IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 95-20532
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
CHARLES WILLIAM BOYLE and
ROBERT EUGENE SMITH,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(91-CR-50-7 & 91-CR-50-6)
_________________________
August 28, 1996
Before KING, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Charles Boyle and Robert Smith were convicted of conspiring to
obstruct a grand jury investigation and to mislead a person into
withholding evidence from a grand jury, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 371, 1503, and 1512. Smith was also convicted of conspiring to
give false testimony to a grand jury, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
§ 1623. We affirm.
I.
A.
Boyle and Smith were attorneys for Linda Ivey,1 a distributor
of sexually explicit materials who owns a network of adult
bookstores in several states. Smith helped Ivey establish an
elaborate corporate structure for the management of her stores;
Boyle represented Ivey in various legal matters.
In 1985, a grand jury in Tennessee was investigating possible
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1462, which bars the interstate transpor-
tation of obscene materials. The grand jury subpoenaed the
custodian of records of four bookstores in Memphis, seeking
information about thirty-six videotapes. On May 15, 1985, Boyle
appeared before the grand jury. He testified that he was appearing
at Smith’s request, that he was a representative of Praxis
Management and the corporate owners of the four bookstores, and
that the documents came from Praxis, a corporation that had
physical possession of the bookstores’ records. He denied that
Praxis was a management corporation for the stores.
In 1986, the grand jury issued a subpoena to Praxis. On
June 26, 1986, Boyle again appeared, at Smith’s request, as
1
Linda Ivey has been referred to in the record as “Mary Jane Jenkins” and
“Lydia Entratter.” We refer to her as Linda Ivey.
2
custodian of records for Praxis.2 He testified that some records
were missing because Praxis no longer existed and the company had
returned the records to its customers. Boyle also qualified his
testimony by stating that his knowledge of Praxis came from
conversations with Smith. Contradicting his earlier testimony,
Boyle testified that Praxis had managed the bookstores.
Smith also testified before the grand jury, stating that
Phoenix, which had replaced Praxis, provided bookkeeping services
to various entities. He claimed that former Praxis personnel were
not working for Phoenix. He denied that he was involved in the
formation of Phoenix, that Phoenix and Praxis were the same
companies, and that he knew who Phoenix’s officers were.
In 1991, a federal grand jury in Houston issued subpoenas to
Phoenix and other Ivey corporations, seeking account numbers and
information regarding numerous accounts maintained by the target
institutions. The subpoena was specifically limited to accounts
with banks or financial institutions.
Michael Cescon, Phoenix’s comptroller, consulted Boyle and
asked for account numbers for some offshore accounts. Boyle knew
the missing account numbers but did not provide them. Instead, he
told Cescon that “there wasn’t any account numbers and just insert
'N/A' in its place.” Boyle also informed Cescon that the offshore
2
In the interim, Smith had modified the corporate structures so that
Phoenix Management succeeded Praxis. According to the government, everything but
the name of the corporation stayed the same.
3
accounts were outside the scope of the subpoena when he told Cescon
that he was not certain that the accounts were with banks or
financial institutions.
B.
On April 9, 1991, the appellants and six other defendants were
charged in an indictment arising out of the grand jury investiga-
tions. Count 12 charged them with conspiring to obstruct grand
jury investigations.3 The six other defendants were charged with
racketeering and obscenity offenses.
The appellants initially were charged with (1) knowingly
engaging in misleading conduct toward a witness in a federal grand
jury to cause and induce the witness to withhold testimony,
records, and/or documents from the grand jury in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A); (2) corruptly influencing, obstructing,
impeding or attempting to influence, obstruct, or impede the
administration of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503; and
(3) knowingly making a false material declaration before a grand
jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). The indictment included
thirty-one overt acts in furtherance of the alleged conspiracies
and a charge of conspiracy to defraud the United States in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.4 The government withdrew the § 371
3
The district court severed count 12 on the appellants’ motion.
4
This portion of count 12 is sometimes referred to as “paragraph 3.”
4
charge.
The appellants challenged the sufficiency of count 12, and the
court ordered a bill of particulars. The government responded, and
the defendants renewed their motion to dismiss count 12, or in the
alternative to compel additional answers to the bill of particu-
lars. The court denied both motions.
Following a jury trial, Boyle and Smith were convicted, under
§ 371, of conspiring to obstruct justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503) and to
mislead a person into withholding evidence from a grand jury
(18 U.S.C. § 1512). Smith was also convicted, as part of the same
count, of conspiring to give false testimony to a grand jury
(18 U.S.C. § 1623).
II.
The defendants contend that the indictment failed adequately
to apprise them of the conspiracy offenses with which they were
charged. Their specific complaint is that the indictment and the
bill of particulars failed to describe how they actually had
violated the underlying substantive offenses. They assert that the
bill of particulars was insufficient because it listed seventy-
eight instances of false, incomplete, or misleading testimony
without explaining why the testimony was false.
We review the sufficiency of the indictment de novo. United
States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1360 (5th Cir. 1995), petition for
5
cert. filed (Mar. 14, 1996) (No. 95-8346). An indictment is
sufficient if it (1) enumerates each prima facie element of the
charged offense, (2) notifies the defendant of the charges filed;
and (3) provides him with a double jeopardy defense against future
prosecution. Id.
A conspiracy indictment is sufficient if it sets out an
unlawful agreement and the commission of at least one overt act by
at least one of the conspirators. The conspiracy, rather than the
accomplishment of its underlying objectives, is the gravamen of the
offense, so it is not necessary that the object of the conspiracy
be described in the detail that would be required to charge a
violation of the substantive offense. United States v. Ivey, 949
F.2d 759, 765 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 819 (1992);
United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 870 (1978).
Count 12 was sufficient to provide the defendants with notice
of the charges against them. They were not entitled to an
indictment that provided a breakdown of how they violated each
substantive crime or the evidence the government intended to
produce. Ivey, 949 F.2d at 765; United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d
1165, 1172 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Moreover, a defendant’s constitutional
right to know the offense with which he is charged must be
distinguished from a defendant’s need to know the evidentiary
details establishing the facts of such offense, which can be
6
provided through a motion for a bill of particulars.”). The
indictment alleged a conspiracy to commit three substantive crimes;
it generally described an agreement between the defendants to
conceal the identities of the true owners of the obscene book-
stores; it contained a description of the various grand jury
investigations and a general account of the conspiracy’s goal to
withhold specific information from the investigators; and it
contained thirty-one overt acts, including allegations that Boyle
and Smith testified falsely or instructed others to do so.
The defendants failed to demonstrate that the district court
abused its discretion in denying their motion for further elabora-
tion on the bill of particulars. See United States v. Johnson, 575
F.2d 1347, 1357 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979).
Like their challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment, the
challenge to the bill of particulars is based on a claim that the
government did not adequately explain how their actions violated
the substantive crimes they are accused of conspiring to violate.
Without more, the defendants have failed to show that the district
court abused its discretion in denying their request for further
elaboration.
III.
We also reject the defendants’ closely related argument that
they were denied their Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict
7
because the indictment included multiple alleged conspiracy
offenses in a single count. It is settled law in this circuit that
“[t]he allegation in a single count of a conspiracy to commit
several crimes is not duplicitous, for '[t]he conspiracy is the
crime, and that is one, however diverse its objects.'” United
States v. Cooper, 966 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir.) (quoting Braverman
v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54 (1942)), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
980 (1992).
Count 12 alleged one conspiracy, a conspiracy to obstruct
grand jury investigations of Ivey’s illicit activities. That the
conspiracy entailed more than one crime does not turn a single
conspiracy into multiple conspiracies. Id. To that extent, cases
cited by the defendants are distinguishable. See, e.g., United
States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1401 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that
the count was duplicitous because it charged two distinct conspira-
cies, one to defraud the United States Navy and a second to
obstruct a grand jury investigation of the fraud).
IV.
The defendants contend that various acts by the court and the
government impermissibly amended the indictment. They assert three
instances of constructive amendment. The first involves the bill
of particulars. The defendants argue that the bill of particulars
included two allegations that were not included in the indictment.
8
The second instance involves the redaction of the overt acts from
the indictment. The defendants argue that the removal of the overt
acts, in combination with the government’s closing remarks, the
court’s instructions regarding overt acts, and the court’s response
to the jury’s question resulted in a conviction premised on overt
acts that were not alleged in the indictment. The third instance
involves the submission of paragraph three of the indictment, which
had been dismissed, to the jury.
Once an indictment has been returned, its charge may not be
broadened through amendment except by grand jury. Stirone v.
United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960); United States v. Doucet, 994
F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d
599, 606 (1991). As we recognized in United States v. Young, 730
F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1984):
Stirone requires the courts distinguish between
constructive amendments of the indictment, which are
reversible per se, and variances between indictment and
proof, which are evaluated under the harmless error
doctrine. The accepted test is that a constructive
amendment of the indictment occurs when the jury is
permitted to convict the defendant upon a factual basis
that effectively modifies an essential element of the
offense charged. In such cases, reversal is automatic,
because the defendant may have been convicted on a ground
not charged in the indictment. If, on the other hand,
the variation between proof and indictment does not
effectively modify an essential element of the offense
charged, “the trial court’s refusal to restrict the jury
charge to the words of the indictment is merely another
of the flaws in trial that mar its perfection but do not
prejudice the defendant.” [Citations omitted.]
The defendants have failed to prove that the bill of particu-
9
lars constructively amended the indictment. The original indict-
ment charged a conspiracy to commit three felonies, one of which
was corruptly to influence, obstruct, and impede the due adminis-
tration of justice. In response to the request for more particu-
larized facts, the government included allegations that the
defendants’ conspiratorial objectives included presenting incom-
plete testimony and incomplete facts to the jury. The government’s
response did not add a new charge, but rather provided particular-
ized examples of the type of conduct the defendants were charged
with conspiring to commit.
We also find no reversible error in the second class of
alleged constructive amendments. The defendants’ basic argument is
that redaction of the overt acts opened the door to a conviction
based on overt acts that were not alleged in the indictment. The
prosecutor’s closing arguments, the court’s jury charge, and the
court’s response to the jury question are the only instances as to
which redaction of the overt acts could have resulted in the
alleged expansion of the indictment.
The defendants failed to object to the redaction of the overt
acts, so we review for plain error. See United States v.
Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1266 (1995). The alleged errors, if they were
errors, were not plain at the time of trial.
A court is not required to submit the indictment to the jury;
10
the decision to do so is within its broad discretion. United
States v. Haynes, 573 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 850 (1978). Moreover, a conviction may be based on an overt
act that is not pled as part of the conspiracy if the overt act is
one that occurs during the life of the conspiracy charged.5
Given this caselaw, we cannot say that providing the jury with
a copy of the indictment and redacting the overt acts was plainly
an act of constructive amendment. Nor can we say that the court
committed plain error when it allowed for the possibility that the
defendants would be convicted on overt acts that occurred during
the life of the conspiracy but were not listed in the indictment.
Even assuming error, we do not find that allowing the convictions
to stand would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.
We also reject the argument that submitting paragraph three to
the jury constructively amended the indictment. The defendants
have conceded that they failed to object to the submission of
paragraph three. The court’s clerical error does not seriously
affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
5
United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535, 550 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that
the government is not limited to the overt acts pleaded in proving a conspiracy,
but may rely on other overt acts of the conspirators during the life of the
conspiracy), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 949, and cert. denied, 480 U.S. 950 (1987);
Johnson, 575 F.2d at 1357 (recognizing the rule that a prejudicial variance does
not occur when the government relies on overt acts other than those alleged in
the indictment or bill of particulars); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880,
911 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Perez, 489
F.2d 51, 70 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974).
11
proceedings. See Calverley, 37 F.3d at 162-64.
V.
The defendants next argue that the district court denied them
a fair trial by intimidating Andrew Grod and Michael Cescon into
giving damaging testimony and by limiting cross examination of the
two witnesses. We discuss each alleged error in turn.
A.
When a defendant asserts judicial misconduct, our role
is to determine whether the [district court’s] behavior
was so prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair,
as opposed to a perfect, trial. To rise to the level of
constitutional error, the district [court’s] actions,
viewed as a whole, must amount to an intervention that
could have led the jury to a predisposition of guilt by
improperly confusing the functions of judge and prosecu-
tor. The [court’s] intervention in the proceedings must
be quantitatively and qualitatively substantial to meet
this test.
United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1569 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 113, and cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1825 (1995). See also Flores, 63 F.3d at 1360).
The court’s statements to Grod did not substantially lead to a
predisposition of guilt by the jury. The statements took place
outside the presence of the jury, limiting any prejudice. United
States v. Samak, 7 F.3d 1196 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (noting
that comments made outside the presence of the jury could not lead
to a predisposition of guilt by the jury).
12
The defendants’ real complaint is that the court’s interven-
tion led to the damaging testimony. A court is allowed to admonish
a witness who is evasive, however. Absent evidence that the
court’s comments caused Grod to lie on the stand, the defendants
cannot complain of prejudice when the court simply instructed a
witness to provide concise and responsive testimony.
B.
Defendants also complain that the court limited cross-
examination of Grod and Cescon. We review rulings on the admissi-
bility of evidence and restrictions on the scope of cross examina-
tion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Crawford, 52 F.3d
1303, 1307 (5th Cir. 1995).
The court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Grod to
testify about foreign bank accounts. The status of the offshore
accounts was relevant to the charge that Boyle had misled Grod by
advising him that the accounts were not bank accounts. Grod, an
accountant who previously had testified that the offshore accounts
were bank accounts, was qualified to give opinion testimony
regarding what types of financial institutions controlled the
offshore accounts. Moreover, the court was within its discretion
in refusing to allow Boyle’s attorney to explain Grod’s testimony;
the attorney’s statements were not evidence and were best left for
closing argument.
13
The court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-
examination of Cescon. On direct examination, Cescon testified
that he did not know why funds from Ivey’s offshore accounts had
passed through Bankers Trust Company. On cross, Boyle’s attorney
made a bald-faced attempt to change Cescon’s answer by attempting
to elicit an affirmative answer to an explanation of why the funds
had passed through Bankers Trust. The court, outside the presence
of the jury, advised Boyle’s attorney that he could not testify on
behalf of Cescon and that Cescon would be perjuring himself if he
changed his answer. None of the court’s actions could be viewed as
an abuse of discretion. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,
679 (1985).
VI.
A.
The defendants argue that the district court erred in its
response to a note sent by the jury during its deliberations. The
jury asked, “Is the 'Count Twelve' the overt acts that we deliber-
ate. If not what is 'Count Twelve's' purpose. Can we get 6 more
copies of the Count 12.” The court responded, “The overt acts are
those set forth in the indictment and arguments of the attorneys.
Count 12 is the allegation of acts in violation of the various
statutes set forth therein.”
The jury made no request for elaboration. The defendants
14
contend that the question demonstrated the jury's confusion over
the overt acts and that the court’s answer furthered that confusion
by referring the jury to count 12, which did not describe any overt
acts.
The district court is granted broad discretion in responding
to jury questions. United States v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966, 977 (5th
Cir. 1988). When a deliberating jury expresses confusion and
difficulty, the court must clear that confusion away with “concrete
accuracy.” United States v. Stevens, 38 F.3d 167, 169-70 (5th Cir.
1994). We must ask whether the court’s answer was reasonably
responsive to the jury’s question and whether the original and
supplemental instructions as a whole allowed the jury to understand
the issue presented to it. Id. at 170. “There is nothing wrong in
responding in a narrow fashion allowing a jury to decide if the
answer is responsive.” United States v. Stowell, 947 F.2d 1251,
1257 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908, and cert. denied,
506 U.S. 902 (1992).
B.
The jury’s question concerning the overt acts obviously
signaled its confusion on this point. A jury’s expression of
confusion after deliberation imposes a heightened duty on the
district court to eliminate that confusion. “When a deliberating
jury expresses confusion and difficulty over an issue submitted to
15
it, the trial court’s task is to clear that confusion away with
'concrete accuracy.'” Stevens, 38 F.3d at 169-70. This task
requires extreme care:
Under those circumstances, a trial judge must be acutely
sensitive to the probability that the jurors will listen
to his additional instructions with particular interest
and will rely more heavily on such instructions than on
any single portion of the original charge. Thus, the
court must exercise special care to see that inaccuracy
or imbalance in the supplemental instructions do not
poison an otherwise healthy trial.
United States v. Carter, 491 F.2d 625, 633 (5th Cir. 1974). While
the district court has wide latitude in crafting responses to the
jury's questions, the supplemental instruction must be reasonably
responsive in clearing that confusion with “concrete accuracy.”
Stevens, 38 F.3d at 170.
The government would have us place the burden of clearing up
the confusion on the jury, stating that “[i]f the district court's
response was unhelpful, the jury could have asked the court one or
more additional clarifying questions." In support of this
proposition, the government cites Stowell.
In Stowell, the jury sent out a note during deliberations
asking, “Can any defendant whom we find was not entrapped become an
ignorant pawn of the government and in turn entrap another
defendant?” 947 F.2d at 1257. The court responded with a simple
“Yes.” Id. The defendants in Stowell argued that the response was
inadequate because “the jury essentially asked for a clarification
on the applicable burden of proof.” Id. We determined that the
16
response was adequate because it was correct and concise, conclud-
ing, “[t]here is nothing wrong in responding in a narrow fashion
allowing the jury to decide if the answer is responsive.” Id.
Stowell is distinguishable from the instant case. In Stowell,
the jury’s question called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer.
Neither party disputed that the answer given was correct, but the
defendants argued that the court should have elaborated more. Id.
In the case at bar, the answer called for was more than 'yes'
or 'no,' and the court’s answer was incorrect and confusing. The
court referred the jury to the indictment for the overt acts, even
though the court had redacted the overt acts from the indictment
given to the jury. The court referred the jury to the closing
arguments, which, while discussing various acts, did not label them
“overt acts.” The issue is not, as in Stowell, whether the court
should have elaborated more in its answer even though it was
correct, but whether, instead, the court’s answer was correct at
all.
C.
Although the answer to the jury’s question was erroneous, the
defendants did not object. Thus, we review for plain error only.
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993); Calverley,
37 F.3d at 162. Plain error is not reversible unless it affects
the defendants' substantial rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732;
17
Calverley, 37 F.3d at 164.
As we stated in Calverley, in most cases, for an error to
affect substantial rights, “it must affect the outcome of the
proceeding.” 37 F.3d at 164. The defendants have the burden of
persuasion. Id. Thus, for the error to justify reversal under
plain error review, the defendants must establish that if the court
had properly instructed the jury, they would have been acquitted.
The defendants have not made this showing.
VII.
The defendants challenge the adequacy of the jury instruc-
tions. We afford the district court substantial latitude in
framing instructions to the jury. United States v. Smithson,
49 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1995). The refusal to give a requested
instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. When
reviewing challenges to instructions, we take into account the
court’s charge as a whole and the surrounding context of the trial,
including arguments made to the jury. Flores, 63 F.2d at 1374. To
prevail, the defendants must demonstrate that the requested
instruction “(1) was a correct statement of the law, (2) was not
substantially covered in the charge as a whole, and (3) concerned
an important point in the trial such that the failure to instruct
the jury on the issue seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to
present a given defense.” Smithson, 49 F.3d at 142.
18
The defendants contend that the district court erred by
redacting the overt acts alleged in the indictment and by deleting
the provision in the pattern jury instruction that refers to the
overt acts in the indictment.6 The defendants submitted six
different jury charges that referred to overt acts.7 The
6
The court deleted the following paragraph from the Fifth Circuit Pattern
Jury Instructions, § 2.21 (1990):
Third: That one of the conspirators during the existence of the
conspiracy knowingly committed at least one of the overt acts
described in the indictment, in order to accomplish some object or
purpose of the conspiracy.
7
The first proposed charge relating to overt acts stated the following:
Mere knowledge or approval, without participation, does not make one
a party to a conspiracy. Mere association does not establish a
conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the
conspiracy with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose to violate the law. The doing of an act which may
unknowingly further any such conspiracy or without the intent to
further such conspiracy is not sufficient.
The second proposed charge stated, in pertinent part:
The government must prove the following three (3) essential elements
beyond a reasonable doubt:
. . .
Two: At some time during the existence or life [sic] the conspiracy,
one of the Defendants knowingly performed one of the overt acts
charged in the Indictment in order to further or advance the purpose
of the agreement to violate the law. . . .
The third proposed charge stated:
The essential elements of a conspiracy are an agreement by two or
more persons to combine efforts for an illegal purpose and an overt
act by one of the members in furtherance of the agreement to violate
the law.
The fourth proposed charge stated, in pertinent part:
The evidence before the jury must show beyond a reasonable doubt
. . . that one of the Defendants engaged in an overt act to further
the illegal goal of the conspiracy. . . . the doing of an act which
was not intended to further the conspiracy does not make someone a
(continued...)
19
defendants contend that the deviation from their proposed charges
impaired their ability to show that all the acts charged by the
grand jury were not intended to further an unlawful agreement or
were never proven.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in submitting
jury instructions without the overt acts alleged in the indictment.
The court’s instructions to the jury did include a statement that
the overt acts must be in furtherance of the conspiracy. To that
extent, the defendants’ requested charge was substantially covered
by the court’s charge.
At oral argument, the defendants added a new twist to their
theory. While admitting that the court’s charge did indeed include
a statement that the act must be “in furtherance of the conspir-
acy,” they claimed the charge was deficient because it did not say
that the overt act must be committed by the conspirator or be
7
(...continued)
member of the conspiracy or a conspirator.
The next charge relating to over acts stated:
Evidence has been received in this case that certain persons, who
are alleged in the Indictment to be a co-conspirator have done or
said things during the existence or life of the alleged conspiracy
in order to further or advance its goal(s). . . . Before even
considering such acts or statements you must find beyond a
reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed, that the person was a
knowing member of the conspiracy and that the act or statement was
made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The final charge to discuss overt acts contained the following:
The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the
members to the conspiracy knowingly performed at least one overt act
and that this overt act was performed during the existence or life
of the conspiracy and was done with the specific intent to further
[sic] object of the conspiracy.
20
committed during the time of the conspiracy.
In addition to being untimely, the argument fails because
defendants have not explained how this seriously impaired their
ability to present a defense. There is no indication that the
government relied on acts by anyone other than the defendants or
acts that were outside the time frame of the co-conspirators’
agreement.
The defendants’ second argument is that the court’s instruc-
tions on the overt act requirement amounted to an abuse of
discretion because the court essentially instructed the jury to
find the defendants guilty. The court’s instructions substantially
conform to the instructions the defendants contend would be
correct.
The court provided the jury with a special verdict form,8 a
8
Following the guilty/not guilty question, the special verdict contained
the following questions:
If you find the defendant guilty, answer the following
questions:
1. What statutes do you find the defendant was guilty
of conspiring to violate?
A. Knowingly engaging in misleading
conduct toward another person with the
intent to cause and induce another person
to withhold testimony, records, documents,
or other objects from a federal grand jury
B. Corruptly influencing, obstructing,
or impeding, or endeavoring to influence,
obstruct, or impede the due administration
of justice
C. Knowingly making a false material
declaration under oath before a grand jury.
(continued...)
21
copy of the indictment with the alleged overt acts redacted, and
the following verbal instruction:
The form verdict starts out with the name of the defen-
dant and determination of whether that defendant is
guilty or not guilty. Obviously, if a defendant is not
guilty, you don’t need to proceed with answering or
filling in the balance of this. You simply need to turn
it over and have the foreperson sign and date the
document.
If you find any defendant guilty, that is, if you
find that this conspiracy existed as the government has
alleged existed, then you must proceed to the A, B, C
sections and each of you, or all of you, must unanimously
agree. If you find any one of these existed, you must
all agree not only that the section is the one that you
agree was violated unanimously, but you must also agree
on the act that you believe constitutes the violation of
that particular section. And that’s why you have the
section two over here where it says “did you agree
unanimously on a specific overt act which was committed
in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit each of the
offenses you checked on question one above?” And you
will answer that “yes.” That has to be answered “yes,”
and the reason it has to be answered “yes” is because you
should not fill in the space if you don’t have a unani-
mous agreement as to the violation.
Now, if you have a violation, if you believe that
there is a conspiracy as toSSand cannot agreeSSwell, let
me justSSwell, let’s start that over.
You must unanimously agree upon the statute that you
believeSSor statutesSSit could be A, B, C or it could be
A or B or C. There is a combination of ways this could
occur.
If you agree unanimously upon the statute, let’s go
ahead and check that bloc, as agreeing if you reach
agreement on that, assuming that you believe and find the
8
(...continued)
2. Did you agree unanimously on at least one specific
overt act which was committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy to commit each of the offenses you checked in
question 1 above?
22
defendants guilty, and then proceed to the second
question which tells you then, do you agree upon a
specific act, the overt act, that constitutes the
violation of the statute. And if I’ve confused you
totally, then you can go back and read the instructions.
Taken as a whole, the court’s instructions provided the jury with
sufficient guidance. The contention that the verbal instruction
amounted to an instruction that the jury find the defendants guilty
is based on creative underlining.
VIII.
We reject the argument that § 15039 is void for vagueness.
The defendants cannot raise a facial challenge to the constitution-
ality of § 1503.10 Thus, all we must consider is an as-applied
9
Section 1503 is reprinted below, with the omnibus clause italicized.
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening
letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or
impede any witness, in any court of the United States or before any
United States magistrate . . . or any . . . juror, or officer in or
of any court of the Untied States, . . . in the discharge of his
duty, or injures any party or witness in his person or property on
account of his attending or having attended such court or
examination before such officer, commissioner, . . . or on account
of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein,
or injures any such . . . juror in his person or property on account
of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of
his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer
[or] magistrate . . . in his person or property on account of the
performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or
force, or by any threatening letter of communication, influences,
obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or
impede, the due administration of justice [violates this statute].
10
United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336 n.9 (5th Cir.) (limiting
challenges to § 1503 for vagueness to as-applied challenges), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
834 (1978). See also United States v. McElroy, 910 F.2d 1016, 1021 (2d Cir. 1990)
(“Vagueness challenges outside the context of the First Amendment are to be examined
(continued...)
23
challenge.
A penal statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it
“define[s] the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). “Void
for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not
attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contem-
plated conduct is proscribed. In determining the sufficiency of
the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of
the conduct which a defendant is charged.” United States v.
National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1962) (citations
omitted).
The term “corruptly” is used in § 1503 in its ordinary sense,
describing “[a]n act done with an intent to give some advantage
inconsistent with the official duty and rights of others. . . .”
United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing
United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir. 1979)), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 837 (1986). The defendants’ conduct sought to
give their clients an advantage inconsistent with the duty to fully
inform the grand jury. Thus, the conduct falls squarely within the
ordinary meaning of § 1503, giving them notice that their acts were
10
(...continued)
in light of the facts of the case, on an as-applied basis.”).
24
criminalized. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954)
(stating that “if the general class of offenses to which the
statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will
not be struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be
put where doubts might arise”).
The defendants’ reliance on United States v. Poindexter,
951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992),
is misplaced. The statute at issue in Poindexter was 18 U.S.C.
§ 1505.11 Poindexter is distinguishable because the alleged
conductSSlying to Congress without the motive of gaining an
advantage for oneself or anotherSSdid not fall within the core
meaning of “corruptly.” For this reason, and because judicial
interpretation of the statute did not provide guidance to the
word’s meaning, the court concluded that the defendant was not on
sufficient notice that his conduct was prohibited by the statute.
See id. at 379-86. In fact, the Poindexter court specifically
recognized that the conduct in the case sub judice falls within the
core meaning of “corruptly” and would not give rise to a void-for-
vagueness challenge. 951 F.2d at 385-86.
11
18 U.S.C. § 1505 states in pertinent part:
Whoever corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes or
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede . . . the due and proper
exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or
investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of
either House [violates the statute].
This provision of the statute is referred to as the omnibus clause.
25
IX.
We affirm a jury verdict if a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that the elements of the offense were established beyond
a reasonable doubt, viewing all evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict and drawing all reasonable
inferences to support the verdict. The evidence need not exclude
every reasonable possibility of innocence. United States v.
Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 768 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 193
(1994).
The crux of Boyle’s challenge is that the conduct that he
allegedly conspired to engage in would not violate § 1503 or
§ 1512. With regard to § 1512, Boyle contends that his interaction
with potential grand jury witnesses would not violate the statute
because he did not engage in misleading conduct toward a witness.
Boyle also contends that his conduct could not violate § 1503
because his behavior was not corrupt.
There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determina-
tion that Boyle misled Cescon. Before responding to the subpoena,
Cescon conferred with Ivey and Smith. As a result of those
conversations, he later spoke with Boyle and asked him for the
account numbers. Boyle told Cescon that the foreign accounts may
not be bank accounts. When Cescon asked Boyle for the account
numbers, Boyle lied and told him that he did not know them.
Those two statements alone were sufficient to support the
26
verdict. In addition, the evidence of a pre-existing conspiracy,
and Cescon’s attempts at trial to claim that the accounts may not
have been bank accounts, further supported a conclusion that Boyle
mislead Cescon about the nature of the accounts, and the purpose of
doing so was to convince Cescon to omit the account numbers.
Boyle’s claim that his behavior was not “corrupt” under § 1503
is also without merit. There was sufficient evidence that Boyle,
as Ivey’s lawyer, engaged in an attempt to impede the due adminis-
tration of justice12 for the purpose of gaining an advantage for his
clients. See Reeves, 752 F.2d at 998.13
X.
The defendants challenge the three-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2) (1992), which applies where “the offense
resulted in substantial interference with the administration of
justice.” The commentary defines “substantial interference” to
include “the unnecessary expenditures of substantial governmental
or court resources.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2, comment, note 1.
We review the district court’s application of the sentencing
12
Boyle does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he impeded
the due administration of justice. His only claim is that he did not do so
corruptly.
13
The decision in United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1484 (9th Cir.
1994), aff’d on other grounds, 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995), is inapplicable, as the Ninth
Circuit accepts the ejusdem generis interpretation of § 1503, which limits its reach
to conduct influencing another person. This circuit has rejected that
interpretation. See United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978).
27
guidelines de novo and findings of fact for clear error. United
States v. Harrington, 82 F.3d 83, 86 (5th Cir. 1996). Due
deference is given to the district court’s application of the
guidelines to the facts. Id.
Boyle’s specific complaint is that the court did not make a
specific finding that his conversation with Cescon caused an
“unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court
resources.” Boyle is incorrect. The court specifically relied on
a presentence report (“PSR”) that made such a finding. A PSR
“generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be construed
as evidence by the trial judge in making the factual determinations
required by the sentencing guidelines.” United States v. Alfaro,
919 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1990). In addition, the court
expressly found that Cescon’s conduct led to a delay in both the
investigation and the criminal trial.
Smith also has failed to demonstrate that the findings were
clearly erroneous. Smith argues that his enhancement was based on
the incorrect finding that Smith had spoken with Grod and Cescon
and had testified to the Houston grand jury.
Smith has failed to demonstrate that the court’s conclusion
that his conduct led to substantial interference is materially
false. There was sufficient evidence to support a finding that
Smith and Ivey coordinated the entire conspiracy, including Boyle’s
discussion with Cescon. In fact, Boyle’s testimony that he
28
appeared at the grand jury at Smith’s request was sufficient to
support an inference that Smith and Boyle worked closely together.
Thus, a conclusion that Smith, through Boyle, attempted to
influence Cescon was not clear error. Moreover, the court properly
relied on the PSR, and the fact that the conspiracy as a whole
resulted in a substantial interference with the administration of
justice, to justify Smith’s enhancement.
AFFIRMED.
29