t i o n f o u n d i n t h e
original complaint and Count I of the amended complaint.
Secondly, t h e r e s p o n d e n t p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e B u t z case d i d
not overrule --
Barr . The cases involved different issues. In
-a r r ,
B- t h e q u e s t i o n was w h e t h e r a f e d e r a l o f f i c e r c o u l d be h e l d
l i a b l e f o r t h e t o r t o f d e f a m a t i o n b a s e d on a p u b l i c a t i o n i s s u e d
within the o f f i c i a l ' s authority. B u t z , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , was a
section 1983 a c t i o n , which considered the issue of a federal
o f f i c i a l ' s p e r s o n a l immunity w h e r e , i n t h e c o u r s e of e n f o r c i n g a
s t a t u t e , t h e f e d e r a l o f f i c i a l i n f r i n g e s someone's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
rights. Moreover, t h i s Court i n Butz recognized t h a t its d e c i s i o n
was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h - a r r .
B- A t 438 U.S. 507, t h e Court s t a t e d :
"We t h e r e f o r e h o l d t h a t , i n a s u i t f o r damages
a r i s i n g from u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a c t i o n , f e d e r a l
e x e c u t i v e o f f i c i a l s e x e r c i s i n g d i s c r e t i o n are
e n t i t l e d o n l y t o t h e q u a l i f i e d immunity s p e -
c i f i e d i n S c h e u e r [ S c h e u e r v. R h o d e s , 416 U.S.
2321 s u b j e ~ ~ o t h o s x c e p t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s
ee
w h e r e it is d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t a b s o l u t e immu-
n i t y is e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e c o n d u c t of t h e
public business.
"The S c h e u e r p r i n c i p l e of o n l y q u a l i f i e d immu-
n i t y f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s is con-
s i s t e n t w i t h B a r r v. Matteo, . . ."
Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice
S t e w a r t and J u s t i c e S t e v e n s , i n a separate opinion, stated the
f o l l o w i n g a t 438 U.S. 522:
" H e r e t h e C o u r t a t l e a s t r e c o g n i z e s and r e a f -
f i r m s t h e minimum p r o p o s i t i o n f o r which B a r r
s t a n d s - - t h a t e x e c u t i v e o f f i c i a l s are a b s o l u -
t e l y immune a t l e a s t from a c t i o n s p r e d i c a t e d
o n common-law claims as l o n g a s t h e y a r e
a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e o u t e r l i m i t s of their
authority. (Citation omitted. ) Barr is
d i s t i n g u i s h e d , h o w e v e r , o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t it
d i d n o t i n v o l v e a v i o l a t i o n of ' t h o s e fun-
d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s of f a i r n e s s embodied i n
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . ' " ( C i t a t i o n omitted .)
From this language w e can see t h a t B a r r , relied upon by this
C o u r t t o s u p p o r t i t s d e c i s i o n i n S t o r c h , was n o t o v e r r u l e d by t h e
-
United States Supreme C o u r t i n Butz. Additionally, Storch is
w i t h i n t h e modern t r e n d o f t h e l a w which e x t e n d s to l o w e r p u b l i c
o f f i c i a l s an absolute p r i v i l e g e i n regard to s t a t e m e n t s made i n
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e h i r i n g and d i s c h a r g e of e m p l o y e e s . S e e , 26
ALR 3 r d 4 9 2 .
As a final contention, appellant urges that reliance upon
S t o r c h would be m i s p l a c e d i n t h i s case b e c a u s e , in Storch, the
p l a i n t i f f a s k e d t h e C o u r t t o r e a d i n t o t h e s t a t u t e on p r i v i l e g e d
communications that t h e r e m u s t be a n a b s e n c e of malice b e f o r e
such a defense w i l l arise. N o s u c h claim is made i n t h i s case;
therefore, the respondent asserts that reliance on S t o r c h is
i n a p p r o p r i a t e because the language cited by the respondent is
dictum not relating to issues specifically presented to the
Court.
The defendant in - rch
S t-
o specifically relied on absolute
privilege u n d e r t h e s t a t u t e a s a c o m p l e t e d e f e n s e to t h e l i b e l
claimed. When the plaintiff attacked the propriety of the
defense by alleging that the statute requires an absence of
malice, t h e C o u r t n e c e s s a r i l y had t o d e t e r m i n e what r e q u i r e m e n t s
m u s t be m e t b e f o r e t h e d e f e n s e of a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e a r i s e s . The
r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e i s s u e was n e c e s s a r y to t h e C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n and
t h e r e f o r e not dictum.
6. A p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s t h a t it is i m p r o p e r i n a l i b e l case to
g r a n t a m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t and dismissal i n l i g h t of
Art. 11, S e c . 7 , 1 9 7 2 M o n t . C o n s t . T h i s p r o v i s i o n g i v e s to j u r i e s
the right to d e t e r m i n e b o t h the l a w and the facts in a libel
case. Appellant argues that the jury h e r e m u s t be given the
r i g h t t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t c a n p r o p e r l y r e l y upon
the absolute privilege under section 27-1-804, MCA.
The i s s u e h a s b e e n c l e a r l y s e t t l e d by t h i s C o u r t i n G r i f f i n
v. Opinion Publishing Company ( 1 9 4 3 ) , 1 1 4 Mont. 502, 1 3 8 P.2d
580, and Manley v . Harer ( 1 9 2 8 ) , 8 2 Mont. 30, 264 P. 937. In
M a n l e y , t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t w h e r e t h e r e is a f a i l u r e to e s t a b l i s h
a n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f t h e c a u s e of a c t i o n , t h e c a s e becomes o n e
of l a w f o r the Court. See, a l s o C o o p e r v. Romney ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 49
Mont. 1 1 9 , 1 4 1 P. 289.
7. Appellant raises one final argument in opposition to
r e s p o n d e n t ' s m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t . The a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s
that summary judgment would not be proper because a disputed
q u e s t i o n of f a c t is o u t s t a n d i n g . Based o n a p p e l l a n t ' s a f f i d a v i t ,
b r i e f s and p l e a d i n g s , i t is a r g u e d t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r
appellant's a c t i o n s were a p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e o f a n o f f i c i a l d u t y
is still disputed.
I n t h e case o f S t a t e ex r e l . C i t y Motor Company v . District
Court ( 1 9 7 4 ) r 1 6 6 Mont. 52, 55, 5 3 0 P.2d 486, 487, t h i s Court
g a v e c i t a t i o n t o M o o r e ' s F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e D i g e s t and n o t e d t h a t a
party opposing a motion for summary judgment: "must p r e s e n t
f a c t s i n p r o p e r form--conclusions of l a w w i l l not suffice; and
t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y ' s f a c t s m u s t be m a t e r i a l and of a s u b s t a n t i a l
nature, not fanciful, f r i v o l o u s , gauzy, nor merely suspicions ."
R u l e 56 ( e ) o f t h e Montana R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e p r o v i d e s t h a t
supporting and opposing a f f i d a v i t s , " s h a l l be made o n p e r s o n a l
knowledge, s h a l l s e t f o r t h s u c h f a c t s as would be a d m i s s i b l e i n
evidence, and s h a l l show a f f i r m a t i v e l y t h a t t h e a f f i a n t is com-
p e t e n t t o t e s t i f y to t h e matter s t a t e d t h e r e i n ... [and s h a l l
show] that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e)
F4.R.Civ.P. R u l e 5 6 ( c ) s t a t e s t h a t a m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t ,
"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
a n s w e r s t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and a d m i s s i o n s on f i l e , t o g e t h e r w i t h
the affidavits, i f a n y , show t h a t t h e r e is no g e n u i n e i s s u e as to
any material fact and that t h e moving p a r t y is e n t i t l e d to a
judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c) M.R.Civ.P.
I n the case o f Harland v. Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 447,
4 5 0 , 548 P.2d 6 1 3 , 6 1 5 , t h i s C o u r t n o t e d :
" T h i s C o u r t h a s o n many o c c a s i o n s commented
upon t h e n a t u r e o f t h e b u r d e n of p r o o f
imposed o n t h e moving p a r t y u n d e r Rule 5 6 .
The C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t t h e p a r t y
moving f o r summary j u d g m e n t h a s t h e b u r d e n of
s h o w i n g t h e c o m p l e t e a b s e n c e of a n y g e n u i n e
i s s u e a s t o a l l f a c t s w h i c h a r e deemed
i n a t e r i a l i n l i g h t of t h o s e s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n -
c i p l e s which e n t i t l e d him t o a judgment as a
m a t t e r of l a w . W e have a l s o h e l d t h e r u l e
o p e r a t e s t o h o l d t h e movant t o a ' s t r i c t
s t a n d a r d 1 and t h a t :
"'. . . To s a t i s f y h i s b u r d e n t h e movant m u s t
make a s h o w i n g t h a t i s q u i t e c l e a r what t h e
t r u t h i s , and t h a t e x c l u d e s a n y r e a l d o u b t as
t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of any genuine i s s u e of
material fact.
&
.
.I1' Kober & K y r i s s v. S t e w a r t
B i l l i n g s Deaconess H o s p i t a l , 148 Mont.
1 1 7 , 1 2 2 , 417 P.2d 4 7 6 , 478.
"The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d o e s n o t f u n c t i o n to a d j u -
d i c a t e g e n u i n e i s s u e s of f a c t o n a m o t i o n f o r
summary j u d g m e n t c a u s e - - i t m e r e l y d e t e r m i n e s
whether such i s s u e s e x i s t . Thus t h e p a r t y
o p p o s i n g t h e m o t i o n w i l l be i n d u l g e d to t h e
e x t e n t of a l l i n f e r e n c e s which may be r e a s o n -
a b l y drawn from t h e o f f e r e d p r o o f . Mally v.
A s a n o v i c h , 1 4 9 Mont. 9 9 , 1 0 5 , 4 2 3 P.2d 294;
J o h n s o n v. S t . P a t r i c k ' s H o s p i t a l , 1 4 8 Mont.
1 2 5 , 417 P.2d 469."
In determining whether disputed questions of fact remain
o u t s t a n d i n g i n t h i s case i t s h o u l d be k e p t i n mind t h a t t h e b a r e
assertions found in appellant's briefs are not sufficient to
d e f e a t a m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t . Likewise, the conclusory
s t a t e m e n t s f o u n d i n a p p e l l a n t ' s a f f i d a v i t s o f F e b r u a r y 1 3 and 2 4 ,
t o the effect t h a t h i s dismissal: "was n o t d o n e i n t h e p r o p e r
d i s c h a r g e of d u t y i n t h a t it v i o l a t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , b o t h
S t a t e and F e d e r a l , was n o t d o n e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e r e q u i r e -
ments of the C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g Agreement and was not done
within any superseding statutory requirements . . ." a r e not
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. The
appellant's c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w would c l e a r l y n o t be a d m i s s i b l e
i n t o evidence at t r i a l , and a r e n o t p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t .
S e e , R u l e 5 6 ( e ) M.R.Civ.P.
It is c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e a l l e g e d l i b e l o u s c o m m u n i c a t i o n w a s
absolutely privileged under the statute, which is cons t i t u -
tionally valid, as a consequence of which there is no
outstanding issue of fact, and the respondent is e n t i t l e d to
h a v e h i s m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t g r a n t e d , effective against
t h e c a u s e s t a t e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t and r e p e a t e d as C o u n t
I i n t h e p r o p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t .
We turn now t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the remaining constitu-
t i o n a l a t t a c k s a g a i n s t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e found i n C o u n t s I V
and V o f t h e p r o p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t . Count I V c o n t e n d s t h a t
r e l i a n c e on t h i s s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e is a v i o l a t i o n of t h e p r i v i -
l e g e s and i m m u n i t i e s c l a u s e of t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , as w e l l
a s t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e , a s it p e r m i t s a l i b e l which would
be actionable against any o t h e r person. Count V a l l e g e s that
r e l i a n c e o n t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
Appellant's contention i n Count I V o f t h e proposed amended
c o m p l a i n t is a n o v e l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , but one
w i t h o u t merit.
The p r i v i l e g e s and i m m u n i t i e s c l a u s e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o -
h i b i t s a s t a t e from d i s c r i m i n a t i n g a g a i n s t t h e c i t i z e n s of o t h e r
s t a t e s w h e r e t h e r e is no s u b s t a n t i a l r e a s o n f o r t h e d i s c r i m i n a -
t i o n beyond t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y are c i t i z e n s o f o t h e r s t a t e s . See
Toomer v . Witsell ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 3 3 4 U.S. 385, 68 S.Ct. 1 1 5 6 , 9 2 L.Ed.
1460. The i n q u i r y i n e a c h case is w h e t h e r r e a s o n s e x i s t f o r t h e
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , and w h e t h e r t h e d e g r e e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e a r s a
close r e l a t i o n t o t h e r e a s o n s .
The s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e a t i s s u e i n t h i s case c a n n o t p o s s i b l y
violate t h e p r i v i l e g e s and immunities c l a u s e . A l l persons, be
t h e y c i t i z e n s o f Montana o r c i t i z e n s of a n y o t h e r s t a t e b r i n g i n g
a l i b e l a c t i o n i n t h i s s t a t e , are e q u a l l y s u b j e c t to t h e s t a t u -
t o r y defense .
Turning to the issue of equal protection, that issue is
a n a l y z e d by u s i n g a t w o - s t e p process. Initially, t h e Court must
consider the nature of the classification and the individual
i n t e r e s t s a f f e c t e d , t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t l e v e l of s c r u t i n y is a p p l i -
cable to the classifications. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County (1974), 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306.
U n l e s s t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t o u c h e s on a f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t ( s u c h as
r e l i g i o u s freedom, freedom of speech or a s s o c i a t i o n , p r i v a c y or
right to travel), or is drawn upon an inherently suspect
distinction ( s u c h as race, r e l i g i o n or a l i e n a g e ) , the constitu-
t i o n a l i t y of t h e s t a t u t o r y d i s c r i m i n a t i o n is p r e s u m e d ; the only
requirement being that t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n be r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d
to a l e g i t i m a t e state i n t e r e s t . N e w O r l e a n s v. Dukes ( 1 9 7 6 ) r 427
U.S. 297, 96 S . C t . 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511. "Rationally related"
means that the classification will be upheld if it has any
-
rational basis. See, Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.
No f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t or s u s p e c t c l a s s is a t i s s u e h e r e , so
t h e Court should a p p l y the r a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n test. The r a t i o n a l
b a s i s f o r r e c o g n i z i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e is o b v i o u s , and h a s
a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d . S e e G r e g o i r e v. B i d d l e , s u p r a , q u o t e d i n
Storch .
Equal p r o t e c t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t a l l p e r s o n s s h a l l be t r e a t e d
a l i k e under l i k e circumstances. See, f o r example Hartford Co.
v. H a r r i s o n ( 1 9 3 7 ) r 3 0 1 U.S. 459, 5 7 S . C t . 8 3 8 , 8 1 L.Ed. 1223.
As noted above in discussing the privileges and immunities
clause, t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e is e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l who
are "libeled" by public officials acting within the s c o p e of
t h e i r employment. C o u n t I V o f t h e p r o p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t h a s
no b a s i s i n l a w .
The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s r a i s e d b y t h e a p p e l l a n t i n C o u n t V
are essentially variations on a theme which has a l r e a d y been
considered. The appellant cites the case o f No11 v. C i t y of
Bozeman ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 6 Mont. 504, 507, 5 3 4 P.2d 880, 881, wherein
t h i s Court said:
" W i t h r e f e r e n c e to t h e s u b j e c t s upon which t h e
Constitution speaks, its d e c l a r a t i o n s are
b i n d i n g upon t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ; S t a t e ex r e l .
P i e r c e v. G ~ w d y , 62 Mont. 1 1 9 , 2 0 3 P . 1 1 1 5 .
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s a r e c o n c l u s i v e upon
t h e l e g i s l a t u r e and p r e v e n t t h e e n a c t m e n t o f
a n y law w h i c h e x t i n g u i s h e s o r l i m i t s t h e
powers c o n f e r r e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ; S t a t e
e x r e l . Bonner v. D i x o n , 5 9 Mont. 5 8 , 1 9 5 P.
8 4 1 ; S t a t e e x r e l . DuFresne v . L e s l i e , 1 0 0
Mont. 4 4 9 , 50 P.2d 9 5 9 . "
Appellant argues t h a t , i n l i g h t of A r t . 11, S e c . 1 8 , 1 9 7 2 Mont.
Const. which abolishes immunity for governmental entities,
" e x c e p t a s may be s p e c i f i c a l l y provided by l a w by a t w o - t h i r d s
v o t e o f e a c h House o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e , " t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s a t t e m p t
t o expand the constitutional privilege in libel actions under
s e c t i o n 27-1-804, MCA, is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Appellant contends
that this sta1:utorily created privilege would not stand up t o
appellant's clear constitutional right t o be protected against
libel under A r t . 11, S e c . 7, 1972 Mont.Const. This provision
g i v e s e v e r y p e r s o n t h e r i g h t to s p e a k f r e e l y and p u b l i s h w h a t e v e r
t h e y p l e a s e o n a n y s u b j e c t , b u t makes them r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a n y
abuse of t h a t l i b e r t y .
Appellant's claims i n r e g a r d t o C o u n t V a r e c l e a r l y w i t h o u t
merit. The c o n s t i t u t i o n d o e s n o t d e f i n e l i b e l , j u s t a s it d o e s
n o t d e f i n e t h e e l e m e n t s which make up a n y o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e t o r t .
T h i s job is l e f t t o t h e c o u r t s and t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Libel has
a l w a y s b e e n d e f i n e d as a f a l s e and u n p r i v i l e g e d p u b l i c a t i o n . T h i s
is true under Montana statute, as well as under common law
principles. If a communication is p r i v i l e g e d , it is not an
actionable libel. Such p r i v i l e g e s were established under the
common l a w f o r p u b l i c p o l i c y r e a s o n s . S e e , G r e g o i r e v. Biddle,
supra. B e c a u s e s u c h a c o m m u n i c a t i o n is n o t a t o r t , n o r e c o g n i z e d
wrong has been suffered which would give rise to a cause of
action. Count: V of t h e proposed amended c o m p l a i n t is w i t h o u t
l e g a l foundation.
The j u d g m e n t o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is a f f i r m e d .
We c o n c u r : U
\
Chief ~ u s t i c e
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting:
I confess at the outset that I do not understand the
foregoing opinion. Its ratio decidendi escapes me. Rather
than attempting to refute what is in the foregoing opinion,
therefore, I will here assert only what I think the rule in
this case ought to be.
This case comes to us on essentially two grounds: (1)
that Aaron P. Small was deprived of due process when he was
removed as chairman of the English department of Eastern
Montana College; and (2) that in his removal, he was libelled.
It is clear that Aaron P. Small was removed as chairman
of the English department without being afforded due process
as to his removal, including an evidentiary hearing where he
would have the right to present favorable witnesses, and to
confront and examine adverse witnesses. The grievance procedure
provided in the collective bargaining agreement for the unit
of which Small was a member is not a sufficient substitute for
Small's right to come to the courts for protection of his con-
stitutional due process rights. Section 1-3-204, MCA. I
find no case cited in the foregoing opinion stating otherwise,
and there could be none.
In like manner, summary judgment should not be granted
against Small on his first amendment claims, and his libel
claims, on the ground of lack of specificity in the pleadings.
NcRae gave as his reasons for dismissing Small as chairman
his "inadequate leadership", his "failure to bring a polarized
department into a smoother functioning unit", "acrimony had
increased within the English department", and an allegation
that Small had failed to effectively and conscientiously
handle the administrative detail associated with his office.
Small has answered that these allegations are false. What
more specificity could he at this stage allege, if his
contention is true that such statements are false? The
District Court and this Court are applying here the specificity
requirements of civil right actions under federal law as
exemplified by Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi (3rd Cir.
19761, 532 F.2d 920, 923. In our state court, Small is not
suing for a deprivation of his federal civil rights, but for
his constitutionally protected rights under our state and
federal constitution. In that situation, it should be
recognized that our pleadings under the Montana Rules of
Civil Procedure are notice pleadings only and that specificity
occurs after discovery has been completed. Further, with
regard to Small's libel action, there is a factual question
existent as to whether he was discharged pursuant to "official
action." The pleadings evince an underlying allegation that
McRae was acting in concert with others to deprive Small of
his chairmanship. Without further proceedings we cannot
tell at this point whether "official action" was actually
involved here or whether there was a drive to impugn his
teaching and administrative integrity and ability in the
guise of official action. That is an issue a jury should
decide.
For those reasons, I would set aside the summary judgment,
and let the facts come to light as to which party should receive
judgment in this case. Therefore, I dissent.
Justice
Mr. J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea concurring.
I a g r e e w i t h t h e r e s u l t r e a c h e d by t h e m a j o r i t y , b u t n o t i n
its reasoning. C l e a r l y , t h e r e was n o l i b e l . And j u s t as c l e a r l y ,
t h e p l a i n t i f f should have exhausted t h e c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e pro-
c e d u r e s b e f o r e r e s o r t i n g to t h e c o u r t s .