No. 8 9 - 0 9 9
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1989
RODNEY and DEBRA THELEN, RICHARD and DANA BUECHER,
SUSAN GRASSO, LARRY and NANCY PINNOW, and GEORGE W.
CLEVELAND, JR.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
CITY OF BILLINGS, HEIGHTS SEWER BOARD, BLACK and
VEATCH, COP CONSTRUCTION CO., SANDERSON, STEWART,
GASTON ENGINEERING, INC., and CHRISTIAN, SPRING,
SEILBACH & ASSOCIATES, jointly and severally,
Defendants/Cross-Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable Russel K. Fillner, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jerrold L. Nye, Nye & Meyer; Billings, MT
For Respondent:
Mark S. Werner, McNamer & Thompson; ~illings, MT
Ronald R. Lodders, Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole
and Dietrich; Billings, MT
W. Anderson Forsythe, Moulton, Bellingham, Longo
and Mather; Billings, MT
. . Dwaine Roybal, Keefer, Roybal, Hanson & Stacey;
J
P- _Billings, MT.
i~c)
C'3 / 1
Submitted on Briefs: May 25, 1 9 8 9
-" 3
i~ Decided: July 5, 1 9 8 9
Mr. Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
This appeal concerns alleged negligence and inverse
condemnation on the part of a city government, a contractor
and an engineering firm in designing and constructing a sewer
system. Plaintiffs Rodney and Debra Thelen, et al.
(Plaintiffs) appeal from the Amended Judgment of the District
Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone
County. The court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants City of Billings, Black & Veatch and COP
Construction Co. We affirm.
Plaintiffs present a single issue on appeal:
Whether the Amended Judgment of November 16, 1988,
granting summary judgment to Defendants by the Montana
District Court and dismissing Plaintiffs' case was proper.
In 1984, construction began on a sewer system project
undertaken by the City of Billings in the Billings Heights
area. The City hired engineering firms and a contractor to
design, supervise and build the project. Preliminary studies
showed that the soil in the area where Plaintiffs' homes are
located contained ground water in quantities that might
interfere with the excavation of trenches where sewer lines
would be buried. The plans therefore called for the
contractor, COP Construction Co., to take steps to "dewater"
the trenches through the use of "dewatering wells".
Construction of the project began in a neighborhood some
distance from Plaintiffs' homes. Dewatering wells were
employed to keep water out of the trenches. The water that
collected in the wells was pumped into an existing irrigation
ditch that ran through the area, passing near Plaintiffs'
homes. At the time in question, the ditch was alleged to
have been i n use f o r i r r i g a t i o n of f i e l d s n e a r t h e homes.
The use of the ditch for disposal of water from the
d e w a t e r i n g w e l l s was a l l e g e d t o have i n c r e a s e d t h e amount o f
w a t e r i n t h e d i t c h beyond normal l e v e l s used f o r i r r i g a t i o n .
The first construction activity in Plaintiffs'
neighborhood consisted of COP d i g g i n g a " t e s t hole" i n an
alley. The workers d i g g i n g t h e h o l e e n c o u n t e r e d a h i g h w a t e r
t a b l e t h a t p r e v e n t e d c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e h o l e and any f u r t h e r
excavation. While t h e h o l e was b e i n g dug, a w a t e r main was
broken. COP t u r n e d o f f t h e t h e w a t e r and r e p a i r e d t h e main,
b u t i t b r o k e a g a i n t h e n e x t day. The main was a g a i n t u r n e d
o f f and remained o f f u n t i l more permanent r e p a i r s were made
some time later. COP then refilled the test hole and
suspended work in Plaintiffs' vicinity, moving t o another
area of t h e project.
While t h e e x a c t t i m e frame i s d i s p u t e d i n t h e r e c o r d ,
sometime after COP'S departure from the area Plaintiffst
basements began t o f l o o d . Some t e s t i f i e d i n d e p o s i t i o n t h a t
t h e water rose a s much a s two feet i n t o t h e i r basements,
causing damage to carpet, wall coverings and concrete.
Plaintiffs and other residents of the area held a public
m e e t i n g a t t e n d e d by COP, t h e C i t y and p r o j e c t e n g i n e e r s , a t
which i t was a g r e e d t h a t COP would i n s t a l l d e w a t e r i n g w e l l s
t o a l l e v i a t e the flooding. The w e l l s were i n s t a l l e d , and t h e
water receded from Plaintiffs ' basements. There were no
further problems with flooding for the duration of the
c o n s t r u c t i o n work, and t h e p r o j e c t was completed.
P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d t h i s l a w s u i t i n August o f 1 9 8 5 , naming
a number o f p e r s o n s and e n t i t i e s i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e p r o j e c t a s
defendants. P l a i n t i f f s alleged t h a t the defendants' f a i l u r e
to anticipate and control the ground w a t e r they "knew o r
s h o u l d have known" t o be p r e s e n t amounted t o n e g l i g e n c e , and
a l s o worked a wrongful taking of Plaintiff's property by
inverse condemnation. After several motions for partial
summary judgment, the field of parties being sued was
e v e n t u a l l y reduced t o t h e C i t y o f B i l l i n g s , t h e e n g i n e e r i n g
f i r m Black and Veatch, and COP C o n s t r u c t i o n Co., referred t o
here a s Defendants. Defendants e a c h moved s e p a r a t e l y for
summary judgment. In a s i n g l e Memorandum and O r d e r , the
District Court granted t h e motions, holding (1) Defendants
b r e a c h e d no d u t y r u n n i n g from t h e m s e l v e s toward P l a i n t i f f s ,
and (2) Plaintiffs were unable to show damage to their
property t h a t was p r o x i m a t e l y c a u s e d by D e f e n d a n t s . This
appeal followed.
On appeal, Plaintiffs first argue that the District
C o u r t m i s a p p l i e d t h e summary judgment s t a n d a r d u s e d i n t h i s
state. Plaintiffs' argument, however, i s based on a
misunderstanding of Montana law. P l a i n t i f f s argue t h a t
Defendants were r e q u i r e d t o show " t h a t t h e f l o o d i n g was n o t
c a u s e d by o r d i d n o t o c c u r a s a d i r e c t r e s u l t o f t h e sewer
e x c a v a t i o n and work." While Defendants were r e q u i r e d t o show
t h a t t h e y were e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a m a t t e r o f law, t h a t
burden did not r e q u i r e Defendants t o p r o v e t h e r e v e r s e of
P l a i n t i f f s ' case. Defendants had t o p r o v e a s a m a t t e r o f law
t h a t P l a i n t i f f s w e r e not e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f . P l a i n t i f f s thus
appear to c o n f u s e t h e burden of proof imposed on a party
moving f o r summary judgment w i t h t h a t imposed on a p l a i n t i f f
in every civil suit. This fundamental misunderstanding
t a i n t s P l a i n t i f f s ' arguments t o t h i s C o u r t .
I n o r d e r f o r summary judgment t o i s s u e p u r s u a n t t o Rule
5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., the movant must show t h a t there i s no
g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o any f a c t deemed m a t e r i a l i n l i g h t o f t h e
s u b s t a n t i v e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s e n t i t l i n g t h e movant t o judgment
a s a matter of law. A l l r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s t h a t can be
drawn from o f f e r e d p r o o f w i l l be drawn i n f a v o r o f t h e p a r t y
opposing t h e motion. Cereck v . A l b e r t s o n ' s , Inc. (1981), 195
Mont. 409, 637 P.2d 509. I f t h e movant meets t h i s b u r d e n , it
t h e n s h i f t s t o t h e non-moving p a r t y t o demonstrate a genuine
issue of material f a c t . "Mere d e n i a l o r s p e c u l a t i o n w i l l n o t
suffice, t h e non-moving p a r t y must show f a c t s s u f f i c i e n t t o
raise a genuine issue." Gamble Robinson Co. v. Carousel
Properties ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 2 1 2 Mont. 305, 312, 688 P.2d 283, 287.
These same standards apply to this Court's review of the
d e c i s i o n below. Kronen v . R i c h t e r ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 2 1 1 Mont. 208, 683
P.2d 1315.
Most of the District Court's memorandum i n this case
deals with a single substantive legal principle held to
entitle Defendants to judgment as a matter of law: the
p r i n c i p l e of proximate cause. Proximate c a u s e i s an element
o f t h e c a u s e o f a c t i o n f o r n e g l i g e n c e , and must be proven i n
o r d e r f o r a p l a i n t i f f t o r e c o v e r damages. Young v . F l a t h e a d
County (Mont. 1988), 757 P.2d 772, 45 St.Rep. 1047.
Proximate c a u s e i s a l s o a r e q u i r e d e l e m e n t o f t h e c a u s e o f
a c t i o n f o r i n v e r s e condemnation. Rauser v . Toston I r r i g a t i o n
District (1977) , 172 Mont. 530, 565 P . 2d 632. The i n i t i a l
burden was therefore on Plaintiffs to come forth with
s u f f i c i e n t proof t o r a i s e i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t concerning
each element of their case, including proximate cause.
Absent a showing of proximate cause, both of Plaintiffs'
claims would fail, and Defendants would be entitled to
judgment a s a m a t t e r o f law.
A s t h i s Court n o t e d i n Young, 757 P.2d a t 777, proximate
c a u s e h a s n o t been d e f i n e d c l e a r l y i n Montana law:
L i a b i l i t y , i n any c a u s e o f a c t i o n , a t t a c h e s i f t h e
p l a i n t i f f can p r o v e f i r s t t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i s a
c a u s e i n f a c t o f i n j u r y and t h e n t h a t t h e i n j u r y i s
t h e d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t r e s u l t , p r o x i m a t e l y caused
by t h e n e g l i g e n t a c t . C a u s a t i o n i n f a c t h a s been
d e t e r m i n e d by t h e u s e o f t h e " b u t f o r " t e s t ...
...
I n Montana, p r o x i m a t e c a u s e i s one which i n a
n a t u r a l and c o n t i n u o u s s e q u e n c e , unbroken by a n y
new, independent cause, produces injury, and
w i t h o u t which t h e i n j u r y would n o t h a v e o c c u r r e d .
[citations] This d e f i n i t i o n o f proximate cause
i n c o r p o r a t e s t h e " b u t f o r " d e f i n i t i o n i n t h e words
o f t h e l a s t c l a u s e " [ a ] nd w i t h o u t which t h e i n j u r y
would n o t have o c c u r r e d . " I t i s from t h i s wording
t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between c a u s e i n f a c t and
p r o x i m a t e , o r l e g a l , c a u s e h a s become c l o u d e d .
The Young o p i n i o n t h e r e f o r e went on t o f o c u s on t h e " n a t u r a l
and continuous sequence, unbroken by a n y new, independent
cause," which must be shown t o e s t a b l i s h p r o x i m a t e cause.
B e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , P l a i n t i f f s r e l i e d l a r g e l y on
their own deposition testimony and a "Preliminary
I n v e s t i g a t i o n R e p o r t " p r e p a r e d by a h y d r o g e o l o g i s t h i r e d by
Plaintiffs. Defendants argued i n b r i e f s f i l e d i n support of
t h e i r m o t i o n s f o r summary judgment t h a t t h i s e v i d e n c e a l l e g e d
insufficient f a c t s on which t o b a s e a showing o f p r o x i m a t e
c a u s e , r e l y i n g i n s t e a d on mere s p e c u l a t i o n . I n o t h e r words,
on t h e b a s i s o f t h e p l e a d i n g s and p r o o f i n t h e r e c o r d , i t was
impossible f o r P l a i n t i f f s t o show t h a t D e f e n d a n t s ' a c t i o n s ,
through a natural and c o n t i n u o u s s e q u e n c e unbroken by any
new, independent cause, produced P l a i n t i f f s ' injuries. The
D i s t r i c t Court agreed.
Because of Plaintiffs ' misunderstanding of Montana ' s
summary judgment standard, t h e i r a r g u m e n t s on a p p e a l s u f f e r
from the same flaw addressed by the District Court.
P l a i n t i f f s argue t o t h i s Court t h a t "undisputed f a c t s " i n t h e
record raise sufficient issues of material fact to avoid
summary judgment: (1) P l a i n t i f f s had no problems with
basement f l o o d i n g p r i o r t o t h e e v e n t s a t i s s u e ; (2) the soil
tests performed prior to construction indicated that
d e w a t e r i n g w e l l s would b e n e c e s s a r y t o c o n t r o l g r o u n d w a t e r
in excavations; (3) COP Construction began excavating in
Plaintiffs' v i c i n i t y b e f o r e i n s t a l l i n g d e w a t e r i n g w e l l s and
encountered ground water; (4) Plaintiffs' basements began
f l o o d i n g " w i t h i n a d a y o r two" a f t e r COP began e x c a v a t i o n ;
(5) once dewatering wells were installed, the flooding
subsided; and (6) P l a i n t i f f s h a v e had no further flooding
problems i n t h e i r basements. Plaintiffs state in their brief
t o t h i s C o u r t t h a t t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e i r argument i s t h u s " b u t
f o r " Defendants' a c t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d with excavating t h e test
hole, Plaintiffs' basements would not have flooded.
P l a i n t i f f s c i t e t h e Young o p i n i o n f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t
t h e "but for" test is appropriate i n t h i s case.
The Young o p i n i o n q u o t e d a b o v e s t a t e s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n
between cause in fact and proximate cause. Plaintiffs
c o r r e c t l y c i t e Young f o r t h e " b u t f o r " t e s t , b u t t h e y a p p l y
the test incorrectly. "But f o r " i s a t e s t o f c a u s e i n f a c t ,
n o t proximate cause. S t a t e d a n o t h e r way, t h e " b u t f o r " t e s t
establishes that if the act complained of had not taken
place, the injury would not have resulted. This same
argument, however, can be a p p l i e d t o any c a u s e t h a t m i g h t
have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e flooding; e.g., t h e presence of water
i n t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i t c h , t h e composition of t h e s o i l , o r t h e
w a t e r from s e p t i c t a n k d r a i n f i e l d s i n t h e n e i g h b o r h o o d . By
t a k i n g t h e argument t o i t s l o g i c a l e x t r e m e , it c o u l d b e s a i d
t h a t i f P l a i n t i f f s had n o t b u i l t t h e i r h o u s e s w i t h b a s e m e n t s ,
t h e y would h a v e had no f l o o d i n g p r o b l e m s ( s e v e r a l homes i n
the neighborhood had no basements and thus no flooding).
T h i s i s why t h e law r e q u i r e s a n a c t t o b e t h e p r o x i m a t e
cause of i n j u r y before l i a b i l i t y w i l l a t t a c h . Which o n e o r
more o f t h e c o n t r i b u t i n g c a u s e s i d e n t i f i e d by t h e " b u t f o r "
t e s t , t h r o u g h a n a t u r a l and c o n t i n u o u s s e q u e n c e unbroken by
any new, intervening cause, produced Plaintiffs' injury?
Certainly Plaintiffs' c h o i c e made y e a r s a g o t o b u i l d homes
w i t h b a s e m e n t s would a p p e a r s o l o g i c a l l y r e m o t e t h a t i t c o u l d
not be the proximate cause of the flooding. However, by
r e s t i n g t h e i r c a s e on " u n d i s p u t e d f a c t s " a s s e r t e d t o m e e t t h e
" b u t f o r " t e s t , P l a i n t i f f s i g n o r e t h e r e q u i r e d showing t h a t
Defendants' a c t i o n s w e r e t h e proximate cause o f t h e flooding.
The f a c t s r e c i t e d by P l a i n t i f f s d o n o t g o t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f
whether there was a natural, continuous, uninterrupted
s e q u e n c e between D e f e n d a n t s ' a c t i o n s and t h e f l o o d i n g . They
simply a l l e g e " b u t f o r " .
The h y d r o g e o l o g i s t ' s p r e l i m i n a r y r e p o r t r e l i e d upon by
P l a i n t i f f s below d o e s n o t remedy t h e f l a w i n t h e i r a r g u m e n t .
The r e p o r t drew two main conclusions: (1) i n c r e a s e d w a t e r
flow i n t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i t c h could have caused t h e f l o o d i n g ,
and ( 2 ) e x c a v a t i o n o f a s e w e r t r e n c h between t h e i r r i g a t i o n
d i t c h a n d P l a i n t i f f s ' homes c o u l d have c a u s e d o r c o n t r i b u t e d
t o t h e flooding. The r e p o r t a l s o s t a t e s , " O t h e r f a c t o r s t h a t
would a f f e c t w a t e r table l e v e l a t t h e basements [including
climate, storms, i r r i g a t i o n o f c r o p s a n d normal w a t e r t a b l e
fluctuation] w e r e examined i n a b r i e f p r e l i m i n a r y manner."
This report, as is evident from its very title, was
preliminary. It is based on the application of
hydrogeological t h e o r y t o a number o f p o s s i b l e c a u s e s , and
i t s c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s no c e r t a i n t y o f a n y k i n d a s t o t h e
natural o r continuous sequence o f e v e n t s under Plaintiffs'
theories. I t i s c u r s o r y and s p e c u l a t i v e . W e have h e l d t h a t
s p e c u l a t i v e statements a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o r a i s e a material.
issue of fact. B.M. by B e r g e r v . State ( 1 9 8 5 ) , 215 Mont.
1 7 5 , 1 7 9 , 698 P.2d 399, 401.
Keeping i n mind t h e r u l e from t h e Cereck c a s e t h a t a l l
r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s drawn from t h e r e p o r t must b e drawn i n
favor of Plaintiffs, i t must be noted that the report's
treatment of "other f a c t o r s " could address t h e question of
proximate cause. Examination o f o t h e r p o s s i b l e c a u s e s could
show w h e t h e r t h e " s e q u e n c e " between t h e D e f e n d a n t s ' a c t i o n s
and the Plaintiffs' injury was "unbroken by any new,
independent cause". However, the report's treatment of
"other factors'' is equally speculative, drawing c o n c l u s i o n s
such as, " [rlandom i n s p e c t i o n o f w a t e r t a b l e r e c o r d s ...
suggests that such occurrences may be rare." The only
p o r t i o n o f P l a i n t i f f s ' o f f e r e d proof t h a t reasonably could be
construed a s addressing proximate cause t h u s f a i l s t o r a i s e
an i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t under t h e r u l e i n Berger.
The p r o o f o f f e r e d by P l a i n t i f f s below f a i l e d t o r a i s e a
material issue of f a c t on t h e q u e s t i o n o f p r o x i m a t e c a u s e .
D e f e n d a n t s moved for summary judgment, and p o i n t e d o u t t h e
flaw in Plaintiffs' case. This had a dual effect. By
pointing out t h a t P l a i n t i f f s ' had f a i l e d t o r a i s e a g e n u i n e
i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t a s t o p r o x i m a t e c a u s e and s u p p o r t i n g
that assertion with briefs, exhibits and affidavits,
Defendants at the same time showed their entitlement to
summary judgment. P l a i n t i f f s t h e n had t h e d u t y t o p r e s e n t
sufficient proof to show that an issue of material fact
actually existed; mere denial or speculation would not
suffice. Gamble Robinson, 683 P.2d a t 287.
P l a i n t i f f s f a i l e d t o come f o r t h w i t h s u f f i c i e n t p r o o f i n
t h e District Court. Instead, they merely r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r
allegations of fact which they assert preclude summary
judgment by their own force, and pointed to the
hydrogeologist's report which in a preliminary fashion
speculates a s t o the possible causes of the flooding. As
shown above, t h e proof thus f a r advanced by P l a i n t i f f s is
i n s u f f i c i e n t t o a v o i d summary judgment. By a r g u i n g t h a t i t
was D e f e n d a n t s ' burden t o - rove t h e i r t h e o r y o f t h e c a s e ,
disp
P l a i n t i f f s s e e k t o r e v e r s e t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f u n d e r Montana
law. T h i s would l e a v e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f
having t o guess a t whether P l a i n t i f f s could p r e s e n t a v i a b l e
case, o r would simply waste the court's time in a futile
trial. This Court has s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f u s e d t o r e q u i r e such a
g u e s s i n g game.
.. . the t r i a l court, i n considering a
m o t i o n f o r summary judgment, h a s no d u t y
t o a n t i c i p a t e p o s s i b l e proof t h a t might
b e o f f e r e d u n d e r t h e p l e a d i n g s and t h a t
asking for such foresight demands
" c l a i r v o y a n c e " n o t p o s s e s s e d by even a
t r i a l judge.
Larry C. Iverson, Inc. v. Bouma ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 195 Mont. 351, 374,
6 3 9 P.2d 4 7 , 5 9 .
W e a f f i r m t h e judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t .