State v. Greenwalt

NO. 82-160

I N THE SUPREPIE COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN

1983

STATE O F MONTANA,

P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,

DOUG GREENWALT and
ROY GREENWALT,

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and F o r t h e County of B i g Horn
Honorable Nat A l l e n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n q .

C o u n s e l o f Record:

For Appellant:

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Pqontana
James M . S c h e i e r , I n t e r n , O f f i c e O F A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l
a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana
James S e y k o r a , County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , H a r d i n , l l o n t a n a

For Respondents:

Moses Law Firm, B i l l i n q s , Montana
Michael Moses a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana

--

Submitted: March 2 4 , 1983

Decided. May 26, 1983

Filed- Play 26, 1.953
P 3
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Doug Greenwalt and Roy Greenwalt , defendants and
respondents, were charged with the crime of theft, a felony.
A jury trial was held on September 22-25, 1981, in the
Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Big Horn County. On
September 24, 1981, the District Court dismissed that part of
the information involving the theft of a calf belonging to
Nelvett Siemion, an enrolled member of the Crow Tribe. On
September 25, 1981, the State, having presented all its
evidence, rested, whereupon defendants moved to dismiss the
remaining charges for insufficient evidence. The District
Court granted defendants' motion, and the jury was dismissed.
The State appeals.
We affirm the District Court's dismissal of the charge
relating to the theft of the Siemion calf. We dismiss that
portion of the appeal arising from the dismissal by the
District Court of the remaining charges.
The following issues are dispositive:
I.) Whether double jeopardy prohibitions mandate the
dismissal of the State's appeal.

2.) Whether the District Court erred in dismissing the
charges relating to the theft of the Siemion calf.
On Sunday, November 9, 1980, at approximately 6:00 p.m.,
as John Siemion Jr., was working on his ranch in Big Horn
County, he saw and heard a pickup truck and horse trailer
traveling south on nearby Rotten Grass Road. The pickup's
lights were on and John was able to see that it was light-
colored and had wrap-around tail lights. Approximately five
minutes later, John Siemion observed the same pickup and
horse trailer traveling back up the same road, heading north.
 The next morning, Monday, November 10, John Siemion was
driving south on Rotten Grass Road. He came across two cows
which were running back and forth along a fence in his
pasture at Rotten Grass Creek. He noticed that the cows were
bawling and that they had tight bags with their udders
protruding, indicating that they were lactating. Their
appearance and behavior indicated to John Siemion that the
cows had been nursing calves and were trying to get out of
the pasture to find their missing calves. The cows were
branded with the Soap Creek Cattle Company (Soap Creek) brand
belonging to P. R. Krone. John Siemion opened a gate and let
the cows into an adjacent pasture which belonged to Soap
Creek.
John Siemion drove further on the road and came across
three more cows, whose appearance and behavior was similar to
that of the first two cows. Two of these three cows bore
Soap Creek's brand and the other bore a brand registered to
his sister-in-law, Nelvett Siemion, an enrolled member of the
Crow Tribe.
There were two spots on the road in which there was
horse manure and cattle hoofprints. These appeared to be the
spots where the cattle were unloaded from the horse trailer.
John Siemion's mother notified Soap Creek, Nelvett Siemion,
and and the sheriff's office.
That afternoon George Siemion, John Siemion's brother,
went to see Doug Greenwalt to discuss the possibility of
buying hay from him. While he was at the Greenwalts', George
Siemion noticed a light-colored pickup with tires containing
an unusual tread design, which was subsequently found to
match the design of the tracks left on the road where the
cows had been unloaded. He also noticed some weanling calves
in the Greenwalt corral. That evening George Siemion
notified the Department of Livestock Inspector, Ron Reed.
On Tuesday morning, November 11, Inspector Reed met with
two sheriff's deputies. They drove to Rotten Grass Creek to
examine the area and to see the five cows, then drove to Doug
Greenwalt's residence. Doug Greenwalt was driving a tractor
when the men arrived. Inspector Reed informed Doug Greenwalt
of the five cows that had been unloaded on Rotten Grass Road
and mentioned that the tread of the tires on the Greenwalt
truck matched those tracks found at Rotten Grass Creek.
Inspector Reed asked several times whether he could bring the
five cows over to Greenwalts' corral to see if any of the
cows and calves would "mother-up" (the instinctive pairing
between a cow and her calf would indicate their
relationship). Doug Greenwalt motioned for Inspector Reed to
join him in the cab of the tractor. He then told Reed that
he and his father, Roy Greenwalt, had hauled the five cows up
to Rotten Grass Creek and that they had intended to keep the
calves, fatten them up, and sell them as payment for the ten
or twelve years that Soap Creek cows had been grazing on
Greenwalt pastures.
Doug Greenwalt removed four of the calves from the
corral of about 250 weanling calves, but was unable to locate
the fifth. Most Greenwalt calves had ear tags, while the
four calves he found did not. The following day, Wednesday,
November 12, the five cows were brought to the Greenwalts ' .
The four calves mothered up almost immediately; the fifth cow
was placed in the weanlings' corral, where a calf mothered up
within a few minutes. The cows and calves were removed from
the Greenwalts' by Inspector Reed.
Doug Greenwalt and Roy Greenwalt were charged with theft
of the five calves. During the presentation of the State's
case, the District Court granted defendantshotion to
dismiss that part of the information charging the Greenwalts
with the theft of the calf belonging to Nelvett Siemion, on
the grounds that the State lacked authority to prosecute a
non-Indian for a crime committed on the reservation against
an Indian.
At the close of the State's case, the defendants moved
for dismissal of the remaining charges on the grounds that
there was insufficient evidence to establish that they had
exerted "unauthorized control" over the calves. This
argument was based upon section 81-4-217, MCA, which
provides, in pertinent part:
"Retention of trespassing stock. (1) If an animal
breaks into an enclosure surrounded by a legal
fence or is wrongfully on the premises of another,
the owner or occupant of the enclosure or premises
may take into his possession the trespassing animal
and keep the animal until all damages, together
with reasonable charges for keeping and feeding the
animal, are paid. The person who takes the animal
into his possession shall, within 72 hours after he
takes possession, give written notice to the owner
or person in charge of the animal, stating that he
has taken the animal . . ."
Greenwalts were charged with the offense of theft, a felony
as defined in section 45-6-301(1)(a), MCA, which provides, in
applicable part:
"A person commits the offense of theft when he
pur~osely or knowingly obtains or exerts
unauthorized control over property o f t h e owner
and :
(a) has the purpose of depriving the owner of the
property."
The District Court granted defendants' motion and dismissed
the remaining charges, as allowed under section 46-16-403,
MCA. The State appeals.

Defendants maintain that this Court's consideration of
the State's appeal would violate their rights against double
jeopardy under Article 11, section 25 of the Montana
Constitution and under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. They argue that the appeal must be
dismissed.
The right of the State to appeal in criminal cases is
narrowly limited by section 46-20-103, MCA, which states in
pertinent part:
"(1) Except as otherwise specifically authorized,
the state may not appeal in a criminal case.
(2) The state may appeal from any court order or
judgment the substantial effect - which results
of
in 2
- -
(a) dismissing - -
a case; (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that in form, the District Court's action was
a dismissal. But, where, after jeopardy attaches, the
substantive effect of the court's action is acquittal, the
State has no right of appeal. State v. Hagerud (1977), 174
Mont. 361, 570 P.2d 1131. As this Court noted in State v.
Cool (1977), 174 Mont. 99, 101, 568 P.2d 567, 568:
"The United States Supreme Court in United States
- Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300
v. -
and Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 82
S.Ct. 6 7 1 7 7 L . ~ d . z d 629, emphasized that what
constitutes an acquittal is not to be controlled by
the form of the judge's action. Rather, this
Court must determine whether the ruling of the
judge, whatever its label, actually represents a
resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the
factual elements of the offense charged."
When a defendant has been acquitted at trial, he may not
be retried on the same offense, even if the legal rulings
underlying the acquittal were erroneous. Sanabria v. United
States (1978), 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43;
Fong Foo v. Uni.ted States (1962), 369 U.S. 141, 82 S.Ct. 671,
7 L.Ed.2d 629. The judgment of acquittal not only bars
further prosecution but bars appellate review of the alleged
error by the trial court. Sanabria, supra; United States v.
art in Linen Supply Co. (1977), 430 U.S. 564, 97 S.Ct. 1349,
51 L.Ed.2d 642. It does not matter whether the judgment of
acquittal is based upon a jury verdict of not guilty or a
ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to
convict; the judgment may not be appealed. United States v.
Scott (1978), 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65.
In State - Cool, supra, the trial judge granted
v.
defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal for
insufficient evidence at the close of all evidence, and
dismissed the case. The State appealed, and this Court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal on double
jeopardy grounds, relying on a statute (R.C.M. 1947 S95-2403)
with provisions similar to those in 46-20-103, MCA. The
Court stated:
"Here the state contends the state of Montana has a
statutory right to appeal under section
95-2403(b) (1). It argues the district court's
ruling was in fact a dismissal. Defendant argues
this was a motion for acquittal and such a motion
does not constitute a dismissal of the case as
contemplated in section 95-2403(b) (1).
"We find no merit in the state's argument in
relation to section 95-2403(b) (I), because
subsection (b)(1) simply does not apply to the
instant fact situation, no matter how the state
tortures the language used by the district court.
The court very clearly and with precision informed
the state in reference to the evidence: 'I am just
saying that it's insufficient.' There can be no
question from the record before this Court that the
district court's dismissal was an acquittal in
substance as well as form." 174 Mont. at 101, 568
P.2d at 568.
In the case at bar, defendants' motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence was based on their assertion that
because of the 72-hour notice rule in section 81-4-217, MCA,
the State could not prove a necessary element of the crime--
unauthorized control--regardless of the other evidence it
presented. The court replied:
"Well it seems to me that it would be silly to let
it go to the jury. I would just have to take the
verdict away if they would find them guilty. I
would have to set it aside. It would never stand
UP
"Well, let's go in and dismiss the jury."
The record contains no order of dismissal, nor does the
transcript include the court's statements to the jury upon
dismissing them.
We find the District Court's dismissal for insufficient
evidence was, in substance, an acquittal, a resolution of
certain factual elements of the offense charged, and, as such
is not appealable.
Defendants argue that this conclusion also should be
dispositive of the charges relating to the theft of the
Siemion calf, since the circumstances surrounding the charges
are identical. We do not agree. The Siemion theft charges
had been dismissed on other grounds the day before the above
charges were dismissed. We decline to extend the District
Court's ruling to cover the Siemion theft.
11.
The District Court dismissed the charges arising from
the alleged theft of the calf belonging to Nelvett Siemion on
defendants' motion, ruling that the State lacked authority to
prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed on the reservation
against Indians. There is no dispute about the facts that
Greenwalts are non-Indians, Nelvett Siemion is an enrolled
member of the Crow tribe, and the alleged theft occurred on
the Crow reservation.
We note that double jeopardy prohibitions are not
applicable here, where the dismissal was based upon a
jurisdictional question rather than a resolution of factual
elements of the offense. Numerous United States Supreme
Court decisions have distinguished between those dismissals
based upon failure of proof, i.e., insufficient evidence,
which are conclusive under the double jeopardy cla.use, and
those dismissals unrelated to a defendant's guilt or
innocence, which do not necessarily preclude appeal by the
state or further prosecution. Scott, supra; United States v.
Dinitz (1976), 424 U.S. 600, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267,
(contains an excellent history and elaboration of the

distinction); United States v. Sanford (1976), 429 U.S. 14,
97 S.Ct. 20, 50 L.Ed.2d 17.
The State makes a valiant argument in support of the
State's assertion of concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
government over crimes on the reservation committed by
non-Indians against Indians. The State points out that

tribal courts lack jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians for
crimes committed on the reservation; Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe (1978), 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d
209, and that federal authorities decline to prosecute the
great majority of those offenses. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES--A CONTINUING QUEST FOR SURVIVAL 154-55

(1981). The State maintains that while the states are
authorized to prosecute non-Indians for crimes against
non-Indians on the reservation, see United States v. Antelope
(1977), 430 U.S. 641, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701, Indian
citizens of the state have little protection against
non-Indian criminals on the reservation under the existing
circumstances. Finally, the State argues that, dicta aside,
there are no specific holdings that the State lacks authority
to assert concurrent jurisdiction.
We appreciate the State's arguments, but find that the
great weight of authority supports the District Court's
ruling.
In Williams v. United States (1946), 327 U.S. 711, 714,
66 S.Ct. 778, 780, 90 L.Ed 962, 964, the United States
Supreme Court stated:
"While the laws and courts of the State of Arizona
may have jurisdiction over offenses committed on
this reservation between persons who are not
 Indians, the laws and courts of the United States,
rather than those of Arizona, have jurisdiction
over offenses committed there, as in this case, by
one who is not an Indian against one who is an
Indian. "
The 1982 edition of FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, states at page 353, relying upon Williams:
"Criminal offenses by non-Indians against Indians
or their property are subject to the Indian Country
Crimes Act [18 U.S.C. 5131. The Supreme Court has
stated that federal court jurisdiction under this
Act is exclusive of state court jurisdiction."

- AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., JUSTICE
See,
IN INDIAN COUNTRY (1980) 32, and MANUAL OF INDIAN CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION (1978 Supp.) 73a; Getches, Rosenfelt and
Wilkinson, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (19791, 388 ("c. Crimes by a
Non-Indian Against an Indian: State courts cannot have
jurisdiction.")
This Court has addressed the matter in dicta in State v.
Youpee (1936), 103 Mont. 86, 94, 61 P.2d 832, 835:
"We think the general rule well expressed in 21
Corpus Juris, Sections 128 and 130, pages 538 and
539, where it says: 'It is usually held that a
state court has no jurisdiction over crimes
committed by or against Indians within a
reservation, such jurisdiction being in the ~ n i t e a
States or the tribal courts; but there are a few
decisions, most of them early ones, to the
contrary.'" (Emphasis in original.)
As noted above, the Oliphant decision in 1978 established
that tribal authorities may not prosecute non-Indians.
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court discussed the
steps necessary to establish state jurisdiction in civil and
criminal matters. Kennerly v. District Court of Ninth J.D.
of Montana (1971), 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 ~ . ~ d . 2 d
507. The case arose in Montana, from the Blackfeet tribal
council's attempt in 1967 to vest the State with concurrent
jurisdiction over civil matters, absent the "affirmative
legislative action" by the State as required before 1968 and
absent the tribal consent required--thereafter under 25
U.S.C. 51321-26. The Court stated:
"Section 406 of the Act, 25 U.S.C. S1326 (1964 ed.,
Supp. V) , then provides:
"'State jurisdiction required pursuant to this
subchapter with respect to criminal offenses or
civil causes of action, or with respect to both,
shall be applicable in Indian country only where
the enrolled Indians within the affected area of
such Indian country accept such jurisdiction by a
majority vote of the adult Indians voting at a
special election held for that purpose. The
Secretary of the Interior shall call such special
election under such rules and regulations as he may
prescribe, when requested to do so by the tribal
council or other governing body, or by 20 per
centum of such enrolled adults.'
"We think the meaning of these provisions is clear:
the tribal consent that is prerequisite to the
assumption of state jurisdiction under the
provisions of Title IV of the [Civil Rights Act of
19681 must be manifested by majority vote of the
enrolled Indians within the affected area of Indian
country. Legislative action by the Tribal Council
does not comport with the explicit requirements of
the Act." 400 U.S. at 428-29, 91 S.Ct. at 483, 27
L.Ed.2d at 512.
See also State ex re1 Flammond v. Flammond (1980) Mont .
, 621 P.2d 471, 37 St. Rep. 1991. (A civil action;

contains a discussion of the requirement of State or tribal
action before the State can assert jurisdiction.) No such
tribal consent to the assumption of criminal jurisdiction by
the State has been granted by the Crow tribe. It is not for
this Court or the State to usurp the function of the tribe.
We hold, therefore, that the District Court properly
dismissed those charges arising from the alleged theft of the
Siemion calf.
We affirm the District Court's dismissal of the charge
relating to the theft of the Siemion calf. We dismiss that
portion of the appeal arising from the dismissal by the
District Court of the remaining charges.
We concur:

3 ~ ~Wd .
8
Chief Justice
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d i s s e n t i n g .

My dissent is directed to the second issue and that is
whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n dismissing charges r e l a t i n g

t o the t h e f t of t h e Siemion c a l f . A s previously noted i n the
o p i n i o n of t h e m a j o r i t y , N e l v e t t S i e m i o n is a n e n r o l l e d member of
t h e Crow T r i b e . Not o n l y i s s h e an e n r o l l e d member of t h e Crow

Tribe, b u t s h e is a c i t i z e n of t h e S t a t e of Montana, and a s a

citizen of the State of Montana, she is entitled to all
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s other c i t i z e n s enjoy. This Court, i n the

case of S t a t e ex rel. K e n n e r l y v. District Court (1970), 154
Mont. 488, 4 6 6 P.2d 85, i n a matter concerning c i v i l j u r i s d i c -

tion, reviewed the problem of Indian rights and the effect

federal and state jurisdictional problems have had upon our
Indian citizens. W h i l e t h a t c a s e i n v o l v e s a c i v i l m a t t e r , much

o f which was s a i d t h e r e i n , i t is a p p l i c a b l e h e r e , e v e n t h o u g h t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t r e v e r s e d o u r d e c i s i o n on a t e c h n i c a l
m a t t e r of a p p r o v a l of I n d i a n o r d i n a n c e s by t h e C o n g r e s s . Some of
w h a t we s a i d i n E n n g r l y is c e r t a i n l y a p p l i c a b l e h e r e and i t is

i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h e C o u r t c o n s i d e r t h e r i g h t of an I n d i a n c i t i z e n
i n a c r i m i n a l m a t t e r s u c h a s we h a v e b e f o r e u s .
I n -n n e r l y w e n o t e d
Ke t h a t the jurisdiction problem a r i s i n g

f r o m c i v i l and c r i m i n a l l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n I n d i a n s and
non-Indians, h a s been b e f o r e t h i s Court s i n c e s t a t e h o o d . With

some 25,000 p l u s I n d i a n c i t i z e n s l i v i n g on o r n e a r one of seven

Indian Reservations i n the s t a t e , it is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e t h a t t h e

problem is not new; however, because of the duality of the
Indian's legal status, e a c h c a s e m u s t be c o n s i d e r e d i n l i g h t of
b o t h s t a t e and f e d e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
I n d i a n s , r e s i d e n t i n Montana, w h e t h e r t h e y a r e f u l l - b l o o d or

partial-blood, allotted or not a l l o t t e d , d o m i c i l e on t h e reser-

v a t i o n o r o f f of i t , of one t r i b e or a n o t h e r , o r whatever their
s t a t u s , a r e c i t i z e n s of t h e S t a t e of Montana. They a r e e n t i t l e d

t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n of o u r laws and a r e r e s p o n s i b l e t o o u r l a w s .

They a r e e n t i t l e d to register to v o t e and many d o . They are
e n t i t l e d t o h o l d p u b l i c o f f i c e , and some d o . They v o t e i n g o o d l y

numbers for o f f i c e of judge of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and for the
j u s t i c e s of t h i s Court. To now h o l d , a s we do i n t h e m a j o r i t y

opinion, t h a t an I n d i a n c i t i z e n , who r e s i d e s on a r e s e r v a t i o n ,

who h a s no p r o t e c t i o n from t h e f e d e r a l l a w on t h a t r e s e r v a t i o n
concerning the s t e a l i n g of o n e of h i s head of cattle, is n o t
entitled to the protection of t h i s Court, is, i n my o p i n i o n ,

d e p r i v i n g one of o u r c i t i z e n s t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws.
Article 11, S e c t i o n 16 of the 1972 C o n s t i t u t i o n provides:
"The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . C o u r t ' s of
j u s t i c e s h a l l be open t o e v e r y p e r s o n , and
s p e e d y remedy a f f o r d e d f o r e v e r y i n j u r y of
person, property, or character. No p e r s o n
s h a l l be d e p r i v e d of h i s f u l l l e g a l r e d r e s s
f o r i n j u r y i n c u r r e d f o r employment f o r which
a n o t h e r p e r s o n may be l i a b l e e x c e p t a s t o
f e l l o w e m p l o y e e s and h i s i m m e d i a t e employer
who h i r e d him i f s u c h i m m e d i a t e employer pro-
v i d e s c o v e r a g e under Workers' Compensation
l a w s of t h i s S t a t e . R i g h t and j u s t i c e s h a l l
be administered without s a l e , d e n i a l , or
delay."
By h o l d i n g a s we d o , we a r e d i s e n f r a n c h i s i n g an I n d i a n c i t i -
zen living within the external boundaries of an I n d i a n reser-
vation. W a r e c l o s i n g o u r C o u r t s t o a l a r g e number of c i t i z e n s
e

of I n d i a n h e r i t a g e who l i v e on a r e s e r v a t i o n . W a r e denying
e

protection from t h e criminal e l e m e n t of the s t a t e who go upon
r e s e r v a t i o n s and d e p r i v e I n d i a n c i t i z e n s of t h e i r p r o p e r t y . Long

ago, i n 1 9 5 2 , J u s t i c e Angstman, i n o p i n i o n B o n n e t v. Seekins
( 1 9 5 2 ) , 1 2 6 Mont. 24, 243 P.2d 3 1 7 , h e l d t h a t t h e c o u r t s of t h i s

S t a t e a r e open t o c i t i z e n ' s of I n d i a n e x t r a c t i o n . Today, we a r e

d e n y i n g o n e of t h o s e c i t i z e n s a r i g h t t o come t o C o u r t i n a c r i -
minal matter.
Equal protection of the laws r e q u i r e s that a l l persons be

treated alike under like circumstances. Billings Associated
Plumbing, Heating & Cooling Contractors v. State Board of
Plumbers ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . --- , 602 P.2d 5 9 7 , 36 S t . R e p . 1996,
Montana' Constitution offers greater protection to its citizen
t h a n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e s e p r o t e c t i o n s
s h o u l d go t o o u r I n d i a n c i t i z e n s a s well a s n o n - I n d i a n s .
 I would f i n d t h a t t h e r e is j u r i s d i c t i o n in t h i s matter with
r e l a t i o n t o a t h e f t by a n o n - I n d i a n of a c a l f of a I n d i a n c i t i z e n
and would remand t h e a c t i o n t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r t r i a l .

I
L
Justice
W
L,

I concur in the foregoing dissent.

&kr