State v. Hoffman

No. 14812 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, BONNIE LEE HOFFMAN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Garnaas, Hall, Riley & Pinsoneault, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Robert L. Deschamps 111, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana Submitted on briefs: October 1, 1981 Decided: January 14, 1982 Filed: JAN 14 1982 Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t . The d e f e n d a n t , B o n n i e Lee Hoffman, was c h a r g e d w i t h n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e u n d e r s e c t i o n 45-5-104, MCA, b a s e d on h e r f a i l u r e t o provide medical a t t e n t i o n f o r her three-year-old son. S h e was c o n v i c t e d a f t e r a j u r y t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , M i s s o u l a C o u n t y , and received a ten-year suspended sentence. Bonnie Lee Hoffman m e t Kinley Dobson in 1 9 7 4 when t h e y w e r e b o t h l i v i n g i n C u t Bank, Montana. The defendant was s i x t e e n a t t h e t i m e ; Dobson was t w e n t y - f o u r and m a r r i e d . The d e f e n d a n t became p r e g n a n t by Dobson, a n d on F e b r u a r y 1 6 , 1 9 7 5 , t h e i r s o n , Chad, was b o r n . Dobson and t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t g e t m a r r i e d a t t h i s time b u t c o n t i n u e d t o s e e o n e a n o t h e r p e r i o d i c a l l y o v e r t h e n e x t few y e a r s . Dobson and t h e d e f e n d a n t had a v o l a t i l e and v i o l e n t relationship, which ended with the death of their young child. I n August 1977, Dobson and the defendant married. They lived together i n Missoula, Montana, where d e f e n d a n t had a j o b a s a key-punch o p e r a t o r a t a b a n k . S h e worked f r o m a b o u t 2:00 p.m. u n t i l 10:OO p.m. Dobson was unemployed and s t a y e d a t home w i t h t h e i r t w o - y e a r - o l d s o n , Chad. After a b o u t a month, the relationship again turned violent. Dobson frequently threatened the defendant and p h y s i c a l l y a b u s e d b o t h h e r and t h e c h i l d . I n December 1 9 7 7 , a f t e r d e f e n d a n t had s t a y e d w i t h f r i e n d s and i n a s h e l t e r f o r b a t t e r e d women, s h e d i v o r c e d Dobson. Dobson, n e v e r t h e l e s s , c o n t i n u e d t o l i v e a t t h e d e f e n - d a n t ' s a p a r t m e n t , s t a y i n g w i t h Chad w h i l e d e f e n d a n t worked. Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e c o u l d n o t make Dobson l e a v e . S h e had t r i e d t o l o c k him o u t o f t h e h o u s e , b u t he always forced h i s way b a c k i n by coming t h r o u g h t h e windows or p i c k i n g t h e l o c k on t h e d o o r . On F e b r u a r y 2 2 , 1 9 7 8 , Chad was t a k e n t o t h e h o s p i t a l by Dobson. C h a d ' s body was c o v e r e d w i t h numerous b r u i s e s . H e had a s e v e r e l y d i s t e n d e d s t o m a c h and was showing no s i g n of life. The c h i l d was p r o n o u n c e d dead a t t h e h o s p i t a l . The c a u s e o f h i s d e a t h was e x t r e m e s h o c k r e s u l t i n g f r o m a r u p t u r e d stomach. I n s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e p o l i c e and i n h e r own t e s t i m o n y at trial, defendant o u t l i n e d t h e r o l e she played i n Chad's death. When s h e woke up a t a b o u t 1 1 : O O a.m. o n F e b r u a r y 22, Chad seemed fine. She s a i d t h a t s h e gave t h e c h i l d h i s l u n c h , i n c l u d i n g some c a k e . D e f e n d a n t r e c a l l e d t h a t Dobson became a n g r y b e c a u s e s h e had g i v e n Chad c a k e when h e had n o t f i n i s h e d h i s sandwich. She t e s t i f i e d that while s h e was w a t c h i n g t e l e v i s i o n , Dobson was w h i s p e r i n g w h a t s h e assumed w e r e t h r e a t s t o t h e boy a n d t h e boy r e s p o n d e d by y e l l i n g , "No! No!" and h i t t i n g Dobson. Then t h e boy y e l l e d , "Mommy, my tummy h u r t s . " Defendant left for work at about 2:00 p.m. that afternoon. Dobson c a l l e d h e r a t work a t a b o u t 3:00 p.m. s a y i n g t h a t Chad had b e e n v o m i t i n g . D e f e n d a n t t o l d Dobson t o g i v e Chad some P e p t o - B i s m o l . A t a b o u t 4:15 that after- n o o n , Dobson c a l l e d a g a i n s a y i n g t h a t Chad had f a l l e n down some s t a i r s w h i l e r i d i n g h i s t r i c y c l e and was h u r t b a d l y . D e f e n d a n t d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h a t Chad was h u r t badly because Dobson called her at work many times each day, t r y i n g t o p e r s u a d e h e r t o come home. Dobson would g e n e r a l l y s a y t h a t s h e s h o u l d come home b e c a u s e Chad was h u r t . The d e f e n d a n t t o l d Dobson s h e would be home for her break at 5:00 p.m. D e f e n d a n t r e t u r n e d home a b o u t 4 : 5 0 that after- noon. Chad was c o n s c i o u s b u t p a l e . H e had b l o o d on h i s n o s e and mouth, and h i s s t o m a c h was s w o l l e n . Chad went l i m p when t h e d e f e n d a n t p l a c e d him i n h i s high chair and l o o k e d , according t o defendant, "exhausted" and "un c o m fo rt a b l e . " Also, according t o defendant, h e was a b l e t o d r i n k a s m a l l amount o f Seven-Up. Not r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t Chad was s e r i o u s l y i l l , d e f e n - d a n t when back t o work a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5:30 p.m. A s soon a s s h e a r r i v e d a t work, s h e r e c e i v e d a m e s s a g e t h a t Dobson had called and he was taking Chad to Saint Patrick's Hospital. D e f e n d a n t c a l l e d t h e h o s p i t a l t o make s u r e t h a t Dobson was t h e r e and t h e n l e f t . Chad showed no s i g n s o f l i f e when Dobson b r o u g h t him i n t o t h e h o s p i t a l a t 6 : 0 0 p.m. The d o c t o r s i n t h e emergency room t r i e d t o revive t h e boy, but at 6:45 p.m. Chad was declared l e g a l l y dead. The d o c t o r o n d u t y a t t h e e m e r g e n c y room when Chad was brought in testified t h a t Chad had bruises on n e a r l y e v e r y p a r t o f h i s body--his legs, buttocks, back, f a c e and arms--and t h a t h e was i n e x t r e m e s h o c k . The d o c t o r f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t f o r t y - f i v e minutes p r i o r t o Chad's a r r i v a l a t the hospital, it would have been obvious that he was s e r i o u s l y ill. A pathologist performed an autopsy on the child's body the day after h i s death. The p a t h o l o g i s t testified t h a t t h e b r u i s e s on t h e c h i l d ' s s t o m a c h w e r e a b o u t t h e same a g e a s t h e o t h e r s and had o c c u r r e d two t o f i v e h o u r s b e f o r e death. The l a r g e b r u i s e on t h e c h i l d ' s s t o m a c h , according to the pathologist, was caused by a blunt force. The pathologist further testified that there was evidence of prior injuries both to the child's skull and stomach. Defendant raises two issues on review: (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that she was guilty of negligent homicide because she failed to provide medical attention for her small child; and (2) whether the District Court erred by admitting into evidence color slides of the dead child taken by the pathologist prior to the autopsy. Because there is substantial evidence to support the verdict and because the probative value of the slides out- weighed any prejudicial effect, the defendant's conviction is affirmed. Under section 40-6-211, MCA, a parent entitled to custody of a child must provide the child with support and education suitable to his circumstances. In State v. Mally (1961), 139 Mont. 599, 366 P.2d 868, we concluded that the failure to obtain medical aid for one who is owed a duty is a sufficient degree of negligence as to constitute involun- tary manslaughter, provided death results from a failure to act. 366 P.2d at 872. Likewise, in State v. Bischert (1957) , 131 Mont. 152, 308 P. 2d 969, we noted that an omis- sion to perform an act required by law can be the basis for manslaughter. See also, State v. Parmenter (1968), 74 Wash.2d 343, 444 P.2d 680; Palmer v. State (1960), 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467; and for a discussion of homicide based on failure to provide medical attention see, 100 A.L.R.2d 483. The defendant here would be guilty of negligent homicide if, by failing to provide medical attention for her son, she d i s r e g a r d e d a r i s k o f which s h e s h o u l d have been aware, and t h e r i s k was s o g r e a t t h a t t o d i s r e g a r d i t was a g r o s s d e v i - a t i o n from a r e a s o n a b l e s t a n d a r d o f conduct. See s e c t i o n 45-5-104, MCA, and s e c t i o n 4 5 - 2 - 1 0 1 ( 3 7 ) , MCA. The f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g C h a d ' s d e a t h s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ' s finding t h a t defendant grossly deviated from a reasonable s t a n d a r d o f c a r e when s h e f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e m e d i c a l a t t e n - t i o n f o r her three-year-old son. D e f e n d a n t ' s own t e s t i m o n y , t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e d o c t o r s i n t h e e m e r g e n c y room, and t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e p a t h o l o g i s t show t h a t on F e b r u a r y 22, 1 9 7 8 , Chad was s e r i o u s l y i l l a t 5:00 p.m. when d e f e n d a n t came home f o r her break. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e emergency room d o c t o r s , t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of Chad's i n j u r i e s would h a v e b e e n o b v i o u s to anyone. Further, t h e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t had Chad b e e n b r o u g h t t o t h e h o s p i t a l w h i l e c o n s c i o u s and a b l e t o d r i n k l i q u i d s , i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d h i s l i f e c o u l d have been s a v e d . By d i s r e g a r d i n g t h e s e r i o u s n e s s o f C h a d ' s i n j u r i e s - - t h e b r u i s e s on h i s b o d y , h i s v o m i t i n g , t h e b l o o d o n h i s n o s e a n d mouth, t h e d i s t e n t i o n o f h i s s t o m a c h , h i s p a l l o r and t h e d i l a t i o n of h i s eyes--defendant acted negligently within the meaning o f s e c t i o n 4 5 - 2 - 1 0 1 ( 3 7 ) , MCA. Defendant r e f u s e d t o acknowledge to herself t h a t Chad was seriously ill. The r e c o r d shows ample p r o o f o f C h a d ' s o b v i o u s n e e d f o r m e d i c a l c a r e and d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e i t . Defendant n e x t contends t h a t t h e admission of color s l i d e s t a k e n by t h e p a t h o l o g i s t p r i o r t o t h e autopsy were too prejudicial and were submitted only to arouse the sympathies of the jury. Defendant c l a i m s that the color s l i d e s w e r e n o t n e c e s s a r y s i n c e t h e b l a c k and w h i t e p h o t o - graphs of the child t a k e n by a policeman a t the hospital were sufficient to show Chad's death. Citing State v. Bischert, supra, defendant claims the color slides should have been excluded. It is well established in this state that the trial court has the discretion to allow into evidence duly veri- fied photographs to aid the jury in its fact-finding process. State v. Mackie (1981), - Mont. -, 622 P.2d 673, 38 St.Rep. 86. As we stated in the often-quoted case of Fulton v. Choteau County Farmers' Co. (1934), 98 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025, 1029: ". . . photographs stand on the same footing as diagrams, maps, plans, and the like, and as a general rule, whenever relevant to de- scribe a person, place, or thing, they are admissible for the purpose of explaining and applying the evidence and assisting the court and jury in understanding the case." Here, because the color slides showed the extent of Chad's injuries more clearly than the black and white photographs, they helped the jury to determine the reason- ableness of the defendant's actions. While we found that admission of the color slides in Bischert was reversible error, we emphasized that failure to provide medical care was not in issue. Here, the defendant's failure to provide medical attention is the central and con- trolling issue. Further, the pathologist in Bischert said he did not need the colored slides to explain his findings. Here, the pathologist explicitly testified that he preferred to use his own color slides in order to be as accurate as possible. The color slides are therefore admissible since their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect they may have had. See State v. O'Donnell (1972), 159 Mont. 138, 496 The judgment of t h e District Court is affirmed. W e concur: