Marian Haugen Trust v. Warner

                         I N THE S U P R E b P COURT O F THE STATE O F PONTAhTA




,ylARIAN HAUGEN TRUST and
MARIAN HAUGEN, TRUSTEE,

                                          Plaintiff and Respondent,




MAURICE A . WARNER, J R . , and
MARLENE R. WARNER, husband and w i f e ,

                                          Defendants, Third Party
                                          P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,




                 .
LAWRENCE E WALKER and
DARLENE E . WALKER, husband
and w i f e , JACK HUME a n d
MIDDLE C m E K MEADOWS, I N C . ,

                                          Third Party Defendants
                                          and Respondents.




Appeal from:           D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E i c s h t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
                       I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of G a l l a t i n
                       H o n o r a b l e W. W. L e s s l e y , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l of R e c o r d

        For A p p e l l a n t s :

               Kirwan & B a r r e t t , Bozeman, Montana
               B e r g , C o i l , Stokes & T o l l e f s e n , B o z e m a n          Montana

        For Respondents:

               L a n d o e e , B r o w n , P l a n a l p , K o m m e r s & L i n e b e r a e r , B o z e m a n , Montana

        For Third P a r t y Respondents:

               Moore,      R i c e , O ' C o n n e l l & R e f l i n g . Bozeman, Montana




                                            S u b m i t t e d On B r i e f s : A p r i l 2 1 ,     1983

                                                                 Decided:         June 30, 1 9 5 3
       $ul\j      ; 1983
                  ,
Filed:
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
     The District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District
issued an order September 13, 1982, dismissing an amended
third party complaint against Jack Hume and Middle Creek
Meadows.      The order also denied        third party      plaintiffs,
Warners, leave to again amend            their amended third party
complaint.    Warners now appeal from that order.            We reverse
the judgment of the District Court.
     Jack Hume and Middle Creeek Meadows, Inc., third party
defendants,    are    the   developers    of   Middle    Creek   Meadows
Subdivision in Gallatin County, Montana.                The subdivision
includes three ponds constructed by the developers primarily
for aesthetic purposes.      Pond three is the only one currently
used for irrigation.
     Plaintiff Haugen, defendants and third party plaintiffs,
Warners and third party defendants, Walkers own property in
Middle Creek Meadows Subdivision.
    Warners' basement was damaged by flooding in 1978 and
1979.   They believed the flooding to be caused by leakage of
water from ponds one and two.      In July of 1979, Warners began
to monitor the relationship between the depth of the water in
their sump hole and the depth of the water in the ponds.
After   finding   a   definite   correlation, Warners         partially
blocked the flow of water into the ponds during the summers
of 1979, 1980 and 1981.
     The obstruction of water flow into the ponds allegedly
caused the water remaining to become stagnant.               Mosquitoes
and other insects began gathering near the ponds.                Haugen's
home is next to one of the ponds.         He filed a complaint July
7, 1981, against Warners for creating a nuisance.                FJarners
filed an answer October 2, 1981.
        In 1982, Walkers asserted a right to the pond water and
claimed that Warners' obstruction of the flow of water into
the ponds deprived them of use of the water.                 On July 8,
1982, Walkers removed the culvert cap placed by Warners to
obstruct the flow of water to ponds one and two.               Warners'
basement again flooded.
     On July 9, 1982, Warners filed a third party complaint
against Walkers, seeking a permanent injunction enjoining and
restraining Walkers from interfering with Warners' attempt to
control the flow of waters into the ponds.            The third party
complaint alleged further that Walkers have negligently and
recklessly constructed, used and maintained the ponds and
that Walkers' use and maintenance of the ponds have created a
nuisance.        Walkers filed a motion to dismiss on July 14,
1982.
    A     July   19,     1982   District Court    order    combined   the
actions and set the entire cause for trial on the merits on
August 26, 1982.
    Warners filed an amended third party complaint August 2,
1982, adding Jack Hume and Middle Creek Meadows, Inc., as
third party defendants.         Hume and Middle Creek filed a motion
to dismiss the third party complaint against them on August
23, 1982, alleging that the action was barred by the statute

of limitations.          The statute of limitations is two years.
Section 27-2-207, MCA.          The complaint was filed in 1982, but
only alleged damages for the years 1978 and 1979.
        Immediately prior to the September 2, 1982, hearing on
Hume's and Middle Creek's motion to dismiss, Warners filed,
without     leave   of    court,    a   second   amended   third   party
complaint alleging damages in 1982.          Third party defendants'
motion was granted         September    13, 1982, without      leave to
amend.
      Warners now appeal that order.           The trial on the merits
as well as a hearing on a motion for summary judgment have
been vacated and continued pending resolution of this appeal.
The issues presented to this Court by Warners are:
      1.    Was leave of court necessary to amend the third
party complaint?
                 third           plaintiffs' action barred            the
statute of limitations?
           Are    third           plaintiffs    entitled          punitive
damages?
      Leave of court was required before Warners could file a
second     amended       third   party   complaint.        Rule     15(a),
M.R.Civ.P.,      states in relevant part:
      "Amendments. A party may amend his pleadings once
      as a matter of course at any time before a
      responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading
      is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted
      and the action has not been placed upon the trial
      calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20
      days after it is served.    Otherwise a party may
      amend his pleading only by leave of court or by
      written consent of the adverse party; and leave
      shall be freely given when justice so requires."
This rule does not allow one amendment as a matter of course
per defendant.       Rather, it allows one amendment as a matter
of course per pleading.            Any   other interpretation would
violate the purposes for the rule, to prevent poor pleadings
and   to discourage harassment of the defendant.                  Wright,
Federal Practice and Procedure, Chapter 4, $1480, p.                 405.
      The original third party complaint was amended once,
prior to any responsive pleadings, to add Jack Hume and
Middle Creek Meadows, Inc., as third party defendants.              Leave
of court was required before it could be amended again,
regardless how many of the amendments affected Jack Hume and
Middle Creek Meadows.
      However,     the   trial   court       judge    clearly     abused     his
discretion when he denied Warners the opportunity to amend
their third party complaint for the second time.                     Warners
failure to allege damages in 1982 was obviously inadvertent.
Leave of court to amend a complaint in order to correct a
mistake should be freely given when the amendment will not
mislead    defendants to their prejudice.                Besse v. McHenry
(1931), 89 Mont. 520, 300 P. 199.             The amendment presents no
new   cause   of    action,    nor    does    it     mislead    third   party
defendants.
      To   deny    Warners    their   day     in     court because      of   an
inadvertent mistake is tantamount to denying Warners justice.
Refusal to permit an amendment to a complaint which should be
made in furtherance of justice is an abuse of discretion.
State ex rel. Gold Creek Mining Co. v. District Court (1935),
99 Mont. 33, 37, 43 P.2d 249, 250.
      Apparently, the trial court judgers reason for denying
leave to amend the complaint was the supposed futility of the

amendment.        However, the amendment is not futile because
Warners' action against the third party defendants is not
barred by the statute of limitations.                Even without specific
allegations of damages in 1982, Warnersr amended third party
complaint     alleges    negligence      in     1982    -   the    negligent
maintenance of the reservoir ponds.                Whether that negligence
caused any recoverable damages is a question of fact to be
decided at a trial on the merits.
      Jack Hume and Middle Creek Meadows, Inc. allege that the
statute of limitations should have begun to run in 1978
because that was when the flooding caused permanent injury.
"   ...    for permanent injury the statute runs from the time
the injury becomes complete to the land's use and enjoyment."
Nelson v. C     &    C Plywood Corp. (1970), 154 Mont. 414, 433, 465
P.2d 314, 324.
       A   permanent           injury    is    one where     the    situation has
"stabilized"         and.       the     permanent      damage      is     "reasonably
certain".       Blasdel v. Montana Power Co.                 (1982),              Mont   .
      ,    640 P.2d 889, 39 St.Rep. 219.                  The situation in the
instant case has not stabilized.                    Warners' basement continues
to    periodically         flood, allegedly whenever               the     ponds    are
allowed to be filled with water from the in-flowing creeks.
The    extent       of    the    damages       to   the   basement       varies     from
occurrence to occurren.cle,depending on the level of the water
in the basement and the condition of the basement at the time
of each flood.
       Further,          the     nuisance      is    apparently         abatable,    as
illustrated by the fact that when the water flow from the
creeks was blocked in 1980 and 1981, the basement did not
flood.       Allegedly, the developers could have                         abated    the
nuisance themselves through corrective action.                           That remains
a determination to be made at trial.                        If the flooding is
terminable, it cannot be deemed a permanent nuisance.                               See
Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co. (1933), 289 U.S.
334, 53 S.Ct 602, 77 L.Ed. 1208, where the Supreme Court held
that where the pollution of a creek was terminable, it could
not be deemed a permanent nuisance from the time the nuisance
was created.
       The   damage         is    not    yet    permanent.         Therefore,       the
nuisance is of a temporary and continuous character and gives
rise to a       separate cause of action each time it causes
damage.      39 Am. Jur., Nuisance, $141, p. 403, and quoted in
Nelson, 154 Mont. at p. 434, 465 P.2d at pp. 324-325.
       The applicable            statute of         limitations is two years.
Section 27-2-207, MCA.                  The Warners may be able to recover
damages for injuries suffered two years prior to the date of
their original third party complaint, July 9, 1982, if such
damages are proven at trial.
     Finally, this      Court has       no   jurisdiction over     issue
number     three, whether     Warners    are   entitled    to   punitive
damages from Hume and Middle Creek Meadows.               The appeal of
that issue is premature as there has been no trial on actual
damages.
     The September 13, 1982, order of the District Court is
reversed and Warners are granted leave to amend their amended
third    party   complaint.     This matter      is remanded to the
District Court for trial on the merits, consistent with this
opinion.



We concur:


 apn-e,~4Q..u~
Chief Justice!