No. 94-412
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995
KENNETH GREENWOOD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-v-
STEVE NELSON TRUCKING, INC.,
Defendant and Cross-
Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
1n and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable Maurice R. Colberg, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
J. Reuss, Wright, Tolliver and Guthals, Billings,
Montana
For Respondent:
Brad L. Arndorfer, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: December 8, 1994
Decided: March 7, 1995
Filed:
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment to Steve
Nelson Trucking by the Thirteenth Judicial District Court,
Yellowstone County. We affirm.
We consider the following issues:
I. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to
Steve Nelson Trucking?
II. Did the District Court err in denying Steve Nelson Trucking
its attorney's fees?
On September 24, 1990, Kenneth Greenwood (Greenwood)
contracted with Steve Nelson Trucking (Nelson Trucking) to have
Nelson Trucking haul livestock from Nye, Montana to Glentana,
Montana. Nelson Trucking hauled the livestock on September 25,
1990 and charged Greenwood $3,174.80.
In the hauling of three loads of livestock, two calves were
injured. Greenwood alleges that Nelson Trucking agreed to charge
$946 per load and at three loads, the total would be $2,838.00.
Greenwood deducted the cost of the injured calves from the
$2,838.00 and tendered payment to Nelson Trucking of $1,972.29.
Nelson Trucking sued Greenwood in Justice Court for $1,202.51.
Greenwood did not submit an answer on Nelson Trucking's charges
until the day of trial. The Justice of the Peace sustained Nelson
Trucking's objec.tion and refused the answer. The court entered a
default judgment for Nelson Trucking ordering Greenwood to pay
$1,202.51 and $35.00 court costs. Greenwood did not appeal the
Justice Court decision.
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Greenwood then filed an action in District Court alleging that
Nelson Trucking overcharged him for hauling the cattle and that he
had two injured calves worth $865.71. Greenwood also alleged that
Nelson Trucking violated § 69-12-502, MCA, and that Greenwood
should recover :for the overcharge. Greenwood asks for treble
damages and attorney's fees.
Nelson Trucking moved the court for summary judgment arguing
that Greenwood's claims cannot be filed again, having already been
filed in Justice Court and decided. The District Court granted
summary judgment to Nelson Trucking.
Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to
Steve Nelson Trucking?
The District Court granted summary judgment based upon its
analysis that Greenwood's action was a collateral attack on the
Justice Court's ruling. The court determined that the original
contract to haul cattle was not void because Nelson Trucking
overcharged Greenwood. According to the court, the appropriate
statute § 69-12-502, MCA, requiring a trucking company to only
charge approved rates, does not say that any contract involving
higher rates is void.
Further, the court stated that §§ 28-2-701, and 28-2-803, MCA,
only make a contract void when the contract has an illegal purpose.
Hauling cattle from place to place is not an illegal purpose, The
contract is not void; therefore, any claims brought before the
Justice Court or claims that should have been brought before the
Justice Court are res judicata.
Summary judgment should be granted if the moving party
successfully carries its burden to establish that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Thomas v. Hale (1990), 246 Mont. 64,
802 P.Zd 1255. Once the movant has discharged this burden of
proof, then the non-moving party must come forward with substantial
evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Thomas, 246
Mont. at 66-67, 802 P.2d at 1257.
Greenwood argues that material issues of fact exist arguing
that his contract to haul cattle was void because the consideration
for the contract was not lawful pursuant to 5 28-2-803 and § 28-2-
701, MCA. According to Greenwood, the void contract prohibits a
finding of res judicata. Further, Greenwood argues that res
judicata is not applicable here because the issues are not the
same.
Nelson Trucking contends that only one of Greenwood's claims
was not considered by the Justice Court. Nelson Trucking argues
that Greenwood's excessive charge claim, though not considered by
the Justice Court, should have been brought and cannot now be
raised. Nelson Trucking contends that all issues are res judicata
and, therefore, it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.
Greenwood centers his arguments on unlawful consideration.
The consideration for hauling cattle was money. Money is not
unlawful consideration. "Amount of money" does not make the
consideration unlawful. Greenwood has provided us with no legal
precedent for his legal argument. His contract was not based upon
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unlawful consideration and is not void. Not being void, the
contract claims made by Greenwood must be analyzed as to whether
they are res judicata.
Res judicata requires that the parties must be the same, the
subject matter of the action must be the same, the issues must be
the same and relate to the same subject matter, and the capacities
of the persons must be the same in reference to the subject matter
and to the issues. Filler v. Richland County (1991), 247 Mont.
285, 806 P.2d 537. The principle underlying the doctrine of res
judicata is that a party is prohibited from relitigating a matter
that the party has already had an opportunity to litigate. Whirry
v. Swanson (1992), 254 Mont. 248, 836 P.2d 1227.
In the present action, Greenwood had an opportunity to
litigate the claims that he now charges against Nelson Trucking.
The fact that he did not file an answer until the day of trial and
suffered a default judgment does not negate the fact that he had
the opportunity to litigate all claims arising from the contract
with Nelson Trucking. Greenwood could have appealed his default
judgment but chose not to do so. Having made that decision,
Greenwood cannot now raise the same issues concerning the contract
price and Nelson Trucking's negligence. These issues are res
judicata because the parties, the issues, the subject matter, and
the parties' capacities are the same as those raised in Justice
Court.
In addition to the issues considered by the Justice Court,
Greenwood contends that he was charged an excessive amount for the
services. The materials considered in connection with the summary
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judgment show that Greenwood paid $1,972.89 of the $3,174.80
contract price. The Justice Court assessed Greenwood $1,202.51.
Because of an admitted $200 overcharge, Nelson Trucking filed a
partial satisfaction of $200 as to Greenwood. Greenwood has failed
to establish any overcharge other than the admitted $200 overcharge
for which a partial satisfaction has been given. As a result
Greenwood has no basis to contend that he paid an excess charge.
We affirm the conclusion of the District Court that Greenwood
failed to raise an issue of material fact with regard to any excess
charges.
The District Court was correct in granting summary judgment on
this issue as well as other issues, because no evidence was
presented to show that Greenwood had overpaid Nelson Trucking.
We hold the District Court correctly granted summary judgment
to Nelson Trucking because Greenwood's claims are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
II.
Did the District Court err in denying Steve Nelson Trucking
its attorney's fees?
Nelson Trucking filed a cross-appeal seeking its attorney's
fees because Greenwood has continued to engage in frivolous
litigation. Nelson Trucking cites State v. Frank (1987), 226 Mont.
283, 735 P.2d 290, for the proposition that equity demands such an
award. Greenwood argues that the present case does not represent
any "extreme" situation which would demand the equitable action of
grant of attorney's fees.
The Frank case involves attorney's fees awarded as costs
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because a governmental entity had acted in bad faith or pursued a
claim frivolously. Frank
-I 226 Mont. at 292-293. The present case
contains no governmental entity. Nor does the present case concern
"extreme" facts as presented in Frank. Frank is not authority for
Nelson Trucking's arguments.
The general rule for award of attorney's fees is that absent
statute or contract, attorney's fees will not be awarded. Sage v.
Rogers (1993), 257 Mont. 229, 848 P.2d 1034. In isolated
instances, a district court, by using its discretion, can award
attorney's fees to make an injured party whole under its equity
powers. Goodover v. Lindeys (1992), 255 Mont. 430, 843 P.2d 765.
This case does not present one of the rare cases in which a
district court could use its equitable powers to award such fees.
We hold that the District Court did not err in denying Steve
Nelson Trucking attorney's fees.
Affirmed.
March 7, 1995
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
J. Reuss, Esq.
Wright, Tolliver and Guthals, P.C.
Box 1977
Billings MT 59103-1977
Brad L. Arndorfer
Attorney At Law
Box 412
Billings MT 59103-0412
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA
BY: A by&=-’
Deputy I/