No. 8 7 - 1 7 0
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
DIXIE RAE HALVERSON,
Petitioner and Respondent,
and
LARRIE E. HALVERSON,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Daniels,
The Honorable M. James Sorte, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven; J. Daniel Hoven,
Helena., Montana
For Respondent:
Wright, Tolliver & Guthals; Kenneth D. ~olliver,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: Nov. 13, 1 9 8 7
Decided: February 2, 1 9 8 8
Clerk
Mr. Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Larrie E. Halverson appeals a judgment of the Fifteenth
Judicial District Court, Daniels County, dividing marits.1
property of Larrie and Dixie Halverson.
We affirm.
Appellant Larrie Halverson raises the following issues:
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it.
valued a portion of the Halversons' marital assets as of the
date of the parties' separation and valued the remainder of
the assets as of the date of dissolution?
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it
held that Dixie was entitled to temporary maintenance in
accord with the parties' October 4, 1984, stipulation?
Larrie and Dixie Halverson were married on June 19,
1957. During their marriage of nearly thirty years, Larrie
and Dixie accumulated marital property consisting of 1,200
acres of deeded farm land, 1,035 acres of agricultural state
leases, approximately 24,000 bushels of grain in storage,
various farm machinery and miscellaneous personal property.
Larrie and Dixie also owe $149,000 to the Federal Land Bank
of Sidney and approximately $29,000 to the Citizens State
Bank of Scobey.
In February 1984, Dixie and Larrie separated. ~ a r r i e
moved from the couple's rented home in Scobey to the farm
property. Larrie managed the farm property through the
sununer of 1984. Dixie resided in Scobey and continued in her
job as manager of the local radio station. Dixie did not
participate in any farm management activities during 1984.
On June 4, 1984, Dixie petitioned to dissolve the
marriage. On September 17, 1984, Dixie filed a motion seek-
ing temporary child support and maintenance. Subsequently,
the District Court ordered Larrie to show cause why he shoulcl
not be required to pay $1,000 per month in maintenance. The
Court also restrained Larrie from disposing of real or per-
sonal property. Prior to hearing, the parties stipulated
that Larrie would pay $600 per month in maintenance during
the pendency of the action. On October 4, 1984, the District
Court granted petitioner Dixie's motion for a decree of
dissolution. The court reserved its ruling on property
distribution and debt obligations.
As stated earlier, Larrie managed the farm following
the parties' separation in February 1984. However, Larrie's
farming decisions for 1984 were much different than in earli-
er years. Larrie did not obtain crop insurance. Larrie
elected to seed all land rather than leaving roughly half of
it in summer fallow. His election disqualified the
Halversons from any federal farm subsidy programs. Larrie
then took an extended vacation to Alaska during the summer of
1984. Larrie testified that he "was mistaken about the final
date for signing up for [crop] insurance" and failed to do
so. Dixie testified that, prior to the insurance deadline,
she warned Larrie to purchase crop insurance.
Larrie's 1984 farming decisions resulted in a poor 1984
farm yield. The Halversons received no federal payments or
crop insurance proceeds. As a result, on October 30, 1984,
Larrie was forced to borrow $21,000 to pay the 1984 land
mortgage payment.
On April 6, 1985, Larrie and Dixie entered into a farm
partnership agreement. The farm partnership agreement re-
quired that the parties evenly split all farm proceeds and
debts. Subsequent to entering the agreement, Larrie, over
Dixie's objection, applied $23,000 of the 1985 farming pro-
ceeds to Larrie's October 30, 1984, note.
Issue 1
Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it
valued a portion of the Halversons' marital assets and debts
as of the date of separation and valued the remainder of
assets and debts as of the date of dissolution?
The standard of review of division of marital property
is found in In Re Marriage of Hall (Mont. 1987), 740 ~ . 2 d
684, 686, 44 St.Rep. 1321, 1323, which provides:
As stated by this Court, our functions
are as limited as the District Court's
functions are broad. We have concluded
that in a property distribution review
in marriage dissolution, this Court will
reverse a District Court only upon a
showing that the District Court has
acted arbitrarily or has committed a
clear abuse of discretion, resulting in
either instance in substantial
injustice.
In its findings of fact, the District Court found that
Larrie "conducted the farm and ranch operation following the
parties' separation without participation of [Dixie]."
Accordingly, the court valued the farm operation as of the
date of separation to avoid "unfairness to the parties which
would have resulted from attributing the husband's post
separation losses to the wife."
The District Court also found that following separa-
tion, the parties' farm land continued to decline in value
due to market conditions which were the fault of neither the
husband nor the wife. As a result, the court valued the
parties' land, farm equipment and personal property at the
date of dissolution.
Larrie cites the general rule that when valuing marital
estates the District Court is required to determine the net
worth of the parties at the time of dissolution. In Re
Marriage of Kramer (1978), 177 Mont. 61, 67, 580 P.2d 439,
442; Downs v. Downs (1976), 170 Mont. 150, 551 P.2d 1025,
appeal after remand 181 Mont. 163, 165, 592 P.2d 938, 939.
Therefore, Larrie argues the District Court abused its dis-
cretion when it valued the farm operation at the date of
separation in February 1984.
A review of the record supports the District Court's
finding that Larrie excluded Dixie from her normal role as
co-manager of the Halverson farm. Larrie, contrary to the
Halversons' traditional farm practices, seeded the land
"fence to fence." Larrie's decision to seed fence to fence
excluded the Halverson farm from any federal farm subsidy
programs. Further, he refused, over Dixie's objection, to
purchase crop insurance. The Halversons' low farm yield is
directly attributable to Larrie's 1984 management decisions.
Additionally, Larrie refused or was unable to testify
to the amount of 1984 farm proceeds. He testified that he
used the 1984 farm proceeds, including sales of an undis-
closed amount of grain in storage, to make numerous unrecord-
ed "cash" purchases. Larrie refused or was unable to testify
to the amount of the above-mentioned purchases. The District
Court was then faced with the unenviable task of dividing an
unknown amount of farm assets.
The District Court in its findings of fact stated:
The Court finds the most equitable and
clearest manner with which to deal with
the parties' post-separation finances is
to value these current assets and lia-
bilities at time of separation for
purposes of property division.
The husband's 1984 farming operation is
easily accounted for. The husband had
complete control and, fairly, should be
held responsible for the 1984 results.
Equitably, it is fair to charge him with
the December, 1984, Federal Land Bank
payment for the use he made of the
family farm in 1984. He, then, would
also be entitled to the fruits of his
1984 crop efforts which he, in fact,
had. Therefore, the indebtedness of
$23,600.00 incurred post-divorce and the
1984 crop proceeds are attributed solely
to the husband.
To approach this matter otherwise would
present a nearly insoluble problem. The
husband had sole access to and control
of the parties' grain and funds in 1984.
He testified that he purchased numerous
antique firearms, post-separation, for
cash. He declined to have such items
appraised deeming them "irrelevant" to
this proceeding. On this state of the
evidence, it is impossible for the Court
to fairly allocate the 1984 crop year
between the parties. The Court declines
to attempt the impossible.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it
valued the Halversons' farm operation at the date of separa-
tion. If the court had valued the farm operation as appel-
lant Larrie suggests, Dixie would be forced to share
responsibility of 1984 debts incurred solely by Larrie.
We note the general rule that proper distribution of
marital property requires a finding of net worth at or near
the time of dissolution. Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), 186
Mont. 282, 283, 607 P.2d 102, 103. However, when the appli-
cation of this rule would create an inequitable disposition,
it is proper for the District Court to utilize a differing
valuation date. In Re the Marriage of Wagner (~ont.1984),
679 P.2d 753, 757, 41 St.Rep. 409, 414; In re Marriage of
Lippert (Mont. 1981), 627 P.2d 1206, 1208, 38 St.Rep. 625; In
Re Marriage of Hunter (19821, 196 Mont. 235, 239, 639 P=2d
The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it
valued the Halversons' marital assets.
Issue 2
Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it
held that Dixie was entitled to temporary maintenance in
accord with the parties' October 4, 1984, stipulation?
Prior to the October 4, 1984, show cause hearing, Dixie
and Larrie stipulated that Larrie would pay Dixie $600 per
month until their property was divided and distributed. The
stipulation provided in pertinent part: "That by October 8,
1984, respondent Larrie E. Halverson would pay the petitioner
$600 in temporary maintenance, and said payments - continue
to
during the pendency - -
of this action and to be paid to the
petitioner by respondent on the 1st of each month." [Empha-
sis added.]
On April 9, 1985, Larrie and Dixie entered into a farm
partnership agreement. Larrie and Dixie agreed to equally
divide farm profits and losses. Additionally, Larrie was to
receive wages of $500 per month. The farm partnership agree-
ment did not make reference to the parties' October 4, 1984,
stipulation. Nor did the agreement contain language address-
ing the maintenance issue. Subsequent to entering the farm
partnership agreement, Larrie discontinued maintenance
payments.
In its May 12, 1986, findings of fact and conclusions
of law, the District Court found Larrie bound by the stipula-
tion. The court noted that Larrie had failed to modify his
maintenance obligation pursuant to S 40-4-208, MCA, and was
therefore responsible for the stipulated maintenance.
Larrie contends that his maintenance obligation was
terminated when he and Dixie entered the farm partnership
agreement. Larrie claims the parties intended the farm
partnership would terminate maintenance. However, Larrie
failed to produce evidence that the parties' intended to
terminate maintenance. Further, the farm partnership
agreement is silent to the maintenance issue.
The District Court properly held that the farm partner-
ship agreement did not terminate the maintenance stipulation:
The husband contends that his obligation
to make support was eliminated by the
1985 farm partnership agreement between
the parties. However, there is no
reference to modification of the stipu-
lated maintenance within the four cor-
ners of the agreement. The wife
testified that there was no mention of
modification of the maintenance prior to
her signing the farm partnership agree-
ment. The Court cannot find, on this
evidence, a factual basis for terminat-
ing a maintenance stipulation which was
part of the dissolution proceedings.
Larrie next contends the District Court failed to make
proper findings of need and duration required by § 40-4-121
and § 40-4-203, MCA, prior to awarding temporary maintenance.
However, the District Court is not required to make such
findings when the parties voluntarily entered into the main-
tenance agreement.
We hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion
when it held that Dixie was entitled to temporary maintenance
in accord with the maintenance stipulation.
Affirmed.
Chief Justice
We concur: