NO. 8 8 - 4 1 7
IN THE SIJPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTAJYA
1989
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
.
KATHRYN K STEPHEI!SON,
Petitioner and Respondent,
and
SAM STPPHENSON, 111,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL F R O F : District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and for the County of Silver BOW,
The Konorahle Arnol.6 Olsen, Judge presiding.
COIJNSEL OF F.ECORD:
For Appellant:
Pichael J. McKeon, Anaconda, Montana
For Respondent :
Mark A Vucurovich; Henningsen, Purcell, TTvcurovich &
i-
Ci'
Richardson, Rutte, Fontana
Submitted. on Briefs: March 23, 1989
Decided: April 25, 1989
-
+ ----- --
Clerk
Mr. Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, Kathryn K. Stephenson, filed for divorce from her
husband of twenty-one years in 1986. The dissolution was tried on
May 12, 1988, in the District Court of the Second Judicial
District, County of Silver Bow. Judge Arnold Olsen divided the
marital assets and provided maintenance to petitioner. Appellant,
Sam Stephenson, 111, appeals the findings of the court.
We affirm.
Appellant asks us to resolve three issues in dispute:
1. Whether the District Court, in a dissolution of marriage
proceeding, erred in not making a specific finding of net worth for
the purpose of separating marital assets.
2. Whether the District Court erred in the award of main-
tenance to petitioner.
3. Whether the District Court erred in awarding one-half of
husband's inheritance to wife.
The District Court entered findings of fact and conclusions
of law on June 29, 1988, separating the marital estate and
providing maintenance for petitioner, Kathryn Stephenson (Kathryn).
During the time that the parties were married, respondent Sam
Stephenson (Sam) was employed with ~tlanticRichfield Company as
an environmental coordinator. Kathryn graduated from high school
prior to the marriage but attained no further degrees, nor does she
have any job experience. Kathryn was mother and housewife during
the marriage.
When the parties separated, both children were over eighteen
years of age but continue to live with Kathryn.
On June 29, 1988, the findings of fact and conclusions of law
were filed by the District Court. In dispensing the marital assets
to the parties, the court did not make a determination of the net
worth of the parties. Instead, Judge Olsen distributed the assets
without calculating the net worth. The following is a list of the
property divided from the marital estate:
(1) extensive gun collection of Sam's
acquired during marriage to be ap-
praised and Sam would get the gun
collection;
(2) husband received all household fur-
nishings located in the cabin at Elk
Park, all mechanical tools, milling
machine, lathe and accessories;
(3) husband received 1986 Ford pickup,
1972 Kawasaki, 1971 Suzuki motor-
cycle, 1969 Bell trailer, and 1976
Layton trailer;
(4) wife received household furnishings
in the Butte family residence and
all household yard tools and equip-
ment ;
(5) stocks valued in excess of $54,000
and a money market account with
Piper, Jaffray and Hopwood was
equally divided between the parties;
(6) husband awarded the cabin and thir-
ty-eight acres located at Elk Park,
Jefferson County;
(7) wife awarded family residence in
Butte ;
(8) all debts of the marriage the re-
sponsibility of the husband;
(9) Kathryn was awarded the sum of $750
per month for at least five years,
until she could rehabilitate her-
self;
(10) Sam was also required to pay the
house payments of $244 a month.
Sam contends that the stocks valued at $54,000 and the cabin at
Elk Park were inherited by him in 1981 and are his sole and exclu-
sive property. These, he asserts, should not be included in the
marital estate.
The first issue is whether the District Court erred in not
determining the net worth of the marital estate. Appellant Sam
contends that if the District Court does not appraise the value of
all the assets from the marriage, the Supreme Court cannot review
the division of property to determine whether it was equitable or
arbitrary.
The standard of review by which we judge the District Court's
determination, as adopted by this Court in In re the Marriage of
Stewart (Mont. 1988), 757 P.2d 765, 45 St.Rep. 850 is:
[that the] District Court has far-reaching
discretion in dividing the marital property.
Our standard of review is that the District
Court's judgment, when based upon substantial
credible evidence, will not be altered unless
a clear abuse of discretion is shown.
Stewart, 727 P.2d at 767, 45 St.Rep. at 852; Marriage of Watson
(Mont. 1987), 739 P.2d 951, 954, 44 St.Rep. 1167, 1170.
Section 40-4-202 (I), MCA, provides that in a proceeding for
division of property, the court shall "equitably apportion between
the parties the property and assets belonging to either or both,
however and whenever acquired and whether the title thereto is in
the name of the husband or wife or both.It The statute does not
specifically require the District Court to determine the net worth
of the assets of the parties. We have specifically held in
previous cases that the District Court must determine the net
worth. As a guideline, it is helpful to this Court in reviewing
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the District Court
that a determination of net worth is made, but in this case it is
not imperative. The test is whether the findings as a whole are
sufficient to determine the net worth and to decide whether the
distribution was equitable. Nunally v. Nunally (Mont. 1981), 625
P.2d 1159, 1161, 38 St.Rep. 529, 531.
We hold that the District Court in this case made an equitable
distribution of the assets of the Stephensons and did not abuse
its discretion in not determining a net worth of the assets. In
reviewing the assets of the parties and the distribution by the
court, each party received an equitable portion of the marital
estate. "Here, the emphasis placed on the parties1 needs and their
relative financial situations indicates a careful exercise of the
court's discretion.I1 Bailey v. Bailey (1979), 184 Mont. 418, 420,
603 P.2d 259, 260.
The second issue is whether the District Court erred in
awarding Kathryn maintenance of $750 per month.
Sam contends that Kathryn has done nothing to "rehabilitate"
herself in the two years since the dissolution of the marriage.
However, Kathryn has no training for employment and spent the
twenty-one years of the marriage as a mother and a homemaker. The
District Court established that she was to receive $750 per month
for no less than five years. This, we believe, is a reasonable
time for Kathryn to rehabilitate herself. Although Sam contends
she is physically capable, good health alone is not enough for
providing for oneself. . Proper training for some employment is
necessary in the rehabilitation process.
Section 40-4-203, MCA, directs under what circumstances
maintenance can be awarded. The court can order maintenance for
either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(1)(a) lacks sufficient property to provide
for his reasonable needs; and
(b) is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment ..
.
(2) The maintenance order shall be in such
amounts and for such periods of time as the
court deems just, without regard to marital
misconduct, and after considering all relevant
facts including:
(a) the financial resources of the party
seeking maintenance, including marital proper-
ty apportioned to him, and his ability to meet
his needs independently ...
(b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient
education or training to enable the party
seeking maintenance to find appropriate em-
ployment ;
(c) the standard of living established during
the marriage;
(d) the duration of the marriage;
(e) the age and the physical and emotional
condition of the spouse seeking maintenance;
and
(f) the ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to meet his needs while
meeting those of the spouse seeking mainten-
ance.
Maintenance is necessary in the case at bar, and we hold that the
District Court made a just determination. The court did not abuse
its discretion.
The third issue is whether the District court erred in award-
ing one-half of Sam's inheritance to Kathryn.
In 1981, Sam inherited $50,000 worth of stocks and bonds, and
real estate located at Elk Park in Jefferson County, valued at
approximately $20,000. Sam contends that Kathryn has not partici-
pated in the enhancement of the stocks and bonds and has not
contributed to the maintenance of the Elk Park property. The
District Court, though, included both of these inheritances in the
assets of the marital estate. The court divided equally the
$54,000 value of the stocks and bonds. The court awarded the
husband the Elk Park property. It is Sam's contention that the
property is exclusively his and should not be considered in the
division of property.
In dividing property in a marriage dissolution
the District Court has far-reaching discretion
and its judgment will not be altered without
a showing of clear abuse of discretion. The
test of abuse of discretion is whether the
trial court acted arbitrarily without employ-
ment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the
bounds of reason resulting in a substantial
injustice.
Becker v. Becker (1985), 218 Mont. 229, 232, 707 P.2d 526, 528; In
re the Marriage of Rolf (1985), 216 Mont. 39, 45, 699 P.2d 79, 83,
citing In re the Marriage of Vert (1984), 210 Mont. 24, 680 P.2d
587.
Section 40-4-202(l)(a), MCA, provides that in dividing
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent, the court
shall consider the contributions of the other spouse, including
nonmonetary contribution of the homemaker contributions facilitat-
ing the maintenance of the property. The determining factor is
whether an equitable distribution was made and within the bounds
of reason. In this case, we hold that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion and acted soundly in dividing the marital
assets.
Affirmed.
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.
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Chief Justice
We concur: