NO. 95-326
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1996
GARY STRATEMEYER and
CAROL STRATEMEYER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
LINCOLN COUNTY, JIM MOREY,
NOEL WILLIAMS, and LARRY DOZEL,
in their capacity as LINCOLN COUNTY / -rf
COMMISSIONERS, and RAY NIXON, in his
capacity as LINCOLN COUNTY SHERIFF,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lincoln,
The Honorable C. B. McNeil, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Sydney E. McKenna (argued); Marsillo, Tornabene,
Schuyler & McKenna, Missoula, Montana
For Respondents:
James E. Vidal (argued) and James M. Ramlow;
Murray & Kaufman, Kalispell, Montana
For Amicus Curiae:
Lawrence A. Anderson (argued), Attorney at Law,
Great Falls, Montana (for Montana Trial Lawyers
Association)
Submitted: January 11, 1996
Decided: April 5, 1996
Filed:
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Gary Stratemeyer (Stratemeyer) appeals from the June 19, 1995,
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Order of Dismissal of the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, concluding that
the statute of limitations barred Stratemeyer's claim, that the
Workers' Compensation Act provided Stratemeyer's exclusive remedy,
and that Lincoln County, the Lincoln County Commissioners, and the
Lincoln County Sheriff (collectively Lincoln County) breached no
duty owed to Stratemeyer. We reverse.
We consider the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the District Court err in determining that
Stratemeyer's suit was not timely filed?
2. Did the District Court err in determining that the
Workers' Compensation Act provided Stratemeyer's exclusive remedy?
3. Did the District Court err in determining that the
Montana Safety Act did not apply to Stratemeyer's claim?
This is Stratemeyer's second appeal to this Court arising out
of mental injuries he suffered while on duty as a deputy sheriff in
Lincoln County, Montana. Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County (1993), 259
Mont. 147, 855 P.2d 506, cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 600. Stratemeyer
observed a traumatic gunshot injury to a suicide victim and alleges
that he has suffered severe mental and emotional distress as a
result of Lincoln County's failure to train, counsel, and debrief
him following the incident.
On May 4, 1990, Stratemeyer, an eight-year veteran of the
Lincoln County Sheriff's Department, responded to a suicide call.
En route to the scene he learned that the victim, a teenage girl,
was still alive. Upon arriving at the victim's home, Stratemeyer
was led to the bedroom where he found a seventeen-year-old girl who
had shot herself in the head. The girl, covered in blood, was
being held in her father's arms. Stratemeyer forcibly removed the
girl from her father's arms and began administering cardiopulmonary
resuscitation. When the ambulance arrived, Stratemeyer assisted
the crew in loading the girl onto the gurney and into the
ambulance. Shortly after escorting the ambulance to the hospital,
Stratemeyer was dispatched to the scene of another accident. Later
that evening, Stratemeyer learned that the girl had died.
Thereafter, Stratemeyer was plagued by thoughts of the girl's
suicide and his decision to tear the victim from her father's arms
during her last moments of life. Although Stratemeyer continued to
report to work, he began to experience a lack of concentration and
mental disorientation. Subsequently, Stratemeyer was diagnosed
with post-traumatic stress disorder. Since the incident,
Stratemeyer has been unable to return to his job with the Lincoln
County Sheriff's Department.
Stratemeyer filed a workers' compensation claim on May 25,
1990, which was denied four days later. After Stratemeyer's
workers' compensation claim was denied, he petitioned the Workers'
Compensation Court for a hearing regarding his wage loss benefits
and medical expenses. The Workers' Compensation Court determined
that Stratemeyer did not suffer an "injury" as defined in § 39-71-
119, MCA. However, the court determined that subsections 3(a) and
3(b) of § 39-71-119, MCA, which exclude mental stress from the
3
definition of injury were unconstitutional and violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution.
Lincoln County and its insurer appealed to this Court, and
this Court determined that § 39-71-119, MCA, does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution because it is
rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of
controlling the costs of the workers' compensation program and
providing benefits. Stratemeyer, 855 P.2d at 510. While
Stratemeyer's case was pending in this Court, Stratemeyer filed a
tort claim against Lincoln County in Missoula County District Court
on April 30, 1993. The District Court's dismissal of Stratemeyer's
tort claim is the subject of the instant appeal.
1. Did the District Court err in determining that
Stratemeyer's suit was not timely filed?
In evaluating a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, courts are
required to construe a complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Loney v. Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, P.C. (Mont. 19951,
905 P.2d 158, 160, 52 St.Rep. 1093, 1094. A complaint should not
be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff is not entitled
to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support
of the claim. Lonev, 905 P.2d at 160 (citing Boreen v. Christensen
(1994), 267 Mont. 405, 408, 884 P.2d 761, 762). The District Court
determined that although Stratemeyer's complaint was filed within
three years, as required by § 27-2-204, MCA, Stratemeyer had failed
to first file his administrative claim with Lincoln County, as
required by § 2-Y-301, MCA, which, according to the District Court,
was a prerequisite to filing suit. Thus, the District Court
4
determined that Stratemeyer's complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted because the administrative
filing prerequisite of § 2-g-301, MCA, had not been satisfied.
This determination is a conclusion of law. See Loner, 905 P.2d at
161. In reviewing a district court's conclusions of law, we
determine whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct.
Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co. (1995), 271Mont. 459, 469,
898 P.2d 680, 686; Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245
Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603-04.
Lincoln County asserts that Stratemeyer's claim should be
barred because he did not first file his claim with Lincoln County.
Section 2-p-301, MCA, sets forth the procedure for filing claims
against the State and its political subdivisions. Lincoln County
argued that because of Stratemeyer's failure to comply with § 2-9-
301, MCA, within the three-year statute of limitations, he is
barred by the statute of limitations from pursuing his claim. The
District Court agreed, concluding that § 2-P-301 and § 27-2-204,
MCA, barred Stratemeyer's claim. Section 2-g-301, MCA, provides:
(1) All claims against the state arising under the
provisions of parts 1 through 3 of this chapter must be
presented in writing to the department of administration.
(2) A complaint based on a claim subject to the
provisions of subsection (1) may not be filed in district
court unless the claimant has first presented the claim
to the department of administration and the department
has finally denied the claim. The department must grant
or deny the claim in writing within 120 days after the
claim is presented to the department. The failure of the
department to make final disposition of a claim within
I20 days after it is presented to the department must be
considered a final denial of the claim for purposes of
this subsection. Upon the department's receipt of the
claim, the statute of limitations on the claim is tolled
for 120 days. The provisions of this subsection do not
5
apply to claims that may be asserted under Title 25,
chapter 20, by third-party complaint, cross-claim, or
counterclaim.
(3) All claims against a political subdivision
arising under the provisions of parts 1 through 3 shall
be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of
the political subdivision.
Lincoln County argues that Stratemeyer's failure to present and
file his claim with the Lincoln County Clerk and Recorder within
the three-year statute of limitations bars his suit in district
court. Stratemeyer contends that he did not pursue his tort claim
in district court until this Court's decision in Stratemever and
the United States Supreme Court's subsequent denial of his petition
for a writ of certiorari had been handed down. He argues that had
he attempted to submit his tort claims to the county before
exhausting possible remedies under the Workers' Compensation Act
his tort claims would have been dismissed based on the exclusive
remedy rule.
Stratemeyer contends that the plain language of § 2-g-301,
MCA, does not require him to present his claim to the county clerk
before filing in district court. He argues that subsection (3) of
§ 2-g-301, MCA, applies and that subsection (3), unlike subsections
(1) and (2), does not require him to file with the clerk before
filing a complaint in district court.
In construing a statute, "the office of the judge is simply to
ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained
therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has
been inserted." Section l-2-101, MCA. The rules of statutory
construction require the language to be construed according to its
6
plain meaning. Clarke v. Massey (1995), 271 Mont. 412, 416, 897
P.2d 1085, 1088. If the language is clear and unambiguous, then no
further interpretation is required; we will resort to legislative
history only if the intent cannot be determined from the plain
wording of the statute. Clarke, 897 P.2d at 1088. Where the
intention of the legislature can be determined from the plain
meaning of the words used in a statute, the courts may not go
further and apply other means of interpretation. Clarke, 897 P.2d
at 1088 (citing Tongue River Elec. Coop. v. Montana Power Co.
(1981), 195 Mont. 511, 515, 636 P.2d 862, 864).
Lincoln County asserts that this Court has previously
interpreted subsection (3) of § 2-g-301, MCA, to require a
plaintiff to first file a claim against the entity before
proceeding in district court. See Rouse v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge
County (1991), 250 Mont. 1, 4, 817 P.2d 690, 691. However, the
language in Rouse on which Lincoln County relies is dicta. In
Rouse, we were considering whether the statute of limitations set
forth in 5 27-2-203, MCA, barred Rouse's claims against Anaconda-
Deer Lodge County. Rouse, 817 P.2d at 691. Rouse's compliance
with § 2-g-301(3), MCA, was not at issue. Although we stated that
"the statutory requirements enacted by the legislature mandate a
plaintiff asserting a cause of action against a governmental entity
to first file a claim before that entity before filing an action in
district court," this sentence is not related to our holding in
Rouse and it is contradicted by other language in the opinion.
Rouse, 817 P.2d at 691. Later in the opinion we stated that:
7
With respect to claims against political
subdivisions, the statutes do not state that a final
disposition of the claim before a local tribunal is a
prerequisite to filing an action in district court. The
statutes also do not provide an automatic denial period
claims made against a county or political subdivision
similar to the 120 day period for claims against the
state.
Rouse, 817 P.2d at 692. In -, we recognized that the plain
Rouse
language of subsection (3) does not require a final disposition of
the claim or an automatic denial period for the claim, yet,
inexplicably, we read the "first file" requirement into the
statute. This violates the mandate of § l-2-101, MCA, and our
rules for statutory construction. & Clarke, 897 P.2d at 1088.
We reject our broad statement in Rouse which would require a
claimant to "first file" his claim with the political subdivision
before proceeding in district court. This statement is contrary to
both our subsequent logic in that case and the plain language of
the statute. To the extent that Rouse expresses an opinion
inconsistent with our analysis in the instant case, Rouse is
expressly overruled. We hold that although subsection (2) of § 2-
9-301, MCA, requires that a claim first be presented to the
Department of Administration, and that the department dispose of
the claim before a plaintiff can file a complaint in district
court, subsection (3) of § 2-g-301, MCA, contains no such
requirement. Rather, § 2-9-301(3), MCA, merely requires that a
claim be filed, it does not require that it be "first presented" or
that it be acted upon before a compliant can be filed.
Accordingly, we determine that Stratemeyer's complaint, which was
filed within three years pursuant to § 27-2-204, MCA, is not barred
8
by his failure to first file an administrative claim with the
Lincoln County Clerk pursuant to § 2-g-301(3), MCA
2. Did the District Court err in determining that the
Workers' Compensation Act provided Stratemeyer's exclusive remedy?
The exclusive remedy rule is perhaps the most firmly
entrenched doctrine in workers' compensation law. See
-I e.s.,
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1915 Mont. Laws 168; Shea v. North-
Butte Mining Co. (1919), 55 Mont. 522, 179 P. 499. The rationale
for adopting workers' compensation legislation was to guarantee
workers with work-related injuries some form of compensation in
exchange for relinquishing any potential tort claims against their
employers.
The enactment of the Workers' Compensation Act was essentially
a compromise between industry and labor--workers received
guaranteed no-fault recovery, and industry was relieved of the
possibility of large and potentially uncapped recoveries in the
tort system. Lewis & Clark County v. Industrial Accident Bd.
(1916), 52 Mont. 6, 8-11, 155 P. 268, 269-70. Montana's exclusive
remedy provision, 5 39-71-411, MCA, provides:
For all employments covered under the Workers'
Compensation Act or for which an election has been made
for coverage under this chapter, the provisions of this
chapter are exclusive. Except as provided in part 5 of
this chapter for uninsured employers and except as
otherwise provided in the Workers' Compensation Act, an
employer is not subject to any liability whatever for the
death of or personal injury to an employee covered by the
Workers' Compensation Act or for any claims for
contribution or indemnity asserted by a thirdperson from
whom damages are sought on account of such injuries or
death. The Workers' Compensation Act binds the employee
himself, and in case of death binds his personal
representative and all persons having any right or claim
to compensation for his injury or death, as well as the
9
employer and the servants and employees of such employer
and those conducting his business during liquidation,
bankruptcy, or insolvency. [Emphasis added.]
Lincoln County argues that Stratemeyer's employment was
covered under the Act, thus, that the Act is his exclusive remedy.
In asserting that a covered injury is necessary before the
exclusivity provision can be applied, Stratemeyer relies on the
second sentence of § 39-71-411, MCA, which provides that an
employer is not subject to liability for the "death of or personal
injury to an employee." We find Lincoln County's argument to be
unpersuasive
The quid pro quo between employers and employees is central to
the Act; thus, it is axiomatic that there must be some possibility
of recovery by the employee for the compromise to hold. The scope
of immunity from tort relates to the definition of injury under 5
39-71-119, MCA. As Professor Larson observed:
If . . . the exclusiveness defense is a "part of the quid
pro quo by which the sacrifices and gains of employees
and employers are to some extent put in balance," it
ought logically to follow that the employer should be
spared damage liability only when compensation liability
has actually been provided in its place, or, to state the
matter from the employee's point of view, rights of
action for damages should not be deemed taken away except
where something of value has been put in their place.
2A Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 65.40 (perm.
ed. rev. vol. 1995).
BY definition, the mental injury which Stratemeyer suffered is
excluded from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Section 39-71-119(3), MCA. This is further evidenced by the policy
statement added by the 1993 Montana Legislature to § 39-71-105(5),
10
MCA. That section declares the "public policy" of the Workers'
Compensation Act. Section 39-71-105(5), MCA, provides:
It is the intent of the legislature that stress
claims, often referred to as "mental-mental claims" and
"mental-physical claims", are not compensable under
Montana's workers' compensation and occupational disease
laws. The legislature recognizes that these claims are
difficult to objectively verify and that the claims have
a potential to place an economic burden on the workers'
compensation and occupational disease system. The
legislature also recognizes that there are other states
that do not provide compensation for various categories
of stress claims and that stress claims have presented
economic problems for certain other jurisdictions. In
addition, not all injuries are compensable under the
present system, as is the case with repetitive injury
claims, and it is within the legislature's authority to
define the limits of the workers' compensation and
occupational disease system.
Thus, it is unequivocally clear that mental injuries, such as
Stratemeyer's, are beyond the scope of coverage of the Workers'
Compensation Act. Accordingly, under Lincoln County's theory,
employees would have no possibility of recovery for mental injuries
and yet the employer would be shielded from all potential
liability. If that were the case, the quid pro quo, which is the
foundation of the exclusive remedy rule would be eliminated. Such
a result would be contrary to the spirit and intent of the Workers'
Compensation Act. Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co.
(1911), 44 Mont. 180, 222, 119 P. 554, 566. Stratemeyer asserts
that in light of the restrictive definition of injury in § 39-71-
119, MCA, as well as the policy statement in § 39-71-105(5), MCA,
there is no quid pro quo for workers who suffer "mental-mental"
injuries. We agree. Absent the quid pro quo, the exclusive remedy
cannot stand, and the employer is thus exposed to potential tort
11
liability. Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills (Or. 1995), 888
P.2d 544, 552; Day v. NLO, Inc. (S.D. Ohio 1992), 811 F. Supp.
1271, 1279.
In w, the plaintiffs asserted tort claims against their
employer and the employer contended that the plaintiffs had not
suffered an injury under Ohio's Workers' Compensation Law. l&Y,
811 F. Supp. at 1278. The plaintiffs argued that their injuries
did not qualify as compensable injuries under Ohio's Workers'
Compensation Act. In asserting their tort claims, the plaintiffs
argued that their emotional distress injuries did not fall within
the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act's definition of "injury." m,
811 F. Supp. at 1279 (discussing Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.01(C)). The
court noted that the Ohio Act excluded " Ipl sychiatric conditions
except where the conditions have arisen from an injury or
occupational disease. .'I LSY, 811 F. Supp. at 1279 (quoting
Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.01(C)). The court determined that "if an
employee's malady does not fall under the definition of an
"injury". . . then the exclusivity provisions of workmens'
compensation do not apply." Day, 811 F. Supp. at 1279.
The court noted that workers' compensation claims involving
emotional distress can be classified as "mental-mental" (mental
stimulus, mental consequence), "mental-physical" (mental stimulus,
physical consequence), or "physical-mental" (physical stimulus,
mental consequence). Dav, 811 F. Supp. at 1280 (citing 1B Arthur
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 5 42.20-42.25 (perm. ed.
rev. vol. 1991). The court concluded that only "mental-mental"
12
claims are actionable in tort in Ohio's courts because Ohio's
exclusive remedy rule continues to govern "mental-physical" and
"physical-mental" claims. Dav, 811 F. Supp. at 1280 (citing
Harover v. City of Norwood (Ohio Ct. App. 1988), 559 N.E.2d 1194).
The Q&y court opined, similar to the Montana Legislature in
setting forth its "public policy" statement in § 39-71-105(5), MCA,
that the subjectivity, costs, and the nature of damages involved in
"mental-mental'1 claims led Ohio's courts to reasonably determine
that workers' compensation does not cover these claims and, as a
result, the employee may sue in tort. Dav, 811 F. Supp. at 1281-
82. However, given the facts of the case before it, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs' claims arose from a physical, non-
mental stimulus and, as a result, the exclusivity provisions of
Ohio's Workers' Compensation Law controlled. Day, 811 F. Supp. at
1280-81.
Likewise, in Errand, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that
the exclusivity provision of Oregon's Workers' Compensation Act did
not shield the employer from the employee's tort claims because the
employee did not suffer a "compensable injury" as that term is
defined in the Oregon Act. Errand, 888 P.2d at 552. The Workers'
Compensation Board determined that the injury suffered by the
employee was not compensable. Thereafter, Errand brought a civil
suit against his employer based on statutory and common law tort
claims. Arguing that workers' compensation was Errand's exclusive
remedy, the employer moved for and was granted summary judgment.
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed stating that "the
13
exclusivity of the Act is not limited to claims that are ultimately
determined to be compensable." Errand, 888 P.2d at 546 (citing
Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. (Or. Ct. App. 1994),
869 P.2d 358, 360. However, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed,
determining that:
In plaintiff's workers' compensation case, it was
established that the employer had no liability to
compensate plaintiff under the Workers' Compensation Law.
By providing for an employer's freedom from "other"
liability [tort liability], it may be inferred from the
exclusivity provision that there must exist, as a
predicate for that freedom, some actual liability under
the Workers' Compensation Law before the exclusivity
provision may protect the employer from "all other
liability.S1 Thus, the text of the exclusivity provision,
specifically its use of the term "liability," further
supports the conclusion that the statutory definition of
"compensable injury" applies to ORS 656.018. [Emphasis
added.]
Errand, 888 P.2d at 548. Although Oregon's Workers' Compensation
Act uses different terminology than ours, the underlying principle
of the opinion is equally applicable under our Act; namely, that
the employer cannot receive the benefit of the exclusive remedy
provision when the Act's definition of "injury" precludes any
possibility of recovery for the particular injury at issue
Section l-2-107, MCA, provides that:
Whenever the meaning of a word or phrase is defined in
any part of this code, such definition is applicable to
the same word or phrase wherever it occurs, except where
a contrary intention plainly appears.
Therefore, the definition of injury in § 39-71-411, MCA, must be
construed consistently with the restrictive definition of injury in
§ 39-71-119, MCA. Thus, an injury excluded by § 39-71-119, MCA,
necessarily must be excluded as an injury from the exclusive remedy
14
provision of § 39-71-411, MCA. The exclusive remedy rule applies
only if the injury suffered by the worker is covered by the Act.
Sections 39-71-119 and 39-71-411, MCA; see also m, 811 F. Supp.
_-
at 1280 (finding that Ohio's exclusive remedy rule governs "mental-
physical" and "physical-mental" claims). For example, in a
"physical-mental" claim, where an employee loses an arm, that
employee's remedy under the workers' compensation act is exclusive
and he cannot recover in tort for emotional distress. BY
definition, under Montana's Workers' Compensation Act,
Stratemeyer's injury is excluded from coverage. Sections 39-71-
105(5) and 39-71-119(3) (a) - (b), MCA; Stratemeyer, 855 P.2d at
508-10. Thus, under both the definition of injury in § 39-71-119,
MCA, and the statement of public policy in § 39-71-105(5), MCA, it
is evident that llmental-mentalB' injuries were intended to be
outside the scope of coverage of the Workers' Compensation Act. It
is equally evident that this exclusion defeats the quid pro quo
central to the Act. & Great Western Sugar Co. v. District Court
(1980), 188 Mont. 1, 6, 610 P.2d 717, 720. Stratemeyer did not
suffer an injury as defined in the Act and, therefore, the Act does
not afford him any "remedy;" certainly not an "exclusive" remedy.
Errand, 888 P.2d at 548. The exclusion of Stratemeyer's "mental-
mental" injury leaves him without workers' compensation coverage
and likewise removes Lincoln County's shield from a tort claim.
Thus, in keeping with the quid pro quo of the Act, we hold that
Stratemeyer is allowed to proceed in tort against his employer.
3. Did the District Court err in determining that the
Montana Safety Act did not apply to Stratemeyer's claim?
15
In reviewing a district court's conclusions of law, we
determine whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct.
Carbon County, 898 P.2d at 686 (citation omitted). The existence
of a duty is a legal question for the court, while breach of that
duty is a question for the jury. Ganz v. United States Cycling
Federation (Mont. 1995), 903 P.2d 212, 215, 52 St.Rep. 1030, 1032.
The District Court determined that there was "no duty under Montana
law which could have been breached by Defendants" and that
Stratemeyer failed to state a claim under the Montana Safety Act,
§§ 50-71-201 and 50-71-203, MCA. Specifically, the District Court
concluded that:
Plaintiffs do not cite any authority which would extend
the duty imposed by the safe place to work statutes to
include alleged injuries for emotional distress which
resulted from the Plaintiff observing a traumatic
incident not caused by Defendants, and the Court
concludes that there is no such Montana authority.
Stratemeyer contends that his claim is based on Lincoln
County's failure to train, supervise, treat and debrief him
following the incident. According to Stratemeyer, the traumatic
nature and consequences of responding to the suicide were
foreseeable, and post-traumatic stress disorder is a common injury
for law enforcement personnel, emergency medical technicians and
disaster and emergency services personnel. He alleges that the
District Court interpreted the Montana Safety Act too narrowly,
when it construed it to include only physical harm. We agree.
Section 50-71-201, MCA, provides in relevant part:
Each employer shall:
(1) furnish a place of employment that is safe for
each of his employees;
16
.
(4) do any other thing reasonably necessary to
protect the life, health, and safety of his employees.
The plain language of the statute does not limit its application to
only physical harm. Rather, 5 50-71-201(4), MCA, and § 50-71-
203(3) - (4), MCA, contain the broad duty to "do any other thing
reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, and safety of his
employees." Although it remains a question for the finder of fact
to determine whether the employer breached its duty in failing to
train, supervise, treat, or debrief Stratemeyer, -tie &te:m~fyjri$ 1: *-,E'
that She Picnrana Safety Act is applicable to mental as well as
physical injuries. We hold that the District Court erred in
concluding that the Montana Safety Act does not encompass mental
or emotional distress type injuries.
Reversed and remanded.
We concur.
Chief Justice
Justices
Justice Charles Erdmann concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority's holding on Issue 1, respectfully
dissent from its holding on Issue 2, and join with Chief Justice
Turnage's dissent on Issue 3. Gary Stratemeyer's mental injuries
resulted from duties performed within the scope of his employment
as a Lincoln County Sheriff's Deputy. See Stratemeyer v. MAC0
Workers Corp. Trust (1993), 259 Mont. 147, 855 P.2d 506
(Stratemeyer I). The legislature has declared that mental injuries
are not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. Section
39-71-105(5), MCA.
In Stratemeyer I this Court held that the exclusion of mental
injuries without physical manifestations was rationally related to
a legitimate government objective of controlling the costs of the
workers' compensation program. Stratemeyer then filed a tort
action against Lincoln County in district court. The District
Court dismissed the action on the basis that the Workers'
Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for Stratemeyer.
The majority has now reversed this determination and has held that
even though Stratemeyer's employment was covered under the Act,
since his injury is not compensable under the Act the exclusive
remedy provisions do not apply. In doing so, the Court avoids a
harsh result and if it were within this Court's province to do so,
I would certainly join the majority. However, the scope of
coverage for employment-related injuries should remain within the
province of the legislature and its power to define and amend the
Workers' Compensation Act.
18
The majority correctly notes that the exclusive remedy rule is
perhaps the most firmly entrenched doctrine in workers'
compensation law. Montana's exclusive remedy provision provides in
part:
For all emplovments covered under the Workers'
Compensation Act or for which an election has been made
for coverage under this chapter, the provisions of this
chapter are exclusive.
Section 39-71-411, MCA (emphasis added). There is no dispute that
Stratemeyer's employment was covered under the Act and therefore
the remedy provisions of the Act, no matter how harsh, are
exclusive.
I do not agree with the majority's interpretation of the
language in 5 39-71-411, MCA, which states that "an employer is not
subject to any liability whatever for the death of or personal
injury to an emnlovee covered bv the . . . Act." (Emphasis added.)
The language is unambiguous and simply states that the employer is
not liable for injuries to its employees covered under the Act.
The majority misinterprets the language to create an exclusivity
provision that is injury-driven, rather than employment-driven.
The majority states that "[tlhe exclusive remedy rule applies only
if the injury suffered by the worker is covered by the Act." On
the contrary, under the plain language of § 39-71-411, MCA, the
focus should not be on the type of injury incurred but instead on
whether the injury occurred within the scope of employment.
The majority supports it conclusion by overlaying the
definition of "injury" found in § 39-71-119, MCA, onto 5 39-71-411,
19
MCA. Such a stretch is not necessary, as the language of
§ 39-71-411, MCA, standing on its own, is clear when it states that
"[flor all employments covered under the . . Act . . the
provisions of this chapter are exclusive."
The majority's reliance on Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling
Mills (Or. 1995), 888 P.2d 544, is not persuasive. In discussing
that case, the majority notes in passing that the language of the
Oregon Workers' Compensation Act differs from ours. However, I
find the difference in the statutory language to be significant.
The Oregon exclusivity provision provides that a complying
employer's liability " is exclusive and in place of all other
liability arising out of compensableinjuries to the subject workers" and
that the "rights given to a subject worker . . for compensable injuries
under this chapter are in lieu of any remedies they might otherwise
have for such injuries against the worker's employer." Errand, 888
P.2d at 546-47 (quoting Or. Rev. Stat. 656.018(l) and Or. Rev.
Stat. 656.018(2)).
The Oregon Legislature, unlike ours, has chosen to
specifically tie its exclusivity provision to "compensable
injuries." Our legislature could certainly choose to restrict
Montana's exclusivity provision to "compensable injuries," but has
chosen not to do so. The Montana Workers' Compensation Act is the
exclusive remedy for all employments covered under the Act,
regardless of the nature of the injury involved.
I agree with the majority that the quid pro quo between
employers and employees is central to the Act, but it is a
legislatively created quid pro quo and, within constitutional
limits, is defined by the legislature.
The majority's rationale that the employer is shielded from
liability only for those injuries covered under the Act essentially
rewrites the language of § 39-71-411, MCA. This Court should not
assume legislative functions by adding what the legislature has
omitted, or by omitting what the legislature has added. Russette
v. Chippewa Cree Housing Auth. (1994), 265 Mont. 90, 93-94, 074
P.2d 1217, 1219. The majority has added "covered injury" to the
exclusive remedy statute, and therefore, has improperly assumed a
legislative function. I would affirm the District Court on
Issue 2.
a
Justice
21
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage, dissenting:
I join in Justice Erdmann's dissent on Issue 2. I also
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on Issue 3.
The majority has interpreted Montana's Safety Act as creating
a duty on the part of the defendants and respondents to take steps
to prevent psychological harm from incidents in the workplace.
This interpretation stretches the Act far beyond the legitimate
purposes for which it was enacted, with no citation to legislative
history or case law as support for that extension. The absence of
such citation is quite understandable, as none exists.
The Montana Safety Act was adopted in 1969. Discussion by
advocates and legislators at the hearings on the bill centered
around the need for employers to provide employees with safety
equipment such as hard hats and boots. See Minutes of House Public
Health, Welfare and Safety Committee, February 4, 1969; Minutes of
Senate State Administration Committee, February 24, 1969. When the
Act was amended in 1991 to, inter alia, exclude a requirement that
employers provide protective footwear for employees, it was again
discussed at legislative hearings as a safeguard requiring
employers to provide safety equipment for employees. See Minutes of
House Labor and Employment Relations Committee, February 21, 1991;
Minutes of Senate Labor and Employment Relations Committee, March
12, 1991.
The cases citing the Act, too, have involved the duty to
protect from physical injury. See, e.g., Hando v. PPG Industries,
Inc. (1989) 236 Mont. 493, 771 P.2d 956 (worker became ill from
22
paint fumes); Kemp v. Bechtel Const. Co. (1986), 221 Mont. 519, 720
P.Zd 270 (worker injured in ditch cave-in); Cain v. Stevenson
(1985), 218 Mont. 101, 706 P.2d 128 (worker fell on slippery cinder
block "step" at exit from building under construction); Stepanek v.
Kober Const. (1981), 191 Mont. 430, 625 P.2d 51 (worker fell from
scaffolding); Reynolds v. Burlington N. (1980), 190 Mont. 383, 621
P.2d 1028 (runaway railway cars struck worker); Shannon v. Howard
S. Wright Const. Co. (1979), 181 Mont. 269, 593 P.2d 438 (worker
fell from ladder).
Expanding the Montana Safety Act to require employers to
provide training, supervision, treatment, and debriefing to protect
workers from on-the-job psychological harm may be a valid subject
for discussion among the peoples' elected representatives in
Montana's legislature. In my view, however, it is not appropriate
for accomplishment by judicial fiat, as the majority does here. I
respectfully dissent.
,e-
, /r/tr-*’
Chief Justice
23