TJo. 82e.488
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF TEE STATE OF nTO?JTANA
1-98 3
IPJ R TEE PIAREIAGE O
E F
IIICI'IAEL T . MEYER,
P e t i t i o n e r and R e s p o n d e n t ,
-vs-
DEBORAII .?I. ?$EYER,
Respondent and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: Dlstrict Court of t n e Tenth J u d i c l a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f F e r g u s , The I l o n o r a b l e
LeRoy McKinnon, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For Appellant:
T o r g e r S, O a a s , Lewistown, Pqontana
For Respondent :
Leonard H. IlcKinney , Lewistown, Flontana
-- - - ---- ----
S u b m l t t e d on B r i e f s : ?,larch 3 1 , 1 9 8 3
Decided: May 1 9 , 1 9 8 3
Filed:
MAY 1 9 1983
---
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e L , C. G u l b r a n d s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s a p p e a l s t e m s from a s u p p l e m e n t a l d e c r e e e n t e r e d by t h e
District Court of the Tenth J u d i c i a l District, Fergus County,
which decree provided for split custody of minor children,
w i t h o u t p r o v i s i o n s f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t , and w i t h o u t s p e c i f i c p r o v i -
sions for visitation.
The p a r t i e s were m a r r i e d on S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , 1 9 7 2 , and a t t h a t
time respondent, Deborah Meyer, had a son, Tracy. Petitioner
Mike Meyer adopted Tracy approximately f i v e or six years after
h i s m a r r i a g e t o Deborah.
After t h e y were m a r r i e d , t h e p a r t i e s moved t o Bozeman, so
t h a t t h e husband c o u l d c o m p l e t e h i s e d u c a t i o n , d u r i n g which t i m e
w i f e was employed and c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e f a m i l y .
A f t e r he g r a d u a t e d , he o b t a i n e d a j o b a s a t e a c h e r and c o a c h i n
Lewistown. H e has held t h i s p o s t f o r the p a s t seven y e a r s .
While r e s i d i n g i n Lewistown, t h e p a r t i e s had two c h i l d r e n ,
S h a y n e , now a g e f i v e , and J i l l e a n , now a g e two. After the b i r t h
o f S h a y n e , t h e w i f e d i d n o t r e t u r n t o work on a p e r m a n e n t b a s i s .
She stayed in the home and cared for the children until she
e n r o l l e d a t E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e i n B i l l i n g s (EMC) i n 1982.
I n 1981, t h e w i f e began a t t e n d i n g c l a s s e s a t t h e Lewistown
College Center so t h a t she could o b t a i n a teaching c e r t i f i c a t e .
She a c q u i r e d a l l t h e c r e d i t s t h a t she c o u l d through t h e C e n t e r .
I t was t h e n d e c i d e d s h e s h o u l d go t o EMC t o o b t a i n t h e o t h e r cre-
d i t s s h e needed i n o r d e r t o become a c e r t i f i e d t e a c h e r .
When s h e began a t t e n d i n g EMC, t h e a r r a n g e m e n t was t h a t s h e
was t o go t o B i l l i n g s Monday e v e n i n g s and r e t u r n t o Lewistown on
Thursday evenings, as her classes were only on Tuesday and
Thursday. However, t h i s a r r a n g e m e n t o n l y l a s t e d f o r a c o u p l e of
weeks. After t h a t time, t h e w i f e began t o spend more time i n
Billings. The e v i d e n c e a s t o e x a c t l y why t h e time l e n g t h e n e d i s
conflicting .
W h i l e w i f e was a t t e n d i n g EMC and Mike was w o r k i n g , a baby-
s i t t e r c a r e d f o r t h e y o u n g e r c h i l d r e n d u r i n g t h e day. Mike c a r e d
f o r t h e c h i l d r e n and t h e h o u s e i n t h e e v e n i n g .
The w i f e r e t u r n e d t o L e w i s t o w n s p r i n g q u a r t e r t o do h e r s t u -
dent teaching. She moved back in with the family, but the
s i t u a t i o n was t e n s e b e t w e e n h e r and h u s b a n d .
D u r i n g s p r i n g q u a r t e r , w i f e made numerous t r i p s t o B i l l i n g s ,
e i t h e r l e a v i n g t h e c h i l d r e n w i t h t h e husband o r a s i t t e r . Only
once, a f t e r s h e had had husband j a i l e d for assault,did she take
t h e two y o u n g e r c h i l d r e n w i t h h e r . The e v i d e n c e is c o n f l i c t i n g
a s t o why t h e t r i p s were made.
T h r e e i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d by a p p e l l a n t f o r o u r r e v i e w :
1. Whether i t was e r r o r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o s e p a r a t e
t h e c h i l d r e n by a w a r d i n g c u s t o d y of T r a c y t o t h e w i f e and the
o t h e r two t o t h e h u s b a n d ?
2. Whether i t was e r r o r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t n o t t o award
t h e w i f e c h i l d s u p p o r t i n l i g h t of h e r r e q u e s t f o r s u c h s u p p o r t ?
3. Whether it was e r r o r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o r e f u s e t o
g r a n t a s p e c i f i c v i s i t a t i o n schedule, d e s p i t e the recognized ani-
m o s i t y between t h e p a r t i e s ?
A s t o w i f e ' s f i r s t c o n t e n t i o n t h a t i t was e r r o r t o s p l i t t h e
c h i l d r e n , we d i s a g r e e .
I n c h i l d c u s t o d y m a t t e r s , t h e p r i m a r y f a c t o r t o be c o n s i d e r e d
i s t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d . S e c t i o n 40-4-212, MCA, Malcom
v . Malcom ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont. , 6 4 0 P.2d 4 5 0 , 39 S t . R e p . 262.
A s r e s p o n d e n t a r g u e s , t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e word c h i l d u s e d i n
s e c t i o n 40-4-212, MCA, mandates t h a t the b e s t i n t e r e s t of each
c h i l d be c o n s i d e r e d , Hovey v. D e p a r t m e n t of Revenue ( 1 9 8 3 ) ,
Mont. , 659 P.2d 280, 40 St.Rep. 272, n o t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t
o f t h e c h i l d r e n as a c o l l e c t i v e .
"In reviewing the D i s t r i c t Courts custody
o r d e r , t h i s C o u r t need o n l y l o o k t o t h e r e c o r d
t o see if the factors s e t forth i n section
40-4-212, MCA, were c o n s i d e r e d , and m u s t
determine whether the trial court made
appropriate findings with respect to these
criteria. M a r k e g a r d v. Markegard ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,
Mont . , 616 P.2d 3 2 3 , 3 2 5 , 37 S t . R e p .
1 5 3 9 , 1540"- B i e r v. S h e r r a r d ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - -
.
A
Mont , 6 2 3 P.2d 5 5 0 , 5 5 1 , 3 8 S t . R e p . 158;
159.
The f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h by t h a t s e c t i o n a r e a s f o l l o w s :
"40-4-212. B e s t i n t e r e s t of c h i l d . The c o u r t
s h a l l determine custody i n accordance with the
b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d . The c o u r t s h a l l
consider a l l relevant factors including:
" ( 1 ) t h e wishes of t h e child's parent or
p a r e n t s a s t o h i s custody;
" ( 2 ) t h e wishes of the child as to his
custodian;
" ( 3 ) t h e i n t e r a c t i o n and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of
the child with h i s parent or parents, h i s
s i b l i n g s , and a n y o t h e r p e r s o n who may s i g n i -
f i c a n t l y af f e c t t h e c h i l d 's b e s t i n t e r e s t ;
" ( 4 ) the c h i l d ' s adjustment to his home,
s c h o o l , and community; and
"(5) t h e m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l health of all
i n d i v i d u a l s involved."
S p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s on e a c h of t h e e l e m e n t s need n o t be made,
where there is substantial evidence to support the findings
adopted. S p e e r v. Speer ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont . , 6 5 4 P.2d 1 0 0 1 ,
39 St.Rep. 2204, 2206.
I n t h i s case, it is e v i d e n t from t h e c o u r t ' s findings that
s u c h f a c t o r s were c o n s i d e r e d . The f i n d i n g s s e t o u t t h e e s s e n t i a l
and d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t s upon which the District Court rested its
conclusions a s is r e q u i r e d by Cameron v. Cameron (1982),
Mont. , 6 4 1 P.2d 1 0 5 7 , 39 S t . R e p . 4 8 5 , 488. They s p e a k t o
s u c h f a c t s a s t h e c h i l d r e n ' s c a r e by t h e p a r e n t s , and t h e o l d e r
c h i l d ' s wishes regarding custody. T h e r e is a l s o ample e v i d e n c e
i n t h e r e c o r d of t h i s case t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s . Examples of
such evidence are:
1. t h e t e s t i m o n y of b o t h p a r e n t s t h a t e a c h wanted c u s t o d y of
a l l t h e c h i l d r e n , a l t h o u g h n e i t h e r of them t h o u g h t t h e c h i l d r e n
s h o u l d be s e p a r a t e d ;
2. the court's interview with Tracy, the oldest child,
r e g a r d i n g who he w i s h e d t o l i v e w i t h ;
3. the testimony elicited on the relationship of the
c h i l d r e n w i t h e a c h o t h e r and b o t h p a r e n t s ;
4. t h e t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g how t h e c h i l d r e n had a d j u s t e d t o
t h e home and v a r i o u s s i t u a t i o n s ;
5. some testimony on the general health of the children.
Based on t h e f i n d i n g s and t h i s e v i d e n c e , we s e e no a b u s e of
d i s c r e t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n r e g a r d s t o c u s t o d y .
Abuse of d i s c r e t i o n a s a s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w a l s o a p p l i e s t o
t h e n e x t i s s u e r a i s e d r e g a r d i n g t h e award of c h i l d s u p p o r t , a s we
have p r e v i o u s l y noted i n G r e n f e l l v. G r e n f e l l ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 2 Mont.
2 2 9 , 596 P.2d 205, w h e r e we s t a t e d :
"The s t a n d a r d f o r r e v i e w i n g m a i n t e n a n c e and
c h i l d s u p p o r t awards is w e l l s e t t l e d in
Montana. The award made by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l u n l e s s t h e r e
h a s b e e n a c l e a r a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n r e s u l t i n g
i n substantial injustice. I n Re M a r r i a g e of
Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont. 5 8 7 P.2d 3 6 1 ,
367, 35 St.Rep. 1733, 1740. The D i s t r i c t
C o u r t , i n making i t s m a i n t e n a n c e and c h i l d
s u p p o r t a w a r d s , m u s t c o n s i d e r t h e i t e m s and
f a c t o r s s e t o u t i n s e c t i o n s 48-322 and 48-323,
R.C.M. 1947, now sections 40-4-203 and
40-4-204, MCA." 596 P.2d a t 207.
Here, t h e record r e v e a l s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court heard testi-
mony concerning the income of the parties, their standard of
living and other relevant factors as is required by section
40-4-204, MCA. This testimony indicated t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s were
employed, that they make almost equal incomes e , husband
$ 1 , 0 9 5 p e r month, w i f e $800 p e r month a t t h a t time and p r e s e n t l y
$950 p e r m o n t h ) , and t h a t e a c h had a home t h a t c o u l d a d e q u a t e l y
accommodate t h e c h i l d r e n .
Based on t h i s evidence, it is a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e r e was no
abuse of discretion on the p a r t of the District Court i n not
awarding t h e a p p e l l a n t c h i l d s u p p o r t . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d
findings concerning the fact that each party was presently
employed w i t h an income. These f i n d i n g s , coupled w i t h t h e evi-
d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y e q u a l incomes and a b i l i t i e s
to care for the children, support the court's conclusion that
each p a r t y should support the c h i l d or c h i l d r e n i n t h e i r custody.
As to the last i s s u e of whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court should
h a v e s e t up a s p e c i f i c v i s i t a t i o n s c h e d u l e , we f i n d no e r r o r .
Both t h e husband and w i f e raise t h e i s s u e of visitation in
their request for custody. They both specifically request
c u s t o d y of the children with reasonable v i s i t a t i o n to the other
parent.
Wife contends t h a t i t was an abuse of discretion for the
t r i a l court not to set a specific v i s i t a t i o n schedule, a s such
s c h e d u l e is n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e of t h e a n i m o s i t y t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
found t o e x i s t between the parents. Although i n some c i r c u m -
stances i t would be a n a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n where n e c e s s i t y is
shown, t h i s is n o t such a c a s e . The r e c o r d in t h i s case indi-
cates each p a r t y ' s willingness to allow the other visitation.
T h e r e is no showing t h a t a h a r d and f a s t v i s i t a t i o n s c h e d u l e is
needed. The c o u r t ' s findings here support its conclusion t h a t
r e a s o n a b l e v i s i t a t i o n is a l l t h a t is r e q u i r e d .
The r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e t y p e of v i s i t a t i o n p r i v i l e g e s g r a n t e d
t h e p a r e n t s i n t h i s c a s e is most a b l y s t a t e d by t h e W a s h i n g t o n
Supreme C o u r t i n Rivard v. Rivard ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 7 5 Wash.2d 415, 451
P.2d 6 7 7 , where t h e y s t a t e :
"'Many t r i a l c o u r t s do what was d o n e i n t h i s
case, i.e., leave considerable l a t i t u d e i n the
m a t t e r of visitation privileges, for the
reason t h a t , i f the p a r t i e s a r e reasonable i n
t h e i r a p p r o a c h t o t h e p r o b l e m , t h e y c a n work
i t o u t on a m u t u a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y b a s i s and
a v o i d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t t o a h a r d and
f a s t v i s i t a t i o n schedule. I f , however, t h e
p a r t i e s c a n n o t a g r e e , t h e c o u r t must t h e n
d e f i n e t h e p r i v i l e g e so minutely t h a t t h e r e
c a n be no o p p o r t u n i t y f o r m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ' "
4 5 1 P.2d a t 679.
Under this rationale, if t h i s v i s i t a t i o n arrangement turns
o u t t o be u n w o r k a b l e f o r t h e p a r t i e s , t h e y c a n r e t u r n t o D i s t r i c t
C o u r t and h a v e t h e i r v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s c l a r i f i e d . S a n d e r s o n v.
Sanderson (1981), Mont. , 6 2 3 P.2d 1 3 8 8 , 38 S t . R e p . 277.
/
For the foregoing reasons, the ~ i s t r i c t h u r t ' sdecree is
a f firmed.
Justi&
W e concur:
Chief J u s t i c e \